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Introduction 
 
This document summarizes water quality trading and offset initiatives in the United 
States, including state-wide policies and recent proposals.  The following format was 
used to present information on each program.  We attempted to have each program 
summary reviewed by at least one contact person for program accuracy.  In the cases 
where this review occurred, we added the statement “Reviewed by…..” at the end of the 
case summary. 
 
 
<Name of program and state> 
 
A.  Program Background 
1. Program description 
 
<Program background and current status>   
 
2. Program motivation 
 
<Water quality issue to be addressed and why a trading approach is being 
used> 
 
3. Pollutant being traded 
 
 
4. Size of program 
 
< e.g., size of watershed, geographic area, extent of potential polluting 
sources> 
 
Trading parties:  <sources that are trading or potentially will trade> 
 
5. Stakeholders/participants 
 
<list of program stakeholders and participants, including description of each 
stakeholder’s role in the program> 
 
6. Regulatory drivers 
 
<specific regulation or policy that creates a need for pursuing improvements 
in water quality through trading> 
 
B.  Trade Structure 
 
7. Determination of credit   
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<e.g., method used to measure/estimate reductions, whether credit is given for 
cost-share projects>. 
 
8. Trading ratios and other mechanisms to deal with uncertainty  
 
<Mechanisms to deal with uncertainty of measurement, performance, 
compliance, etc.—e.g., trading ratios> 
  
9. Liability/penalties for noncompliance 
 
<Liability/penalties for noncompliance faced by buyer, seller, government, 3rd 
party.> 
 
10. Approval process 
 
<Description of process required for trade approval>   
 
11. Ex post verification/auditing. 
 
<Mechanism used to verify trades>   
 
12. Mechanisms for trade identification and communication (education and 
outreach, third party facilitation, embedded ties) 
 
<Approach taken to identify potential trades and to communicate with 
potential trading partners—in particular, whether the credit purchaser is 
responsible for direct outreach (including education campaigns), whether third 
parties are employed to identify and negotiate trades, or whether existing 
networks such as working relationships or associations (“embedded ties”) 
facilitate negotiations with potential suppliers of credits.> 
 
13. Market structure (bilateral, clearinghouse, third party brokers) 
 
<Type of market structure created to facilitate trades.  For a description of 
market structures, see Woodward, R. T., Kaiser, R. A. and Wicks, A. B.  
(2002).  The structure and practice of water quality trading markets.  Journal 
of the American Water Resources Association.  38: 967-979 >  
 
14. Types of trades allowed  
 
<e.g., trading only between point sources allowed?  Or is point/nonpoint 
source trading permitted?>  
 
C.  Outcomes 
15. Types and volume of trades that have occurred 
  
 
 5
16. Administrative costs 
 
<Costs incurred to administer program>   
 
17. Transaction costs 
 
<Cost associated with trades>  
 
18. Cost savings 
 
<Savings expected or realized through trading>  
 
19. Program goals achieved  
 
<Whether program objectives were achieved.  In some cases, the program’s 
objective may be to facilitate a single trade or bring interested parties to the 
table rather than to engage in a significant volume of trades.  The program’s 
goal and whether it was achieved will therefore depend on each specific case> 
 
20. Program obstacles 
 
<Were there any specific obstacles to establishing a trading program or to 
achieving the program goals?> 
 
21. NPS involvement and incentives to engage in trading. 
 
<Description of the extent of involvement by nonpoint sources and specific 
incentives created to encourage nonpoint sources to participate>  
 
22. Other 
 
 
 
Program information/References 
 
Websites: 
<related program websites> 
 
Contacts: 
<Persons providing program information or verifying accuracy of information 
presented in each case summary> 
 
Written Program Information: 
<References cited in program summary or other sources of program 
information> 
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Acronyms  
 
 
BMP: best management practice  
 
BOD: biological oxygen demand  
 
CBOD: carbonaceous biochemical oxygen demand 
 
LA: load allocation 
 
NPDES: national pollutant discharge elimination system 
 
NPS: nonpoint source 
 
NSW: nutrient sensitive water 
 
POTW: publicly owned treatment works  
 
PRF: pollution reduction facility  
 
PS: point source  
 
SAV: submerged aquatic vegetation 
 
SLA: selenium load allocation 
 
SPDES: state pollutant discharge elimination system 
 
TMDL: total maximum daily load 
 
TMAL: total maximum annual load 
 
USEPA: United States Environmental Protection Agency 
 
WLA: waste load allocation 
 
WWTP: wastewater treatment plant 
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Summary of Trading Initiatives and State Policies  
 
State   Name Pollutant  Potential Types of Trading (Point or Nonpoint Sources) Page
Trading Initiatives    
CA Grassland Area Farmers Selenium NPS-NPS 8 
CA San Francisco Bay  Mercury Not determined 17 
CO Bear Creek Phosphorus PS-PS 22 
CO Boulder Creek Nitrogen PS-NPS 29 
CO Chatfield Reservoir Phosphorus PS-PS and PS-NPS 35 
CO Cherry Creek Phosphorus PS-NPS 42 
CO Clear Creek Heavy metals (e.g. 
Arsenic, Copper) 
PS-NPS 54 
CO Lake Dillon  Phosphorus PS-NPS and NPS-NPS 62 
CO Lower Colorado River  Selenium, possibly 
habitat 
PS-PS, PS-NPS, and NPS-NPS 73 
CT Long Island Sound Nitrogen PS/PS 79 
FL Tampa Bay  Nitrogen No trading actually occurs 89 
ID Lower Boise River  Phosphorus PS-NPS 96 
IL Illinois Pretreatment Trading 
Program 
Multiple (indirect 
discharges) 
PS-PS 105 
IL Piasa Creek Watershed Project Sediment PS-NPS 109 
MA Acton WWTP Phosphorus PS-NPS 119 
MA Charles River  Water flow PS-NPS 124 
MA Edgarton WWTP Nitrogen PS-NPS 130 
MA Falmouth WWTP Nitrogen PS-NPS 136 
MA Massachusetts Estuaries Project Nitrogen PS-NPS 142 
MA Specialty Minerals, Inc. Temperature PS-NPS 146 
MA Wayland Business Center  Phosphorus PS-NPS 153 
MI Kalamazoo River  Phosphorus PS-NPS 161 
MN Minnesota River  Phosphorus PS-PS 169 
MN Rahr Malting Co. Phosphorus, nitrogen, 
5-day carbonaceous 
biochemical oxygen 
demand (CBOD-5), 
and sediment 
PS-NPS 175 
MN Southern Minnesota Beet Sugar 
Cooperative 
Phosphorus PS-NPS 182 
NV Truckee River  Nitrogen, Phosphorus, 
or Total Dissolved 
Solids (TDS) 
PS-PS and PS-NPS 189 
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NJ Passaic Valley Sewerage 
Commission Pretreatment Trading
Heavy metals 
(Cadmium, Copper, 
Lead, Mercury, 
Nickel, and Zinc) 
PS-PS 198 
NY New York City Watershed Phosphorus PS-PS and PS-NPS 206 
NC Neuse River Basin  Nitrogen PS-NPS 218 
NC Tar-Pamlico Basin  Nitrogen and 
Phosphorus 
PS-NPS 225 
OH Clermont County  Nitrogen, Phosphorus, 
or Total Dissolved 
Solids (TDS) 
PS-NPS 233 
OH Great Miami River Watershed 
Trading Pilot Program 
Nitrogen and 
Phosphorus 
PS-NPS 238 
PA Conestoga River  Nitrogen and 
Phosphorus 
PS-NPS 246 
PA Pennsylvania Water-based 
Trading Simulations 
Simulations include: 
CBOD, phosphorus, 
nitrogen, suspended 
solids, ammonia, acid 
and metals 
PS-PS, PS-NPS, and NPS-NPS 251 
VA Blue Plains Nitrogen PS-PS 260 
VA Henry County  Total Dissolved Solids 
(TDS) 
PS-PS 265 
WI Fox-Wolf Basin  Phosphorus PS-PS and PS-NPS 269 
WI Red Cedar River Phosphorus PS-NPS 275 
WI Rock River  Phosphorus PS-PS and PS-NPS 282 
Regional Chesapeake Bay  Nitrogen and 
Phosphorus 
PS-PS and PS-NPS 289 
STATE POLICIES AND PROGRAMS    
MD Maryland Nutrient Trading Policy Nitrogen and 
Phosphorus 
PS-PS, PS-NPS, and NPS-NPS 297 
MI Michigan Water-Quality Trading 
Rules 
Nitrogen, Phosphorus, 
potentially sediments 
PS-PS, PS-NPS, and NPS-NPS 300 
PA Pennsylvania Multi-media 
Trading Registry 
Multiple (potentially 
nutrients, habitat, 
carbon, etc.) 
PS-PS, PS-NPS, and NPS-NPS 305 
VA Virginia Nutrient Trading 
Program 
Nitrogen and 
Phosphorus 
PS-PS and PS-NPS 308 
WV West Virginia Trading Framework Multiple (could 
potentially include 
nutrient, metals, or 
cross-pollutant trading 
for dissolved oxygen) 
PS-NPS and NPS-NPS 312 
WI Wisconsin Nutrient Trading Rules Phosphorus PS-PS, PS-NPS, and NPS-NPS 316 
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 Grassland Area Farmers Tradable Loads Program (CA) 
 
A.  Program Background 
1. Program description 
 
The Grassland Area Farmers, a regional consortium of seven irrigation and 
drainage districts in the San Joaquin Valley, administers an internal cap-and-
trade program for selenium.  Each district in Grassland Area Farmers is 
allocated a portion of the collective selenium cap, which was established as 
part of the Grassland Bypass Project.  The district-level selenium cap forms 
the basis for trading.  The Grassland Tradable Loads Program was the first 
water quality trading program among nonpoint sources, although since the 
selenium loading from irrigated agriculture is accurately measured at the 
drainage pumps, it may be more akin to a point-point trading program 
(Woodward, Kaiser and Wicks 2002). 
 
The Grassland Bypass Project is the foundation for the Tradable Loads 
program.  The bypass project enabled the seven districts in the Grassland 
Drainage Basin to use the federal San Luis Drain to convey drainage to the 
San Joaquin River.  The Agreement for Use (Use Agreement) of the drain, 
signed between the U.S. Bureau of Reclamation and the San Luis and Delta-
Mendota Water Authority in 1995, established aggregate monthly and annual 
selenium discharge limits.   The districts are subject to “incentive fees” if they 
exceed their aggregate cap, and their use of the drain will be cut off after a 
20% exceedance (Austin 2001). The Use Agreement also established the 
Grassland Area Farmers as a legal entity, controlled by a Steering Committee 
with representatives from all seven districts.  The selenium cap was lowered 
each year, and the incentive fee for exceedances was raised each year, 
providing a strong incentive for the districts to control their discharge.  Actual 
discharge into the San Luis Drain began in 1997.   
 
The selenium limits imposed by the Use Agreement were incorporated into 
the Waste Discharge Requirement Order issued by the California Regional 
Water Quality Control Board in August 1998 (Anderson 2000).   Phase II of 
the Grassland Bypass Project was signed in 2001 and will continue through 
2009 (Joe McGahan, personal communication, May 12, 2004). The monthly 
and annual selenium load limits in Waste Discharge Requirements and the 
load caps in the Use Agreement decrease each year through 2011 until they 
are equal to the load allocations in the selenium TMDL for the Lower San 
Joaquin River, which was completed in August 2001.  The TMDL will begin 
setting the load limits in the Use Agreement in 2005 (CRWQCB-CVR 2001; 
eslie Grober, personal communication, June 2, 2004).   L 
District-level selenium load allocations and the tradable load program were 
internal mechanisms to help Grassland Area Farmers comply with the 
Grassland Bypass Project selenium cap.  The Steering Committee distributed 
the aggregate SLA among the districts in March 1998 based on tilled acreage, 
total acreage, and historical selenium  loads.   Each district had the flexibility 
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of designing its own methods for complying with the district SLA, such as 
tiered water pricing, low interest loans, workshops, and recycling of drainage 
water.  The fee for exceedances over the aggregate cap was proportionally 
divided among districts exceeding their district-level caps. 
 
The tradable loads program was introduced in June, 1998.  The Environmental 
Defense Fund (EDF) had first proposed using market mechanisms to control 
the San Joaquin Valley’s agricultural pollution in 1994 (Young and Congdon 
1994), and the EDF proposal provided the impetus and initial framework for 
designing the Grassland tradable loads program (Austin 2001).  In the first 
year (Water Year 1998), only one trade occurred because of the unusual 
weather and resultant uncertainty.  The exceptionally heavy rainfall during 
that year caused the districts to exceed their selenium caps even when they 
were not irrigating, and incentive fees were not levied because it was deemed 
an uncontrollable and unforeseeable event (Austin 2000).   
 
The trading rules for Water Year 1999 added a fee and rebate system that 
functioned similarly to an automatic trading program (Anderson 2000).  
Regardless of whether the region exceeded its selenium cap, the Grassland 
Area Farmers would levy a fee for exceeding district-level limits and 
redistributed these fees as rebates for districts that remain below their SLA.  
This established greater incentives for controlling selenium loading and for 
creating trade agreements to avoid the fees (Austin 2000).  Eight trade 
agreements were signed in Water Year 1999.   
 
Several more trades were planned in Water Year 2000, but there have been no 
trades since then.  One drainage district implemented a drainage recycling 
project, in which drainage water is applied to salt-tolerant crops. This has 
sufficiently reduced the regional selenium loading to the point where there is 
no need to trade (Joe McGahan, personal communication, May 12, 2004).  
This drainage recycling project was installed with contributions from other 
drainage districts.  
 
Grassland Area Farmers continues to write trading rules for each year, but 
they are not official since one drainage district does not approve them.  The 
group wants to keep trading open as an option that may become useful again 
in the future (Joe McGahan, personal communication, May 12, 2004).   
 
2. Program motivation 
 
Much of the land in the region has a shallow layer of subsurface clay and must 
be tiled and drained to avoid crop damage.   The drainage water that is 
pumped out of the irrigated fields carries significant amounts of selenium, 
which naturally occurs at high levels in the region’s soils (USEPA 2000).  
Selenium loading from the Westland Water District was found to cause 
wildlife death and deformity in the Kesterson Reservoir, and the partially 
constructed San Luis Drain that empties into the reservoir was closed in 1983. 
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The Grassland Area Farmers historically conveyed their drainage to the San 
Joaquin River through the discharge channels within the Grassland Water 
District. The channels were also used by the district to supply fresh water to 
the entire wetland area, including an array of wildlife refuges.  Although the 
channels would alternate the use of the channels for fresh and drainage water, 
the arrangement was cumbersome and did not completely prevent selenium 
discharge into the wetlands (Austin 2001).   
 
Farmers in the Grassland drainage area wanted to reopen a portion of the San 
Luis Drain because they faced instability with this discharge arrangement and 
recognized that stringent water quality standards were imminent (EDF 2000). 
The Grassland Bypass Project diverted flow around the sensitive ecosystems 
using a 28 mile section of the San Luis Drain, but the Use Agreement 
stipulated a regional selenium cap on the discharge.  The trading system 
developed as a means of meeting this regional load limit more cost-effectively 
and equitably. 
 
3. Pollutant being traded 
 
Selenium 
 
4. Size of program 
 
There are seven irrigation and drainage districts covering 97,000 acres of 
irrigated farmland in the Grassland Area Farmers (Anderson 2000).  Parties 
outside the Grassland Area Farmers are not permitted to purchase and retire 
credits. 
 
Trading parties:  Irrigation and drainage districts in Grassland Area Farmers 
 
5. Stakeholders/participants 
 
• Grassland Area Farmers (GAF): regional consortium of seven irrigation 
and discharge districts in the Grassland Basin, San Joaquin Valley.  
Signed the Use Agreement with the US Bureau of Reclamation and 
obtained a discharge permit from California.  Has the legal authority to 
distribute selenium load allocations among its members and enforce 
discharge requirements. 
• Economic Incentives Advisory Committee: met to design the Tradable 
Loads program.  Included a farmer, a regulator, and environmentalist, and 
an academic.  
• San Luis and Delta-Mendota Water Authority: regional group of water and 
drainage districts, seven of whose members are additionally organized as 
the Grassland Area Farmers.  Signed the Use Agreement for the San Luis 
Drain with the Bureau of Reclamation 
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• U.S. Bureau of Reclamation: controls the San Luis Drain; established the 
selenium cap for the Grassland Area Farmers as part of the Grassland 
Bypass Project; participates in the Grassland Area Farmers Drainage 
Steering Committee meetings 
• California Regional Water Quality Control Board, Central Valley Region 
(CRWQCB-CVR):  issued a Waste Discharge Requirements Order to 
regulate the discharge from the bypass project; participates in the 
Grassland Area Farmers Drainage Steering Committee meetings 
• Environmental Defense Fund (EDF): contributed significantly to the 
design of a workable trading program and the development of interim 
goals.  First put forth the idea of using economic incentives to control the 
San Joaquin Valley’s agricultural pollution in 1994.  
• Susan Austin: consultant and Project Director for the Economic Incentives 
Advisory Committee.  Her role was to work with Grassland Area Farmers, 
environmentalists, and regulators to design, implement, and assess the 
selenium load trading program.  
• California Department of Fish and Game: participates in the Grassland 
Area Farmers Drainage Steering Committee meetings 
 
6. Regulatory drivers 
 
The regional SLA provided the impetus and foundation for the tradable loads 
program. The California Regional Water Quality Control Board, Central 
Valley Region (CRWQCB-CVR) first developed load allocations for the 
region’s subsurface agricultural drainage in a 1994 report, which later formed 
the basis of the TMDL (CRWQCB-CVR 2001).  When the Use Agreement 
for the San Luis Drain was signed in 1995, the selenium load limits were 
directly incorporated into the contract as an interim measure because they 
were not provided by existing state regulations (Young and Karkoski 2000).  
The RWQCB issued a Waste Discharge Requirement Order in 1998 to 
establish a limit enforceable by state permit. The selenium TMDL for the 
Lower San Joaquin River was completed in 2001 and now forms the basis for 
the monthly and annual load limits in the Waste Discharge Requirements and 
the Use Agreement’s load limits.  The load allocations specified in the TMDL 
are the basis for the load limits in the Use Agreement starting in 2005 
(CRWQCB-CVR 2001).  TMDLs also exist for the Grassland Marshes (to 
protect the wetland channels) and the Salt Slough. 
 
B.  Trade Structure 
 
7. Determination of credit   
 
The total regional selenium load has been allocated among the districts in 
Grassland Area Farmers. These district-level SLAs set the baseline for 
trading.  Districts that discharge below their SLA generate credits, and 
districts that exceed their SLA must trade with another district or pay an 
exceedence fee.  
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Credits are based on actual monthly selenium loads as measured by each 
irrigation district.  Since it takes a month or two to process the data and make 
the exact numbers available, most trades have been retroactive (Joe McGahan, 
personal communication, May 12, 2004).   
 
8. Trading ratios and other mechanisms to deal with uncertainty  
 
There is no trading ratio in the Grassland Tradable Loads program.  There is a 
high degree of certainty compared to many other trading programs, since 
trades are based on measured selenium loads rather than estimates of BMP 
effectiveness.  Furthermore, there is no need to adjust credits for relative 
environmental impacts because there is a single discharge point (Austin 
2001). 
 
9. Liability/penalties for noncompliance 
 
With retroactive trades based on actual selenium loads, there is no danger of 
noncompliance with trade agreements.  Grassland Area Farmers does, 
however, have a fee and rebate policy that governs district-level SLA 
exceedances not offset by trades.  Each district has its own system to enforce 
agreements and rules with farmers.   
 
10. Approval process 
 
Trading agreements must be certified by the Regional Drainage Coordinator 
(Austin 2001).   
 
11. Ex post verification/auditing. 
 
The drainage districts monitor selenium loads at the 62 sumps where water is 
pumped into the drain.  A combination of flow measurements and analytical 
sampling is used to determine selenium loading, and although farmers and 
districts can estimate weekly updates on loading, it often takes a month or two 
before the exact numbers are known (Anderson 2000; Joe McGahan, personal 
communication, May 12, 2004).  For this reason, final trade agreements are 
retroactive.  In addition to the districts’ monitoring, the Bureau of 
Reclamation continuously monitors the discharge within the drain at an 
automated stations (Anderson 2000).   
 
12. Mechanisms for trade identification and communication (education and 
outreach, third party facilitation, embedded ties) 
 
Embedded ties.  Trading occurs between districts within the Grassland Area 
Farmers. District representatives have an opportunity to arrange trades at 
monthly meetings.  The Regional Drainage Coordinator can also facilitate 
trades by sharing information (Austin 2001).  
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13. Market structure (bilateral, clearinghouse, third party brokers) 
 
Bilateral.  Irrigation and drainage districts sign bilateral Trade Agreements.  
An example of a Trade Agreement is included as an appendix in Austin 
(2001).  
 
14. Types of trades allowed  
 
Nonpoint/nonpoint.  Trades are for either monthly or annual allowances, with 
no banking permitted (Austin 2001).  
 
C.  Outcomes 
15. Types and volume of trades that have occurred 
 
Nine trading agreements, involving 39 trades, had occurred by February 2000.  
These trades totaled 605 lbs of monthly selenium loads at approximately 
$40/lb and 128 lbs. of annual selenium loads at about $100/lb (Grumbles 
2002).  
 
16. Administrative costs 
 
The Tradable Loads program piggy-backs onto existing organizations of 
farmers and systems of monitoring and record-keeping, which streamlines the 
administration and regulatory oversight associated with trades (EDF 2000).   
 
17. Transaction costs 
 
The open communication and working relationship between the districts in 
Grassland Area Farmers has kept transaction costs to a minimum (Woodward 
et al. 2002).  Information costs are kept low because monitoring is already 
conducted by each district, and search costs are low because districts can 
arrange trades at monthly meetings. Most districts report negligible costs for 
implementing a trade, with only one district reporting $500-1,000 for having a 
lawyer review the contract (Austin 2001).   
 
18. Cost savings 
 
A total of $14,320 changed hands during the first five years of the agreement 
(Grumbles 2002).  Many trades exchanged in-kind services, which makes 
trading significantly less costly for a district than paying incentive fees for an 
exceedance (Joe McGahan, personal communication, May 12, 2004).   
 
It is difficult, however, to estimate the costs savings of trading because the 
structures of trading purchases and incentive fees are very different.  Incentive 
and rebate fees from SLA exceedances is a variable price per pound based on 
the total fees for the group (Anderson 2000).  
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19. Program goals achieved  
 
Selenium loading has decreased every water year from 1995 to 2001, except 
the wet year in 1998, and regional selenium load targets have been met nearly 
every month through February 2004 (gathered from monthly reports posted at 
Grassland Bypass Compliance Monitoring Program, 
http://www.sfei.org/grassland/reports/gbppdfs.htm).   
 
20. Program obstacles 
 
Green and Karkoski (2000: 157) noted that “several years of rancorous 
meetings preceded the final agreement.” 
 
Susan Austin opined that the biggest implementation challenge for the 
tradable loads program was determining a reasonable price for trading (Austin 
2001).  
 
21. NPS involvement and incentives to engage in trading. 
 
Farmers are already organized into water and drainage districts, and the 
districts can help manage the farmers’ selenium loading with policies such as 
tiered water pricing, low-interest loans for more efficient irrigation equipment, 
and recirculation requirements for drainage water.  Irrigation efficiency 
decreases the deep percolation of water into fields and therefore the amount of 
selenium in the drainage water. (Austin 2000).   
 
The individual farmers, however, are not directly participating in trading.  
Selenium load allocations and accountability remains at the district level.  In 
an ideal trading program, the market would be set at the farm level (Austin 
2001). 
 
22. Other 
 
An additional environmental benefit of the project was that removing drainage 
water from more than 93 miles of conveyance channels allowed the delivery 
of fresh water to wetland areas (USEPA 2001). 
 
Program information/References 
 
Websites: 
Grassland Bypass Compliance Monitoring Program.  
http://www.sfei.org/grassland/reports/gbppdfs.htm 
 
Contacts: 
Joe McGahan, Drainage Coordinator for the Grassland Area Farmers, 
Summers Engineering, Inc. (559) 582-9237 
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San Francisco Bay Mercury Offset Program (CA) 
 
A.  Program Background 
1. Program description 
 
Since the issue of mercury contamination was first raised in the early 1990’s, 
concerns over mercury in the Bay have escalated year by year.  In 2000, a 
draft TDML was first written, and currently is in its final stages with final 
approval expected within the year (Mercury Watershed Council 2003).  This 
document will include targets, in the form of goals related to bioaccumulation 
concentrations and wildlife risk concentrations, TMDL allocation, and an 
implementation plan. These targets and the implementation protocol will then 
enter the Basin Plan as an amendment (Strass 2004).  No trading program has 
been developed, although the California Regional Water Quality Control 
Board (RWQCB) has stated that they are willing to consider a mercury trading 
program if a discharger proposes one (Dyan Whyte, personal communication, 
January 28, 2004).   
 
The Central Valley Watershed and Guadalope River Watersheds both 
contribute to mercury levels in the Bay, and thus establishing TMDLs and 
making progress in these watersheds are essential to lower the level of 
mercury in the Bay (Mercury Watershed Council 2003).  In particular a 
TDML is in the process of being developed for Guadalope River (Strass 
2004). 
 
The San Francisco Bay TMDL is currently in the final approval stage, and 
with 1,200 kilograms of mercury entering the Bay each year, trading may be 
essential after TMDL implementation (Mercury Watershed Council, 2003).  
The current proposed mercury concentration objective is .025 µg/l (averaged 
over 4 days), while the sediment target is a one-hour average total mercury 
sediment concentration of 2.1 µg/l.  
 
2. Program motivation 
 
Mercury mines around the Bay first attracted public attention in the early 
1990’s (RWQCB 2003) with concerns regarding the effects of mercury on the 
environment. 
 
The California EPA has issued fish consumption advisories warning people to 
limit their consumption of fish from the Bay (RWQCB 2003).  Furthermore, 
reproductive failures have been witnessed among bird populations that 
consume fish from the Bay, believed to be due to mercury ingested by the 
birds that is subsequently passed through to their eggs (RWQCB 2003).  
According to the San Francisco Estuary Institute’s latest survey of fish, 
screening values of mercury were exceeded by about 38% (Greenfield et. al. 
2003).  Concern has been expressed by certain environmental groups that the 
consumption and negative effects of mercury in fish are disproportionately 
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borne by minorities because certain minority groups are more likely to fish the 
Bay for food and are often unaware of warnings from the EPA (NRDC 2001). 
 
The current goals for mercury reduction are .2 ppm mercury in fish tissue, .5 
ppm mercury in bird eggs, and .2 ppm in sediments, which amounts to a 50% 
reduction (Mercury Watershed Council 2003).    
  
3. Pollutant being traded 
 
Mercury.   
 
4. Size of program 
 
The TDML, and thus any potential trading program, includes these specific 
sections of the bay: Sacramento/San Joaquin River Delta, Suisun Bay, 
Carquinez Strait, San Pablo Bay, Richardson Bay, Central San Francisco Bay, 
Lower San Francisco Bay, and South San Francisco Bay (including the Lower 
South Bay) (Johnson and Looker, 2003). 
 
Potential trading parties: N/A  
 
5. Stakeholders/participants 
 
• Mercury Watershed Council: A division of the San Francisco Bay 
Regional Water Quality Control Board, this council is most directly 
responsible for setting forth guidelines and developing solutions.  
• San Francisco Estuary Institute: The San Francisco Estuary Institute is a 
non-profit research organization made up of scientists, governments, 
industries, and other concerned citizens that focuses on environmental 
issues in the San Francisco Bay region.  In particular the Institute 
published a study on the contamination of fish by the Bay, and conducts a 
comprehensive regional monitoring program in collaboration with the 
Regional Water Quality Control Board, and regulated dischargers. 
http://www.sfei.org 
• National Resources Defense Council: The National Resources Defense 
Council is an environmental group with a section in San Francisco 
working to alert the public of environmental problems in the region.  This 
group is concerned that the effects of mercury contamination in fish are 
disproportionately borne by minorities. 
http://www.nrdc.org/greengate/health/fishf.asp 
• Local industrial, municipal wastewater, and municipal storm water 
permittees: These groups will are to be given waste load allocations that 
will be included in the Basin Management Plan once the TDML is 
released. 
 
6. Regulatory drivers 
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The Clean Water Act of 1977 requires that states identify water bodies that do 
not meet certain standards.  If these standards are not met, then a TMDL must 
be developed.  This act has been the impetus for the San Francisco Bay 
TMDL. 
 
The TDML is still in the development stages as the final document has not 
been released.  Although the TDML/Planning and Policy Division of the 
California Regional Water Quality Control Board has announced their 
willingness to consider specific trades by stakeholders, without a TDML there 
is little incentive for trading. 
 
 
B. Trade Structure 
 
Trading structure for the San Francisco Bay Mercury Offset Program has not 
yet been developed. 
 
7. Determination of credit  
 
N/A 
 
8. Trading ratios and other mechanisms to deal with uncertainty  
 
N/A 
 
9. Liability/penalties for noncompliance 
 
N/A 
 
10. Approval process 
 
N/A 
 
11. Ex post verification/auditing. 
 
N/A 
 
12. Mechanisms for trade identification and communication (education and 
outreach, third party facilitation, embedded ties) 
 
N/A 
 
13. Market structure (bilateral, clearinghouse, third party brokers) 
 
N/A 
 
14. Types of trades allowed  
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N/A 
 
C. Outcomes 
 
15. Types and volume of trades that have occurred 
 
None.  There does not yet exist a framework in which trades can occur. 
 
16. Administrative costs 
 
N/A 
 
17. Transaction costs 
 
N/A 
 
18. Cost savings  
 
N/A 
 
19. Program goals achieved  
 
N/A 
 
20. Program obstacles 
 
N/A 
 
21. NPS involvement and incentives to engage in trading. 
 
N/A 
 
22. Other 
 
 
Program information/References 
 
Websites: 
San Francisco Bay Regional Water Quality Control Board: San Francisco Bay 
Mercury TMDL. http://www.swrcb.ca.gov/rwqcb2/sfbaymercurytmdl.htm 
 
Contacts: 
Dyan Whyte, TMDL/Planning and Policy Division, San Francisco Bay 
Mercury Offset Program. (510) 622-2441. 
 
Written Program Information: 
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Bear Creek (CO) 
 
A.  Program Background 
1. Program description 
 
The Colorado Water Quality Control Commission is appointed by the 
Governor and serves as the rule-making policy body for clean water in 
Colorado.  The Bear Creek Watershed Control Regulation (Regulation #74), 
issued by the Colorado Department of Public Health and Environment, Water 
Quality Control Commission defines water quality goals, wasteload allocation 
for total phosphorus, and outlines the monitoring program, and other strategies 
for the Bear Creek Watershed (RNC Consulting 2003).  There is not an 
official trading program outlined in the Regulation; however, the Regulation 
does permit the Water Quality Control Division of the Colorado Department 
of Public Health and Environment to “allow small wastewater treatment 
facilities with design capacities of 20,000 gallons per day or less to discharge 
a total phosphorus concentration of greater than 1.0 mg/l if an agreement is 
made for equal phosphorus reduction at another facility” (CDPH 2001).   
 
There is one instance in which trading has occurred.  The Forest Hills 
Metropolitan District is a very small point source polluter.  Forest Hills is 
allowed to discharge more than allowed under its permit with offsets from the 
Evergreen Metropolitan District, a large point source polluter. 
 
2. Program motivation 
 
Bear Creek Reservoir currently is experiencing algal blooms in the growing 
season due to a high level of nutrients in the water (CDPH 2001).  Low 
oxygen conditions have eliminated most of the cold water habitat for aquatic 
life from July to September, severely limiting the recreational potential of the 
lake (CDPH 2001). 
 
A study by Richard P. Arber Associates (1998) of wastewater treatment plants 
in the basin showed that “biological treatment  processes for reducing 
phosphorus, or simple alum addition to wastewater in a chemical treatment 
plant, can achieve a total phosphorus concentration of 1.0 mg/l without a 
major upgrade of treatment facilities and with considerably less operation and 
maintenance expense then with advanced treatment” (CDPH 2001, Richard P. 
Arber Associates 1998, pp. 30-31).  As a result of this study, the management 
plan recommends a 75% reduction from the current 21,584 pounds per year in 
point source phosphorus loading each year (CDPH 2001).   
 
Trading pollution rights is a secondary outcome of this program and has been 
integrated into the program to achieve goals of improved water quality in the 
most cost effective way.  One point source-point source trade has occurred 
which allows a small polluter to take advantage of a larger polluters better 
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technology and pay the larger polluter to clean up an amount of pollution 
equivalent to what the small plant would need to clean up.  This allows the 
small polluter to pay less over time for pollution reduction and thus the trade 
is motivated by the implications and limitations of economies of scale that 
affect the small polluter.   
 
Currently, non point sources have been instructed to adhere to best 
management practices (BMPs), which essentially eliminates the potential to 
trade pollution rights.   
 
3. Pollutant being traded 
 
Phosphorus.  Reducing phosphorus has been identified as the necessary step to 
reduce levels of chlorophyll a and its negative side effects that currently 
plague the reservoir (CDPH 2001).  
 
4. Size of program 
 
The Bear Creek Watershed is 83,665 acres (RNC Consulting 2003).  It 
includes Bear Creek and all its tributaries, Turkey Creek and all its tributaries, 
and Bear Creek Reservoir in Jefferson County (CDPH 2001).  The watershed 
also extends into Clear Creek and Park counties (CDPH 2001).   
 
Potential trading parties: There are two participants, Evergreen Metropolitan 
District and Forest Hills Metropolitan District, who actually participated in the 
trade, as described below.  Other point source polluters could also attempt to 
take advantage of trading opportunities, but have not. 
 
5. Stakeholders/participants 
 
• Colorado Water Quality Control Commission: Created by the Colorado 
Clean Water Act, this Commission issues “control regulations which 
describe prohibitions, standards, concentrations, and effluent limitations 
on the extent of specifically identified pollutants that any person many 
discharge into and specified class of state waters” (CDPH, 2001).  The 
Commission issues the regulations that other committees and 
organizations must enforce and adhere to, such as Regulation #74.   
• Water Quality Control Division of the Colorado Department of Public 
Health and the Environment:  The duties of the Water Quality Control 
Division are defined under the Colorado Water Quality Control Act.  This 
division can issue requirements with regard to site approvals and discharge 
permits and overseas potential trades which are then reviewed by the Bear 
Creek Watershed Association.   
• Denver Regional Council of Governments (DRCOG):  The DRCOG is a 
voluntary association of 50 county and municipal governments in the 
Denver, Colorado metro area, working together to address regional issues.  
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This group has released the Clean Water Plan which addresses clean water 
concerns and management programs on both a regional and local scale. 
• Bear Creek Management Plan Committee: The committee is made up of 
representatives from the following four groups: Local Governments, State 
Agencies, Federal Agencies, Denver Regional Council of Governments. 
This Committee defines goals and objectives for improving water quality 
in the reservoir.   
• Bear Creek Watershed Association: The Association is recognized by the 
Denver Regional Council of Governments (DRCOG) as the “designated 
water quality management agency for the Bear Creek Watershed.  The 
agency implements the Bear Creek Reservoir Control Regulation” 
(Regulation #74) (RNC Consulting 2003).Members of the Association 
include governments, special districts, and all National Pollutant 
Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) dischargers in the Watershed.  
The Association promotes joint participation and planning among all 
members.   
 
6. Regulatory drivers 
 
The Bear Creek Watershed Management Plan was developed by the DRCOG 
after the implementation of the Clean Water Act (DRCOG 1998).  This plan 
was developed with cooperation from local governments, state agencies, and 
citizens with the goal of improving the quality of the water in the Bear Creek 
Reservoir (CDPH 2001). 
 
The Bear Creek Watershed Control Regulation (Regulation No. 74; 5 CCR 
1002-74) “assures watershed point and nonpoint source water quality 
compliance consistent with adopted stream standards and classifications” 
(RNC Consulting 2003).  It also defines the water quality goal, wasteload 
allocation for total phosphorus (pages 3-4 describe the initial formula for 
allocation), monitoring and control strategies for the Bear Creek Watershed 
(RNC Consulting 2003).   
 
 
B.  Trade Structure 
 
7. Determination of credit  
 
Within the Bear Creek Watershed, all point sources are to be limited to an 
aggregate phosphorus wasteload of 5,255 pounds per year (RNC Consulting 
2003).  The Evergreen Metropolitan District is allowed 1,500 pounds of 
phosphorus to be discharged each year, while Forest Hills Metropolitan 
District is allowed 80.  However, Forest Hills produces closer to 98 pounds of 
phosphorus (Russell Clayshulte, personal communication, April 9, 2004).  For 
this reason the trade is built into each company’s permits, requiring Evergreen 
Metro to offset Forest Hills’ discharge in a 1:1 ratio of 48 pounds (Russell 
Clayshulte, personal communication, April 9, 2004).   
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8. Trading ratios and other mechanisms to deal with uncertainty 
 
This trade is built into the permits of both Evergreen Metro and Forest Hills. 
There is no monitoring program set up, it is only required that Evergreen and 
Forest Hills report their releases, but a violation of a permit is serious, so there 
is a strong incentive for them to comply. 
 
9. Liability/penalties for noncompliance 
 
Failure to meet to the specified discharge by either organization would be a 
violation of their permit and thus would be subject to Clean Water Act 
penalties (Russell Clayshulte, personal communication, April 9, 2004).  The 
actual control regulation has been adapted by the state, and so although no 
system of penalties for violations of the regulation has been set up, it is 
expected in the future (Russell Clayshulte, personal communication, April 9, 
2004).  This year, in fact, the Association is scheduled to meet to strengthen 
regulations and in particular look more closely as how to regulate and enforce 
nonpoint pollution (Russell Clayshulte, personal communication, April 9, 
2004).   
 
10. Approval process 
 
In this specific case, the trade was first recommended by the Association and a 
site application and permit amendment process by the State Department of 
Health was carried out (Russell Clayshulte, personal communication, April 9, 
2004).  Once approved by the Regional Council of Governments, the Water 
Quality Control Division included the trade in the two permits (Russell 
Clayshulte, personal communication, April 9, 2004).   
  
11. Ex post verification/auditing. 
 
All point source dischargers will be subject to monitoring under the Bear 
Creek Watershed Control Regulation (2001), section 74.6.   
 
12. Mechanisms for trade identification and communication (education and 
outreach, third party facilitation, embedded ties) 
 
It is expected that the control regulation will be changed in the near future to 
incorporate more trading as treatment plants are approaching their allocations 
and new players want their own allocations (Russell Clayshulte, personal 
communication, April 9, 2004).   
 
13. Market structure (bilateral, clearinghouse, third party brokers) 
 
So far the only trade that has occurred was between two point sources that met 
directly.   
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14. Types of trades allowed  
 
This program addresses point sources and non-point sources separately.  
Nonpoint sources are required by the Bear Creek Watershed Control 
Regulation (2001) to implement BMPs to control erosion and sediment 
loading.  Further information about what defines BMPs and what the specific 
restrictions is available in the Bear Creek Watershed Control Regulation 
(2001).  Nonpoint sources will not be discussed further here because the 
requirement of BMPs eliminates the possibility of trading. 
One point source trade (discussed above and below) has occurred.  However, 
it is expected that more point-point trades will occur in the future. 
  
C.  Outcomes 
 
15. Types and volume of trades that have occurred 
 
One point-point trade has occurred.  Each year Evergreen Metro reduces 
phosphorus release in a trade of 40-80 pounds per year so that Forest Hills 
does not have to undergo a costly upgrade of facilities (Russell Clayshulte, 
personal communication, April 9, 2004).   
 
16. Administrative costs 
 
The administrative costs of this trade are minimal.  The parties must meet and 
discuss the trade, and then loading data needs to be entered into a spreadsheet 
and an annual report is released (Russell Clayshulte, personal communication, 
April 9, 2004).  The regulatory agency only needs to pay someone to look 
over the annual report (Russell Clayshulte, personal communication, April 9, 
2004).   
  
17. Transaction costs 
 
As mentioned above, a yearly meeting is necessary in addition to minimal 
loading data that needs to be reported. 
  
18. Cost savings 
 
It is estimated that Forest Hills saves over $1.2 million, the cost of an 
expensive system replacement that would be necessary to meet their allocation 
with out a trade (Russell Clayshulte, personal communication, April 9, 2004).  
In exchange for Evergreen Metro reducing their discharge, Forest Hills pays 
an undisclosed amount of money that has been estimated to be around $5,000 
per year (Russell Clayshulte, personal communication, April 9, 2004).   
 
19. Program goals achieved  
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According to RNC Consulting (2003), the trophic status of the reservoir has 
shifted from hypertrophic-eutrophic towards the eutrophic-mesotrophic 
boundary.  In addition, all major wastewater treatment plants are in 
compliance with the control regulation and are meeting the specific wasteload 
they were allocated. 
 
20. Program obstacles 
 
Several small plants (Brook Forest Inn, Bear Creek Development Corporation, 
Bear Creek Cabins, and Geneva Glen) have had compliance problems or have 
not been meeting the agency’s reporting standards (RNC Consulting 2003).  
 
21. NPS involvement and incentives to engage in trading. 
 
NPS involvement in trading was restricted due to a mandate of 
implementation of best management practices (BMPs) in the permit (CDPH 
2001).  The implementation of BMPs will be reviewed along with the 
regulation in general at each mandatory triennial review.  NPS activities will 
likely be the focus of the Bear Creek Watershed Association in the future 
(RNC Consulting 2003).   
 
22. Other 
 
Program information/References 
 
Websites: 
See individual websites under “Written program information.” 
 
Contacts: 
Russell N. Clayshulte, RNC Consulting and Denver Regional Council of 
Governments.    (303) 751-7144 
Bill McKee, Water Quality Control Division, Colorado Department of Health 
and Environment. (303) 692-3583  
 
Written program information: 
Bear Creek Watershed Association and Colorado Water Quality Control 
Division (2001).  2002-2005 Bear Creek Watershed: Sample Analysis 
Plan (SAP) and Quality Assurance Project Plan (QAPP).  Retrieved May 
11, 2004 from 
http://www.drcog.org/reg_growth/water/regional_water_quality%20data
_management/pdf_files/Bear_Creek_SAP_and_QAPP.pdf 
Clear Creek County Planning and Zoning Department (2003).  Clear Creek 
County Master Plan.  Retrieved May 11, 2004 from  
 http://www.co.clear-creek.co.us/Depts/Planning/Masterplan.htm 
Colorado Department of Public Health and Environment Water Quality 
Control Commission (CDPH) (2001). Bear Creek Watershed Control 
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Regulation (Regulation No. 74 5 CCR 1002-74). Retrieved January 30, 
2004 from http://www.cdphe.state.co.us/op/regs/waterregs/100274.pdf 
Denver Regional Council of Governments (1998). Metro Vision 2020 Clean 
Water Plan: policies, assessments, and management programs. Retrieved 
February 11, 2004 from 
http://www.drcog.org/reg_growth/water/1pagecwp.htm 
------(1999). 1999 Clean Water Plan amendments to the Metro Vision 2020 
Plan.  Retrieved May 11, 2004 from 
http://www.drcog.org/downloads/cwp.pdf 
Environomics (1999).  A summary of U.S. effluent trading and offset projects.  
A report prepared for Dr. Mahesh Podar, U.S. Environmental Protection 
Agency, Office of Water.  Retrieved May 7, 2004 from 
http://www.epa.gov/owow/watershed/trading/traenvrn.pdf 
Richard P. Arber Associates (1998).  Water Sewer Availability Study: Clear 
Creek County.  Available from Richard P. Arber and Associates upon 
request. (www.arber.com)  
RNC Consulting (2003). Bear Creek Watershed Report 2002: Annual Report 
& Water Quality Summary Sheets. A report prepared for the Bear Creek 
Watershed Association.  Available from RNC Consulting upon request. 
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 Boulder Creek Trading Program (CO) 
 
A.  Program Background 
1. Program description 
 
In 1986, the City of Boulder, CO needed to renew the National Pollutant 
Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) permit for its wastewater treatment 
plant (WWTP), but it faced increased regulation due to impaired water quality 
in Boulder Creek.  A traditional approach would have called for upgrading the 
WWTP to full nitrification, but after studies indicated that the ammonia 
toxicity was largely due to degraded riparian conditions, the City proposed a 
combination of partial nitrification upgrades and stream restoration projects 
(USEPA 1996).  The City emphasizes that this innovative approach to water 
quality, known as the Boulder Creek Enhancement Project, is a case of “trade-
offs” rather than formal trading (Chris Rudkin, personal communication, 
March 13, 2003).  
 
The 1991 WWTP modifications cost $23 million, which was primarily used 
for partial nitrification upgrades. The stream restoration projects proceeded in 
four phases and covered 4.6 miles.  Phase I, completed in 1990, implemented 
six best management practices (BMPs) over a 1.3-mile segment of the creek 
that ran through a cattle ranch.  The BMPs included cattle fencing, streambank 
stabilization, riparian revegetation, channel modification, and reaeration 
(USEPA 1996).  Phase II, completed in 1991, extended restoration along 
another 1.1 miles. Phase III, completed in 1992, added another 0.5 miles. 
Phase IV, completed in 1994, involved 1.7 miles.   
 
2. Program motivation 
 
Although the POTW was in compliance with state water quality guidelines, a 
15.5-mile segment of Boulder Creek below the WWTP exceeded standards 
for un-ionized ammonia and failed to attain the state-designated uses for warm 
water aquatic life (USEPA 1993b).  Studies indicated that plant upgrades 
alone could not have solved these water quality problems.   Stream 
channelization, riparian degradation by cattle, and, to a lesser extent, nonpoint 
source nutrient loading significantly contributed to the impaired water quality 
(USEPA 1993b).  
 
3. Pollutant being traded 
 
Nitrogen 
 
4. Size of program 
 
The environmental focus was on 15.5 miles of Boulder Creek downstream of 
Boulder, CO.  The Boulder Creek Enhancement Project involved only one 
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point source (the Boulder WWTP) and 4.6 miles of stream.  The total 
watershed covered 1,160 km2. 
 
Parties to trade: City of Boulder, CO; landowners along Boulder Creek 
 
5. Stakeholders/participants 
 
• City of Boulder, CO: created offset framework, negotiated with 
landowners, implemented stream restoration projects 
• State of Colorado, Colorado Water Quality Control Division: provided 
monitoring data and financial support under the Nonpoint Source 
Pollution Prevention Program 
• US EPA Region 8: provided guidance and financial support to Boulder 
• City of Longmont, CO: conducted instream monitoring 
• community volunteers: provided labor and materials for restoration 
projects 
• Consultants: Love & Associates; Aquatic and Wetland Consultants 
 
6. Regulatory drivers 
 
Colorado protects the designated uses of surface waters, including warm water 
aquatic life, under NPDES permitting requirements.   
 
Although not formally submitted as a TMDL, the Boulder Creek 
Enhancement Project demonstrated a holistic approach and paralleled the 
TMDL process (USEPA 1993b).  As of 1999, Boulder Creek was on a list of 
waters for which a TMDL must be developed (Environomics 1999).  
 
 
B.  Trade Structure 
 
7. Determination of credit   
 
Since this was not a formal trading program, there was no need to determine 
credits.   
 
8. Trading ratios and other mechanisms to deal with uncertainty  
 
Since this was not a formal trading program, and the ultimate bar was set by 
water quality standards rather than compliance, there was no need to manage 
uncertainty with trading ratios.  Although there was uncertainty introduced by 
the fact that many BMPs had been somewhat untested, the three-phase 
approach allowed for adaptive improvements to be made in the fencing and 
replanting technology (USEPA 1992).  
 
9. Liability/penalties for noncompliance 
 
 32
Most of the BMPs involved permanent constructions or plantings to restore 
the stream integrity rather than agricultural practices that could be subject to 
noncompliance.  An easement guarantees the permanent protection of a cattle 
exclusion buffer between grazing land and the creek.   
 
10. Approval process 
 
Since this was not a formal trading program, individual nonpoint source 
projects did not have to be certified or approved by any regulatory agency.  
 
11. Ex post verification/auditing. 
 
Baseline data was collected before, during, and after the implementation of 
each BMP project, but some of the riparian restoration and revegetation 
projects may take up to a decade to show measurable results.  Instream 
monitoring included monthly sampling for water quality, flow, temperature 
and vegetation.  Rapid Bioassessment and Indices of Biotic Integrity for fish 
and vertebrates are also conducted (USEPA 1992).   US EPA Region VII 
provides financial support for the in-stream monitoring efforts of the Cities of 
Boulder and Longmont, and the USGS, the Colorado Water Quality Control 
Division, and a University of Colorado Undergraduate Research Program 
have also provided additional stream monitoring data (USEPA n.d.).  
 
12. Mechanisms for trade identification and communication (education and 
outreach, third party facilitation, embedded ties) 
 
Education and Outreach.  Consultants helped to identify the important 
sections of the creek, and the City’s real estate office helped to identify 
ownership plots fitting certain criteria.  These criteria included environmental 
priority, project budget, and size and ownership patterns.  The City then 
contacted landowners directly, although word of mouth spread the news about 
the project and helped landowners initiate projects themselves (Chris Rudkin, 
personal communication, March 13, 2003) 
 
13. Market structure (bilateral, clearinghouse, third party brokers) 
 
Sole-source offsets.  The City of Boulder, CO coordinated and implemented 
all BMPs directly as part of a holistic approach towards water quality.  
 
14. Types of trades allowed  
 
Point/nonpoint.  This is technically not a trade, but it utilized in-stream 
restoration projects to help defer full nitrification WWTP upgrades.  
 
 
C.  Outcomes 
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15. Types and volume of trades that have occurred 
 
Stream restoration projects have included: streambank stabilization, riparian 
restoration, development of pool habitat, narrowing/deepening the channel, 
returning natural sinuosity, restoring ring wetlands habitat, rerouting irrigation 
return flows through developed wetland (USEPA 1996). 
 
16. Administrative costs 
 
The Phase I demonstration project cost $125,000, and is estimated to value 
$426,000, including donated time, labor, and materials.  Phase II funding was 
also $125,000.  Phase III was funded for $75,000, and Phase IV is estimated at 
$225,000.  The total cost is estimated at $1.3-1.4 million (USEPA 1996).  
Costs included the costs of gathering data for planning and evaluation, 
construction, materials, labor, and time.   The overall cost was brought down 
by the donation of volunteer labor, time, materials, and land easements from 
landowners. 
 
17. Transaction costs 
 
The City coordinated and implemented stream restoration projects, reducing 
transaction costs.  
 
18. Cost savings 
 
Although the City did have to go forward with significant WWTP upgrades, it 
saved $3-7 million by deferring full nitrification modifications (USEPA 
1996).    
 
19. Program goals achieved  
 
The key environmental objective of the Boulder Creek Enhancement Project 
was to restore water quality and achieve the designated uses for aquatic life.  
The project did achieve these goals: un-ionized ammonia has decreased, and 
measurements of pH, temperature, and aquatic life have improved (USEPA 
1996).   
 
In addition, the Boulder Creek Enhancement Project was valuable as a 
laboratory for testing how channel modifications, revegetation, and riparian 
habitat restoration could impact ambient water quality.  The project was 
innovative in its use of stream restoration technologies, and the phasing 
allowed for BMPs to be tested and improved (USEPA 1992).   
 
20. Program obstacles 
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Some of the BMPs, particularly the fencing and the tree-planting, were not 
initially successful.  The three-phase approach allowed subsequent 
improvements to be made (USEPA 1992).  
 
21. NPS involvement and incentives to engage in trading. 
 
The City reached out to landowners with an upfront, watershed-wide 
educational campaign, and it worked cooperatively and flexibly with 
landowners to respond to their needs and concerns.   Positive incentives for 
cooperating with the City included increased stability of land, increased land 
values, aesthetic improvements, and community strengthening.  Although 
landowners were not paid, there was no cost to them because the City 
constructed all BMPs (Bruce Zander, personal communication, March 2003).   
 
22. Other 
 
23. Program information references 
 
Websites: N/A 
 
Contacts: 
Chris Rudkin, City of Boulder, CO.  (303) 413-7355. 
Bruce Zander, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency Region 8.  (303) 312-
6846. 
 
Written Program Information: 
Environomics (1999).  A summary of U.S. effluent trading and offset projects.  
A report prepared for Dr. Mahesh Podar, U.S. Environmental Protection 
Agency, Office of Water.  Retrieved May 7, 2004 from 
http://www.epa.gov/owow/watershed/trading/traenvrn.pdf 
US Environmental Protection Agency (USEPA) (n.d.). Boulder Creek, CO: 
considerations for using ecological restoration: elevated concentrations 
of un-ionized ammonia.  Retrieved January 20, 2004 from 
http://www.epa.gov/owow/nps/Ecology/chap6bou.html 
--------(1992).  Boulder Creek, CO:  nonpoint source meets point source in 
win-win situation.  Nonpoint Source News Notes, 18.  Retrieved 
February 20, 2003 from 
http://www.epa.gov/owow/info/NewsNotes/issue18/nps18new.html 
--------(1993a).  Polluted runoff (nonpoint source pollution ) – Section 319 
success stories – Colorado.  Retrieved January 15, 2003 from 
http://www.epa.gov/OWOW/NPS/Success319/CO.html 
--------(1993b).  TMDL case study: Boulder Creek, Colorado. EPA841-F-93-
006.  Retrieved January 8, 2004 from 
http://www.epa.gov/OWOW/tmdl/cs8/cs8.htm 
--------(1996). Draft trading framework – December 1996: Boulder Creek, 
Colorado. Retrieved on January 8, 2004 from 
http://www.epa.gov/owow/watershed/trading/bould.htm 
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US Geological Survey (2003).  Water quality of the Boulder Creek watershed, 
Colorado. USGS Fact Sheet 043-03. Retrieved on January 8, 2004 
from 
http://wwwbrr.cr.usgs.gov/projects/SWC_Boulder_Watershed/Fact%2
0Sheet%20FINAL508.pdf 
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Chatfield Reservoir Trading Program (CO) 
 
A.  Program Background 
 
1. Program description 
 
Eutrophication concerns prompted the development of a phosphorus 
management program for the Chatfield Watershed.  A TMAL has been 
established and trading guidelines have been developed.  A point source’s 
discharge may only exceed the set phosphorus concentration limit of 1.0 mg/l 
if, through the purchase of credits, the amount of discharge above this limit is 
offset by reductions made at another source (CDPHE 1999).  
 
The Chatfield Watershed Authority acts as a clearinghouse through which 
nonpoint sources can deposit credits into a “Authority Removal Credits” pool 
(Chatfield Watershed Authority 2000).  Once a 2:1 trading ratio and additional 
processing fees have been applied, these nonpoint reductions enter the 
“Authority Discharge Credits Pool” from which point sources can purchase 
credits (Chatfield Watershed Authority 2000).  Credit purchases allow a point 
source’s discharge to exceed its allowance outlined in the Chatfield Reservoir 
Control Regulation, and specified in its permit.   
 
Point sources may also engage in bilateral trading and are permitted to 
proactively recruit other point sources to supply credits.   
 
The generally accepted trading ratio for both point and nonpoint sources is 2:1 
(Chatfield Watershed Authority 2000).  However, all trades must be approved 
by the Water Quality Control Commission on a case-by-case basis, so trading 
ratios may differ across cases.   
  
2. Program motivation 
 
Although originally constructed to protect Denver from possible floods, the 
Chatfield reservoir is now a state park and a popular recreation area (Little 
and Zander 1996).  Concerns about chlorophyll A levels and resulting 
eutrophication are the principal motivating factors behind the Water Quality 
program (Little and Zander 1996).   
 
A TMAL has been created that allocates 7,446 lbs/yr of phosphorus loading to 
point sources, and 51,554 lbs/yr to nonpoint sources, background pollution, 
and phosphorus that enters from the Upper South Platte River Watershed 
(which amounts to approximately 17,930 lbs/yr) (RNC Consulting 2003).  In 
2002, only 3,676 pounds of phosphorus were discharged from point sources 
(RNC Consulting 2003).  
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3. Pollutant being traded 
 
Phosphorus   
 
4. Size of program 
 
The Watershed is approximately 3,000 square miles in area (Little and Zander 
1996), receives drainage from the South Platte River Watershed in Jefferson 
and Park counties (RNC Consulting 2003) and borders Cherry Creek 
Watershed to the east.   
 
Trading parties: Both point and nonpoint sources are expected to be involved.  
 
5. Stakeholders/participants 
 
• Chatfield Watershed Authority: The designated water quality management 
agency for the Chatfield Watershed (RNC Consulting 2003).  The 
Authority is responsible for implementing the Chatfield Reservoir Control 
Regulation. Formed by an intergovernmental agreement (CDPHE 1999), 
membership includes local towns, counties, districts, industry and 
agencies, and church camps (RNC Consulting 2003).   
• Point Source Dischargers: There are 7 point source dischargers (CDPHE 
1999). 
• Nonpoint Source Dischargers: Nonpoint source dischargers are actively 
recruited through different Chatfield Watershed Authority projects to 
reduce discharge. 
• Water Quality Control Division: The Water Quality Control Division 
reviews all decisions and recommendations of the Chatfield Watershed 
Authority.  
 
6. Regulatory drivers 
 
The Chatfield Reservoir Control Regulation (Regulation #73) specifies water 
quality standards to be met by both point and nonpoint sources.  It also 
outlines the formulas and procedures used to determine the TMAL.   
 
Denver Regional Council of Governments (DRCOG) Metro Vision 2020 
Clean Water Plan (the Chatfield Water quality program is referenced in this.) 
http://www.drcog.org/downloads/cwp.pdf.  The Metro Vision 2020 Plan 
outlines community goals, including clean water.  Although not a regulatory 
driver, it affects the environment in which trading will occur. 
 
 
B.  Trade Structure 
 
7. Determination of credit   
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No point source discharges (including municipal, domestic or individual 
waster water discharge) can exceed 1.0 mg/l total phosphorus as a 30-day 
average concentration, except as provided for under trading provisions (RNC 
Consulting 2003).   
 
The regulation authorizes both point-point and point-nonpoint trades.  In 
particular point sources can increase their wasteload allocation if nonpoint 
sources reduce their phosphorus release in a ratio of 2:1 (RNC Consulting 
2003).  This ratio may be less, but is evaluated on a case-by-case basis.  Point 
sources can bilaterally transfer pollution allocations to one another if approved 
by the Chatfield Watershed Authority, but a 2:1 trading ratio is applied. 
 
Finally, all trading and approvals by the Chatfield Watershed Authority are 
subject to confirmation by the Water Quality Control Division (RNC 
Consulting 2003).   
 
8. Trading ratios and other mechanisms to deal with uncertainty  
 
The trading ratio is 2:1; for every 2 pounds of phosphorus reduced by 
nonpoint sources, a point source is granted a one pound phosphorus credit 
(RNC Consulting 2003).   
 
9. Liability/penalties for noncompliance 
 
“Trade credits shall be incorporated into the discharge permits by the Water 
Quality Control Division, as appropriate and incorporated as proposed 
amendments to the phosphorus allocation at the next triennial review of 
rulemaking hearing for the Regulation (RNC Consulting 2003).”  Serious 
penalties are applied in cases where a permit is violated. 
 
10. Approval process 
 
Trades that are either done through the Chatfield Watershed Authority and its 
“Authority Discharge Credits” pool as well as those trades negotiated by a 
third party or negotiated directly by two point sources must all be approved by 
both the Chatfield Watershed Authority and the Water Quality Control 
Division. 
 
11. Ex post verification/auditing. 
 
A monitoring program that takes samples throughout the watershed is in place 
and is being carried out by the Chatfield Watershed Authority (RNC 
Consulting 2003). The monitoring program attempts to assess the annual and 
growing season limnological status of Chatfield Reservoir; whether the 
current total phosphorus load controls are working to prevent further 
eutrophication of the reservoir, and whether the watershed is in compliance 
with the regulation (RNC Consulting, 2003).  The 2003-2005 Chatfield 
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Watershed Authority: Quality Assurance Project Plan (QAPP), Sampling and 
Analysis Plan (SAP) and Standard Operating Procedures (SOP) Version 2.0, 
January 1, 2003 provides a more detailed description of the monitoring 
program.    
 
12. Mechanisms for trade identification and communication (education and 
outreach, third party facilitation, embedded ties) 
 
Point sources can apply to the Chatfield Watershed Authority for phosphorus 
trade credits, which would allow them to increase their phosphorus discharge 
above their permitted level, or above the 1.0 mg/l concentration limit.  These 
trade credits for point sources are based on phosphorus reductions made by 
nonpoint sources (RNC Consulting 2003).  The Chatfield Watershed 
Authority develops specific programs and incentive strategies to encourage 
nonpoint sources to reduce phosphorus discharges.  These reductions are 
banked by the Authority and subsequently sold to point sources. 
 
13. Market structure (bilateral, clearinghouse, third party brokers) 
 
The Chatfield trading program includes a clearinghouse but also accepts 
bilateral agreements.  The Chatfield Watershed Authority accepts credits from 
nonpoint sources and pools them as credits to be purchased by point sources.   
Point sources can alternatively contact point sources directly to pursue a trade, 
subject to approval.   
 
14. Types of trades allowed  
 
Both point/point and point/nonpoint trades are allowed.  In both cases, a 2:1 
trading ratio is applied unless otherwise approved by the Authority and the 
Water Quality Control Division.  The Authority essentially banks credits from 
nonpoint sources until they are purchased by point sources. 
 
C.  Outcomes 
 
15. Types and volume of trades that have occurred 
 
One trade has taken place and although other trades have been discussed, they 
have yet to be implemented.  The one trade involves the purchase of credits by 
the Ponderosa Wastewater Treatment Plant at the Ponderosa Retreat and 
Conference Center from the Authority’s pool (Russell Clayshulte, personal 
communication, April 25, 2004).  In the end, Ponderosa will only need two 
pounds of phosphorus credit from the pool.  The actual project involves the 
replacement of an outdated septic system with a new sewage treatment plant.  
The project will occur in two phases.  The first phase will result in reductions 
in phosphorus almost equal to what is required cover the increase in discharge 
from the new treatment plant, once the 2:1 trading ratio is applied; however, 
the project will be short two pounds (Russell Clayshulte, personal 
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communication, April 25, 2004).  The Authority has approved Ponderosa’s 
purchase of these 2 pounds from the “emergency pool” that was created under 
Regulation 73 (Russell Clayshulte, personal communication, April 25, 2004).  
After phase II, however, the permit pounds will equal the trade credit pounds 
and the two pounds will reenter the emergency pool (Russell Clayshulte, 
personal communication, April 25, 2004). 
 
16. Administrative costs 
 
A $100 application fee to cover administrative costs is required for point 
sources to apply for increased discharge through trading (Chatfield Watershed 
Authority 2000).  Credits that enter the pool are sold at a price that reflects the 
cost of nonpoint source reduction projects, costs associated with the pooling 
program, and costs incurred by the Authority to administer the trading 
program (Chatfield Watershed Authority 2000).  Exact costs are unknown, but 
the monitoring program has been estimated to cost $58,500/year (DRCOG 
2004). 
  
17. Transaction costs 
 
Discussed above under ‘administrative costs.’ 
 
18. Cost savings 
 
Not determined 
 
19. Program goals achieved  
 
The program has created the necessary infrastructure for trading in the future.  
However, little trading has occurred due to the lack of need for credits 
(Kathleen Reilly, personal communication, May 26, 2004).  
 
20. Program obstacles 
 
Little and Zander (1996) determined that nonpoint source involvement in 
pollution reduction via trading only becomes cost-effective once point sources 
are subject to strict discharge limits—approximately 1.0 to .5 mg/l effluent 
total phosphorus.  Until this limit is reached, most dischargers have no need 
for the trading program.   
 
Funding is a problem for nonpoint source reduction efforts due to difficulties 
associated with measuring the change in water quality from nonpoint sources 
reductions (DRCOG 2004).   
 
21. NPS involvement and incentives to engage in trading. 
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Regulation 73 states that BMP’s for sediment and erosion control should be 
implemented by nonpoint sources.  In addition “nonpoint control programs” 
should be implemented to reduce nonpoint phosphorus release into the Basin 
by nonpoint sources to 33,712 lbs/yr in the category reservoir base load and 
background.   
 
The required nonpoint source phosphorus pollution reduction plan has been 
put in place by the Chatfield Watershed Authority.  The Authority has divided 
the watershed into 30 drainage areas so that base-loads, point source and 
storm water runoff can be assigned phosphorus loads (RNC Consulting 2003).  
The Authority then works with potential phosphorus polluters to maintain a 
plan to reduce overall phosphorus discharge from nonpoint sources (RNC 
Consulting 2003).  The nonpoint strategy includes permit managing, BMP’s 
implementation, TMDL screening, sediment and erosion control reduction and 
monitoring programs, establishing BMP’s with regards to stream bank 
restoration and new highway construction, and developing water quality 
education efforts, as well as other measures described in the Chatfield 
Watershed Report 2002 (RNC Consulting 2003).  Nonpoint source reductions 
and BMPs such as those related to storm water runoff, will be incorporated 
into permits (CDPHE 1999).   
 
22. Other 
 
Program information/References 
 
Websites:  See websites related to specific sources below. 
 
Contacts: 
Russell N. Clayshulte, RNC Consulting and Denver Regional Council of 
Governments.    (303) 751-7144 
 
Kathleen Reilly, Colorado Department of Public Health and Environment. 
(303) 692-3573 
 
Written Program Information: 
Chatfield Watershed Authority (2000). Water Quality Trading Guidelines. 
Accepted February 15, 2000 and Modified April 18, 2000. Available 
upon request from RNC Consulting. 
Chatfield Watershed Authority (2002).  Chatfield Watershed 2001-2005: 
sampling and quality assurance plans.  Retrieved May 11, 2004 from 
http://www.drcog.org/reg_growth/water/regional_water_quality%20data
_management/pdf_files/Chatfield_Sampling_and_Quality_Assurance_Pl
an.pdf 
Colorado Department of Public Health and Environment (CDPHE) (1999). 
Chatfield Reservoir Control Regulation, Regulation No. 73. Retrieved 
April 10, 2004 from http://www.cdphe.state.co.us/op/regs/100272.pdf  
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Denver Regional Council of Governments (DRCOG) (2004). Chatfield 
Watershed Authority: long-range nonpoint source strategies and 
priorities 1998-2020. DRCOG, Colorado. Available upon request from 
RNC Consulting. 
Environomics (1999).  A summary of U.S. effluent trading and offset projects.  
A report prepared for Dr. Mahesh Podar, U.S. Environmental Protection 
Agency, Office of Water.  Retrieved May 7, 2004 from 
http://www.epa.gov/owow/watershed/trading/traenvrn.pdf 
Little, Keith, and Zander, Bruce (1996). Optimal trading between point and 
nonpoint sources of phosphorus in the Chatfield Basin, Colorado.  
Retrieved April 10, 2004 from  
http://www.epa.gov/OWOW/watershed/Proceed/little.html   
RNC Consulting (2003).  Chatfield watershed report 2002: Annual Summary 
and Water Quality Fact Sheets.  Available from RNC Consulting upon 
request.   
  
Reviewed by Kathleen Reilly, Colorado Department of Public Health and 
Environment. 
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Cherry Creek Basin (CO) 
 
A.  Program Background 
 
1. Program description 
 
The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers constructed the Cherry Creek Reservoir in 
the1950s to control the frequent flooding of Cherry Creek. Located in 
southeast Denver, the 850-acre Reservoir and the 4200-acre State Park that 
surrounds it now provide outdoor recreational opportunities to about 1.5 
million visitors each year (CCBWQA 2003a, p. 2-01). The reservoir also 
serves as a water source for the Denver area and is currently classified for 
warm water aquatic life, including fisheries, as well as agricultural uses. 
Cherry Creek flows through one of the nation’s fastest growing metropolitan 
areas. Escalating development has necessitated increasingly comprehensive 
management strategies, in which phosphorus has become a central target, as 
the principal nutrient leading to algal growth in the Reservoir. Municipal 
wastewater treatment facilities are the primary point sources of phosphorus in 
the Cherry Creek Watershed, and urban stormwater runoff is the most 
significant nonpoint source.   
 
In 1985, the Colorado Department of Public Health and Environment adopted 
the Cherry Creek Control Regulation, assigning phosphorus wasteload 
allocations to point source dischargers throughout the watershed, under a total 
maximum daily load (TMDL). Since becoming effective in 1989, the 
Regulation has allowed point sources to increase these allocations by 
removing nonpoint source phosphorus loadings in exchange. Yet several years 
passed before any specific guidelines for trading were in place (USEPA 
1996). A framework for a watershed-based trading program began to take 
form in 1996 and was implemented the following year, under the direction of 
the Cherry Creek Basin Water Quality Authority (“Authority”). In 2001, a 
new Control Regulation introduced a phased total maximum annual load 
(TMAL) that will evolve to reflect new findings on the Reservoir’s water 
quality, incorporating both point and nonpoint source controls. The TMAL 
allocations established in this latest Control Regulation are upheld in the 
Cherry Creek Reservoir Watershed Plan, put forth by the Authority in 2003, 
along with revised guidelines for the trading program.  
  
2. Program motivation 
 
Primarily, the trading program aims to allow wastewater treatment plants to 
increase their phosphorus discharges as they meet escalating demands on their 
facilities. The development of a framework for trading addressed the problem 
that local treatment plants, having achieved a high level of phosphorus 
abatement, would face extremely high costs for achieving additional 
reductions under pressure of regulations and growing populations. The 
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program makes increased wasteload allocations for point sources possible by 
requiring in exchange the implementation of best management practices 
(BMPs) that reduce phosphorus pollution from nonpoint sources. Given 
predictions of increasing phosphorus loading due to a rise in stormwater 
runoff and stream erosion, incentives for greater nonpoint source controls are 
particularly crucial in wider efforts to preserve the reservoir (CCBWQA 
2003a, p. 2-19). 
 
3. Pollutant being traded 
 
Phosphorus   
 
4. Size of program 
 
The Cherry Creek Watershed covers nearly 380 square miles, within which 
run 600 miles of riparian vegetated stream corridors (CCBWQA 2003a). The 
watershed contains six principal wastewater treatment facilities that are 
authorized to discharge into the reservoir directly or land-apply reclaimed 
water within the Basin. According to the 2000 Census, these facilities serve a 
population of approximately 440,000 and close to 194,000 total housing units 
(CCBWQA 2004).  Meanwhile, in about 80% of the watershed that remains 
rural or undeveloped, agricultural runoff, septic systems, and gravel mining 
make significant contributions to the phosphorus load (CCBWQA 2003a, p. 2-
16). 
 
Trading parties:  Municipal wastewater treatment plants and nonpoint sources 
(e.g., agricultural runoff, septic systems, gravel mining) 
 
5. Stakeholders/participants 
 
Colorado Department of Public Health and Environment 
Within the Department, the Water Quality Control Commission (“Commission”) 
adopts water quality classifications and standards for surface and ground waters of 
the state. It develops regulations aimed at achieving compliance with those 
classifications and standards. The Water Quality Control Division (“Division”) 
enforces Colorado's discharge permit program and the regulations adopted by the 
Commission.  
 
Cherry Creek Basin Water Quality Authority (“Authority”)  
Since 1988, the Cherry Creek Basin Water Quality Authority has managed 
Cherry Creek, the reservoir, its tributaries, and the surrounding land. 
Established by the state legislature, the Authority is comprised of elected 
officials and governor-appointed representatives from two counties, seven 
municipalities, seven special districts, and various environmental and 
economic interests. Its stated mission is to maintain beneficial uses of the 
Cherry Creek Reservoir by promoting water quality throughout the watershed. 
The Authority must spend at least 60% of its authorized revenues 
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constructing, operating, maintaining, and monitoring pollution reduction 
facilities (PRFs), which increase the level of water quality protection above 
baseline BMPs (CCBWQA 2003a, pp. 2-17). The initial PRFs constructed in 
the early and mid-1990s have become a source of credits for the trading 
program. The Authority administers and oversees the development of credits, 
authorizing their exchange.   
 
Point Source Dischargers - Wastewater treatment facilities.  
Within the Cherry Creek Watershed, there are six municipal water supply 
entities that provide centralized wastewater treatment services and "either 
directly discharge the treated water or land apply the reclaimed water within 
the basin" (CCBWQA 2003a, p.  2-13). These are: 1) Arapahoe County 
Wastewater Authority/Cottonwood Water and Sanitation District, 2) Denver 
Southeast Suburban Water and Sanitation District, 3) Inverness Water and 
Sanitation District, 4) Meridian Metropolitan District, 5) Parker Water and 
Sanitation District, and 6) Stonegate Center Metropolitan District.  
 
6. Regulatory drivers 
 
The following documents provide the regulatory basis for the Cherry Creek 
trading program:  
 
a) Regulation #72: Cherry Creek Reservoir Control Regulation 
Originally adopted in 1985 and last amended in 2001, this Regulation from 
the Water Quality Control Commission is the legal basis for the Authority's 
management of the Cherry Creek Reservoir. It establishes the TMAL for 
phosphorus and authorizes trading between nonpoint and point sources. The 
Regulation allocates more than 70% of the annual phosphorus load 
(approximately 10,300 lbs) to nonpoint sources, calling on local governments 
(counties, municipalities, and districts) to carry out control measures in 
nonpoint sources within their jurisdictions. In particular, new development is 
required to provide high level BMPs. The Division and the Authority oversee 
progress in nonpoint reductions and recommend additional controls to the 
Commission if best management practices are not being effectively 
implemented to meet the overarching goal of a 50% reduction in nonpoint 
source pollution. Point sources receive an aggregate annual load allocation of 
approximately 2,300 lbs, which is predicated upon nonpoint source controls. 
Each wastewater treatment facility’s share of this total is based on the 
Commission’s analysis of its service area and needs given the projected 
population for 2007-2010 (CDPHE 2001, p. 46). Point source allocations must 
be updated periodically to reflect changes in the service areas, and all point 
sources must achieve a discharge concentration of 0.05 mg/l total phosphorus 
or less (CDPHE 2001, p. 7).  
 
b) Watershed Plan 2003 & Trading Program Guidelines
The Watershed Plan 2003 outlines the Cherry Creek Basin Water Quality 
Authority’s strategy for protecting the uses of the Reservoir and sets the 
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objective of meeting the 40 µg/L total phosphorus standard. The revised 
Trading Program Guidelines that the Authority put forth in 2003 comply with 
2001 modifications to the Cherry Creek Control Regulation and provide a 
more detailed framework for trades. According to the guidelines, point 
sources can “receive, in allocated form, or purchase/lease, a total of 432 lbs of 
phosphorus for new or increased phosphorus wasteload allocations” 
(CCBWQA 2003a, p. 2-19). These credits are split evenly in two categories. 
The Reserve Pool contains 216 lbs of credits awarded in “new trade projects,” 
which represent phosphorus reductions from nonpoint source control projects 
constructed by point sources, governmental entities, or private landowners. 
The Phosphorus Bank contains 216 lbs of credits awarded in “historic trade 
projects,” which represent phosphorus reductions from four pollution 
reduction facilities that the Authority began constructing between 1991 and 
1997. Point sources may purchase credits from the Phosphorus Bank at a price 
established by the Authority.  
  
c) Colorado Discharge Permit System for Municipal Separate Storm Sewers 
The EPA’s Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) requires that 
many of the municipalities represented by the Authority implement certain 
water quality controls in their storm sewer system. The Division supports this 
mandate in its stormwater regulations, which require that storm sewer systems 
in the Cherry Creek Reservoir drainage basin obtain permits to discharge 
through the Colorado Discharge Permit System (CDPS). CDPS calls for the 
use of BMPs that optimize pollution reduction on a location-by-location basis. 
The Division evaluates proposed stormwater BMPs to determine whether they 
are appropriate and sufficient to comply with state and federal water quality 
controls and discharge regulations. The permit contains requirements 
additional to those in the Control Regulation specifically for stormwater 
BMPs that impact the amount of phosphorus entering state waters. 
 
 
B.  Trade Structure 
 
7. Determination of credit   
 
The trading program gives credits for phosphorus reductions for nonpoint 
source projects involving existing developed areas that originally lacked 
BMPs, retrofits to required BMPs that achieve a higher level of phosphorus 
removal, or BMPs in new development that reduce more phosphorus than the 
BMPs required to comply with the TMAL (CDPHE 2001, p. 11). Credits for 
these projects are determined using “site-specific monitoring data or best 
available scientific evidence of similar types of projects” (CCBWQA 2003d, 
p. 6). For a pollution reduction facility, the calculation of credits involves 
three steps. First, the average annual phosphorus load into the PRF from the 
watershed is calculated.  Second, the average annual phosphorus load 
reduction by the PRF is calculated. In some cases, expected performance 
range values can be applied to determine a PRF’s potential to immobilize 
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phosphorus by sedimentation, infiltration, and adsorption and filtration in 
wetlands. When considering less standard PRFs, the Authority must evaluate 
potential reductions on a case-by-case basis. Third, adjustment factors and a 
trade ratio are applied to the PRFs’ average annual phosphorus load reduction 
to account for fate and transport and dissolved versus particulate phosphorus 
(CCBWQA 2003b). 
 
8. Trading ratios and other mechanisms to deal with uncertainty  
 
Trade ratio-- The minimum trade ratio used in calculating credits exchanged 
in new trade projects is 2:1, i.e. 2 lbs of dissolved phosphorus removed in a 
nonpoint source project can be traded for a maximum of 1 lb of credit toward 
point source discharges (CDPHE 2001, p. 11). The trade ratio can be adjusted 
up to a value of 3 on a project-specific basis. A 3:1 ratio is appropriate “when 
the point source discharge is further away from the reservoir than the nonpoint 
source project location” (CDPHE 2001, p. 12). The ratio ensures that trading 
provides a net water quality benefit greater than that provided by the 1.3:1 
trading ratio, which was in effect prior to the 1997 revisions to the Control 
Regulation.  
 
Additionality-- When BMP projects are expanded or retrofitted in land 
development activities undertaken prior to 2000, only the increase in 
phosphorus removal beyond that resulting from existing BMP projects is 
available for trading. When new BMP projects are implemented in land 
development activities undertaken in 2000 or subsequently, only the 
phosphorus reduction greater than that resulting from required BMP projects 
is available for trading (CCBWQA 2003d, p. 5). 
 
9. Liability/penalties for noncompliance 
 
The Control Regulation for Cherry Creek states that “local governments, 
individuals, corporations, partnerships, associations, agencies, or other entities 
with responsibility for activities or facilities that cause … nonpoint source 
pollution of waters in the Cherry Creek Watershed shall adopt and implement 
best management practices to the maximum extent practicable to reduce 
nutrient loading from such sources” (CDPHE 2001, p. 14). While nonpoint 
sources face a total load allocation, no individual nonpoint source faces 
specific regulations. Counties and cities bear the burden of implementing 
BMPs to try to reduce nonpoint pollution, but unlike point sources that are 
bound to wasteload allocations through NPDES permits, nonpoint sources are 
not regulated or punished for pollution (Dick Parachini, Colorado Department 
of Public Health and Environment, personal communication, 2002).  Penalties 
can be imposed, however, on municipal storm sewage systems regulated 
under the Colorado Discharger Permit System that lack permits or fail to 
comply with permits. Fines for violations range from up to $10,000 per day to 
$25,000 per day (CDPHE 2002, p. 3). Point sources are fully accountable for 
the legitimacy of the trades they propose. If a point source exceeds its 
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allocated phosphorus load because a nonpoint project it has funded as a trade 
falters, it faces the same legal consequences as it would by simply exceeding 
its allocation through excess production of phosphorus from its facility (Dick 
Parachini, Colorado Department of Public Health and Environment, personal 
communication, 2002). 
 
10. Approval process 
 
The owners of nonpoint source projects can earn Reserve Pool credits. Point 
source dischargers can implement nonpoint source projects to generate credits 
and increase their wasteload allocations. Before submitting an application for 
a trade, the owner must present a project proposal to the Authority’s Technical 
Advisory Committee and modify it according to the Committee’s 
recommendations. The application must justify the need to trade, describe the 
project’s design, and provide a schedule for its construction, as well as a plan 
for operation, maintenance, monitoring, and reporting. Also, the project owner 
must pay an application fee to the Authority and provide evidence of 
sufficient financial resources to construct and operate the project. After a 
comprehensive review of the application, the Technical Advisory Committee 
recommends an approval, conditional approval, or denial to the Authority 
Board. The Board then considers comments from the project owner, the 
Division, and other interested parties, holds a public hearing on the potential 
project, and prepares a written decision. Any awarded credits are then 
incorporated into the Reserve Pool under the title of the project owner. Credits 
earned by point sources can be used to increase their own allocation or 
transferred to another discharger (CCBWQA 2003d, pp. 8-12).  
 
Before selling credits from the Phosphorus Bank, the Authority must 
determine that the potential point source recipient qualifies as a permit-
holding discharger that has complied with its past effluent limitations and has 
adequate operations to meet future effluent limitations. Taking into account 
treatment capacity, population estimates, and facility expansion plans, the 
Authority compares the need of the potential credit buyer with that of other 
dischargers in the watershed.  The discharger must submit an application that 
justifies the trade and describes its plans for new or modified facilities. The 
Technical Advisory Committee reviews the applications for consistency with 
the Trading Guidelines and recommends to the Authority Board that the sale 
be approved, conditionally approved, or denied. As in the process for granting 
Reserve Pool credits, the Authority considers comments from interested 
parties and holds a hearing before finalizing its decision over a proposed sale 
of credits from the Phosphorus Bank (CCBWQA 2003d, pp. 15-18). 
 
11. Ex post verification/auditing. 
 
Working in conjunction with local governments, the Authority carries out a 
routine annual monitoring program of the Cherry Creek watershed and 
reservoir to assess water quality and inflow volumes (CDPHE 2001, p. 27). 
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As required by the trading program, the monitoring of nonpoint sources 
determines the total annual transport of nutrients to the reservoir and provides 
data on the removal efficiencies of BMPs. The retention of credits in the 
phosphorus bank and the reserve pool depends on the continued 
demonstration of the performance of the nonpoint source project. Meanwhile, 
point source permits require monthly reports of 7-day average and 30-day 
average measurements of phosphorus concentrations and loadings. The 
Authority retains the right to modify or revoke a trade if it either the point 
source of nonpoint source party fails to comply with the Control Regulation 
(CDPHE 2001, p. 13). 
 
12. Mechanisms for trade identification and communication (education and 
outreach, third party facilitation, embedded ties) 
 
In September 2001, the Authority submitted to the Division a prioritized list 
of capital improvement projects to control nonpoint source pollution, as 
required by the Control Regulation. The list identifies the watershed’s most 
effective and/or cost efficient projects in terms of phosphorus removal. The 
list is updated each year as new information becomes available (CDPHE 
2001, p.14). The Control Regulation also directs the Authority to develop and 
implement a public education program focused on the abatement of nutrient 
pollution from agricultural practices, individual sewage disposal systems, lot 
development, and other nonpoint sources, especially those associated with 
rapidly urbanizing areas (CDPHE 2001, p.51). In  2003, the Authority 
developed an educational fact sheet program, The BMP Series, which 
addresses “the role that BMPs and PRFs serve as potential remedial actions to 
improve water quality” (CCBWQA 2004, p. 39). Also, the Authority has seen 
a positive early response to its new ‘phosphorus facilitator” program, which 
promotes BMPs going well beyond minimum requirements among local 
developers (CCBWQA 2004, p. ES-6). 
 
13. Market structure (bilateral, clearinghouse, third party brokers) 
 
The phosphorus trading program at Cherry Creek functions as a 
clearinghouse. The Reserve Pool and the Phosphorus Bank convert nonpoint 
source reductions from diverse BMPs and PRFs into uniform credits. The 
Authority reserves the right to purchase phosphorus reductions from nonpoint 
source project owners and sell them to dischargers seeking larger allocations.  
 
14. Types of trades allowed  
 
Two types of point-nonpoint trades are possible in the trading program. The 
Authority can grant credits from the Reserve Pool to point sources that have 
completed a new trade project or have extended wastewater service to semi-
urban areas (CDPHE 2001, p.10). It can also sell or lease credits from the 
Phosphorus Bank to point sources that can demonstrate compliance with past 
effluent limitations and the adequate designs/operations to meet future 
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effluent limitations. The program also allows for one kind of point-point trade. 
The Authority may transfer phosphorus allocations from one wastewater 
facility to another for a single year or for multiple years, as long as the 
receiving discharger is committed to “take all reasonable interim steps to 
decrease, to the extent practicable, the total phosphorus loading” (CDPHE 
2001, p.9). 
 
C.  Outcomes 
 
15. Types and volume of trades that have occurred 
 
Since the early 1990s, the Authority has been constructing, maintaining, and 
monitoring pollution reduction facilities in the vicinity of the Cherry Creek 
Reservoir. There are now four projects in operation:  (1) Shop Creek detention 
pond and wetlands, (2) Quincy Drainage detention pond, (3) East Shade 
Shelter streambank improvements, and (4) Cottonwood Perimeter Road Pond 
(CCBWQA 2003a: 2-17). The reductions in phosphorus loadings derived 
from these PRFs comprise the 216 pounds of credits in the Phosphorus Bank, 
which can be used in “historic trade projects.” Thus far there have been no 
credits drawn from the Phosphorus Bank (Dan Beley, CDPHE, personal 
communication, 2004).  
  
A summary of effluent trading efforts prepared for the EPA in 1999 indicates 
that three trades had occurred since the Cherry Creek trading program was 
launched in 1997 (Environomics 1999). The summary mentions a point-point 
trade and the point source purchase of credits from the Reserve Pool. 
Dischargers seeking trades were located in districts with initially low 
allocations that experienced explosive growth, since regulation required 
offsets for increased wastewater treatment capacity. Demand for credits has 
been minimal since these early trades because point source wasteload 
allocations based on project populations for 2007-2010 proved more than 
sufficient. Trading will likely increase when populations have grown enough 
to require plants to expand operations and load allocations (Dick Parachini, 
Colorado Department of Public Health and Environment, personal 
communication, 2002).  
 
According to an Annual Report of Activities by the Authority, “there were no 
temporary transfers or Reserve Pool actions in 2002” (CCBWQA 2003e, p. 
25). In 2003, however, the Authority received and reviewed three trade project 
applications in 2003, two from the Parker Water Sanitation District (PWSD) 
and one from the Arapahoe County Water and Wastewater Authority 
(CCBWQA 2004, p. 35). PWSD requested credits for two nonpoint source 
projects involving wetlands, one that it had constructed the previous year and 
another that it proposed to construct. It withdrew both applications after the 
Authority found them problematic in the initial review.    
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The Arapahoe County Water and Wastewater Authority (ACWWA) had 
reserved the right to modify two detention ponds in 2002 (CCBWQA 2003e, 
p. 24). In January 2004, the Authority granted ACWWA a conditional 
allocation of 57 lbs of phosphorus for the planned retrofit of one of these 
ponds, a stormwater detention pond two miles upstream from the Cherry 
Creek Reservoir, which is scheduled to begin in June 2004 (Will Koger, 
ACWWA, personal communication, May 28, 2004). The allocation represents 
the program’s first phosphorus trade between a point and nonpoint source 
(CCBWQA 2004, p. 37).  
 
Although the credits level in this groundbreaking point-nonpoint trade is 
lower than ACWWA originally anticipated, it was determined through a 
comprehensive review of the proposed project during 2003 by the Authority’s 
Technical Advisory Committee. Estimating phosphorus reduction potential 
involved an EPA-approved method for assessing the settling of suspended 
solids, dissolved-to-total-phosphorus ratios from a comparable facility, and a 
fate and transport adjustment. Trade ratios of 2.9:1 for total phosphorus and 
2.2:1 for dissolved phosphorus were applied (CCBWQA 2004, p. 36). If the 
extensive monitoring required in this project reveals that a greater level of 
phosphorus is removed at the pond than expected, Arapahoe may request an 
increase its allocation. Conversely, if monitoring demonstrates that the 
upgrade does not perform as well as planned, the Authority can reduce 
ACWWA’s allocation.  
 
Officials at the Arapahoe County Water and Wastewater Authority pursued 
this trade because they expect to increase the treatment capacity of their 
facilities from the current 1.6 million gallons per day to over 2 million gallons 
per day in the next year, to 3.6 million gallons per day by 2007, and 
eventually, to 6 million gallons per day over 30-40 years. ACWWA has 
discussed the possibility of obtaining credits for the retrofit of a second 
detention pond with the Authority and expects to proceed with the application 
process. Additionally, the Inverness Water and Sanitation District, which also 
anticipates growth in its service needs, is preparing to apply for a phosphorus 
allocation for a nonpoint source project they have in place (Will Koger, 
ACWWA, personal communication, May 28, 2004). 
 
16. Administrative costs 
 
Coming from a combination of property taxes and user fees, the Authority’s 
budget for 2003 was $1.4 million, of which at least 60% had to be spent on the 
construction and maintenance of PRFs. The remaining 40% is used in 
research, planning documents, technical reports, and administrative costs. 
State grants finance a smaller portion of the Authority’s work, particularly that 
involving educational campaigns about nonpoint source pollution and 
construction of PRFs (CCBWQA 2004, p. 5). 
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17. Transaction costs 
 
Given that the Authority functions partially on user fees, the price paid by 
applicants to the trading program reflects the transaction costs associated with 
trading. The Authority charges each project owner submitting an application 
to create Reserve Pool credits $2,500 to cover the costs of consultants to 
review the application, regardless of the outcome of the review (CCBWQA 
2003d, p. 10). Dischargers seeking credits from the Phosphorus Bank must 
deposit $500 for the consideration of their request (CCBWQA 2003d, p. 17). 
 
18. Cost savings 
 
For a sanitation district serving a rapidly expanding population, an increase in 
its phosphorus discharge allocation through nonpoint source credits represents 
a cost effective response to demographic pressure. Although ACWWA was 
using only 90% of its phosphorus wasteload allocation when it applied to 
trade, it anticipates a future need for the credits. Moreover, because it had 
already achieved the .05 mg/L phosphorus discharge concentration using 
advanced technology, it recognizes that the cost of upgrading its treatment 
facilities would far exceed that of implementing nonpoint source projects 
(CCBWQA 2004, p. 35). Given the $8,000/lb value of phosphorus credits, a 
project that costs $400,000 and yields 57 lbs of credit (worth $456,000), as 
does ACWWA’s planned pond retrofit, appears financially favorable (Will 
Koger, ACWWA, personal communication, May 2004). 
 
19. Program goals achieved 
 
Although the Cherry Creek Reservoir has not achieved the phosphorus 
concentration goal of 40 µg/L, the loads of this crucial nutrient have been 
lower than the TMAL of 14,270 pounds in all but one of the past 10 years 
(CCBWQA 2004, p. ES-1). Watershed management strategies implemented 
thus far at Cherry Creek should prove beneficial over the long term, even 
though they have not resulted in immediate measurable improvements to the 
Reservoir’s quality. When demand for credits rises among point sources under 
pressure from growing populations and continued regulation, pollution 
reduction facilities will advance as an integral element of the trading program.  
 
In a September 2003 statement before the Senate, an EPA representative 
referred to the Cherry Creek trading program as a success case that has 
“reduced phosphorus loads to the Cherry Creek watershed by approximately 
450 pounds per year” (USEPA 2003). She noted that nonpoint source projects 
carried out in an effort to create the phosphorus credits “have provided 
ancillary environmental benefits such as flood control and wildlife habitat” 
(USEPA 2003). Trading is expected to favor watershed health by encouraging 
management practices that exceed minimum requirements during new 
development. 
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20. Program obstacles 
 
Recent studies on nutrient enrichment at Cherry Creek illustrate the 
importance of gearing additional management strategies toward “more short-
term improvements to reservoir water quality” (CCBWQA 2004, p. ES-8). 
Because of the lack of pressure currently imposed by point source wasteload 
allocations, trading has yet seem like a short-term strategy. Still, the Authority 
is considering ways to bolster trading and thereby strengthen water quality 
controls. For instance, after much deliberation, the Authority has determined 
that it will remove the 216 lb cap from the Reserve Pool to increase incentives 
for both publilc and private entities to implement BMPs or PRFs (Dan Beley, 
CDPHE, personal communication, 2004). 
 
21. NPS involvement and incentives to engage in trading. 
 
 
22. Other 
 
Program information/References 
 
Websites:   
Cherry Creek Basin Water Quality Authority 
www.cherrycreekbasin.org 
Colorado Department of Public Health and Environment  
Water Quality Control Commission: 
http://www.cdphe.state.co.us/op/wqcc/wqcchom.asp
Water Quality Control Division:  
http://www.cdphe.state.co.us/wq/wqhom.asp
Cherry Creek Stewardship Partners 
 http://www.cherry-creek.org/ 
Colorado State Parks  
 http://parks.state.co.us/ 
 
Contacts: 
Dan Beley, Colorado Dept of Public Health and Environment 
  4300 Cherry Creek Dr. South, Denver, CO 80222-1530 
  (303) 692-3606 daniel.beley@state.co.us 
 
Dick Parachini, Colorado Department of Public Health and Environment, 
(303) 692-3500, dick.parachini@state.co.u 
 
Will Koger, Authority Engineer, Arapahoe County Water and Wastewater 
Authority, 1301 East Caley Avenue, Centennial, CO 80111, (303) 790-4830 
ext. 17 wkoger@arapahoewater.org 
 
Written Program Information:   
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Cherry Creek Basin Water Quality Authority (CCBWQA)  (2004).  
2003 Annual Report of Activities by the Cherry Creek Basin Water 
Quality Authority. March 2004. Retrieved May 25, 2004 from 
http://www.cherrycreekbasin.org/%20pdf/2003%20Annual%20Report_f
inal.pdf 
------(2003a). Cherry Creek Reservoir Watershed Plan 2003.  Retrieved June 
2, 2004 from http://www.cherrycreekbasin.org/cc_plan2003.asp 
------(2003b). Illustrated Example: Trading Credits Associated with Pollutant 
Reduction Facilities.  Retrieved June 2, 2004 from 
http://www.cherrycreekbasin.org/cc_trading.asp 
------(2003c). PRF Lone Tree Creek: Arapahoe County Water and Wastewater 
Authority Pre-Application for Phosphorus Credit. Retrieved June 2, 
2004 from http://www.cherrycreekbasin.org/cc_trading.asp 
------(2003d). Trading Program Guidelines. Retrieved June 2, 2004 from  
http://www.cherrycreekbasin.org/cc_trading.asp 
Colorado Department of Public Health and Environment (CDPHE)  
(2002). Stormwater Discharges Associated with Cherry Creek Reservoir 
Drainage Basin Municipal Separate Storm Sewer Systems. Colorado 
Discharge Permit Number COR-080000. Retrieved May 25, 2004 from 
http://www.cdphe.state.co.us/wq/PermitsUnit/MS4-CC-rat.PDF
------(2001).  Creek Reservoir Control Regulation. Regulation NO. 72. 5 CCR 
1002-72.  Retrieved May 25, 2004 from 
http://www.cdphe.state.co.us/op/wqcc/GeneralInfo/StatutesRegsPolicies
/Superceded%20Regs/superceded/1002720598.pdf
Environomics (1999).  A summary of U.S. effluent trading and offset projects.  
A report prepared for Dr. Mahesh Podar, U.S. Environmental Protection 
Agency, Office of Water.  Retrieved May 7, 2004 from 
http://www.epa.gov/owow/watershed/trading/traenvrn.pdf 
United States Environmental Protection Agency (USEPA)  (2003). Statement 
of G. Tracy Mehan, III, Assistant Administrator for Water. US EPA, 
September 16, 2003. Retrieved May 25, 2004 from 
http://www.epa.gov/water/speeches/091603tm.html 
------(1996). Draft Trading Update -- December 96 Cherry Creek Basin, 
Colorado. Retrieved June 2, 2004 from  
http://www.epa.gov/owow/watershed/trading/cherry.htm 
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Clear Creek (CO) 
 
A.  Program Background 
1. Program description. 
 
The Clear Creek Trading program began as a case study to examine how a 
multiple pollutant trading system could be implemented, in contrast with 
traditional programs that focus primarily on regulated point sources and single 
pollutants.  In the case of Clear Creek, the concept of “allowing any interested 
party to implement trades involving the clean up of unregulated “orphan” 
sources, often involving multiple pollutants, in exchange for “credits” that 
could be used for immediate purposes or that could be banked, and may or 
may not be water quality related” was explored (Hydrosphere 1998). 
 
Since only one trade occurred during the Clear Creek experimental program, 
this case summary will focus on this one trade and the information about 
orphan trading necessary to understand the trade.  The concept of orphan 
trading and its potential beyond Clear Creek is currently being explored by 
Colorado, as the state is in the process of developing a state-wide water 
quality trading program (Carl Norbeck, personal communication, May 2, 
2004).     
  
The only trade that occurred was initiated by a mining company, ASARCO 
(Carl Norbeck, personal communication, May 2, 2004).  In exchange for 
better relations with the EPA and public recognition of its environmental 
effort, ASARCO agreed to clean up a mine tailings pile known as “Little Six 
#1” located in Virginia Canyon of the Clear Creek Basin (Hydrosphere 2001; 
Carl Norbeck, personal communication, May 2, 2004). 
 
2. Program motivation 
 
This specific trade was motivated by efforts to demonstrate the success of 
potential orphan site trading programs.  Because of Colorado’s mining history, 
numerous abandoned mine sites throughout the state are releasing toxic 
chemicals and metals into the state’s waterways.  In the early 1990’s the 
Coors Brewing Company first proposed the possibility of cleaning up orphan 
mine sites located near the mouth of Clear Creek, in exchange for avoiding 
additional copper removal from its wastewater effluent (Hydrosphere 2001).  
Although this particular trade never occurred, it set forth the idea of orphan 
site cleanup.   
 
Orphan site trading would allow orphan sites, defined as “an identifiable 
source of water-quality impairment that cannot be regulated under current 
laws or is unlikely to be corrected due to funding realities even though the 
owners can be identified” (Hydrosphere 2001), to be cleaned up by companies 
or organizations interested in exchanging the orphan site cleanup for discharge 
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or non-discharge credits.  The expectation is that such a trading system would 
provide a cost-effective approach to achieving improvements in water quality. 
 
The abandoned mine site Little Six #1 was chosen by ASARCO and the 
Steering Committee because portions of waste rock found at the site were 
eroding into the stream, reducing water quality downstream, during storms, 
snow melts and periods of higher stream flow (Hydrosphere 2001).  This 
waste rock is comprised of metals like arsenic and sulfuric materials 
(Hydrosphere 2001).  These metals, when released into the water supply, lead 
to problems with surface and groundwater quality and negatively impact 
aquatic organisms.  The oxidation of metallic sulfide minerals generates acids, 
which lower the pH value of the water, and increases dissolution, mobility, 
and bioavailability of metals and the concentrations of sulfates (Hydrosphere 
2001).   
 
3. Pollutant being traded 
 
No particular pollutant was traded.  Instead ASARCO agreed to clean up an 
orphan mining site in exchange for better relations with the EPA and public 
recognition of its efforts.  This cleanup involved the removal and 
transportation of waste rock from the site to an approved landfill, and 
recontouring and reseeding of the site (Hydrosphere 2001).  Public 
recognition took the form of several newspaper articles, television news 
coverage, a public recognition and dedication ceremony, and a display sign 
near the clean-up site (Hydrosphere 2001). 
 
4. Size of program 
 
The Clear Creek watershed is located west of Denver, Colorado and was used 
as an example in an orphan site feasibility study completed in 1998 
(Hydrosphere 1998).  Because of past mining activities, the water quality in 
this basin is considered impaired (Hydrosphere 2001).  
 
The actual trade involved ASARCO cleaning up a mine waste site called 
“Little Six #1” (Hydrosphere 2001).  Little Six #1 consists of a 750 cubic yard 
pile of waste rock located next to a stream bed (Hydrosphere 2001).  This site 
consisted of two separate mining claims, one owned by an individual (Tom 
Boy Claim, Mineral Survey #20148) and the other owned by Clear Creek 
County (Queen Elizabeth Claim, Mineral Survey #20148) (Hydrosphere 
2001). Both are located on Virginia Creek, a minor, yet one of the most toxic, 
tributaries of Clear Creek (Hydrosphere 2001).   
 
The waste material was transferred to a disposal site outside the Clear Creek 
Basin at the Keenesburg Coal Mine owned by Coors Brewing Company.  The 
advantage of this site was that disposal was free, courtesy of the Coors 
Brewing Company, and thus the cost of transportation and the proximity to 
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the clean-up site of the dumpsite were outweighed by the cheap disposal cost 
(Hydrosphere 2001).   
 
Potential trading parties:  Under a potential Orphan Trading Program any 
organization that wanted some sort of credit and was willing to clean up a 
polluted site to get it, would be eligible to trade.  Any site that polluted the 
waterways and could cost-effectively be cleaned up, would be eligible to be 
used in trade for credits. 
 
5. Stakeholders/participants 
 
• ASARCO: a mining company that cleaned up Little Six #1 in exchange 
for credit. 
• The Conservation Fund and the National Geographic Society: These 
two agencies convened the National Forum on Non-point Source 
pollution which sought innovative non-regulatory approaches to non-
point source pollution (Hydrosphere 2001).  One of the initiatives was 
the Orphan Sites Feasibility Study to take place in the Clear Creek 
Basin. 
• Steering Committee: A steering committee was created to provide 
direction on the Orphan Sites Feasibility Study.  This Committee 
consisted of representatives from The Conservation Fund, the United 
States Environmental Protection Agency, the Colorado Department of 
Public Health and Environment, the Clear Creek Watershed Forum, 
Environmental Defense, Colorado School of Mines, City of 
Westminster, ASARCO, Frick & Gilman Inc, Coor Brewing 
Company, Duprey Environmental, Cyprus Climax, Hydrosphere 
Resource Consultants (Hydrosphere 2001).   
• Water Quality Control Commission (WQCC): This agency is 
responsible for implementing the Colorado Water Quality Control Act 
and thus is responsible for water-quality classifications and water 
quality standards (Hydrosphere 2001).  Their role in future Orphan 
Site trading would be important because of their role in specifying 
waterway impairment. 
• Coors Brewing Company: Although the company refused to accept 
credit for the trade because they considered their contribution to be 
small, the company did allow the waste to be disposed without charge 
in an abandoned mine that was in the process of reclamation.  
   
6. Regulatory drivers 
 
The Clean Water Act requires that all point source polluters, both owners and 
operators, obtain a permit under the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination 
System.  Problems regarding liability for cleanup arise because a sponsor or 
volunteer who works to clean up a polluted site could become an “operator” 
and thus is liable for a complete clean up that meets the applicable water 
quality standards (Hydrosphere 2001).  Third party “good samaritans” are not 
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protected under the Clean Air Act and thus corporations and organizations are 
often hesitant to share any role in the clean up of pollutants for fear of 
imposed liability.  Amendments have been proposed recently to try to remedy 
this problem. 
 
Under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and 
Liability Act (CERCLA), “the EPA has authority to respond directly or 
compel potentially responsible parties to respond to releases or threatened 
releases of hazardous substances, pollutants, or contaminants (Hydrosphere 
2001).”  However, CERCLA does have a “Good Samaritan” clause that 
protects volunteers from liability as long as their work is in accordance with 
the National Contingency Plan, or if the work is supervised by the appropriate 
government official (Hydrosphere 2001).  This has allowed the State of 
Colorado and the EPA to protect the liability of “good samaritans” attempting 
to clean up orphan mining sites.  It is also possible that in some instances 
CERCLA’s Good Samaritan clause can also protect an organization under the 
EPA’s Clean Water Act (Hydrosphere 2001). 
 
In order to obtain a Good Samaritan exemption the EPA must approve the 
project and grant an Administrative Order on Consent (Hydrosphere 2001).  
This approach would be limited when actually applied to the hundreds of 
orphan mine sites in Colorado because of the sheer bulk of paper work 
required.  There are also remaining concerns by organizations that liability 
under the Clean Water Act could still be invoked in the future (Hydrosphere 
2001). 
 
The Voluntary Clean-up Act of Colorado applies to abandoned sites, and sites 
without an owner held liable for clean up (Hydrosphere 2001).  This act could 
also be used to get around the fears of liability claims of potential participants 
in orphan site trading.    
 
 
 
B. Trade Structure 
 
Note: Orphan Site Trading is still in the developmental stages.  Therefore, trade 
structure is not well defined.  
 
7. Determination of credit   
 
As proposed as part of a general Orphan Site trading program a Target Zone 
approach could be used to measure pollution and quantify water-quality goals 
to be met in specific waterways.  This approach assigns numerical targets to 
various indicators.  This could be used as a tool to decide how important 
proposed cleanups are, and to what extent one proposed cleanup would be 
more beneficial and more creditworthy than another.   
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8. Trading ratios and other mechanisms to deal with uncertainty 
 
N/A 
 
9. Liability/penalties for noncompliance 
 
N/A 
 
10. Approval process. 
 
N/A 
 
11. Ex post verification/auditing. 
 
N/A 
 
12. Mechanisms for trade identification and communication (education and 
outreach, third party facilitation, embedded ties) 
 
N/A 
 
13. Market structure (bilateral, clearinghouse, third party brokers) 
 
In the pilot study, a third party broker was used to identify parties interested in 
cleaning up one of the orphan mines in exchange for some amount of 
pollution credits.   
 
14. Types of trades allowed  
 
The orphan sites are all nonpoint pollution sources.  However, their cleanup 
could be exchanged for pollution currently discharged by either a point or a 
nonpoint source, or even for credits unrelated to pollution. 
 
There are two types of credits that can be awarded: 
Type 1: “credit use results in a direct impact on water quality in the basin” 
Type 2: “credit use does not result in a direct impact on water quality use in 
the basin” (Hydrosphere 2001). 
 
Three types of trades as defined in 2001 Hydrosphere Final Report: 
Type 1: Out-of-kind trade – Where the pollutants, or other nonpollutant 
tradable items to be traded differ.  
Type 2: Out-of–time trade - “Where from the perspective of the receiving 
water body, there is a significant temporal mismatch between the water 
quality benefits resulting from the clean up and the water-quality impacts of 
the credit use, after each is implemented.” 
Type 3: Out-of-place trade - A “trade in which, from the perspective of the 
receiving water body, the water-quality benefits from a clean up and the 
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water-quality impact of the credit use occur at significantly different 
locations.”  
 
C. Outcomes 
 
15. Types and volume of trades that have occurred 
 
As discussed, only one trade occurred.  The trade between ASARCO and the 
EPA involved ASARCO cleaning up the Little Six #1 mine tailings pile in 
exchange for better relations with the public and the EPA. 
 
16. Administrative costs 
 
Not determined. 
  
17. Transaction costs 
 
Not determined. 
 
18. Cost savings 
 
The clean-up cost to ASARCO was estimated to be approximately $50,000 
(Hydrosphere 2001). 
  
19. Program goals achieved  
 
The objective of the Orphan Sites Feasibility Study was “to investigate 
market-based incentives and mechanisms to achieve net water-quality benefits 
to the watersheds not otherwise attainable under existing regulatory 
programs” (Hydrosphere 2001).  
 
The concept of orphan trading is now being explored at the state level, so it 
appears this goal has been met. 
 
Water-quality improvements that resulted from this trade include:   
• The total loading of heavy metals to the surface and groundwater 
supplies within the basin was reduced; 
• Metal sulfides were reduced which will reduce acid drainage; and  
• In-water sediment concentrations were reduced (Hydropshere 2001). 
 
Other benefits include: 
• Improved aesthetic appearance 
• Positive effects of revegetation 
• Habitat improvement 
• Improved health of the area  
• Downstream fish populations benefited from less water pollution and  
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• Removing the metals will reduce the costs of water treatment for both 
municipal and industrial purposes (Hydrosphere 2001). 
 
20. Program obstacles 
 
There are obstacles that both impede the process of orphan site trading in 
general, and that applied in this specific case.  For more information about 
general orphan trading obstacles please see the 2001 Hydrosphere Final 
Report. 
 
Unlike trading, orphan trading is a relatively new idea not addressed by the 
EPA or in the current literature (Hydrosphere 2001).  In particular, the EPA 
has not yet offered any advice regarding trades involving credits that have no 
direct water-quality implications, like tax credits (Hydrosphere 2001).  
However, the EPA does not envision, but does not expressly forbid, cross-
parameter trading, or trading involving clean up and credit for different 
pollutants (Hydrosphere 2001).  Cross parameter trades have occurred, as 
evidenced by the Rahr Plant in Minnesota.  
 
The lack of a Good Samaritan clause addressing liability issues in the Clean 
Water Act poses problems for those volunteering to clean-up orphan pollution 
sites (Hydrosphere 2001).  In the specific case of the ASARCO trade an 
“Administrative Order on Consent” was granted (Hydrosphere 2001).  
Tools and technical assessment approaches with which to evaluate trades 
involving unlike water quality parameters are needed (Hydrosphere 2001).  
The Target Zone Approach is one approach that has been outlined, but 
because ASARCO wanted only the Type 2 trade incentive of positive image, 
this was never employed (Hydrosphere 2001). 
 
Substantial financial resources are needed to establish multiple pollutant 
trading programs and their necessary educational components (Hydrosphere 
2001). 
 
ASARCO would have liked to have pursued Type 1 or Type 2 credit other 
than just recognition, but it did not have any operations specifically located 
within the Clear Creek Basin, and so trades of metal loading, or reduced 
monitoring requirements were beyond the scope of the program (Hydrosphere 
2001).  
 
21. NPS involvement and incentives to engage in trading. 
 
Credits are the main incentive to engage in trading.  As discussed above, 
proposed orphan site trading programs would involve a variety of credit types 
that would appeal to a variety of organizations.  Flexible use banking, where 
credits could be stored without a pre-defined future use restriction, has also 
been suggested as an additional incentive for clean up (Hydrosphere 2001).  
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22. Other 
 
 
Program information/References 
 
Websites: None 
 
Contacts: 
Carl Norbeck. Clear Creek Forum/ Clear Creek Watershed Foundation.  
Phone: (303) 692-3513 
 
Written program information: 
Colorado Division of Wildlife and the Colorado Hazardous Material and 
Waste Management Division (1998). Clear Creek Monitoring 
Program. Accessed April 30, 2004 from the World Wide Web: 
http://ndis1.nrel.colostate.edu/waterquality/ftp/clcrweb.pdf 
Hydrosphere Resource Consultants (1998). Orphan Sites Feasibility Study: 
Phase III, Task 3. Colorado: Boulder. Available upon request from 
Hydrosphere Resource Consultants. 
Hydrosphere Resource Consultants (2001). Adapting Orphan Sites for Credit: 
Expanding Watershed-Based Trades Through Unlike Trades. 
Available for a fee by contacting Hydrosphere Resource Consultants.  
This report is a summary of all previous reports and summarizes 
legislation and other key issues central to the project.  The appendix 
provides a lengthy discussion of the case study and includes access 
agreements between ASARCO and property owners, the Agreement 
on Consent between ASARCO and the EPA, the pertinent Colorado 
Water Quality Control Commission stream classifications, and soil 
analysis results.  
Woodling, John.  1998.  Clear Creek Monitoring Program Report, July 1998, 
Colorado Division of Wildlife.  This report details fish and 
macroinvertebrate monitoring procedures conducted in the Clear 
Creek Watershed with the expressed goal of determining whether 
superfund mine cleanup efforts are working effectively.  Copper, in 
particular, is discussed on page 16.  Available at 
http://ndis1.nrel.colostate.edu/waterquality/ftp/clcrweb.pdf 
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Lake Dillon (CO) 
 
A.  Program Background 
1. Program description 
 
In the early 1960s, the Denver Water Board built a dam on the Blue River 
fifty-five miles west of the city to create a staging reservoir for the municipal 
water system. The resulting Dillon Reservoir—often called Lake Dillon 
today—is a prominent recreational area in the Arapaho National Forest and 
the source of more than one-half of Denver’s water (Anderson 2001, p. 102).  
In response to growing concerns over the reservoir’s water quality and 
predicted acceleration in local development, the EPA launched a study of 
Lake Dillon in1982 under its Clean Lakes Program. The study identified 
phosphorus loading as the most significant factor behind algae growth in the 
reservoir and determined a phosphorus concentration standard that the State of 
Colorado subsequently put forth. The study also set the stage for the Dillon 
Reservoir Control Regulation, which went into effect in1984 to maintain 
water quality at the current levels at that time. The Control Regulation 
established a total phosphorus wasteload cap and distributing discharge 
allocations among the watershed’s point sources, primarily municipal 
wastewater treatment plants.  It also requires local governments to develop 
ordinances controlling nonpoint sources of phosphorus, predominantly septic 
tanks and commercial/residential runoff.  
 
Since its origin, the Regulation has allowed for increased point source 
allocations in exchange for reductions from nonpoint sources, setting the 
framework for the nation’s second oldest effluent trading program and the 
first to promote point-nonpoint trades (Woodward 2003, p. 3). Continual 
monitoring of Lake Dillon since the early 1980s has documented increasing 
phosphorus loading from nonpoint sources, heightening the effort for better 
incentives to control this crucial nutrient’s nonpoint sources.  
 
2. Program motivation 
 
The basic structure of the trading program reflects the findings of economic 
analyses that suggest that wastewater treatment plants around Lake Dillon 
could cut their average annual cost of reducing phosphorus by about 50% if, 
rather than investing in facility upgrades, these plants funded nonpoint source 
reductions to offset their increase in wasteload (Jarvie and Solomon 1998, p. 
146). The program’s underlying assumption—that a demand for credits would 
exist among point sources—was reinforced by the finding that one of the 
watershed’s four municipal treatment plants was in violation of its NPDES 
permit for phosphorus prior to the adoption of the Control Regulation (Bruce 
Zander, EPA, personal communication, May 2004). By providing a 
framework for trades between point and nonpoint sources, the program 
provides a dual purpose. Trading would allow plants to increase their 
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wasteload and accommodate an expanding population, while encouraging 
efforts to mitigate the region’s growing nonpoint source pollution problem.  
 
In the decade following the Clean Lakes Study, the unanticipated discovery of 
low cost direct control methods for point sources caused their phosphorus 
discharges to fall sharply, below permitted levels. Point sources therefore 
lacked the incentive to fund nonpoint sources controls through trades. 
Meanwhile, the contribution to the total phosphorus load from privately 
owned septic systems nearly doubled, and, given projected growth expected in 
areas not currently served by treatment plants, their impact will escalate 
(NWCCOG 2002, p. B-18). Phosphorus pollution from nonpoint sources like 
residential runoff and construction in ski areas also increased. In 2002, the 
Northwest Colorado Council of Governments affirmed that “nutrient 
enrichment due to phosphorus loading from nonpoint sources” had become 
“the principle concern in the Dillon Reservoir” (NWCCOG 2002, p. B-18). 
Accordingly, the program has modified its emphasis on point-nonpoint 
trading, combining regulations and a system for nonpoint-nonpoint trading: 
“new nonpoint sources must offset their water quality impacts by 
implementing additional BMPs at older nonpoint source sites” (USEPA 
1996). 
 
3. Pollutant being traded 
 
Phosphorus 
 
4. Size of program 
 
Three tributaries originating at the continental divide empty into Lake Dillon: 
the Blue River, Ten Mile Creek, and the Snake River. Together they form the 
Upper Blue River Watershed, each contributing approximately one-third of 
the flow to the reservoir, which covers 3,220 acres (NWCCOG 2002, p. B-5). 
The 840 square kilometers (325  mi 2) watershed includes all of Summit 
County, home to a permanent resident population of approximately 25,000 
and an additional ski season population of approximately 100,000 at its peak 
(Chen 2002; Fedstats 2004).  Four municipal wastewater treatment plants 
discharge into Lake Dillon, and these are the primary point sources of 
phosphorus. Approximately 1,000 individual septic systems of vacation and 
primary residences, mostly along the Blue River, are the primary nonpoint 
sources of phosphorus, followed by urban runoff (Chen 2002). 
 
 
5. Stakeholders/participants 
 
• Colorado Department of Public Health and Environment: Within the 
Department, the Water Quality Control Commission (“Commission”) 
adopts state-wide water quality classifications and standards for surface 
and ground waters. It develops regulations aimed at achieving compliance 
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with these classifications and standards. The Water Quality Control 
Division (“Division”) enforces Colorado's discharge permit program and 
regulations adopted by the Commission. In the Lake Dillon watershed, the 
Division issues point source discharge permits that incorporate nonpoint 
sources offsets. It also reports periodically to the Commission and to local 
governments of Summit County on the results of inspections of nonpoint 
source controls.  
• Summit Water Quality Committee: Since 1984, the Summit Water Quality 
Committee has overseen the monitoring of water quality standards and the 
proper implementation of nonpoint source controls throughout the Blue 
River watershed. Made up of representatives from local municipalities, 
Summit County, and Sanitation Districts in Summit County, and the 
Denver Water Board, the Committee “reviews all activities in the 
watershed that may potentially impact water quality” and reports to the 
Commission on management efforts (USEPA 1996). The members played 
a central role in the development of the water quality management plan for 
the basin and continue collaborating toward their mission of protecting 
and enhancing water quality in Lake Dillon, the nearby Green Mountain 
Reservoir, and the tributaries of both. As the coordinating body of the 
Lake Dillon trading program, the Committee identifies potential BMP 
projects.  
• Local governments in Summit County: establish regulations requiring 
phosphorus controls of new nonpoint sources within their jurisdictions. 
They provide information to the Division so it can assess the effectiveness 
of local regulations. The Northwest Colorado Council of Governments, a 
voluntary association of municipal governments and five counties, 
provides support through its Watershed Services Program and the Blue 
River Water Quality Management Plan, which consolidates recent 
findings on the conditions of the Lake Dillon, the larger of two water 
storage facilities in the Blue River watershed.  
• Pollution Sources: As the beneficiaries of potential trades, the four 
municipal treatment plants—point sources—and the owners of individual 
sewage systems, nonpoint sources, are key stakeholders in the program. 
Other representatives of nonpoint sources include supervisors of private 
ski areas, golf courses, and other commercial/residential development, as 
well as managers of the Forest Service and municipal governments (Bruce 
Zander, EPA, personal communication, 2004). 
 
6. Regulatory drivers 
 
Discharge Permit System 
Authorized by the Clean Water Act, the EPA’s NPDES permit program 
regulates point sources that discharge pollutants into U.S. waters. Point 
sources in the Lake Dillon watershed are subject to the Colorado Discharge 
Permit System (CDPS), the state program that addresses the federal 
regulations on water pollution.  Because these point sources have been able to 
reduce phosphorus discharges, achieving levels below their allowances, the 
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CDPS restrictions have not produced a demand for trades. One analyst of the 
program suggests that without more rigid restrictions on nonpoint sources, 
“only substantial downward revisions in the point sources’ NPDES permits 
would create demand for nonpoint source abatement” (Woodward 2003, p. 
12).  
 
Total Maximum Daily Load 
According to the federal Clean Water Act, states must identify impaired 
waters and establish a total maximum daily load (TMDL) for each pollutant 
that exceeds water quality standards, including nutrients. The TMDL 
represents the amount of the pollutant that a waterbody can assimilate without 
affecting its designated uses. Originally, efforts to enforce TMDLs targeted 
point sources, but since 2000, the Clean Water Act has extended the use of 
TMDLs to include nonpoint sources. Thus, TMDLs now incorporate the “sum 
of the point sources, nonpoint sources, and a margin of safety (which can 
include anticipated future pollutant loadings)” (NWCCOG 2002, p. B-46). 
The EPA approved a TMDL for phosphorus at the Dillon Reservoir in 1997.  
 
Dillon Reservoir Control Regulation 
Since adopting the Control Regulation in 1984, the Commission has aimed to 
maintain water quality at1982 levels, which it considered adequate for 
protecting classified uses of the reservoir––cold water aquatic life and 
recreation (CDPHE 2003, p. 4). The regulation established a standard total 
phosphorus concentration of 7.4 g/l in the top 15 m of the reservoir during the 
growing season and a total maximum annual phosphorus load from point 
sources of 1,634 lb/yr. Within this cap, it distributes allocations between four 
major municipal and six minor domestic wastewater treatment facilities. 
Limits on phosphorus concentration also take the form of a 0.5mg/l daily 
maximum for any point source treating more than 2,000 gallons per day 
(CDPHE 2003, p. 1).  
 
The regulation requires a state-local partnership to control both point and 
nonpoint sources of phosphorus in the Lake Dillon watershed. Since 1995, the 
point source allocations it puts forth have been “based on the assumption that 
Summit County and local governments in Summit County adopt regulations 
that require best management practices or other methods of phosphorus 
control will result in pound for pound mitigation for all new nonpoint sources 
of phosphorus” (CDPHE 2003, p. 3). Only nonpoint sources that were 
established within the watershed prior to July of 1984 can generate credits. 
This provision prevents entities from purposefully creating a nonpoint source 
pollution problem with the intention proposing a treatment for it at a later time 
for which they can receive phosphorus credit (Bruce Zander, EPA, personal 
communication, May 2004). 
 
 
B.  Trade Structure 
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7. Determination of credit  
 
Credits received through trades are based directly on the amount of 
phosphorus reduced by the particular practice installed (Stephenson and 
Shabman 1996). The amount of credit is “determined using site-specific data 
or a water quality modeling approach with review and approval by the 
Division” (CDPHE 2003, p. 2). This approach followed from the Clean Lakes 
Study and has been continually updated to reflect the findings of ongoing 
monitoring.  
 
8. Trading ratios and other mechanisms to deal with uncertainty  
 
The Dillon Reservoir program sets a 2:1 trading ratio between point and 
nonpoint sources and a 1:1 trading ratio between nonpoint sources. The 2:1 
ratio requires a 2 lb reduction of phosphorus discharges from nonpoint source 
for each credit used by a point source. According to some analysts of the 
program, “this trade ratio was established so that there would be enough P 
reduction in the basin to allow for growth of the [treatment plants] and new 
nonpoint sources” (Jarvie and Solomon 1998, p. 146). The 1:1 ratio requires 
that all new nonpoint sources offset their discharges pound for pound with 
existing nonpoint sources (Anderson and Lohof 2001). The effort to mitigate 
the nutrient loading from nonpoint sources is supported by the Colorado 
Department of Public Health and Environment, which has the authority to 
reconsider allowed phosphorus allocations among point sources if it 
determines that “nonpoint source controls are not adequate to prevent 
exceedance of the phosphorus standard in the Dillon Reservoir” (CDPHE 
2003, p. 3). 
 
9. Liability/penalties for noncompliance 
 
Because nonpoint sources do not typically come under the restrictions of the 
Clean Water Act, point sources are held responsible for the compliance of all 
trades. Thus, if a nonpoint source is not in compliance, the point source is held 
in violation of its NPDES permit, and it falls under the penalty structure of the 
Clean Water Act” (Sohngen 1998).  
 
10. Approval process 
 
While the control regulation authorizes the Division to issue point source 
permits incorporating point sources—nonpoint sources tradeoffs, the trades 
themselves are approved by the Commission (CDPHE 2003, p. 2). To receive 
credit, a point source must submit to the Division an application describing 
the proposed design of the nonpoint source controls and indicating the total 
phosphorus load that will be reduced. The application must demonstrate that 
the operation and maintenance of nonpoint source controls as well as 
monitoring and reporting procedures in accordance with all the relevant 
guidelines provided by the Commission. If the Division approves the 
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application, it issues a permit specifying the construction requirements for the 
nonpoint source project and the amount of credit that the point source will 
earn. Credits are incorporated into point source permits only after local 
governments adopt regulations addressing the phosphorus contribution of the 
nonpoint source (CDPHE 2003, p. 3).  
 
11. Ex post verification/auditing. 
 
Point source discharge permits require treatment plants to monitor and report 
total phosphorus concentrations and loadings in terms of a 30-day average, 7-
day average, daily maximum, or another measurement determined by the 
Division. Permits granting credit for nonpoint source controls contain 
monitoring requirements that comply with the Commission’s guidelines 
(CDPHE 2003, p. 3). 
 
12. Mechanisms for trade identification and communication (education and 
outreach, third party facilitation, embedded ties) 
 
No standard mechanism to identify nonpoint source projects exists at Lake 
Dillon. Each entity seeking credits, whether a point or nonpoint source, must 
determine for itself the likely benefits and drawbacks of each potential project. 
Options that involve low capital cost and fewer monitoring requirements tend 
receive attention and serve as models for other interested parties (Bruce 
Zander, EPA, personal communication, May 2004).  
 
13. Market structure (bilateral, clearinghouse, third party brokers) 
 
The market structure at Lake Dillon distinctly supports bilateral negotiations, 
in which each transaction must be carefully negotiated between individual 
buyers and sellers of credits. Buyers and sellers are responsible for agreeing 
upon the terms of trade. 
 
14. Types of trades allowed 
 
The Lake Dillon trading program encourages point-nonpoint and nonpoint-
nonpoint trades. It does not include a mechanism for point sources to transfer 
surplus phosphorus allocations to other point sources. It also prohibits the 
banking of nonpoint source credits for future sale. In 1995, the Commission 
considered proposals for point-point trading and for a “reserve pool” of point 
source allocations, but could resolve issues regarding the ecological impacts 
of such trades and the appropriate standards for accumulating or distributing 
the stored credits (CDPHE 2003, p. 7). 
 
 
C.  Outcomes 
 
15. Types and volume of trades that have occurred 
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Opportunities for point-nonpoint trades have not been nearly as numerous as 
was originally anticipated, since treatment plants in the watershed found 
affordable ways to drastically reduce phosphorus discharges. Using some of 
the most advanced nutrient removal capabilities in the nation, all the plants 
around the reservoir had reduced their share of its total phosphorus load to 
only 2% by 1990 (Kashmanian and Podar 1992). Having attained phosphorus 
discharge levels well below their allowances, the point sources lacked the 
incentive to seek credits through trades.  
 
Despite the absence of CDPHE regulatory pressure, point sources have 
collaborated with nonpoint source reductions in a few instances, supporting 
the greater effort to protect Lake Dillon’s water quality while accommodating 
growth. In1985, the Frisco Sanitation District built a system of underground 
pipes that removed 50-70% of the phosphorus load from the town of Frisco’s 
runoff. At that time, the Sanitation District was only using 50 of the 341 
phosphorus lbs in its permit allocation, so it “donated its surplus credits 
toward a proposed town golf course” (Jarvie and Soloman 1998,p. 146). In 
1995, the Breckenridge Sanitation District removed two nonpoint source 
septic systems—one at a residential subdivision and the other at a ski area—
and incorporated their wastewater into its sewer system.  Although 
Breckenridge received an 11.5 lb increase in its phosphorus allocation as 
credit for these projects, the Summit Water Quality Committee reported in 
1995 that this point source had been discharging phosphorus at less than 15% 
of its permitted load level for two years (CDPHE 2003, p. 6; Woodward 
2003).  
  
In 1997, for the first time in the trading program’s history, a point source 
began seeking credits from nonpoint source reductions to increase discharges 
beyond its wasteload allocation. The motive for the trade arose with a 
developer’s plans to expand the Copper Mountain Ski Resort by 1,000 
residential units and 80,000 square feet of commercial space. Managers of the 
municipal wastewater treatment plant servicing the resort—Copper Mountain 
Consolidated Metro District—determined that the expansion would cause 
phosphorus discharges to exceed the NPDES permit by 40 lbs, even after 
upgrading the plant. After considering various options, including 
compensating Breckenridge for placing sewage lines in a proposed housing 
development, Copper Mountain settled a deal with the Frisco Sanitation 
District. Copper Mountain offered to pay an “investment fee” to homeowners 
with individual septic systems in Frisco’s service area, which would cover 
part of the cost of connecting their residences to the Frisco plant (Woodward 
2003, p. 7).  
 
Because the State of Colorado considers the phosphorus load per residence 
serviced by a wastewater facility to be “negligible” and estimates that the load 
per residence with an individual septic system is one pound per year, a total of 
80 homes had to connect to the municipal sewer system in order to 
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compensate for the proposed increase of 40 lbs in Copper Mountain’s 
phosphorus load (CDPHE 2003, pp. 8-9). The project was completed in 1999 
and the changes to Copper Mountain’s permit were included in the January 
2001 rulemaking of the Control Regulation (Woodward 2003, p. 8; CDPHE 
2003, p. 8). In September 2003, the Commission updated the regulation to 
reflect a 13-lb increase in Copper Mountain’s load allocation, which the plant 
had earned by sewering an additional 26 homes in Frisco’s service area. 
 
 
16. Administrative costs 
 
Not available  
 
17. Transaction costs 
 
The transaction costs vary according to the specific trade and the nature of the 
nonpoint source project. In the case of the Frisco-Copper Mountain trade, 
transaction costs were restricted by the Commission’s assessment that sewage 
disposal systems of individual homes generate approximately one pound of 
phosphorus per residence. This standard of one pound per home became “a 
basis on which trading could easily proceed, greatly reducing transaction costs 
when a trading opportunity became available" (Woodward 2003, p. 4). 
 
18. Cost savings 
 
In the Control Regulation, the Commission reviews a series of time value and 
opportunity cost analyses, finding that “the social and economic costs of 
allowing Dillon Reservoir to become eutrophic could be over two million 
dollars annually” (CDPHE 2003, p. 5). At the same time, the Commission 
estimates a cost of “slightly over 1.5 million dollars annually” to maintain the 
reservoir’s water quality without employing nonpoint source tradeoffs 
(CDPHE 2003, p. 5). Noting that trading could reduce that figure by about a 
half, the Commission concludes that the costs of maintaining water quality 
controls are significantly less than the potential economic and social cost of 
allowing the Reservoir to become eutrophic. There State of Colorado thereby 
considers the Control Regulation, including its trading provisions, “quite 
defensible on economic grounds” (CDPHE 2003, p. 5). 
 
19. Program goals achieved  
 
Although continuous monitoring since the Clean Lake Study has shown 
sustained reductions in total phosphorus loading, reductions have been mostly 
attributable to the improved performance of wastewater treatment plants.  In 
the interest of maintaining high property value around Lake Dillon and high 
drinking water standards for the Denver community, a cooperative 
management approach has developed around the trading program, 
successfully safeguarding water quality at Lake Dillon. As in the case of the 
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Frisco-Copper Mountain trade where many homes with substandard septic 
systems transferred to more effective wastewater treatment, trading can bring 
a broad range of environmental benefits.  
 
20. Program obstacles 
 
The program’s greatest obstacle lies in the limited demand for credits. While 
most point sources are not compelled by regulatory pressure on the allocation 
permits to participate in trades, the inability to invest in future sales of 
nonpoint source credits limits the motive to engage in nonpoint source 
projects (Woodward 2003, p. 6). 
  
21. NPS involvement and incentives to engage in trading. 
 
New nonpoint sources face regulatory pressure to offset their phosphorus 
dischargers by implementing pollution controls. Although a 1:1 trade ratio is 
in place to account for these offsets, mechanisms to monitor the exchanges 
between nonpoint sources are not as precise as in the case of point source 
reductions (Bruce Zander, EPA, personal communication, 2004). Still, the 
effort to watchdog nonpoint source reductions throughout the watershed 
grows and populations expand and more potential projects are identified.  
 
22. Other 
 
Program information/References 
 
Websites:  See websites related to specific sources below. 
 
Contacts: 
Bruce Zander, TMDL Coordinator, EPA Region 8.  (303) 312-6846 
Vern Berry, TMDL Assistant, EPA Region 8. (303) 312-6234 
 
Written Program Information: 
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Lower Colorado River Selenium and Aquatic Habitat Offset 
Program (CO) 
 
A.  Program Background 
1. Program description 
 
The City of Grand Junction, CO has received grant funding from USEPA 
Region 8 to develop a water quality trading program for selenium in the 
Lower Colorado River with URS Corporation.  The project is still in the 
conceptual stages, and no trading framework or demonstration projects have 
been fully developed.   
 
Phase I of the project was performed in 2002-2003.  Phase I addressed 
stakeholder coordination, data collection on selenium loading and monitoring, 
and initial trading framework design.  The Grand Valley Selenium Task Force 
formed in August 2002, when it became evident that many tributaries in 
Segment 13b of the Colorado River could be listed on the 303(d) list for 
selenium impairment (NIWQP 2003).  The purpose of the task force was to 
evaluate strategies for bringing the tributaries into compliance with the 4.6 
µg/L state selenium standard.  In January, 2003, the City of Grand Junction 
received a grant from the USEPA Region 8– one of eleven trading pilots 
funded under the new Water Quality Trading Policy –  and contracted with 
URS Corporation to design a selenium trading framework (USEPA 2003; 
Eileen List, personal communication, May 21, 2004).  The Phase I report 
discusses trading concepts and provides guidance on potential projects, but no 
trading framework was established (Julie Vlier, personal communication, May 
24, 2004).  
 
Phase II of the grant will continue with data collection and trading design and 
will begin looking into pilot or demonstration projects (Julie Vlier, personal 
communication, May 24, 2004).  
  
2. Program motivation 
 
High concentrations of selenium are naturally found in the Colorado River 
Basin soil due to the presence of marine Mancos shale (Gunnison Basin 
Selenium Task Force n.d.).  Irrigated agriculture leaches selenium from the 
shale, and other activities such as urban development or sand and gravel 
mining can also cause selenium loading to the watershed.  High levels of 
selenium have been found to cause reproductive deformities in wildlife. 
 
The Grand Valley Selenium Task Force was assembled to evaluate measures 
for bringing the region’s tributaries into compliance with the 4.6 µg/L state 
selenium standard (NIWQP 2003).  The City of Grand Junction’s primary 
motivation for participating in the Task Force and spearheading research into 
a trading framework is the specter of a TMDL that could force it to remove 
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insignificant point sources of selenium from wastewater and stormwater 
discharge despite the fact that selenium originates from significant nonpoint 
sources.  See “Regulatory Drivers” for more details on the City’s motivating 
factors.  
 
3. Pollutant being traded 
 
Selenium.  Other pollutants, phosphorus and habitat offsets have also been 
discussed (Julie Vlier, personal communication, May 24, 2004).  
 
4. Size of program 
 
Not determined. The trading arena might potentially be expanded to include 
the Gunnison Basin, which contributes the majority of the selenium to the 
Colorado River near Grand Junction.  Point sources for selenium include 
WWTPs, stormwater discharges, and sand and gravel dewatering operations, 
but these sources are arguably negligible (City of Grand Junction 2004).  
Downstream states could theoretically be interested in reducing selenium 
loads in Colorado, and the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service could be interested 
if remediation projects could improve the habitat of endangered fish species 
(Julie Vleir, personal communication, May 24, 2004).   Although not related 
to selenium, the City of Grand Junction and Mesa County are converting 
individual septic systems to sewer connections, and these agencies are 
interested in determining what kinds of tradable credits could be generated 
(Eileen List, personal communication, May 21, 2004).  Selenium remediation 
measures being explored in the region include phytoremediation (uptake by 
plants), lining of irrigation canals, polymer applications, agricultural water 
efficiency, and conservation methods and dilution (Gunnison Basin Selenium 
Task Force n.d.; Eileen List, personal communication, June 2, 2004). 
 
Potential trading parties: wastewater treatment plants; stormwater discharge 
systems; sand and gravel mining operations; irrigated agriculture 
 
5. Stakeholders/participants 
 
• City of Grand Junction: spearheading the development of a trading 
program; obtained funding from USEPA  
• URS Corporation: contracted for developing trading framework 
• U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Region 8: funded the City of 
Grand Junction’s 2003 proposal to develop a selenium trading program 
• Grand Valley Selenium Task Force:  Assembled in August, 2002 because 
many tributaries within Grand Valley would be placed on the 303(d) list 
for selenium impairment.  Includes representatives from the Cities of 
Grand Junction and Fruita, local water and land users, Mesa County, 
Grand Junction Drainage District, Mesa County Soil Conservation 
District, Colorado River Water Conservation District, Natural Resources 
Conservation Service, Colorado Department of Public Health and 
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Environment (CDPHE) Water Quality Control Division, Colorado 
Division of Wildlife, U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, U.S. Bureau of 
Reclamation, U.S. Geological Survey, and U.S. Environmental Protection 
Agency Region 8 Water Quality Unit.  
 
6. Regulatory drivers 
 
There is no regulatory driver for selenium trading, primarily because the vast 
majority of the selenium loads originates from unregulated nonpoint sources 
(Eileen List, personal communication, May 21, 2004).   
 
Point sources, including the Persigo WWTP operated by the City of Grand 
Junction and co-owned with Mesa County, have effluent standards set by the 
Colorado Discharge Permit System.  The Persigo WWTP discharges into 
Persigo Wash just before it joins the Colorado River, and selenium 
concentrations in the Persigo Wash and other tributaries often exceeds the 
acute selenium standard of 18 µg/L.  Due to the uncertainty associated with 
the selenium standard, however, the Colorado Water Quality Control 
Commission issued a temporary modification of the selenium standard 
(among other pollutants) for Persigo Wash and other Grand Valley washes in 
July, 2001 (City of Grand Junction 2004).   
 
A TMDL for selenium has not yet been developed for the segment of the 
Colorado River below the Gunnison River confluence near Grand Junction, 
but it is on the 303(d) list of impaired waters.  Grand Junction proposed that 
the segment be downgraded to the Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) list 
because existing selenium concentrations have not harmed fish, including 
threatened and endangered species.  The City also notes that a TMDL might 
not be appropriate at this time since the EPA may be revising its criteria for 
the chronic selenium standard.  Since more than 60% of the selenium in the 
segment comes from the Gunnison River Basin, Grand Junction concludes 
that upstream selenium remediation could preclude the need for a TMDL 
(City of Grand Junction 2004). 
 
The State has reassured Grand Junction that the selenium discharge limits for 
the WWTP will not be lower than the ambient stream concentrations, but 
Grand Junction remains concerned that they will be forced to reduce the 
background and inflow selenium concentration at great expense (City of 
Grand Junction 2004), especially due to the presence of threatened and 
endangered fish species in designated critical habitat of the Colorado River   
Although the City is concerned that a TMDL would burden them with an 
unfairly large portion of the selenium reductions, a TMDL might provide a 
baseline for nonpoint/nonpoint trading.  It is worth noting that the Grassland 
Area Farmers (see “Trading Initiatives”) achieved nonpoint/nonpoint 
selenium trading among irrigation districts in the San Joaquin Valley, 
California, using allocations under an aggregate selenium cap (although not 
through the TMDL process).   
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B.  Trade Structure 
7. Determination of credit  
 
Not determined. 
 
8. Trading ratios and other mechanisms to deal with uncertainty  
 
Not determined. 
 
9. Liability/penalties for noncompliance 
 
Not determined. 
 
10. Approval process 
 
Not determined. 
 
11. Ex post verification/auditing. 
 
Not determined. 
 
12. Mechanisms for trade identification and communication (education and 
outreach, third party facilitation, embedded ties) 
  
Not determined. 
 
13. Market structure (bilateral, clearinghouse, third party brokers) 
 
Not determined.  
 
14. Types of trades allowed  
 
Point/point, point/nonpoint, nonpoint/nonpoint and habitat offset trades are 
being considered (Eileen List, personal communication, May 21, 2004). 
 
C.  Outcomes 
15. Types and volume of trades that have occurred 
 
None. The trading framework is only at the conceptual stage.  
 
16. Administrative costs 
 
All costs will depend on the trading framework and market structure. 
 
17. Transaction costs 
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Not determined. 
 
18. Cost savings 
 
Not determined. 
  
19. Program goals achieved  
 
It is too early to determine the outcome of selenium trading on the Lower 
Colorado River, but the initiative has faced significant obstacles in crafting a 
viable trading framework.  
 
20. Program obstacles 
 
The project has faced difficulty in determining what to trade, how water 
quality credits could potentially be generated, and who might be interested in 
generating and/or purchasing nonpoint source selenium credits (Eileen List, 
personal communication, May 21, 2004).   Additional complications arise 
from the controversy regarding potential changes in selenium standards.  
 
The project has also found it difficult to elicit interest and support from the 
federal agencies and agricultural community (see below). 
 
21. NPS involvement and incentives to engage in trading. 
 
Gaining nonpoint source support for trading has been a challenge because 
agricultural sources of pollution are unregulated in Colorado.  Pilot projects 
and incentives are needed to engage water and land users by demonstrating 
how they can benefit from trading (Eileen List, personal communication, May 
21, 2004).  
 
22. Other 
 
Program information/References 
 
Websites: 
See individual online documents, listed below 
 
Contacts: 
Eileen List, Environmental Regulatory Coordinator, City of Grand Junction.  
(970) 256-4149 
Julie Vlier, URS Corporation.  (303) 740-2715 
Ronda Sandquist, Jackson Kelly PLLC, (303) 390-0186 
 
Written Program Information: 
City of Grand Junction (2004).  Prehearing statement of City of Grand 
Junction, February 2, 2004.  Retrieved May 26, 2004 from 
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http://www.cdphe.state.co.us/op/wqcc/OtherRegs/93-
94/PHSGrandJunction9394.pdf 
Gunnison Basin Selenium Task Force (n.d.).  What can be done about the 
selenium problem?  Retrieved May 26, 2004 from 
http://www.seleniumtaskforce.org/ 
National Irrigation Water Quality Program (2003).  Selenium update for 
Colorado’s Lower Gunnison River Basin and Grand Valley.  U.S. 
Bureau of Reclamation. Retrieved May 26, 2004 from 
http://www.usbr.gov/niwqp/info/current/ggv/news6.pdf 
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (2003).  City of Grand Junction 
receives innovative grant to help clean up Lower Colorado River.  
Environmental News, January 24, 2003.  Retrieved May 3, 2004 
from 
http://yosemite.epa.gov/r8/r8media.nsf/0/5c07e1fc3940e4e587256cb
70083143b?OpenDocument 
 
Reviewed by Eileen List, Environmental Regulatory Coordinator, City of Grand 
Junction and Ronda Sandquist, Attorney, Jackson Kelly PLLC. 
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Long Island Sound (CT) 
 
A.  Program Background 
 
1. Program description 
 
The entire Connecticut coastline and portions of New York’s coast make up 
the shores of the Long Island Sound. The bulk of the Sound’s watershed is in 
Connecticut, as are most of the point sources discharging nutrients that 
threaten its water quality.  Efforts to address low oxygen levels in the Long 
Island Sound began in 1990 with controls of nitrogen loading from sewage 
treatment plants (McGinnis 2001, p.168). After multiple phases of 
conventional reduction strategies in management zones across Connecticut 
and New York, plans began for a watershed-based approach that included 
effluent trading between point sources. In 2001, the Connecticut Department 
of Environmental Protection (CTDEP) and the New York State Department of 
Environmental Conservation formally established an EPA-approved TMDL 
calling for nitrogen reductions of 58.5% from point and non-point sources by 
2014, given the 1990 base load. Although the two states developed the TMDL 
in coordination, New York chose not to participate in an interstate trading 
program (McGinnis 2001, p.169, Gary Johnson, CTDEP, personal 
communication, 2004). Legislators in Connecticut proceeded to pass a 
NPDES General Permit for Nitrogen Discharges in the Long Island Sound, 
including a Nitrogen Credit Exchange Program, which became effective 
January 1, 2002. The General Permit limits nitrogen discharges from 
individual municipal sewage treatment plants while allowing plants 
discharging less than their allocation to generate credits for plants discharging 
more than their allocation. 
 
2. Program motivation 
 
The Long Island Sound lies in one of the nation’s most densely populated 
regions, a highly urban and suburban setting. The Sound contributes an 
estimated $5.5 billion per year to the regional economy from boating, 
commercial and sport fishing, and other forms of recreation for more than 8 
million people live in the watershed. Ecological degradation due to increasing 
development threatens a diversity of plant and animal species that inhabit the 
estuary and its surroundings. In 1985, Congress initiated the Long Island 
Sound Study, which found low levels of oxygen to be the greatest threat to the 
watershed and identified nitrogen as the primary pollutant causing hypoxia in 
the summer (Peterson 2003, CTDEP 2003). Excess nitrogen stimulates the 
growth of dense algae blooms, which are decomposed by bacteria in a process 
that consumes large amounts of the dissolved oxygen necessary to sustain 
aquatic life, including important fish and shellfish resources. Short periods of 
hypoxia have occurred in the Long Island Sound since the 1950s, but 
beginning in the 1980s, scientists documented extended periods of severely 
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low oxygen levels that they attributed mostly to increasing nitrogen loads 
from sewage treatment plants (McGinnis 2001, p. 168). In Connecticut, 
officials foresaw that plants able to cost-effectively remove nitrogen due to 
their size and design would be willing to implement nitrogen reductions 
greater than those required by their permit, especially given the opportunity to 
sell excess reductions in the form of credits (CTDEP 2001). The state 
estimated that a flexible distribution of allowances through a trading program 
would reduce the overall cost of nitrogen removal by more than $200 million 
(CGA 2001b). 
 
3. Pollutant being traded 
 
Nitrogen  
 
4. Size of program 
 
Long Island Sound covers about 1,300 square miles, measuring more than 100 
miles from east to west and about 21 miles wide at its widest point. The Sound 
drains an area of more than 16,000 square miles, encompassing virtually all of 
Connecticut and portions of several other states (CTDEP 2000). The General 
Permit, however, applies only throughout the State of Connecticut. The 
Connecticut portion of the watershed contains 79 publicly owned sewage 
treatment plants that that each discharge at least 20 lbs of total N per day 
(USEPA 2003b, p. 1). Nonpoint sources of nitrogen to the Sound include 
atmospheric deposition of automobile emissions and stormwater runoff from 
urban and residential areas. 
 
5. Stakeholders/participants 
 
The Connecticut Department of Environmental Protection administers the 
TMDL, issues the General Permit to comply with its limits, and monitors 
annual progress in its 15-year schedule. It also monitors all nitrogen removal 
projects, consults with Nitrogen Credit Advisory Board to oversee and 
execute the exchange of all nitrogen credits, and maintains an account of 
state-owned nitrogen credits.  
 
The Connecticut General Assembly and the Governor of the State appoint the 
Nitrogen Credit Advisory Board (NCAB), which includes 12 members 
representing a balance between buyers and sellers of credits, large and small 
municipalities, and different regions of the state. The Board meets monthly 
throughout the year to assist and advise the CTDEP in the exchange of all 
nitrogen credits. It reports to the Environment Committee of the Connecticut 
General Assembly on the progress of the nitrogen exchange program, 
suggested improvements, and the adequacy of funding for the program.  
 
The 79 sewage treatment plants regulated under the General Permit are the 
main point sources of nitrogen in the Long Island Sound and the most 
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significant sources of the nutrient in this highly urbanized region. As publicly 
owned wastewater facilities, they represent municipalities and towns. They 
make up the buyers and sellers of the Long Island Sound trading program 
 
6. Regulatory drivers 
 
Under the federal Clean Water Act, municipal water treatment plants must 
reduce the annual loading of total nitrogen to meet a statewide aggregate 
target as established in the TMDL. The state modified existing NPDES 
permits for point sources to comply with the TMDL and committed to 
nonpoint source reduction actions. The TMDL load allocation target is based 
on a “64% reduction goal for treatment plants of the state and a “10% 
reduction in nonpoint and stormwater nitrogen from land classified as 
urban/suburban and agricultural” (Gary Johnson, CTDEP, personal 
communication, 2004). Connecticut’s General Permit for Nitrogen Discharges 
in the Long Island Sound reflects annual limits established in the TMDL. 
According to the Nitrogen Credit Exchange Program under the General 
Permit, facilities that discharge less total nitrogen than the permit allows 
receive credit for nitrogen removal. Facilities that discharge more total 
nitrogen than the permit allows must secure nitrogen credits equivalent to the 
amount by which they exceed their limit. The credits are bought and sold 
annually through the Credit Exchange Program. Credits representing the 
difference between the maximum allowable nitrogen discharge from all of the 
plants and their total actual discharge are held by the state.  
 
Although trading allows some treatment plants to purchase credits rather than 
reduce nitrogen discharges, the overall 58.5% reduction goal requires that 
other municipalities modify existing treatment methods or build new systems. 
Since1986, the State of Connecticut has provided municipalities with a 
combination of grants and loans to design and construct wastewater control 
projects through the Clean Water Fund (CWF). The Long Island Sound 
Restoration Act of 2000 authorized the use of additional federal funds to 
upgrade the watershed’s wastewater treatment facilities (NCAB 2003, p. 12). 
Now designated as a “revolving loan program” required under the Clean 
Water Act, the CWF receives federal assistance and is subject to EPA 
regulation. As of 1999, it has provided a 30% grant for nitrogen removal 
projects, compared to the 20% grant otherwise awarded, and a loan for the 
remainder of the costs. Using the CWF, the state purchases excess credits 
generated from municipalities within the Nitrogen Credit Exchange Program 
(CTDEP 2004a). 
 
B. Trade Structure 
 
7. Determination of credit   
 
Plants receive nitrogen credits for any amount their discharge limit under the 
General Permit exceeds their actual discharge, in pounds of nitrogen per day, 
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as determined through monitoring. The nitrogen reduction is calculated by 
subtracting the actual end-of-pipe pounds of nitrogen discharged from the 
“baseline” loading established in the TMDL for Long Island Sound (NCAB 
2003, p. 8). The cost of a credit represents “the cost of the removal of an 
equivalent pound of nitrogen per day at each treatment facility” (Moore 1998, 
p. 7). Each year, the CTDEP audits the performance of plants operating for the 
full calendar year (January 1 to December 31) to establish the value of 
nitrogen credits, taking into consideration increased capital costs of nitrogen 
removal as well as added operational and maintenance costs of reduction 
methods. At the end of March each year, the CTDEP determines the total 
number of credits to be bought and sold, publishes the annual value of 
nitrogen credits, and notifies each plant of its nitrogen credit balance. Plants 
have until the end of July to purchase credits from the CTDEP to meet their 
discharge limit. By the middle of August, the CTDEP must purchase all 
available credits (CGA 2001a) 
 
8. Trading ratios and other mechanisms to deal with uncertainty  
 
The CTDEP adjusts nitrogen credits using an "equivalency factor” to account 
for the locations of treatment plants and their varied impact on the Long 
Island Sound. The equivalency factor makes nitrogen reductions closer to 
hypoxic zones more valuable than reductions occurring further from these 
zones, encouraging plants with more detrimental discharges to remove 
nitrogen beyond their permit requirement and sell the credits (CGA 2001b). 
While nitrogen credit exchange can help the 79 dischargers in Connecticut’s 
portion of the watershed meet their collective limit, trading cannot be used to 
meet any local river or harbor water quality requirements or nitrogen limits 
(Moore 1998, p. 6). Discharge limits under the General Permit are “set with 
the objective of balancing credits sold and purchased to prevent a large deficit 
or surplus of credits in any year” (EPA 2003b, p. 2). New information on 
annual performance can be incorporated to better adjust the permits and 
achieve a more effective balance of credits. To ensure compliance with the 
TMDL, the General Permit establishes annual limits on each plant well below 
TMDL requirements and reduces the limits each year (EPA 2003b, p. 2). 
Also, the State reserves the right to revoke a point source’s authorization 
under the General Permit or “modify it to establish any appropriate conditions, 
schedules of compliance, or other provisions which may be necessary to 
protect human health or the environment or to implement the 15 year TMDL” 
(CTDEP 2002, p. 9) 
 
9. Liability/penalties for noncompliance 
 
The CTDEP is authorized to conduct compliance audits of the annual 
operating data for plants participation in the program. Any plant that fails to 
meet its individual waste load allocations and does not purchase the 
appropriate amount of credits is subject to existing statutory water pollution 
control enforcement provisions (CGA 2001b). Within five days of learning of 
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a violation under the General Permit, a point source must determine the cause 
of this violation; it must institute plans to correct it, mitigate its effects, and 
prevent further forms of it. The permittee is also required to report the 
violation and subsequent corrective action to the State (CTDEP 2002, p. 7) 
 
10. Approval process 
 
Because the 79 treatment plants in Connecticut’s portion of the watershed are 
all subject to the Nitrogen Exchange Program, they do not have to undertake 
any additional application process to complete a trade besides the procedures 
required under the General Permit. If their annual audit indicates that they 
have exceeded their allocation, they are expected to purchase sufficient credits 
from the state to account for the difference between their actual discharge and 
their permitted discharge. Treatment plants make these purchases by certified 
bank check or money order to the Nitrogen Credit Exchange Program; they 
must do so in July, after being an issued an invoice by the state at the end of 
March  (CGA 2001a). For those plants that reduce more nitrogen than 
required by their permit, the state approves funds for the purchasing of excess 
credits and issues the respective municipalities checks in mid-August. 
 
11. Ex post verification/auditing 
 
Since 2002, treatment plants have been required to monitor flow and total 
nitrogen, reporting to the state on a monthly basis. All treatment facilities 
must monitor daily flow continuously to calculate their average daily flow 
volume.  Depending on the facility’s flow rate, it must monitor the final 
effluent either once (if its flow rate is less than 10,000,000 gallons per day) or 
twice per week (if its flow rate greater or equal to 10,000,000 gallons per day) 
(CTDEP 2002, p. 6). Each month, municipalities must enter the results of 
analyses for the total nitrogen and the average daily flow volume of the 
effluent on Monthly Operating Reports and Nitrogen Analysis Reports, which 
they present to the CTDEP (CTDEP 2002, p. 7). Plants are also subject to 
annual inspections. The CTDEP inspects each of the 79 municipal facilities 
regulated under the General Permit at least once during each year of the 
program, evaluating all aspects of the facility’s operation and monitoring 
procedures (NCAB 2003, p.10) 
 
12. Mechanisms for trade identification and communication (education and 
outreach, third party facilitation, embedded ties) 
 
The CTDEP funds the most cost-effective, or lowest cost per pound, 
construction of nitrogen treatment facilities in priority process, according the 
financing procedures of the Clean Water Fund, (Moore 1998, p. 6). When 
federal funds are awarded, “distressed communities receive priority” (NCAB 
2003, p. 12). The NCAB conducts “technical assistance outreach projects and 
presentations” to assist communities in “operating their treatment facilities to 
remove nitrogen more efficiently” (NCAB 2003, p. 9) 
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13. Market structure (bilateral, clearinghouse, third party brokers) 
 
Connecticut’s nitrogen trading program at Long Island Sound represents a 
prototypical clearinghouse. The equivalency factor converts nitrogen 
reductions from point sources throughout the watershed into uniform credits, 
and the NCAB assigns a single dollar value to these credits through careful 
analysis of typical reduction costs. This state-controlled system involves 
numerous checks and balances that encourages confidence in the trades 
among stakeholders and reinforces the efficacy of the program. The 
clearinghouse  framework has eased concerns that more financially distressed 
towns would end up sending money to wealthier communities in the 
southwest corner of the state, where most of the initial upgrades to facilities 
were feasible. Towns feel more comfortable with a central credit exchange 
than bilateral trades because they feel like they are paying for the true value of 
credits rather than just subsidizing the wealthy towns (Gary Johnson, CTDEP, 
personal communication, 2003). 
 
14. Types of trades allowed 
 
While the program has emphasized point-point trades since the onset, it is 
flexible enough to allow for trading with nonpoint sources. Because nonpoint 
source controls in the Long Island Sound have proven to be much more costly 
than point source controls and point sources dominate the nitrogen load, the 
CTDEP has suggested that “the purchase of point source credits to offset 
nonpoint reductions requirements” could help cut the costs of managing 
nitrogen (CTDEP 2001, p. 2). Managers of the Long Island Sound currently 
consider the inclusion of credits from nonpoint sources unlikely, given the 
high cost of removing nitrogen from these sources, the limited force of the 
regulations they face, and the impracticality of monitoring their reductions. 
Applying trading ratios would address the uncertainty of measurement, but it 
would also increase the incremental cost of managing nonpoint source 
pollution, thereby reducing the appeal of point-nonpoint trades. Thus, 
although trading with nonpoint sources may be technically permitted in the 
Long Island Sound, specific ground rules and actual incentives are lacking 
(Paul Stacey, CTDEP, personal communication, 2004).  
 
The authors of the trading program recognize that protecting the Sound from 
severe hypoxia calls for continuous standards on nitrogen control, year after 
year.  For this reason, the CTDP does not allow nitrogen reductions achieved 
at an individual source to be saved for use or sale beyond a 12-month period. 
The absence of a year-to-year banking provision in the trading program 
ensures that the 12-month average discharge remains below nitrogen 
reduction targets (CTDEP 2001, p. 2). 
 
C. Outcomes 
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15. Types and volume of trades that have occurred 
 
Given audited monitoring data for the period January through December 
2002, the first year of the trading program, the NCAB notified 38 
municipalities at the end of March 2003 that they would have to purchase a 
total of $1.32 million worth of credits in order to remain in compliance with 
the General Permit. During the same period, 41 treatment plants were able to 
reduce more nitrogen than their permit stipulated, allowing them to sell a total 
of $2.76 million worth of credits. The exchange left the State of Connecticut 
with excess credits amounting to $1.44 million, which it purchased through 
the Clean Water Fund. These dollar amounts are based on the credit price of 
$1.65 that the NCAB calculated from nitrogen removal costs at 24 sewage 
treatment plants (CTDEP 2003b, p. 4). The Board reported that all 79 
municipalities regulated under the General Permit cooperated fully in 
implementing the Nitrogen Credit Exchange program in 2002 (NCAB 2003, 
p. 4).  
 
At the end of March 2004, the State of Connecticut accepted the NCAB’s 
recommendation to set the cost of a credit at $2.14 for the trading program’s 
second year. This value results from the division of $5,869,569 —the 
combined capital, operation and maintenance costs at the 25 facilities with 
nitrogen removal projects financed by the Clean Water Fund during this 
period—by 2,742,081 pounds of equalized nitrogen removed. This higher 
price relative to the 2002 credit value is attributable in part to differences in 
weather between first to second years of trading. Compared to the colder 
conditions in 2003, a mild winter and above average heat in the summer and 
fall of 2002 favored the biological nitrogen removal activity at treatment 
plants. Moreover, wetter conditions in 2003 caused greater flows at the plants, 
placing strain on their treatment capacity. The higher credit price in 2003 also 
reflects normal increases in capital costs, as well as the costs of operation and 
maintenance. Between January and December 2003, 40 municipalities 
exceeded their nitrogen discharge allocation and 39 municipalities reduced 
more nitrogen than required by their permits. Given the $2.15 credit price, 
municipalities seeking to increase their allocations by buying credits owe a 
total of $2.12 million and municipalities able to sell credits expect a total of 
$2.43 in compensation for their reductions. The State will purchase the 
remaining $312,000 worth of credits using the Clean Water Fund (Gary 
Johnson, CTDEP, personal communication, 2004). 
 
16. Administrative costs 
 
The trading program at Long Island Sound has carried out two years of credit 
exchange with relatively limited financial resources, besides the state and 
federal funds used to implement nitrogen removal projects. The CTDEP 
currently employs between four and five individuals to work on the Nitrogen 
Credit Exchange, the equivalent of two full-time employees (Gary Johnson, 
CTDEP, personal communication, 2004). All members of the Nitrogen Credit 
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Advisory Board complete their work for the program without monetary 
compensation. 
 
17. Transaction costs 
 
The CTDEP does not collect a transaction fee for credit sales. Although early 
drafts of the legislation authorized the CTDEP to collect such a fee, this 
provision was excluded from the final bill. The bill did allow the use of state 
clean water funds to support the program if needed (Gary Johnson, CTDEP, 
personal communication, 2004). 
 
18. Cost savings 
 
The CTDEP estimates that reaching the 15-year nitrogen reduction goal 
without trading would cost approximately $1 billion, and that trading will save 
20% of that cost over those 15 years, or approximately $200 million (Gary 
Johnson, CTDEP, personal communication, 2004). 
 
19. Program goals achieved  
 
In April 2003, the EPA described Connecticut’s Long Island Sound trading 
program as a “national model of holistic planning based on sound science, 
watershed permitting of multiple dischargers, and the use of water quality 
trading to achieve necessary nitrogen reductions at lower cost" (EPA 2003a). 
The State expects to be well ahead of the reduction targets established in the 
TMDL for nitrogen. When the TMDL is fully implemented, established 
criteria for dissolved oxygen can be achieved (Paul Stacey, CTDEP, personal 
communication, 2004). 
 
20. Program obstacles 
 
Upgrades to municipal treatment plants require stable, multi-year funding. 
The single most critical factor to the continued progress of the program is the 
continued availability of Clean Water Fund to support the infrastructure of 
nitrogen removal (NCAB 2003, p. 4). In September 2003, the NCAB reported 
that “the projected demand for Clean Water Fund financing to support 
construction projects is more than twice the amount projected to be available” 
(NCAB 2003, p. 11). 
 
21. NPS involvement and incentives to engage in trading. 
 
Because point sources dominate the nitrogen load to the Sound and since 
accurate, affordable, and enforceable methods for controlling nonpoint 
sources are currently lacking, the program does not rely on nonpoint source 
reductions. Still, the potential remains to accommodate nonpoint source 
trading, especially as the cost of reducing nitrogen from point sources 
increases. The cost of a point source credit been estimated to range from just 
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over $1.50 per pound in the first year to “$29.84 per pound at the point when 
the nitrogen reduction goal of 58.5% total reduction to the Sound is achieved” 
(Moore 1998, p. 7) 
 
22. Other 
 
Program information/References 
 
Websites: 
CTDEP, Nitrogen Control Program for Long Island Sound 
http://www.dep.state.ct.us/wtr/lis/nitrocntr/nitoindex.htm 
 
Contacts: 
Paul E. Stacey, Long Island Sound Study Coordinator, CTDEP, Water 
Management Bureau, 79 Elm St., Hartford, CT 06106, (860) 424-
3728, paul.stacey@po.state.ct.us 
Gary Johnson, Senior Environmental Engineer, CTDEP, Water Management 
Bureau, 79 Elm St., Hartford, CT 06106, (860) 424-3754, 
gary.johnson@po.state.ct.us 
 
Written program information: 
Connecticut Department of Environmental Protection (CTDEP).  (2004). 
“Connecticut’s Clean Water Fund.” Retrieved May 27, 2004 from 
http://dep.state.ct.us/wtr/cwa/cwfund.htm 
---------(2003a). "Connecticut's Nitrogen Control Program: General Permit for 
Nitrogen Discharges and Nitrogen Credit Exchange Program." 
February 2003. Retrieved May 27, 2004 from 
www.envtn.org/docs/ct_fact_sheet.PDF 
---------(2003b). "Long Island Sound Benefits from Nitrogen Credit 
Exchange." Managing Environmental Compliance in Connecticut. 
November 2003. Issue 4. Retrieved May 27, 2004 from 
http://dep.state.ct.us/enf/newsletter/envcompliance.htm 
---------(2003c). Lt. Governer Jodi Rell. "L. Governor Rell Marks the Success 
of Connecticut's Innovative Nitrogen Trading Program" October 24, 
2003. Retrieved May 27, 2004 from 
http://dep.state.ct.us/whatshap/press/2003/cr1024a.htm 
---------(2002). Bureau of Water Management Permitting, Enforcement & 
Remediation Division. General Permit for Nitrogen Discharges. 
Issuance Date:  January 2, 2002. Retrieved May 28, 2004, 
http://www.dep.state.ct.us/pao/download.htm#WaterGP 
---------(2001). "Connecticut's Nitrogen Control Program: Facilitating 
Hypoxia Control in Long Island Sound through a Nitrogen Credit 
Exchange Program." April 2001. Retrieved May 27, 2004 from 
dep.state.ct.us/wtr/lis/nitrocntr/nitrcrdt.pdf 
---------(2000). "A Total Maximum Daily Load Analysis to Achieve Water 
Quality Standards for Dissolved Oxygen in Long Island Sound." 
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December 2000. Retrieved May 27, 2004 from 
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Report of the Nitrogen Credit Advisory Board to the Joint Standing 
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McGinnis, S.L. "Watershed-based Pollution Trading Development and 
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Moore, Robert. “Long Island Sound Watershed-Based Trading Demonstration 
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http://www.envtn.org/programs/longisld.htm 
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Peterson, Greg. "Trading Water Pollution." Geotimes. March 2003. Retrieved 
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United States Environmental Protection Agency (USEPA). (2003a). Office of 
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Tracy Mehan, III Assistant Administrator  
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Tampa Bay Estuary Program (FL) 
 
A.  Program Background 
 
1. Program description 
 
The Tampa Bay National Estuary Program (TBNEP) was initiated in 1991 to 
protect the health of the Bay (Nanette  Holland, personal communication, May 
10, 2004).  In the spring of 1997, after gaining approval from the EPA and 
community partners, the Tampa Bay Management Plan was approved and the 
program’s name changed to the Tampa Bay Estuary Program (TBEP) 
(Nanette Holland, personal communication, May 10, 2004). 
 
The Tampa Bay Estuary Program (TBEP) takes an interdependent ecosystem 
approach to solving regional environmental issues by bringing all stakeholders 
together.  The emphasis of this program is unique in that it is not driven solely 
by government policies and regulations, but rather by what studies have 
shown is best for the health of the bay, and the concern of local residents over 
the health of the bay.  This makes for a unique situation in which “trading” 
does not actually occur, but group consultation and decision-making are used 
as alternative approaches to determine how certain sources should reduce their 
discharge.  
 
Although trading does not occur, it is believed that the interdependent 
ecosystem perspective taken by the program leads to similar results. In 
particular, participants work together to keep nitrogen levels beneath an 
established threshold by instituting reduction programs and adopting other 
individual measures.  This program is based on the premise that all 
stakeholders should work together to do what is best for the Bay.  In defining 
“what is best for the Bay,” the TBEP has established and allocated nitrogen 
loading goals for the Bay to encourage seagrass recovery (TBNEP 1996).  In 
1996 local government and agency partners in the NEP agreed to maintain 
nitrogen loading at existing levels (using 1992-1994 average) (TBNEP 1996).  
However it is expected that local governments and agencies will actually have 
to reduce their nitrogen reduction quota by about 7% by 2010 to offset 
anticipated population growth (TBNEP 1996).  Each city and participating 
agency has been assigned a nitrogen release quota to meet this reduction goal 
through individual local government action plans (TBNMC 1998).  These 
quotas are flexible and allow reductions to be credited to future years, and to 
be achieved through a selection of projects.   
 
Governments and other polluters have an incentive to participate in nitrogen 
reduction through the TBEP because through participation these entities are 
granted regulatory flexibility by regulatory agencies (Nanette Holland, 
personal communication, May 10, 2004).  All participation is voluntary, but as 
long as overall nitrogen reduction goals are being met, the participation of 
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these Bay area polluters in the TBEP will take the place of a more formal 
TDML (Nanette Holland, personal communication, May 10, 2004). 
  
Originally local governments agreed to reduce nitrogen emissions by 6 tons 
per year (from sources including stormwater runoff and discharges from 
municipal sources), while the Nitrogen Management Consortium (made up of 
industries, local governments and regulatory agencies) pledged to reduce 
nitrogen pollution by 11 tons (from atmospheric deposition, industrial point 
sources, fertilizer shipping and handling, and intensive agriculture)   (TBNEP 
1996). 
 
The Nitrogen Management Consortium members have calculated existing 
nitrogen pollution, as well as planned reductions that will occur from specific 
projects.  These pollution loads are outlined in Tampa Bay Nitrogen 
Management Consortium (1998).  The group then calculated each 
participant’s contribution to nitrogen cleanup based on the participants current 
system of nitrogen reduction and is working on deciding the most efficient 
reduction strategies for the future.  
 
The Tampa Bay Nitrogen Management Consortium (TBNMC) has also been 
established with the specific goal of nitrogen pollution reduction.  Its purpose 
is to “work with nongovernmental point and nonpoint polluters to reduce the 
56 tons of nitrogen to 11 tons of nitrogen that currently comes from 
atmospheric deposition , industrial point sources, fertilizer shipping and 
handling, and intensive agriculture” (TBNMC 1998).  A flexible and holistic 
approach has been taken by the TBNMC whereby members work together to 
identify the most cost effective ways of reducing nitrogen pollution and 
equitably distributing the costs through a credit program among its members 
(TBNMC 1998).  The goal is to have all nitrogen reduction projects identified 
and completed by 2005 (TBNMC 1998).  If the projects that have been 
proposed and those that actually have begun, are not enough, the consortium 
will identify the most cost effective projects that should then be undertaken to 
achieve the goal.  
 
2. Program motivation 
 
The Clean Water Act of 1972 first alerted the public about potential nitrogen 
problems in the Bay.  Nitrogen was the main nutrient targeted in the 70’s 
because it was leading to eutrophication and algal growth.  This growth was 
clouding the water of the bay and cutting off light to seagrass, which in turn 
negatively affected fish habitats (TBNEP 1996).  
 
3. Pollutant being traded 
 
Nitrogen is the focus of the TBEP, but no pollutant is actually traded.   
 
4. Size of program 
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The TBEP territory covers an area of approximately 2,200 square miles in 
Hillsborough, Pinellas, and Manatee counties, which combined has a 
population of 2.5 million people and three seaports (TBNEP 1996; Nanette 
Holland, personal communication, May 10, 2004).  The estuary itself covers 
almost 400 square miles (TBNEP 1996). 
 
Potential trading parties: none 
 
5. Stakeholders/participants 
 
• Partners in the Estuary Program: Hillsborough, Pinellas and Manatee 
counties; the cities of Tampa, St. Petersburg and Clearwater; the 
Southwest Florida Water Management District; Florida Department of 
Environmental Protection; and the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 
• U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (USEPA): oversees the Tampa 
Bay Estuary Program along with 27 other estuary programs, which were 
all instituted under the Clean Water Act. 
• Tampa Bay Regional Planning Council: supports the Estuary Program at a 
local level 
• Tampa Bay Nitrogen Management Consortium (TBNMC): The TBNMC 
is a unique public and private partnership between major industries, 
including utilities, agriculture and fertilizer manufactures, and local 
governments, which works to meet specific nitrogen reduction goals 
(Nanette Holland, personal communication, May 10, 2004). 
• Agency on Bay Management (ABM): ABM is the natural resources 
committee of the Tampa Bay Regional Planning Council and works 
closely with the TBEP.  The association represents interests of recreational 
and commercial fisheries, industrial, academic, and scientific sectors, and 
local, state and regional governments.   
• Southwest Florida Water Management District (SWFWMD) and its 
Surface Water Improvement and Management Program (SWIM): integral 
in implementing the Bay plan 
• Hillsborough County Environmental Protection Commission: played 
active role in water quality monitoring, leading to a database for tracking 
improvements. 
• The TBEP has a community advisory committee comprised of interested 
citizens who offer advice on potential educational outreach programs 
(Nanette Holland, personal communication, May 10, 2004). 
 
6. Regulatory drivers 
 
The Clean Water Act initially drew attention to the nitrogen pollution problem 
of the Bay, but the TBEP goes beyond the standards of specific legislation.  
However, there are regulations within the documents of the TBEP that 
members have agreed to.  In particular, each participating local and 
government agency was required to develop its own action plan to reduce 
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nitrogen and help meet the goals for the Bay, which was submitted to TBEP’s 
Management and Policy Committee.  These action plans are critical because 
portions of these plans are later incorporated into regulatory permits (TBNEP 
1996). 
 
The Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990 require reductions in NOx from coal-
fired power plants nationwide.  Tampa Electric Company actually reduced 
emissions before the 2000 deadline to meet requirements and help with 
nitrogen reduction under the TBEP (TBNMC 1998).  
 
 
D. Trade Structure 
 
7. Determination of credit   
 
N/A 
 
8. Trading ratios and other mechanisms to deal with uncertainty  
 
N/A 
 
9. Liability/penalties for noncompliance 
 
N/A 
 
10. Approval process 
 
N/A 
 
11. Ex post verification/auditing 
 
Several local governments and agencies work together to monitor the region 
with an emphasis on health and diversity of bay habitats rather than the 
traditional laboratory standards.  In particular, a Regional Ambient 
Monitoring Program (RAMP) exists through which all the agencies test the 
samples in their own laboratories and subsequently reconvene to evaluate the 
results on total nitrogen, nitrate, nitrite, ammonia, turbidity, and other factors 
(Pribble et al 2002).  
 
The TBEP will revisit the nitrogen goal and the associated management 
strategies every five years, or as often as new information comes up (TBEP 
1996).  In addition, an annual progress report for the TREP Management and 
Policy Boards and local community will be released that compares the current 
situation to the goals outlined in TBNMC 1998.  Finally, a biannual report on 
bay monitoring will be prepared for bay managers (TBNMC 1998).  
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12. Mechanisms for trade identification and communication (education and 
outreach, third party facilitation, embedded ties) 
 
N/A 
 
13. Market structure (bilateral, clearinghouse, third party brokers) 
 
N/A 
 
14. Types of trades allowed 
 
N/A 
 
E. Outcomes 
 
15. Types and volume of trades that have occurred 
 
No trades have occurred, and there is no infrastructure in place to permit 
trading in the future.   
 
16. Administrative costs 
 
N/A 
 
17. Transaction costs 
 
N/A 
 
18. Cost savings 
 
Preliminary analyses suggest that the cost to meet certain water quality goals 
for Tampa Bay will be relatively minimal over the plan’s lifetime (see 
Implementation & Financing chapter of TBNEP 1996). For example, local 
communities and industries will need to reduce future nitrogen loadings to the 
Bay by about 17 tons (or about one-half percent of the total load) per year to 
maintain water quality levels and provide for continued seagrass recovery. 
The cost of achieving this goal is estimated to be an additional $2 to $4 
million per year over current expenditures, or about $2 per bay area resident 
(TBNEP 1996). 
 
19. Program goals achieved  
 
In 2000, all government stakeholders updated their action plans for nitrogen 
removal projects, which became an amendment to the Consortium Action 
Plan (Holly Greening, personal communication, May 3, 2004).  These planned 
reductions will be compared to actual reductions in the future. 
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Chlorophyll a concentrations are measured yearly to keep track of nitrogen 
loading (Holly Greening, personal communication, May 3, 2004).  A 
“decision matrix” has been developed through which chlorophyll a 
concentrations and light attenuation are tracked and assessed (Poe et al 2004).  
In 2000, 2001 and 2002 chlorophyll a targets for all four Bay segments were 
met, and three of the four targets were met in 2003 (Poe et al 2004).  This 
indicates that nitrogen loading maintenance is on track (Holly Greening, 
personal communication, May 3, 2004).  
 
In 2003, the TBEP initiated development of a computerized database to track 
nitrogen reduction projects that are either planned, or have been undertaken by 
the various stakeholders (Holly Greening, personal communication, May 3, 
2004).  Once this database is complete and up-to-date, load goals and actual 
reductions will be easier to track (Holly Greening, personal communication, 
May 3, 2004).  The next full loading estimate, undertaken every five years and 
include TN, TP, and TSS, will be available in August 2004 (Holly Greening, 
personal communication, May 3, 2004).  
 
20. Program obstacles 
 
N/A 
 
21. NPS involvement and incentives to engage in trading. 
 
Nonpoint sources are not the focus of the Estuary Program. 
 
22. Other 
 
Program information/References 
 
Websites: 
Tampa Bay Estuary Program. http://www.tbep.org/index.html 
 
Contacts: 
Nanette Holland, Public Outreach Coordinator, Tampa Bay Estuary Program, 
(727) 893-2765 
Holly Greening, Senior Scientist, Tampa Bay Estuary Program, (727) 893-
2765   
 
Written program information: 
Pribble, R.J., Janicki, A.J., and Greening, H.  2002.  Baywide Environmental 
Monitoring Report 1983-1998. Tampa Bay Estuary Program, Technical 
Report 07-99.  Retrieved April 1, 2004 from 
http://www.tbeptech.org/TechPubs/FishWild1Page2.html 
Environomics (1999).  A summary of U.S. effluent trading and offset projects.  
A report prepared for Dr. Mahesh Podar, U.S. Environmental Protection 
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Agency, Office of Water.  Retrieved May 7, 2004 from 
http://www.epa.gov/owow/watershed/trading/traenvrn.pdf 
Poe, A., Janicki, A., & Janicki, S. (2004). Technical memorandum: Tracking 
chlorophyll-a and light attenuation in Tampa Bay: Application to 2003 
data. Tampa Bay Estuary Program.  
Tampa Bay National Estuary Program (TBNEP) (1996).  Charting the course: 
the comprehensive conservation and management plan for Tampa Bay.  
Retrieved May 20, 2004 from http://www.tbep.org/pdfs/ctc/ctctoc.html.  
Also available from the Tampa Bay Estuary Program on CD-ROM. 
Tampa Bay Nitrogen Management Consortium (TBNMC) (1998). Partnership 
for progress:  Tampa Bay Nitrogen Management Consortium Action 
Plan 1995-1999. Available from the Tampa Bay Estuary Program on 
CD-ROM 
 
 
Reviewed by Nanette Holland, Tampa Bay Estuary Program. 
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Lower Boise River Effluent Trading Demonstration Project (ID) 
 
A.  Program Background 
1. Program description 
 
The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the Idaho Department 
of Environmental Quality (DEQ) are designing a phosphorus trading 
demonstration project for the Lower Boise River.  The trading framework will 
be implemented to help achieve the nutrient reduction goals set by the TMDL.  
Trading will occur within a watershed-wide, market-based trading system that 
will include both point and nonpoint sources.   
 
The EPA began working with Idaho, Oregon, and Washington in 1997 to 
examine how trading could reduce the cost of meeting TMDL requirements.  
The Lower Boise Effluent Trading Demonstration Project was launched as the 
first pilot project. Phase I of the demonstration project, which began in 
January, 1998, assessed the market feasibility for phosphorus trading.  In 
Phase II, beginning in August, 1998, the project developers began designing 
the trading structure and protocols and completed two trading simulations. A 
draft framework was completed in December 1999, and the final report was 
issued in September 2000 (Ross and Associates 2000). 
 
Within the Lower Boise River’s trading framework, point sources can 
purchase credits to comply with the phosphorus limits in the NPDES permit.  
Point/nonpoint source trades will generally proceed as follows: First, trading 
parties are identified and contract terms are negotiated.  The trading parties 
sign a contract specifying the amounts of credits to be delivered, the best 
management practice (BMP) to be used to generate these credits, payments, 
monitoring provisions, and penalties for noncompliance.  The nonpoint source 
will install the BMP generating the phosphorus reductions and maintain the 
BMP according to the standards specified in the list of BMPs approved for the 
watershed.  Each month, the point source gathers the information from the 
nonpoint source to complete the reduction credit certificate and signs it, 
attesting that they verified the operation of the BMP themselves.  The credits 
documented in the certificate are recorded in the Trade Tracking System, 
which is a central database that holds credits that can be transferred to other 
accounts. The Trade Tracking System will be administered by a new nonprofit 
association, The Idaho Clean Water Cooperative.  To complete a trade, the 
buyer and seller jointly submit an official Trade Notification Form that 
transfers these credits to the buyer and gives the DEQ and the EPA 
(accompanied by the Soil Conservation Commission) access to the site of the 
BMP for the purpose of assessing the regulatory compliance of the NPDES 
permit holder (Ross and Associates 2000; Schary and Fisher-Vanden 2004).  
  
Trading was initially expected to commence by the end of 2001 
(Environomics 1999).  The delay of the Snake River/Hell’s Canyon TMDL, 
which is expected to set the nutrient reduction targets for the Lower Boise 
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River TMDL, has delayed the implementation of the Lower Boise River 
trading framework.   The Idaho DEQ submitted the Hell’s Canyon phosphorus 
TMDL to the EPA in July, 2003 and approval is anticipated by Fall 2004.  
 
2. Program motivation 
 
Faced with the considerable challenge of developing and then implementing 
many TMDLs on a strict court-ordered schedule, Idaho, Oregon, and 
Washington joined the U.S. EPA Region 10 in exploring trading as a new 
water quality management tool.   Trading seemed to offer a flexible and cost-
effective option for achieving the pollutant reduction goals established by a 
TMDL (Ross and Associates 2000).   
 
The Lower Boise River TMDL did not establish nutrient reduction targets 
independent of Snake River-Hell’s Canyon TMDL because the Lower Boise 
itself is not visibly impaired by nuisance aquatic growth.  In anticipation of 
basin-wide nutrient reduction goals set by the Snake River TMDL, however, 
the Lower Boise River TMDL called for no net increase of total phosphorus 
as an interim measure (Lower Boise River TMDL 1998). The Lower Boise 
River is the greatest contributor of phosphorus to the Brownlee Reservoir (via 
the Snake River), which suffers from excess nutrient loading and nuisance 
aquatic growth.  The TMDL for the Hell’s Canyon reach of the Snake River is 
expected to establish significant nutrient reduction goals for the Lower Boise 
(Schary and Fisher-Vanden 2004).   
 
3. Pollutant being traded 
 
Phosphorus 
 
4. Size of program 
 
The Lower Boise River watershed drains 1290 square miles.  The trading 
program extends over approximately 64 miles, from Lucky Peak Dam to the 
mouth of the Boise River at the Snake River (Ross and Associates 2000).  
Potential trading parties within this area include seven POTWs, three 
industrial dishchargers, and eight irrigation districts (Environomics 1999).  
 
Potential trading parties: NPDES permit holders (wastewater treatment plants, 
industrial dischargers); farmers; irrigation districts 
 
5. Stakeholders/participants 
 
• Idaho Department of Environmental Quality (DEQ)—prepares a TMDL 
and implementation plan, and develops trading ratios. 
• U.S. EPA Region 10—issues NPDES permits for Idaho and approves 
TMDLs. 
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• Idaho Soil Conservation Commission (ISCC) – created the list of 
approved BMPs, effectiveness calculations, and uncertainty discounts. 
(ISCC 2002).  
• Ross and Associates Environmental Consulting, Ltd. – consultant and 
facilitator for development of the trading framework, under contract to the 
EPA and DEQ. 
• Idaho Clean Water Cooperative (ICWC)– a newly created non-profit 
entity that will be responsible for administering the Trade Tracking 
System 
• Natural Resources Conservation Service (NRCS) 
• Agricultural stakeholders: Idaho Water Users Association, Idaho Farm 
Bureau, Pioneer Irrigation District, Payette River Water Master, Ada and 
Canyon Soil Conservation Districts (SCD) 
• Industrial stakeholders: Micron, Simplot, Idaho Power Company 
• Environmental stakeholders: Idaho Rivers United 
• Municipal governments: Association of Idaho Cities, Cities of Boise, 
Meridian, Nampa, Middletown, Star, Notus, and Parma. 
• U.S. Bureau of Reclamation (USBR) – operator of Lucky Peak Dam 
which provides water to the irrigation districts. 
• Southwest Idaho Resource Conservation and Development Council 
(SWIRCD)—nonprofit established by the NRCS and assists in the 
development of the ICWC. 
• American Wetlands—private, for-profit entity that constructs wetlands. 
• Boise State University Environmental Finance Center—funded by grants 
to assist municipal governments with environmental issues. 
 
6. Regulatory drivers 
 
Trading will occur within the framework of a TMDL since no phosphorus 
limits are specified in the permits currently.  The regulatory driver in the short 
term is likely to be a No Net Increase policy for total phosphorus, established 
in the Lower Boise River TMDL.  The regulatory drivers in the longer term 
are likely to be TMDLs for the Lower Boise River and Snake River/Hell’s 
Canyon (Ross and Associates 2000).   The proposed draft TMDL for Snake 
River could require up to a 80% reduction in phosphorus loads for the Lower 
Boise River (Claire Schary, personal communication, May 24, 2004).   
 
The broader regulatory context for water quality trading has been established 
by the U.S. EPA’s Final Water Quality Trading Policy, finalized in January 
2003, and the Idaho DEQ’s Pollutant Trading Guidance, drafted in November 
2003 and being revised based on public comment.  Idaho is not a delegated 
state for NPDES permits, so the U.S. EPA is responsible for issuing NPDES 
permits in Idaho. 
 
 
B.  Trade Structure 
7. Determination of credit  
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The Idaho Soil Conservation Commission (ISCC) created a list of surface 
irrigated cropland best management practices (BMPs) that are approved for 
generating credits (ISCC 2002).  BMPs eligible for trading include sediment 
basins, filter strips, efficient irrigation systems, constructed wetlands, and crop 
sequencing.    
 
Preference is given to measurable reductions, but the ISCC report includes a 
formula for estimating phosphorus reductions and acknowledges that direct 
measurement on a field scale BMP would not provide a reduction amount that 
can take the baseline year runoff into account.   Therefore, measurement 
methods are only allowed for watershed scale BMPs.  Each approved BMP is 
assigned an effectiveness ratio and an uncertainty discount.  The uncertainty 
discount is eliminated if the farmer follows a certified nutrient management 
plan.   
 
Phosphorus loading reductions for a nonpoint source seller are calculated by 
first multiplying the nonpoint source’s baseline load (estimated using the 
Surface Irrigation Soil Loss (SISL) model applying a conversion factor of 2 
lbs phosphorus per ton of soil loss) by a ‘water quality contribution 
percentage’ that represents the individual nonpoint source’s share of the 
reduction amount needed to achieve the load allocation assigned in the 
TMDL.  This ‘water quality contribution’ represents the amount of reductions 
the nonpoint source must exceed to generate credits to sell.  The amount of 
reductions created by a BMP is estimated by multiplying the nonpoint 
source’s baseline load by a BMP effectiveness ratio.  The number of credits 
that can be sold is calculated as the difference between the amount of 
reductions generated by the BMP and the ‘water quality contribution’ 
reduction amount.  These remaining reductions are multiplied by three ratios 
to determine the number of tradable credits: 1. a “river location ratio” to 
calculate credits in “Parma pounds” (Parma is the small town near the mouth 
of the Boise River where the TMDL’s reduction target is measured; this 
conversion reflects how phosphorus reductions throughout the watershed will 
have differential impacts on the water quality at Parma); 2. a “drainage 
delivery ratio” to account for transmission losses within a drainage channel; 
and 3. a  “site location factor” to account for transmission losses between 
cropland and drainage channels (Claire Schary, personal communication, May 
24, 2004). 
 
Approved BMPs, effectiveness and uncertainty ratios, SISL estimates, and 
ratios for river location, site location, and drainage delivery are listed in ISSC 
(2002).   The report also contains an example of how tradable credits are 
calculated. 
 
Point sources’ initial permit limits (which can be adjusted through trades) are 
established by the Waste Load Allocations (WLA) in their NPDES permit.  
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8. Trading ratios and other mechanisms to deal with uncertainty 
 
As detailed above in “How credits are determined,” the formula for credits 
includes an uncertainty discount.   Additional trading ratios reflect river 
location, site location, and drainage delivery (ISCC 2002).   The approval 
process is also intended to reduce uncertainty, since Reduction Credit 
Certificates are submitted at the end of each month to document that the 
reduction has already taken place.  
 
9. Liability/penalties for noncompliance 
 
The State will ultimately hold the point source liable for securing sufficient 
credits, but the trading parties sign a private contract that includes the amount 
of credits in Parma pounds, a description of the practices that will generate 
credits, monitoring requirements and assignment of responsibility, payment 
terms, and penalties for failure to deliver credits (Ross and Associates 2000).   
 
10. Approval process 
 
A Reduction Credit Certificate, signed by the point source purchasing the 
credit and containing information provided by the nonpoint source, is 
submitted every month to the ICWC.  The credits are entered into the Trade 
Tracking System and the credits are placed into the nonpoint source’s account.  
The buyer and seller subsequently sign and submit an official Trade 
Notification Form that specifies the amount, effective date, and duration of a 
trade which then transfers the credits to the point source’s account at the end 
of each month (Ross and Associates 2000). 
 
Since trading is broadly authorized by the rule, trades do not need to be 
individually approved by regulators.  The ICWC reviews the forms for 
completeness before submitting the information into the Trade Tracking 
System.  The point source is responsible for evaluating nonpoint source 
credits, although the Trade Notification Form also authorizes the IDEQ and 
the EPA (when accompanied by the ISCC) to inspect the BMP to evaluate 
compliance (Ross and Associates 2000).  
 
The point source’s Discharge Monitoring Report (DMR) is due 45 days after 
the end of the month that it covers.  This allows time to verify nonpoint source 
reductions and submit the necessary forms for a trade (Schary and Fisher-
Vanden 2004).  The DMR worksheet indicates how the point source’s initial 
limit and subsequent trades establish a new limit that is equal to or greater 
than its actual reported discharge for that month.  A Trade Summary Report 
from the Trade Trading System must accompany the DMR.  (Claire Schary, 
personal communication, May 24, 2004). 
 
11. Ex post verification/auditing. 
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Trades can be audited through the existing verification and inspection process 
for NPDES permittees (Ross and Associates 2000).  Point sources must 
submit a monthly Discharge Monitoring Report, and purchased credits will be 
checked against these discharge reports in audits of NPDES permits.  
 
For measurable nonpoint reductions, water quality monitoring of inflow and 
outflow verifies the exact amount of reduction.  For calculated nonpoint 
sources reductions, BMP installation is monitored by the point source prior to 
the creation of credit, and maintenance inspections are conducted by the point 
source to document monthly credits (Ross and Associates 2000).  Nonpoint 
source projects are inspected by the point source at least once a year after 
installation and before seasonal operation.  A schedule of inspections is 
contained in ISCC (2002).  
 
12. Mechanisms for trade identification and communication (education and 
outreach, third party facilitation, embedded ties) 
 
The trading framework does not define how buyers and sellers must identify 
trades.  Buyers can contact sellers directly (as in education and outreach) or 
through a third party broker or cooperative, should one develop.  The ISCC 
will play an important role in identifying trading opportunities and can market 
trading along with their cost share programs (Claire Schary, personal 
communication, May 24, 2004). 
 
Farmers are not recruited through cost-share, but neither are they disqualified 
for receiving cost-share funds.   The “voluntary water quality contribution” 
represents the individual nonpoint source’s share of the reduction amount 
needed to achieve the load allocation assigned in the TMDL.  This satisfies 
the expectation that reductions from farmers need to be “surplus” to the 
reductions implied by the TMDL as part of the load allocation.  
 
13. Market structure (bilateral, clearinghouse, third party brokers) 
 
Bilateral.  Buyers and sellers are expected to sign long-term private contracts 
for credit delivery, although there may be opportunities to purchase credits in 
the open market (Schary and Fisher-Vanden 2004).   A new non-profit group, 
the Idaho Clean Water Cooperative, will be responsible for administering the 
Trade Tracking System (Schary and Fisher-Vanden 2004), but this is a trade 
registry and auditing system rather than a clearinghouse.  
 
14. Types of trades allowed 
 
Point/point and point/nonpoint. Credits are generated and used on a monthly 
basis.  Nonpoint source credits are created at the end of the month, and point 
sources must use those credits to offset nutrient loading during the same 
month.  (Ross and Associates 2000).  
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C.  Outcomes 
15. Types and volume of trades that have occurred 
 
None.  Trading is being delayed by the EPA approval of the Snake 
River/Hell’s River TMDL, which will set the reduction target for the Lower 
Boise River phosphorus TMDL.  
 
16. Administrative costs 
 
Administrative costs should be very low since the onus for identifying and 
evaluating trading opportunities is on the point sources.  The regulator’s time 
has been spent on defining the trading conditions rather than individually 
brokering or evaluating trades (Schary and Fisher-Vanden 2004)   
 
17. Transaction costs 
 
The BMP list provides one strategy for reducing transaction costs, but 
transaction costs could vary greatly depending on the mechanisms used to 
identify trades and communicate with trading partners.  
 
18. Cost savings 
 
Environomics (1999) estimated a cost savings potential of $10-158/lb of 
phosphorus reduced, based on 80% phosphorus reduction estimates of $12-
178/lb for point sources and $2-20/lb for nonpoint sources.  Ross and 
Associates (2000) similarly estimated that phosphorus reductions at 
wastewater treatment plants ranged from $5 to more than $200/lb, while 
reductions through BMPs cost only $5-50/lb.   
 
19. Program goals achieved  
 
The goals for the Demonstration Project were to “create a proposed trading 
program that is environmentally and legally sound; work within existing 
regulatory programs; allow trades to occur in a dynamic, market-based 
manner; and that is grounded in environmentally protective requirements” 
(Ross and Associates 2000: ii).  The participants have succeeded in 
developing a trading framework within these parameters, but the trading 
program has yet to be implemented due to the delay of the Snake River/Hell’s 
Canyon TMDL and subsequently the Lower Boise River TMDL.    
 
20. Program obstacles 
 
The delay associated with TMDL approval has been the most significant 
obstacle to trading.  The TMDL is needed to establish phosphorus limits in the 
NPDES permits.  The project team also faced many challenges during the 
trading framework development process, from determining the legality of 
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trading under a TMDL to negotiating with all stakeholders to ensure that their 
needs are met (Environomics 1999).  
 
21. NPS involvement and incentives to engage in trading. 
 
The primary incentive for farmers to participate is that they are partially 
compensated financially for BMPs. Gaining farmers’ broad support, however, 
could be a challenging process.  For example, many farmers were concerned 
about losing their water rights and making themselves more vulnerable to 
increased regulation (Environomics 1999).  Handing the trade administration 
over to a nonprofit association was one design choice that may have helped 
farmers feel more comfortable with the trading program and ensured that 
regulatory liability remained with the point source in any trade transaction 
(Claire Schary, personal communication, May 24, 2004).  
 
22. Other 
  
Program information/References 
 
Websites: 
Idaho Department of Environmental Quality: Lower Boise Effluent Trading 
Demonstration Project. 
http://www.deq.state.id.us/water/tmdls/lowerboise_effluent/lowerboiseriver_e
ffluent.htm 
 
Contacts: 
Claire Schary, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency Region 10.  (206) 553-
8514 
Susan Burke, Idaho Department of Environmental Quality. (208) 373-0574  
 
Written program information: 
Environomics (1999).  A summary of U.S. effluent trading and offset projects.  
A report prepared for Dr. Mahesh Podar, U.S. Environmental Protection 
Agency, Office of Water.  Retrieved May 7, 2004 from 
http://www.epa.gov/owow/watershed/trading/traenvrn.pdf 
Idaho Department of Environmental Quality. (2003).  Pollutant trading 
guidance, November 2003 Draft.  Retrieved May 17, 2004 from 
http://www.deq.state.id.us/water/wastewater/guidance_pollutant_trading
_Nov03.pdf 
------(2002) 2nd annual status report for the Lower Boise River Effluent 
Trading Demonstration Project.  Retrieved May 12, 2004 from 
http://www.deq.state.id.us/water/tmdls/lowerboise_effluent/Effluent_AR
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Reviewed by Claire Schary, US EPA Region 10. 
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Illinois Pretreatment Trading Program (IL) 
 
A.  Program Background 
1. Program description 
 
In 1995, the Illinois Environmental Protection Agency (IEPA) investigated 
five water quality trading options and determined that pretreatment trading 
had the “greatest potential” (Park 1996).  Through an amendment to the 
Illinois Environmental Protection Act in 1998, the General Assembly 
mandated IEPA to design a pretreatment market system that would give 
POTWs and their industrial permittees the greatest flexibility in achieving 
cost-effective pollution reductions.  The design team evaluated four 
operational pretreatment programs and found that federal categorical limits 
were often more stringent than local limits, making trading feasible primarily 
at the categorical level.   
 
However, the US EPA does not allow trading of the categorical pretreatment 
limits that mandate technology-based standards for industrial sectors (EPA 
2003).  Further development of a pretreatment trading program was not 
pursued, and no plans exist to revive the trading initiative in the immediate 
future due to a lack of interest from POTWs and industrial permittees and also 
staff and resource limitations within the IEPA (Toby Frevert, Personal 
Communication, May 14, 2004).   
 
2. Program motivation 
 
Minimization of compliance costs while meeting pretreatment regulatory 
requirements at the federal, state, and local levels was the motivation behind 
the establishment of a pretreatment market system.  The General Assembly 
wanted to employ a market-based approach for pollution reductions that 
would encourage innovative and cost-effective solutions while achieving 
environmental goals associated with water quality, sludge quality and 
protection of the treatment system (State of Illinois 1998).   
 
3. Pollutant being traded 
 
Multiple (within indirect discharges) 
 
4. Size of program 
 
Implementation of a pretreatment market system would be approved by IEPA 
for any POTW service area in Illinois meeting the following requirements: the 
POTW operates a local pretreatment program in accordance with State and 
federal regulations and has incorporated a market system or trading rule into 
that program; the POTW is not, at the time of application, in violation of 
NPDES requirements; and the POTW receives indirect discharges from 
industries subject to federal categorical or local pretreatment limits (Illinois 
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Environmental Protection Act, Section 13.4(d)).  At the time of the design of 
the program, there were 45 POTWs with delegated pretreatment programs in 
Illinois (Environomics 1999). 
 
Potential trading parties:  Indirect dischargers within POTW service areas in 
Illinois 
 
5. Stakeholders/participants 
 
• Industrial Dischargers - subject to federal categorical and local 
pretreatment limits 
• POTWs – responsible for implementing local pretreatment programs 
• Illinois Environmental Protection Agency (IEPA) – responsible for 
conducting water quality trading feasibility studies, designing pretreatment 
market system and approving implementation; Pretreatment Market 
System design team represented municipal, industrial and public interests 
• United States EPA – active participant in the development of a 
pretreatment trading rule for the State of Illinois and prohibitor of trading 
federal categorical pretreatment limits implemented through technology 
standards 
 
6. Regulatory drivers 
 
Section 13.4 of the Illinois Environmental Protection Act mandates the 
development of a pretreatment trading program by IEPA.  Development of the 
proposed trading rule was stymied by EPA’s Effluent Guidelines & 
Limitations, Parts 405-471, which designate technology-based categorical 
limits and also EPA’s water quality trading policy. 
 
 
B.  Trade Structure 
7. Determination of credit  
 
N/A 
 
8. Trading ratios and other mechanisms to deal with uncertainty  
 
N/A 
 
9. Liability/penalties for noncompliance 
 
N/A 
 
10. Approval process 
 
If a pretreatment trading program had been designed, within 120 days of 
receiving notification of a POTW’s intent to implement a pretreatment trading 
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rule, IEPA would provide approval based on the POTW’s ability to meet the 
following requirements: the POTW operates a local pretreatment program in 
accordance with State and federal regulations and has incorporated a market 
system into that program; the POTW is not, at the time of application, in 
violation of NPDES requirements; and the POTW receives indirect discharges 
from industries subject to federal categorical or local pretreatment limits 
(Illinois Environmental Protection Act, Section 13.4(d)). 
 
11. Ex post verification/auditing. 
 
N/A 
 
12. Mechanisms for trade identification and communication (education and 
outreach, third party facilitation, embedded ties) 
 
N/A 
 
13. Market structure (bilateral, clearinghouse, third party brokers) 
 
N/A 
 
14. Types of trades allowed 
 
Point/Point  
 
C.  Outcomes 
15. Types and volume of trades that have occurred 
 
N/A 
 
16. Administrative costs 
 
N/A 
 
17. Transaction costs 
 
N/A 
 
18. Cost savings 
 
One service area estimated a cost savings of $6.9 million dollars if able to 
trade federal categorical pretreatment limits (Park 1996).  
  
19. Program goals achieved  
 
No trading to achieve cost-effective reductions occurred and the pretreatment 
trading initiative is dormant. 
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20. Program obstacles 
 
US EPA does not allow categorical pretreatment loading allowances to be 
traded, but rather utilizes technology-based standards developed on an 
industry-by-industry basis to achieve the environmental goal.  Since federal 
categorical limits were more stringent than local limits, there was no incentive 
for trading. 
 
21. NPS involvement and incentives to engage in trading. 
 
N/A 
 
22. Other 
 
Program information/References 
 
Websites: 
http://cfpub.epa.gov/npdes/pretreatment/pstandards.cfm#categorical  
 
Contacts: 
Toby Frevert; Manager, Division of Water Pollution Control, Bureau of 
Water, Illinois EPA.  Telephone: 217-782-1654   
E-mail:Toby.Frevert@epa.state.il.us 
 
References: 
Park, James B. 1996. Original Comments on Watershed-Based Trading:  State 
of Illinois Environmental Protection Agency.  Retrieved May 7, 2004 
from 
http://www.epa.gov/OWOW/watershed/tradecom/level3/iepa.html 
State of Illinois.  Public Acts:  90th General Assembly.  Retrieved May 7, 2004 
from 
http://www.legis.state.il.us/legislation/publicacts/pubact90/acts/90-
0773.html  
Environomics. 1999.  A summary of U.S. effluent trading and offset projects.  
A report prepared for Dr. Mahesh Podar, U.S. Environmental Protection 
Agency, Office of Water.  Retrieved May 7, 2004 from 
http://www.epa.gov/owow/watershed/trading/traenvrn.pdf 
US Environmental Protection Agency, Office of Water. 2003.  Water Quality 
Trading Policy.  Retrieved May 13, 2004 from 
http://www.epa.gov/owow/watershed/trading/finalpolicy2003.pdf  
 
Reviewed by Toby Frevert, Illinois EPA. 
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Piasa Creek Watershed Project (IL) 
 
A.  Program Background 
1. Program description 
 
The Piasa Creek Watershed Project is a point/nonpoint trading program 
developed to reduce the flow of sediments into the Mississippi River.  
Facilitated by a local, not-for-profit organization, Great Rivers Land Trust 
(GRLT), and funded by the Illinois-American Water Company (IL-AWC), the 
Project is designed to generate nonpoint sediment reductions within the Piasa 
Creek, a tributary of the Mississippi River, over a period of ten years.  In 
exchange for funding the Project, the IL-AWC with the support of the Illinois 
Environmental Protection Agency (IEPA), was able to obtain an adjusted 
standard from effluent discharge requirements as granted by the Illinois 
Pollution Control Board (IPCB).  The adjusted standard enabled IL-AWC’s 
new public water supply treatment facility located in Alton, IL to directly 
discharge its residual into the Mississippi River rather than install a costly and 
publicly opposed lagoon, dewatering and landfill management system 
(Gregory 2003). 
 
The terms of the adjusted standard and contractual agreement signed between 
IL-AWC and GRLT for the Piasa Creek Watershed Project are incorporated 
into the Alton water treatment facility’s NPDES permit by IEPA.  First 
proposed by GRLT and brought before the IPCB by IL-AWC and IEPA in 
late 1999 and early 2000, implementation of the Project began in 2001 (IPCB 
2000b). 
 
In year one of the Project, GRLT updated its 1995 watershed plan, identified 
potential sediment reduction sites and control measures through a 
“geomorphic inventory assessment,” and contacted local landowners with the 
help of county Soil and Water Conservation Districts and USDA service 
centers (IPCB 2000a, Gregory 2003, Alley Ringhausen, personal 
communication, May 27, 2004).  During years two through five, GRLT has 
been working and will continue to work with landowners to install sediment 
control practices (Gregory 2003).  In year six, the halfway point of the 
program, IEPA will review IL-AWC’s adjusted NPDES permit and the 
Project itself to ensure sediment reductions (IPCB 2000b).  Between years six 
and ten, installation of sediment control structures will continue and by year 
ten, the Project will have reduced sedimentation within the Piasa Creek 
watershed by 6600 tons/year in accordance with a 2:1 trading ratio for the 
Alton facility’s 3300 tons/year direct discharge (Gregory 2003).  Projected 
year-end sediment reductions in 2003 were 2613 tons/year (ibid).   
 
Sediment reductions are achieved through such measures as land acquisition, 
conservation easements, streambank stabilization, and development of silt 
basins, dry dams, terraces, grassed waterways, filter strips, and grade control 
structures (Gregory 2003 and Cheng 2001).   
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As outlined by the GRLT at the first hearing before the IPCB, major 
components of the Piasa Creek Watershed Project include: watershed 
stewardship, siltation dam construction, monitoring, educational outreach, 
streambank protection, and land protection through acquisitions and 
easements (IPCB 1999).  
 
2. Program motivation 
 
IL-AWC decided to replace a water supply treatment facility in Alton, IL, that 
had been filtering Mississippi River water and supplying clean water to 
customers for over 100 years (Ringhausen n.d).  While the old water treatment 
facility was subject to flooding, it did receive regulatory relief from the IEPA 
in meeting environmental regulations (Gregory 2003).  The regulatory relief 
included a Site-Specific Exemption that allowed for direct discharge and a 
nonstandard NPDES permit that exempted the discharge from total suspended 
solids (TSS) and iron effluent standards (Gregory 2003, IPCB 2000b, Kieser 
2003).   
 
IEPA and a site specific impact study performed by ENSR environmental 
engineers determined a sediment lagoon, dewatering equipment and off-site 
landfilling would be necessary for the management of residuals at the new 
facility in accordance with Illinois technology-based effluent standards for 
suspended solids (Gregory 2003; Toby Frevert, personal communication, May 
21, 2004).  Other treatment alternatives included farmland application, 
discharge to the Alton POTW, and permanent storage in monofills (IPCB 
2000b).  While IL-AWC found the storage lagoon and landfill system to be 
“technologically feasible,” it did not consider the treatment “economically 
reasonable” (IPCB 2000b).  However, the IEPA would not support a variance 
allowing for direct discharge since IL-AWC had full knowledge of federal and 
State effluent and water quality standards during construction of the facility 
(IPCB 2000b).      
 
The lagoon system required a $7.4 million capital investment and would 
involve $0.42 million in annual operation and maintenance expenses (Gregory 
2003).  The hauling of dewatered solids from the storage lagoon to the landfill 
would also increase truck traffic along a national Scenic Byway, a fact that 
generated strong local opposition for both aesthetic and safety reasons 
(Gregory 2003).   
 
The Great Rivers Land Trust, the organization responsible for the Scenic 
Byway designation, proposed the Piasa Creek Watershed Project to IL-AWC 
and IEPA as an alternative to the lagoon and landfill requirements (IPCB 
1999, 2000a).  The Project would generate greater environmental benefits 
within the watershed via a 2:1 trading ratio for upstream nonpoint source 
reductions as compared to the direct discharge of the water treatment facility 
(IPCB 2000b).   
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GRLT supported the Project because it would help fund its watershed plan, 
allowing for larger scale demonstration projects, and target the real problem of 
sedimentation in the Mississippi River (nonpoint source pollution) (IPCB 
1999).  IL-AWC approved the proposal because the Project would be a cost-
effective means of meeting environmental regulations (requiring funds of 
$4.15 million over a period of ten years) and lessen any rate impacts on IL-
AWC customers (IPCB 1999, Gregory 2003).  Local groups supported the 
lower rate impacts and avoidance of any nuisance associated with a lagoon 
and landfill system (IPCB 1999, Gregory 2003).  Although first opposed to 
the proposal, IEPA determined the Project would achieve greater 
environmental benefits than on-site treatment by the IL-AWC facility and 
serve as a model for future trading initiatives managing point and nonpoint 
source reductions together (IPCB 1999, 2000b).   
 
3. Pollutant being traded 
 
Sediment 
 
4. Size of program 
 
Located in parts of Jersey, Macoupin and Madison counties, the Piasa Creek 
watershed drains over 78,000 acres (Ringhausen n.d.).  The 78,000 acres 
includes 44,705 acres of cropland, 15,029 acres of woodland, 13,930 acres of 
grassland, and 2,496 acres of urban development 
(www.greatriverslandtrust.com).  Most of the land in the Piasa Creek 
watershed is privately-owned (IPCB 2000a). The Piasa Creek is the last 
tributary of the Mississippi River before convergence with the Missouri River 
(IPCB 1999).  In 2000, the Piasa Creek was described as having a “foul odor” 
and being “loaded with sediment” predominantly as a result of urban 
development and wetland loss (IPCB 2000b).   
 
The new 16.0 million gallons per day (mgd) Alton public water supply 
treatment facility is located approximately five miles downstream from the 
Piasa Creek/Mississippi River confluence (ETN n.d., Ringhausen n.d.)  The 
residuals of the new facility would be almost identical in composition to the 
previous facility’s discharge and have little economic or environmental 
damage downstream (IPCB 2000b).  The new facility’s discharge of total 
suspended solids is 91% silt and 9% coagulants (IPCB 2000b). 
 
Potential trading parties:  Illinois-American Water Company’s public drinking 
water supply treatment facility in Alton, IL and nonpoint sources of sediments 
in the Piasa Creek Watershed, primarily agricultural lands 
 
5. Stakeholders/participants 
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• Illinois-American Water Company (IL-AWC) – applied for adjusted 
standard that would allow new public water supply treatment facility to 
directly discharge purification residuals into the Mississippi River, funds 
Piasa Creek Watershed Project in exchange for adjusted standard  
• Great Rivers Land Trust (GRLT) – formed by private citizens in 1992; 
created watershed plan in 1995; proposed Piasa Creek Watershed Project 
to IL-AWC and IEPA in 1999; sought technical and cooperative assistance 
from USDA, IEPA, IDNR, US Army Corps of Engineers, and County soil 
and water districts regarding project development; updated watershed plan 
in 2001; facilitates nonpoint sediment reductions; negotiates land 
acquisitions and easements; runs educational outreach programs 
encouraging local participation; administers Project; and monitors 
reductions 
• Illinois Environmental Protection Agency (IEPA) – supported Piasa Creek 
Watershed Project and filed joint motion with IL-AWC for adjusted 
standard, writes and issues NPDES discharge permit, monitors reductions, 
enforces terms of the adjusted standard and contractual agreement, and 
reviews Project’s effectiveness 
• Illinois Pollution Control Board (IPCB) – writes environmental laws for 
Illinois, granted adjusted standard for IL-AWC facility 
• Illinois Department of Natural Resources (IDNR) – worked with IL-AWC, 
GRLT, and IEPA on offset Project agreement 
• Alton Lake Heritage Parkway Commission – created by Illinois General 
Assembly, recommended formation of Great Rivers Land Trust, opposed 
lagoon and landfill management system, testified before the IPCB  
• River Bend Growth Association – testified before IPCB in opposition to 
lagoon and landfill management system because of the increased truck 
traffic and expense to taxpayers 
• City of Alton – opposed lagoon construction and off-site landfilling for 
safety and aesthetic reasons 
• IL-AWC’s customers – felt expense of residual management system in 
water rates 
• Landowners in the Piasa Creek Watershed – work with GRLT to achieve 
nonpoint sediment reductions 
• County Soil and Water Conservation Districts – help identify landowners 
for participation in the program and estimate sediment reductions 
 
6. Regulatory drivers 
 
In late 1999 and early 2000, counsel for the Illinois-American Water 
Company (IL-AWC) and Illinois Environmental Protection Agency (IEPA) 
introduced before the Illinois Pollution Control Board (IPCB), the Piasa Creek 
Watershed Project proposal which would enable the IL-AWC to receive an 
Adjusted Standard, AS 99-6, from 35 Illinois Administrative Code sections 
304.124, 304.106, and 302.203.  Section 304.106 “bans offensive discharges,” 
such that no effluent contains “settleable solids, floating debris, visible oil, 
grease, scum, or sludge solids” and color, odor, and turbidity are below 
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“obvious levels” (IPCB 2000b, IPCB 2002).  Section 304.124 delineates 
effluent standard concentrations (IPCB 2002).  Section 302.203 is the water 
quality standard that bans “offensive conditions” (IPCB 2000b, IPCB 2002).  
IPCB found the adjusted standard request to be consistent with federal law in 
that the designated use status of the Mississippi River would not change as a 
result of a direct discharge from the new facility (IPCB 2000b).  The approved 
adjusted standard and contractual agreement between GRLT and IL-AWC 
were written into the terms of the Alton facility’s NPDES permit by IEPA 
(IPCB 2000b).  The adjusted standard expires on September 7, 2007, but IL-
AWC may file for an extension (IPCB 2000b). 
 
B.  Trade Structure 
7. Determination of credit  
 
Streambank stabilization calculations performed quarterly (determination of 
erosion rates) and estimated sediment accumulations taken for silt basins 
(IPCB 2000a).  Physical measurements are also taken at maintenance time 
(Alley Ringhausen, personal communication, May 27, 2004).  GRLT employs 
the universal soil loss equation and USDA standards to estimate soil savings 
for different sediment control methods (Alley Ringhausen, personal 
communication, May 27, 2004).  Other nonpoint sediment control projects 
performed by the Illinois State Water Survey and IEPA’s Bureau of Water, 
Watershed Planning Section under Section 319 of the Clean Water Act were 
used to illustrate the likelihood of the Piasa Creek Watershed Project meeting 
its goal of 2:1 sediment reductions by the end of the year ten (IPCB 2000b).     
 
Credit is given for cost-share projects that receive additional funding from 
GRLT (Alley Ringhausen, personal communication, May 27, 2004).  Credit is 
not given for farm management plans such as no-till or minimal-till cropping 
systems that were put into place without Project aid (Alley Ringhausen, 
personal communication, May 27, 2004). 
 
Sediment reductions are intended to be sustainable (Alley Ringhausen, 
personal communication, May 27, 2004). 
 
Resource inventory worksheets are kept for every project (Gregory 2003). 
 
8. Trading ratios and other mechanisms to deal with uncertainty  
 
A 2:1 trading ratio must be in place by year ten of the Project.  IEPA used 
federal guidance for TMDLs in determining the trading ratio even though 
TMDLs did not apply in this specific case (IPCB 2000a).  IEPA showed 
conservatism in the trading ratio determination as TMDL guidance requires 
only a 1.5:1 ratio (IPCB 2000a). 
 
9. Liability/penalties for noncompliance 
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Landowners are responsible for the maintenance of sediment control 
structures built on their land (Alley Ringhausen, personal communication, 
May 27, 2004). 
 
If, at the halfway review point, the IEPA determines the program is not 
effective in achieving sediment reductions, the contract will be terminated 
(IPCB 2000b).  Although, this does not seem likely given the progress of the 
Project (Alley Ringhausen, personal communication, May 27, 2004). 
 
Monitoring and reporting requirements are incorporated into the NPDES 
permit in order to enable IEPA to monitor sediment offsets (IPCB 2000b). 
 
If, for some reason, GRLT disbands before the Project is completed, acquired 
lands, easements, and responsibility for the Project will be accepted by the 
Illinois Nature Conservancy or the Nature Institute (IPCB 2000b). 
 
10. Approval process 
 
Approval for the contractual agreement between GRLT and IL-AWC came 
from the IPCB and IEPA.  The process took almost two years from the time 
the motion for an adjusted standard was first filed in March 1999 to 
implementation of the program in 2001 (IPCB 2000b). 
 
Due to a high level of participation by landowners, GRLT ranks projects to 
receive funding based on a sliding scale of total tons soil saved and cost 
(cost/ton soil saved) (Alley Ringhausen, personal communication, May 27, 
2004).  
 
11. Ex post verification/auditing. 
 
GRLT is responsible for monitoring and provides quarterly and annual reports 
to IEPA and IL-AWC (Alley Ringhausen, personal communication, May 27, 
2004).  During the first year of the Project, GRLT provided monthly, 
quarterly, and annual reports (Alley Ringhausen, personal communication, 
May 27, 2004).   
 
Maintenance of sediment control structures is performed by landowners 
(Alley Ringhausen, personal communication, May 27, 2004). 
 
12. Mechanisms for trade identification and communication (education and 
outreach, third party facilitation, embedded ties) 
 
GRLT organizes educational outreach programs, such as the Piasa Creek 
Watershed Education Team, to involve local landowners and community 
members in the implementation of sedimentation control measures 
(www.greatriverslandtrust.com). 
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GRLT facilitates identification of priority nonpoint source reduction sites with 
the help of county Soil and Water Conservation Districts and USDA service 
centers (Alley Ringhausen, personal communication, May 27, 2004). 
 
Based on the success of demonstration projects, landowners now come to 
GRLT wanting to participate in the Project (see also NPS incentives) (Alley 
Ringhausen, personal communication, May 27, 2004).   
 
GRLT cooperates with other initiatives such as the Illinois Buffer Partnership 
program managed by Trees Forever to achieve sediment loadings reductions 
(www.greatriverslandtrust.com/Trees%20Forever.htm).  GRLT has also 
worked on projects with the Illinois Department of Transportation, the Illinois 
Department of Natural Resources, the Illinois Board of Education, and the 
City of  Alton (Alley Ringhausen, personal communication, May 27, 2004). 
 
13. Market structure (bilateral, clearinghouse, third party brokers) 
 
The Great Rivers Land Trust serves as a third party broker responsible for 
generating sediment reductions at nonpoint sources in order to fulfill the 
contractual agreement signed between Illinois-American Water Company and 
the Great Rivers Land Trust, the terms of which are incorporated into the 
Alton facility’s NPDES permit and written into Illinois law. 
 
14. Types of trades allowed 
 
Point/Nonpoint  
 
C.  Outcomes 
15. Types and volume of trades that have occurred 
 
An isolated trade agreement between IL-AWC and GRLT has occurred.  
Nonpoint source sediment reductions generated by the Project are mapped 
with accompanying meta-data that give project specifics such as the total 
number of acres affected, tons soil saved, percentage cost share funds, and 
percentage Project funds (Alley Ringhausen, personal communication, May 
27, 2004).  In 2004, year four of Project implementation, sediment reductions 
had already exceeded the halfway point (Alley Ringhausen, personal 
communication, May 27, 2004). 
 
16. Administrative costs 
Administrative costs account for 15% of individual project costs (Alley 
Ringhausen, personal communication, May 27, 2004). 
 
17. Transaction costs 
 
N/A.  Landowners are coming to GRLT with requests for project funding 
(Alley Ringhausen, personal communication, May 27, 2004). 
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18. Cost savings 
 
IL-AWC avoided capital, operation and maintenance costs associated with 
lagoon and landfill system and there was no waste of landfill space 
(Difference between capital investment of lagoon and Piasa Creek Watershed 
Project funding: app $3.25 million)  
 
GRLT is also able to supplement IL-AWC funding with in-kind services and 
federal matching grants (Cheng 2001, Alley Ringhausen, personal 
communication, May 27, 2004). 
 
19. Program goals achieved  
 
The goal of the Piasa Creek Watershed Project is to significantly reduce or 
mitigate nonpoint sources of sediments entering the Mississippi River from 
Piasa Creek (IPCB 1999).   Projected year-end sediment reductions in 2003 
were 2613 tons/year and the Project is ahead of schedule with sediment 
reductions already exceeding the halfway point (Gregory 2003, Alley 
Ringhausen, personal communication, May 27, 2004).   
 
The Piasa Creek Watershed Project has renewed the Piasa Creek Watershed 
plan, decreased rate impacts for IL-AWC customers as a result of costs 
savings associated with avoidance of the lagoon and landfill system, 
prevented increased truck traffic along a national Scenic Byway, and saved 
landfill space (Gregory 2003, Alley Ringhausen, personal communication, 
May 27, 2004).  The Project serves as a precedent for other point/nonpoint 
trading programs in Illinois (Gregory 2003, Alley Ringhausen, personal 
communication, May 27, 2004, Cheng 2001). 
 
20. Program obstacles 
 
At the start of the Project, landowners were hesitant and wary (Alley 
Ringhausen, personal communication, May 27, 2004).  However, GRLT 
employed county Soil and Water Conservation Districts, the NRCS, USDA 
service centers, and local individuals with agricultural knowledge to help 
explain the Project, facilitate agricultural interests and encourage participation 
(Alley Ringhausen, personal communication, May 27, 2004).  As a result of 
this initial outreach and the success of demonstration projects, the level of 
landowner participation is high and there is a waiting list for Project funding 
(Alley Ringhausen, personal communication, May 27, 2004). 
 
21. NPS involvement and incentives to engage in trading. 
 
Nonpoint source reductions are the backbone of the Piasa Creek Watershed 
Project.  As indicated by Richard Mollahan of the Watershed Planning Section 
in the IEPA’s Bureau of Water, the Project involved “a great deal of 
 117
landowner and organization cooperation” even before the proposal was 
approved by IPCB (IPCB 2000b).  All NPS pollution control measures in 
Illinois are voluntary (Cheng 2001). However, financial incentives encourage 
farmers and landowners to participate in the Project and implement 
conservation practices; “loss of acreage [as caused by erosion] means loss of 
income” (Alley Ringhausen, personal communication, May 27, 2004).   Due 
to the success of demonstration projects, voluntary landowner participation is 
high, and GRLT must rank proposed projects due to limited resources (Alley 
Ringhausen, personal communication, May 27, 2004).   
 
22. Other 
 
Program information/References 
Websites: 
Great Rivers Land Trust (home) http://www.greatriverslandtrust.com  
(Piasa Creek Watershed) http://www.greatriverslandtrust.com/pcwp.htm 
      (Illinois Buffer Partnership) 
http://www.greatriverslandtrust.com/Trees%20Forever.htm 
 
Contacts: 
Alley Ringhausen, Director Piasa Creek Watershed Project, Great Rivers  
Land Trust. Telephone: (618) 467-2265. E-mail:pcwp@piasanet.com 
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Acton WWTP (MA) 
 
A.  Program Background 
1. Program description 
 
The Town of Acton explored water quality trading to offset a new publicly 
owned treatment works (POTW).  Acton’s 20,000 residents historically relied 
on individual septic systems, many of which were failing.  Title V of the 
Massachusetts Environmental Code brought further pressure to develop a 
municipal sewer system, and the Town finally obtained funding in the late 
1990s (Woodward and Curran, n.d.).  Due to the degraded water quality of the 
Assabet River, however, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) 
denied the Town’s proposal for a discharge permit.   
 
The EPA entertained the idea of water quality trading, but it strongly 
advocated a groundwater infiltration facility rather than a trading program in 
light of the degraded river conditions (David Pincumbe, personal 
communication July 3, 2003).  Acton ultimately adopted this latter strategy 
and built a POTW that discharges into a groundwater infiltration basin rather 
than directly into the river.  Since the infiltration system does not appear to 
cause phosphorus loading of the river, there is no need for nonpoint source 
offsets.  
 
2. Program motivation 
 
As the largest town in the state without municipal wastewater treatment, 
Acton insisted that it needed a POTW to address its increasing problems of 
waste disposal and failing septic systems (Cole 1998).   The Assabet River, 
part of the Sudbury-Assabet-Concord (SuAsCo) basin, already suffered from 
high phosphorus loading from urban runoff, failing septic systems, and four 
upstream POTWs.  At a minimum, the EPA wanted a TMDL to determine 
loading before it could consider an additional POTW, but improving water 
quality really required reducing all phosphorus sources as much as possible 
(David Pincumbe, personal communication, July 3, 2003).   At low flow times 
the water table was pulled down so low that many towns faced water 
shortages and nearly all of the water in the Assabet’s main stem came from 
wastewater discharge (David Pincumbe, personal communication, July 3, 
2003).  Therefore, the EPA’s focus on groundwater infiltration facilities 
combined river protection and groundwater recharge.  
 
3. Pollutant being traded 
 
Phosphorus 
 
4. Size of program 
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The Sudbury-Assabet-Concord (SuAsCo) watershed encompasses 377 square 
miles and is experiencing rapid development (SuAsCo Watershed Council 
website).  Several nonpoint source offsets were considered as offsets for the 
Acton POTW, including agricultural BMPs, road sanding, and landscaping 
(Environomics 1999).    
 
Potential trading participants:  Town of Acton, MA; farmers 
 
5. Stakeholders/participants 
 
• Town of Acton, MA – initiated discussions about trading for proposed 
POTW  
• U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Region I – regulatory agency, 
denied Acton’s initial request for surface water discharge permit, steered 
Acton towards groundwater infiltration system 
• Massachusetts Department of Environmental Protection 
• SuAsCo Watershed Community Council – local environmental nonprofit 
 
6. Regulatory drivers 
 
At the time that Acton was exploring trading, a TMDL and a six-town 
Comprehensive Wastewater Management Plan (CWMP) were being written 
for the SuAsCo basin.  The CWMP proposed a phosphorus limit for 0.75 
mg/L, possibly eventually decreasing to 0.2 or 0.1 mg/L (Nancy Bryant, 
personal communication, April 4, 2002).  The Acton POTW may have faced a 
0.2 mg/L limit rather than 0.1 mg/L because it planned to offset all 
phosphorus discharge to surface water (Environomics 1999).  The TMDL for 
the Assabet River was finally completed in 2004 (David Pincumbe, personal 
communication, June 1, 2004). 
 
 
B.  Trade Structure 
7. Determination of credit  
 
Not determined.  Phosphorus credits could not be generated by the reductions 
resulting from replacing failing septic systems with the municipal sewer 
system (Environomics 1999). 
  
8. Trading ratios and other mechanisms to deal with uncertainty  
 
A trading ratio of 3:1 was proposed (Environomics 1999.)   
 
9. Liability/penalties for noncompliance 
 
Not determined. 
 
10. Approval process 
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Not determined. 
 
11. Ex post verification/auditing. 
 
Not determined. 
 
12. Mechanisms for trade identification and communication (education and 
outreach, third party facilitation, embedded ties) 
 
Not fully determined, but possibly third party facilitation.  The Town of Acton 
used GIS to identify phosphorus sources with the greatest water quality 
impact.  During a river clean-up effort organized by the Organization for the 
Assabet, volunteers surveyed 25 miles of shoreline and identified potential 
areas for nonpoint source phosphorus controls (Environomics 1999).  
 
13. Market structure (bilateral, clearinghouse, third party brokers) 
 
Not determined.  
 
14. Types of trades allowed 
 
Point/nonpoint offsets were considered. 
 
C.  Outcomes 
15. Types and volume of trades that have occurred 
 
None.  
 
16. Administrative costs 
 
Not determined 
 
17. Transaction costs 
 
Not determined. 
 
18. Cost savings 
 
The proposed scheme to build a $7 million surface-water discharge POTW, 
offset by nonpoint source phosphorus reductions, was estimated to save Acton 
residents $2.25 million annually.  Although the Town would have spent 
$100,000-200,000 annually for nonpoint source offsets, the POTW would 
enable residents to avoid approximately 150 septic tank reconstructions each 
year, with an average cost of $15,000 each. The operating costs for the POTW 
would be financed through user fees (Environomics 1999).   
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19. Program goals achieved  
 
No trading program was implemented.   The Town of Acton was able to build 
a groundwater infiltration POTW that did not impact surface water, obviating 
the need for water quality trading. 
 
20. Program obstacles 
 
The degraded condition of the SuAsCo basin was the primary reason that the 
EPA steered Acton towards an infiltration system rather than water quality 
trading, but the project faced additional obstacles.  Acton had difficulty 
identifying sufficient numbers of nonpoint sources to offset the POTW, partly 
phosphorus credits would not be granted for connecting failing septic systems 
to the municipal sewer system.   Environomics (1999) notes that phosphorus 
reductions resulting from the sewering could not be traded because of a debate 
over “additionality” (“additionality” means that credits are only tradable if the 
reductions would not be achieved in the absence of trading; in this case, 
Environomics suggests that sewering would not be considered additional 
because it would have happened as a matter of course).  However, the bigger 
issue was that the many of the septic systems drained to the Concord River, 
which is downstream of the Assabet River.  Phosphorus reductions achieved 
by sewering those properties would not have reduced phosphorus loading to 
the Assabet (David Pincumbe, personal communication, June 1, 2004). 
 
21. NPS involvement and incentives to engage in trading. 
 
Not determined. 
 
22. Other 
 
Program information/References 
 
Websites: 
SuAsCo Watershed Community Council, http://www.suasco.org 
 
Contacts: 
Nancy Bryant, SuAsCo Watershed Community Council.  (978) 461-0735 
David Pincumbe, Water Quality Management Section, U.S. Environmental 
Protection Agency, Region I.  (617) 565-3544 
 
Written Program Information: 
Cole, Caroline Louise (1998).  For Acton, sewer plan hinges on clean river: 
Assabet seen as key for treatment plant. Boston Globe, Northwest 
Weekly, August 9, 1998, p. 1. Retrieved from Lexis-Nexus Academic 
Universe. 
Environomics (1999).  A summary of U.S. effluent trading and offset projects.  
A report prepared for Dr. Mahesh Podar, U.S. Environmental Protection 
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Agency, Office of Water.  Retrieved May 7, 2004 from 
http://www.epa.gov/owow/watershed/trading/traenvrn.pdf 
Griesser, J. Elliot (2004).  Offset projects: success and suitability in 
addressing water quality impairment.  Unpublished master’s thesis, 
Bard College, Annandale on Hudson, NY. 
Woodward and Curran, Inc. (n.d.).  Sewer System Development and 
Treatment Facility Design: Acton, Massachusetts.  Retrieved March 31, 
2004 from 
http://www.woodardcurran.com/aoe_RelProjArticle/ProjectID/32/SA_I
D/218 
 
Reviewed by David Pincumbe, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Region I. 
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Charles River Flow-Trading Program (MA) 
 
A.  Program Background 
1. Program description 
 
The Charles River Watershed Association (CRWA) is establishing a water 
flow trading program that will re-engineer how municipalities manage 
rainwater. CRWA observed that municipal stormwater systems, which are 
designed to get rid of water quickly, have disrupted the water cycle in a way 
that increases total pollutant loading and decreases river flow.  Impervious 
surfaces have created contaminated stormwater runoff (e.g. by oil and grease 
in parking lots or agricultural chemicals in lawns and golf courses) that is 
subsequently collected and treated by WWTPs. The rainwater is no longer 
available to percolate through the soil and recharge the groundwater, and as a 
result, aquifers are being depleted and the base flow of the river is reduced.  
CRWA’s theory is that recharging clean water to the ground is a less 
expensive and more environmentally beneficial alternative to collecting and 
treating contaminated runoff.  In addition to reducing total pollutant loading to 
the river, it will boost river flows.  WWTPs benefit because fewer pollutants 
will be in their inflow, thereby reducing net treatment (EPA 2003).  
Additionally, greater river baseflow resulting from enhanced groundwater 
storage dilutes the effects of point source dischargers.  
 
A 1994 study found that combined sewer overflows (CSOs) and low river 
flows were the primary sources of impairment in the Charles River.  By 1996, 
CRWA started realizing that the larger problem was the way in which 
municipalities manage rainwater.  CRWA received a grant from the U.S. 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) in 1997 to investigate watershed 
permitting, and in 1998 began flow modeling for eight towns with help from 
the U.S. Geological Survey (USGS) (Robert Zimmerman, personal 
communication, May 28, 2004; ETN 2003).   CRWA also invented 
SmartStorm®, a rainwater remediation system that collects water in cisterns 
for watering lawns and washing cars, using an integral high-tech drywall 
system to infiltrate excess roof runoff back into the ground year round. The 
average home sheds 50,000-60,000 gallons of water off of the roof each year, 
and collecting this water for home use reduces groundwater withdrawal while 
the excess enhances groundwater storage(EPA 2003).   
 
Now supported by a 2003 EPA grant for water quality trading, CRWA and the 
Massachusetts Department of Environmental Protection (DEP) are working to 
develop a viable flow-trading program. CRWA has already negotiated flow 
and rainwater remediation deals with Intel and American National Power.  
These demonstration projects will inform the development of broader flow 
management rules and a water bank.  Payments made to the water bank will 
be made on a “water in/water out” basis at the subbasin level:  a discharger 
will calculate how much water is “lost” by its facility through consumptive 
use or infiltration/inflow (see “Program motivation”), and payments into the 
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water bank will offset this loss at a 2:1 ratio by funding rainwater collection 
and recharge systems, such as SmartStorm®. CRWA plans to test the water 
bank model by 2005 (Robert Zimmerman, personal communication, May 28, 
2004). 
 
2. Program motivation 
 
The base flow in the Charles River is so low that 90% of the summer river 
flow is treated wastewater (ETN 2003).  CRWA recognized that water quality 
would only be improved by an expansive and holistic approach to the 
hydrologic system, not simply by improving treatment at the WWTP.   
 
Trading was attractive because it provides economic incentives and funding 
mechanisms for improving stormwater management systems throughout the 
watershed (Robert Zimmerman, personal communication, May 28, 2004). 
 
3. Pollutant being traded 
 
Water flows 
 
4. Size of program 
 
The Charles River is 80 miles long and drains 308 square miles.  Purchasers 
of water flow credits within the watershed will likely be expanding WWTPs, 
municipal stormwater systems, residential and industrial developments, and 
water suppliers (Kathy Baskin, personal communication, May 24, 2004).   
Towns can generate credits by helping residential homeowners install 
SmartStorm® systems or by reducing groundwater withdrawal (Robert 
Zimmerman, personal communication, May 28, 2004).  
 
Potential trading parties: WWTPs, stormwater systems, residential and 
industrial developments, water suppliers, municipalities 
 
5. Stakeholders/participants 
 
• Charles River Watershed Association (CRWA): partner in the 
development of the flow-trading program 
• Massachusetts Department of Environmental Protection (DEP): partner in 
the development of the flow-trading program 
• U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA): provided grant money, 
issues NPDES permits in Massachusetts 
• U.S. Geological Survey (USGS): conducted flow monitoring 
• Municipalities: negotiate with landowners to install stormwater collection 
systems; potential purchasers of credits  
• Industrial dischargers, e.g. Intel and American National Power: purchasers 
of credits in demonstration projects 
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6. Regulatory drivers 
 
CRWA is motivated by environmental interests rather than cost-savings, and 
to some extent the inadequacy of the current regulatory context has driven its 
interest in flow-trading.  CRWA’s theory is that flow-trading will improve 
water quality in a way that traditional end-of-pipe limits or even TMDLs 
cannot achieve.  Ultimately, CRWA hopes to link groundwater recharge, 
including impervious surfaces and stormwater runoff, to permits for water 
withdrawal, development, and wastewater discharge (EPA 2003).  
 
TMDLs for phosphorus, nitrogen, bacteria, and dissolved oxygen (DO) are 
currently being developed for the watershed.  Flow-trading is separate from 
the TMDL process, but the TMDL can be used to verify how flow-trading 
reduces pollutant loading and improves river flow and habitat.  If the flow-
trading is successful, then it could be linked or used as an alternative to 
TMDLs in the future. (Robert Zimmerman, personal communication, May 28, 
2004).  
 
In 2001, the Massachusetts Bureau of Resource Protection enacted an Interim 
Policy on Infiltration and Inflow in recognition of how wastewater and 
stormwater collection systems can impede groundwater recharge.  Infiltration 
and inflow refers to water that enters the sewer system through defects or 
openings, such as yard drains, sump pumps, manhole covers, roof gutters, or 
indirect stormwater connections (BRP 2001).  Infiltration/inflow can account 
for a significant amount of water; the infiltration/inflow associated with the 
Deer Island WWTP is greater than the entire river flow of the Charles River 
(Robert Zimmerman, personal communication, May 28, 2004).  The Interim 
policy requires all NPDES permittees to develop and implement a plan to 
control infiltration/inflow, and the overall strategy is meant to prioritize areas 
for aquifer recharge (BRP 2001).   This infiltration/inflow issue may be used 
to steer dischargers towards flow trading. 
 
B.  Trade Structure 
7. Determination of credit  
 
The baselines for purchasing credits are set by the water in-water out 
equation.  This balance is modeled fairly readily.  It is not fully determined 
how the baseline will be set for rainwater remediation projects that generate 
credits (Robert Zimmerman, personal communication, May 28, 2004).  
 
8. Trading ratios and other mechanisms to deal with uncertainty  
 
The trading ratio will probably be 2:1.  The American National Power trade 
used nearly a 2.5:1 trading ratio (Robert Zimmerman, personal 
communication, May 28, 2004).   
  
9. Liability/penalties for noncompliance 
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Not determined. 
 
10. Approval process 
 
A third party, most likely a non-profit organization established for the 
purpose, will oversee the release of funds for rain water remediation and other 
credit-generating projects.  In the case of the American National Power (ANP) 
project, the money for flow offsets was banked with the Crossroads 
Community Foundation.  Individual rainwater remediation projects were 
approved by a five-person committee with representatives from two towns, 
CRWA, Crossroads, and ANP (Robert Zimmerman, personal communication, 
May 28, 2004). 
 
11. Ex post verification/auditing. 
 
The SmartStorm systems are maintained by the municipalities and CRWA 
(Robert Zimmerman, personal communication, May 28, 2004).  
 
12. Mechanisms for trade identification and communication (education and 
outreach, third party facilitation, embedded ties) 
 
Education and Outreach to municipalities, Embedded Ties to individual 
homeowners.  In the case of the ANP project, rainwater remediation projects 
were planned on a town basis.   The town itself negotiated with homeowners 
to install SmartStorm systems (Robert Zimmerman, personal communication, 
May 28, 2004).   
 
13. Market structure (bilateral, clearinghouse, third party brokers) 
 
The first couple of trades will be similar to third party brokers, since trades 
will probably be written directly into dischargers’ permits with direct links to 
the remediation projects.  CRWA plans to set up a clearinghouse or water 
bank to support flow-trades in the future (Kathy Baskin, personal 
communication, May 24, 2004). 
 
14. Types of trades allowed  
 
These trades are closest to point/nonpoint trades.  Point source dischargers 
will be able to pay into a water bank to fund water flow offsets in exchange 
for expanding or building a new facility.  
 
C.  Outcomes 
15. Types and volume of trades that have occurred 
 
CRWA already negotiated deals with Intel and American National Power 
(ANP).  ANP wanted to build two new gas-fired power plants in the upper 
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Charles River with a combined cooling water demand of 7 million gallons per 
day (gpd).  Under pressure from CRWA, ANP switched to air-cooled systems, 
reduced average daily flow to 80,000 gpd (the flow ranges from 13,000 gpd 
and to nearly 250,000 gpd during the peak summer months).   To offset these 
flows, ANP has paid $1.3 million to fund water flow projects such as the 
elimination of infiltration and inflow and rainwater remediation projects 
(Robert Zimmerman, personal communication, May 28, 2004).   
 
16. Administrative costs 
 
Not determined. 
 
17. Transaction costs 
 
Not determined. 
 
18. Cost savings 
 
Not determined. 
 
19. Program goals achieved  
 
The water bank has not yet been established, but the early pilot trades have 
been very successful (Robert Zimmerman, personal communication, May 28, 
2004).   
 
20. Program obstacles 
 
The biggest obstacle has been the predilection for following traditional 
engineering practices.  Water flow-trading requires municipalities and 
dischargers to completely change the way they think about water flows and 
water quality.  (Robert Zimmerman, personal communication, May 28, 2004).  
 
21. NPS involvement and incentives to engage in trading. 
 
Individual property owners who have a SmartStorm® system on their property 
will benefit from having irrigation water at a very low or no cost (Robert 
Zimmerman, personal communication, May 28, 2004). 
 
22. Other 
 
 
Program information/References 
 
Websites: 
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Region 1: Charles River.  
http://www.epa.gov/region1/charles/index.html 
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Charles River Watershed Association (CRWA).  http://www.crwa.org 
 
Contacts: 
Robert Zimmerman, Executive Director, Charles River Watershed 
Association.   (781) 788-0007 
Kathy Baskin, Technical Director, Charles River Watershed Association.  
(781) 788-0007 
 
Written Program Information: 
Bureau of Resource Protection (2001). Interim Infiltration and Inflow 
Policy, Policy No. BRP01-1, Effective September 6, 2001.  
Massachusetts Department of Environmental Protection.  Retrieved 
May 23, 2004 from 
http://www.mass.gov/dep/brp/wwm/files/iipolicy.doc 
Environmental Trading Network (2003).  April 30, 2003 Conference Call.  
Retrieved May 11, 2004 from 
http://www.envtn.org/calls/april2003call.pdf 
Landers, J. (2003).  Water quality trading program seeks to restore natural 
river flows.  Civil Engineering, the journal of the American Society 
of Civil Engineers. 73(4): 22-24. 
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (2003).  EPA selects Charles River 
Watershed Association for innovative water trading project.  EPA 
New England Press Release, February 13, 2003, Release # 03-02-04.  
Retrieved May 24, 2004 from 
http://www.epa.gov/region1/pr/2003/feb/030204.html 
 
Reviewed by Robert Zimmerman, Charles River Watershed Association. 
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Edgartown WWTP (MA) 
 
A.  Program Background 
1. Program description 
 
The Edgartown wastewater treatment plant (WWTP) was upgraded in 1996 to 
meet Class I Ground Water Discharge Standards. The upgrade increased the 
WWTP’s flow capacity from 500,00 gallons per day (gpd) to 750,000 gpd 
(average daily flow was 250,000 gpd before the upgrade, but ranged from 
55,000 gpd in the winter to over 450,000 gpd in the summer during 2003) 
(MA DEP 1999; Claire Barker, personal communication, June 2, 2004).  At 
the same time, actual nitrogen discharge was reduced from approximately 
3000 or 4000 kg/year to 625 kg/year (Bill Wilcox, personal communication, 
May 24, 2004).  The permit sets a target goal of 2,200 kg/year, which is three 
times higher than the current discharge.  This goal was based on the nitrogen 
loading tolerance of Edgartown Great Pond and will give the WWTP the 
capacity to tie in several hundred additional homes (Bill Wilcox, personal 
communication, May 24, 2004).   
 
The Edgartown Wastewater Commission applied for the WWTP’s new permit 
in December 1997 and was issued the permit in December 1999. During the 
review of the permit, the Martha’s Vineyard Commission (MVC) completed a 
report to determine Great Pond’s tolerance for nitrogen loading and describe 
nutrient management options under three growth scenarios (MVC 1998).  The 
report recommended that Edgartown reduce nonpoint sources of nitrogen 
loading by sewering an additional 300 residences near Great Pond, which the 
authors visualized as a subdivision near the WWTP, and installing on-site 
denitrification systems for approximately 900 homes elsewhere in the 
watershed (Bill Wilcox, personally communication, May 24, 2004; MA DEP 
2003).   Additional nitrogen-reducing measures included reducing fertilizer 
use and purchasing conservation easements from vacant lots in the watershed.  
All of these nonpoint source projects would be voluntary, and there is no 
current timetable for their implementation.  The WWTP permit itself contains 
no offset requirements or provisions.   
 
Edgartown has not ended up extending sewers to the subdivision near the 
WWTP, but it has accepted treatment from a golf course and clubhouse, 
comprising approximately 10,000 gallons per day (gpd).  The golf course was 
not part of the 1998 MVC study, so this load is in addition to those projected 
in the study.  A neighborhood that has discovered nitrogen leaching into their 
well water is also considering tying into the WWTP (Bill Wilcox, personal 
communication, May 24, 2004).    
 
Nitrogen reductions from the other avenues have similarly seen mixed 
progress.  Interest in denitrification systems has languished, primarily because 
of the high cost to individual homeowners but also because the Board of 
Health, which enforces regulations for on site wastewater disposal, remains 
 131
unconvinced that Great Pond needs that level of protection.  Public education 
about reducing lawn fertilizer, however, has been taken on by a diverse set of 
organizations, including the Great Pond Foundation and the Edgartown Ponds 
Advisory Committee.  Furthermore, the acquisition of conservation land has 
far exceeded the 200 acres (under low growth scenarios) recommended by the 
1998 MVC report.  The individual acquisitions of Town of Edgartown, the 
Department of Environmental Management, the Martha’s Vineyard Land 
Bank, and the Nature Conservancy collectively add up to several hundred 
acres of land with conservation easements, primarily for habitat protection or 
the preservation of open space (Bill Wilcox, personal communication, May 
24, 2004).  
 
The Massachusetts DEP portrays this as a point/nonpoint source trade, 
suggesting that Edgartown received a larger nitrogen load allocation in 
exchange for reducing nonpoint source nitrogen loading (MA DEP 2003).   
The original intent of the nonpoint source nitrogen reductions was not, 
however, to directly offset the WWTP discharge.  The nonpoint source 
projects were recommended as a margin of safety to compensate for any 
calculation errors in Great Pond’s nitrogen loading capacity (Bill Wilcox, 
personal communication, May 24, 2004).   
 
The 1998 study did not recommend trades as much as it outlined a program to 
keep within a yearly loading limit of total nitrogen to Edgartown Great Pond.  
The study assigned projected loads to various sources, but trading was not 
recommended in the study or pursued as an implementation.  The Town will 
need additional nitrogen reductions if the WWTP approaches capacity.  If in 
any year the load reaches 80% of the 2,200 kg/year target, the Town must 
develop a plan of specific actions to keep within the target.   At present the 
facility averages 5 mg/L total nitrogen, but the Town would need additional 
treatment to reduce its nitrogen discharge to the 2.1 mg/L limit needed for 
750,000 gpd (Claire Barker, personal communication, June 2, 2004).   
 
2. Program motivation 
 
Edgartown Great Pond is a brackish coastal pond on the island of Martha’s 
Vineyard.  The pond is separated from the Atlantic Ocean by a barrier beach, 
which is breached for about a week every three months by excavating a trench 
between the pond and ocean.  The breaching maintains pond salinity and 
brings the pond down to sea level, and since it also increases the rate of 
groundwater nitrogen discharge, it is important to leave the trench open for 
long enough to remove sufficient nitrogen from the pond.  The pond appears 
to alternate between excess nitrogen and times of nitrogen deficiency, but on 
the whole, excess nutrient loading has contributed to algae blooms, oyster 
kills, and declines in eelgrass beds. Currently, septic systems contribute 
approximately 30% of the nitrogen loading in great pond, followed by farms 
at 14%, the WWTP at 8%, and lawns/garden at 3%.  Acid rain contributes 
approximately 45% of the nitrogen loading, but it is not caused locally (MVC 
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1998).  Buildout projections predict septic systems will become the primary 
source of nitrogen. 
 
The WWTP upgrade provided the opportunity to think more broadly about 
nutrient management in the watershed.   MVC’s proposal for the nutrient 
study coincided with a movement among some residents to contest the 
increased flow of the WWTP.  At the same time, the DEP was interested in 
innovative options for reducing nutrient loads, and the MVC study provided 
an opportunity to explore some degree of nitrogen offsets for Edgartown (Bill 
Wilcox, personal communication, May 24, 2004).   
 
3. Pollutant being traded 
 
Nitrogen 
 
4. Size of program 
 
The recharge area for Great Pond is approximately 5150 acres, which included 
615 residential structures, hundreds of buildable lots, and 2348 acres of 
conservation land as of 1998 (MVC 1998).  There is no plan for actual trades 
or offsets, but recommendations for nitrogen reduction included sewering 300 
homes near the WWTP, installing denitrification systems in 900 new homes 
elsewhere in the watershed, reducing fertilizer use, and acquiring conservation 
land (MA DEP 2003).  Edgartown has tied a golf course and clubhouse into 
their WWTP, and fertilizer reduction and conservation easements have been 
pursued by other organizations.  
 
Potential trading parties: Edgartown WWTP; residential property owners  
 
5. Stakeholders/participants 
 
• Martha’s Vineyard Commission (MVC): conducted study of nutrient 
loading and management options in Great Pond in 1998 
• Edgartown Wastewater Commission: permittee for Edgartown WWTP 
• Massachusetts Department of Environmental Protection (DEP): issues 
groundwater discharge permit for Edgartown WWTP; provided grant to 
MVC for the 1998 nutrient loading and management report  
• University of Massachusetts Cooperative Extension: partnered in the 
MVC 1998 study 
 
6. Regulatory drivers 
 
The DEP issues groundwater discharge permits in Massachusetts.  The 
WWTP upgrade did not violate antibacksliding or antidegradation provisions 
of the Clean Water Act, for it drastically reduced the WWTP’s nitrogen 
discharge. Although Massachusetts regulations do not expressly authorize 
nutrient trading, the DEP had an interest in exploring nonpoint source offsets 
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in Edgartown, particularly because of the residents’ opposition to the 
WWTP’s new permit.  
 
 
B.  Trade Structure 
7. Determination of credit  
 
No “credits” are determined or traded.  Connecting 300 homes to the WWTP 
was estimated to reduce nitrogen loads by 1130 kg/year, while installing on-
site denitification systems for approximately 900 new homes was estimated to 
reduce nitrogen by 1135 kg/year (MA DEP 2003).   But since there is no 
official trade, actual nitrogen reductions resulting from the golf course tie-in 
have not been calculated.  
 
8. Trading ratios and other mechanisms to deal with uncertainty  
 
The nonpoint source projects are simply meant to compensate for the 
uncertainty in calculating Great Pond’s nitrogen carrying capacity (Bill 
Wilcox, personal communication, May 24, 2004).  Since no firm “offsets” or 
“credits” are determined, trading ratios are not applicable.   
  
9. Liability/penalties for noncompliance 
 
Not applicable.  The Edgartown Wastewater Commission is not required to 
install nonpoint source nitrogen reductions. 
 
10. Approval process 
 
Not applicable.   
 
11. Ex post verification/auditing. 
 
Not applicable. 
 
12. Mechanisms for trade identification and communication (education and 
outreach, third party facilitation, embedded ties) 
 
The MVC report (1998) identified several measures for reducing nonpoint 
source loading. Individual nonpoint source projects are pursued for a variety 
of reasons that have no direct connection to WWTP offsets; the golf course 
and subdivision with nitrogen contamination sought WWTP connections to 
solve their own wastewater problems, and conservation land is acquired by 
various organizations to further their own goals of open space or habitat.    
 
13. Market structure (bilateral, clearinghouse, third party brokers) 
 
There are no official offsets or trades. 
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14. Types of trades allowed  
 
Although the DEP characterizes these as point/nonpoint offsets (MA DEP 
2003), there are no actual trades.   
 
C.  Outcomes 
15. Types and volume of trades that have occurred 
 
No actual “trades” have occurred. “Program Description” describes several 
nonpoint source nutrient-reducing measures, but these have not been actual 
offsets or trades.  
 
16. Administrative costs 
 
Not applicable. 
 
17. Transaction costs 
 
Not applicable. 
 
18. Cost savings 
 
Not applicable. 
 
19. Program goals achieved  
 
It is not accurate to delineate any program goals since there has not been an 
official trading or offset program. The MVC report (1998) recommended 
several nonpoint source nitrogen reduction measures, and indeed there have 
been reductions associated with the golf course tie-in and the acquisition of 
conservation easements.  However, these reductions have not been in the 
context of any official trades or offsets.  
 
20. Program obstacles 
 
The MA DEP cites funding for sewer extensions and conservation easements 
as an obstacle (MA DEP 2003).  The MVC report (1998) describes the 
disadvantages associated with each nitrogen reduction measure – such as high 
financial costs, consuming WWTP capacity that could potentially be used for 
downtown expansion, or difficulty of public outreach – that would serve as 
obstacles to their implementation.  
 
21. NPS involvement and incentives to engage in trading. 
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Nonpoint sources do not engage in trading per se, but individual nonpoint 
sources (the golf course and subdivision) have pursued WWTP tie-ins to solve 
their wastewater problems.   
 
22. Other 
 
 
Program information/References 
 
Websites: 
See individual online documents, listed below 
 
Contacts: 
Bill Wilcox, Martha’s Vineyard Commission.  (508) 693-3453 
Claire Barker, Massachusetts Department of Environmental Protection.  (617) 
556-1128 
 
Written Program Information: 
Barker, Claire I. (2003).  Using nutrient offsets to improve water quality 
[Powerpoint].  Massachusetts Estuary Project, Massachusetts 
Department of Environmental Protection.  Presented to the 
Environmental Business Council of New England on February 23, 
2003.  Retrieved on May 3, 2004 from 
http://www.ebcne.org/ppts/clairebarker.ppt 
Martha’s Vineyard Commission (MVC) (1998)  Edgartown Great Pond: 
nutrient loading and recommended management program.  Available 
on request from the Martha’s Vineyard Commission.  
Massachusetts Department of Environmental Protection (MA DEP) 
(2003).  Appendix 1: nutrient trading: background and case studies.  
In The Massachusetts Estuaries Project: embayment restoration and 
guidance for implementation strategies.  Retrieved May 4, 2004 from 
http://www.mass.gov/dep/smerp/files/mepappen.pdf 
------(1999).  Discharge Permit SE #2-24.  Issued to the Edgartown 
Wastewater Commission for the Edgartown municipal wastewater 
treatment facility, March 5, 1999. 
 
Reviewed by Bill Wilcox, Martha’s Vineyard Commission and Claire Barker, 
Massachusetts Department of Environmental Protection. 
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Falmouth WWTP (MA) 
 
A.  Program Background 
1. Program description 
 
The Town of Falmouth, MA will implement nonpoint source nitrogen 
reduction measures in conjunction with its current wastewater treatment plant 
(WWTP) upgrade.  The nonpoint source projects, which include connecting 
additional properties to the sewer and installing on-site denitification systems, 
grew out of a comprehensive wastewater management plan developed by the 
Town from 1998-2001.  Construction on the new WWTP began in June, 2003 
and does not yet include plans for sewer connections (Town of Falmouth 
n.d.).  However, the current discharge permit does require the Town to submit 
a proposed schedule for constructing the sewers proposed by the plan (MA 
DEP 2002), and it is likely that the new WWTP permit will specify a 
construction timetable (Brian Dudley, personal communication, May 24, 
2004).   
 
As one of the last four Class III facilities in the state, the Falmouth WWTP did 
not previously have nitrogen controls but tried to reduce nitrogen loading by 
spray irrigating about 75% of the effluent into woodlands near the facility 
(Costa 1997).  The discharge contained approximately 23 mg/L total nitrogen, 
with a permit up to 50 mg/L.  The WWTP upgrades will increase the flow 
capacity from 810,000 gallons per day (gpd) to 1.2 million gallons per day 
(although only 1 mgd can be discharged within the watershed), while reducing 
nitrogen discharge to 3 mg/L nitrogen through tertiary treatment.  Annual 
nitrogen loading will be capped at 9,100 lbs (MA DEP 2003).   
 
The Town expects to offset some of the nitrogen discharge by connecting 
more than 400 properties to the WWTP in dense areas of West Falmouth 
Harbor and installing on-site dentrification systems eastern portions of the 
watershed (Weeks 2004; MA DEP 2003).  It has not been determined whether 
the sewer connections will be funded through betterment assessments or taxes.  
The denitrification systems will be operated and managed by the town, but the 
costs will be borne by the individual property owners (Brian Dudley, personal 
communication, May 24, 2004).  The Town’s Wastewater Treatment Facility 
Improvement Project does not include sewer expansions at this time (Town of 
Falmouth n.d.), but current permit requires the Town to submit a proposed 
construction schedule to the DEP, and the final WWTP permit, which will be 
completed by late 2005, will likely require an implementation timetable   
(Brian Dudley, personal communication, May 24, 2004).   
 
In some sense, the anticipated offsets have already been “counted,” since they 
were taken into account when determining the WWTP’s annual nitrogen load 
limit.  The 9,100 lb/year limit was back calculated from West Falmouth 
Harbor’s estimated nitrogen carrying capacity, accounting for anticipated 
nonpoint source offsets and attenuation factors (Brian Dudley, personal 
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communication, May 24, 2004).  The attenuation factors acknowledge that the 
nutrient loading to West Falmouth Bay is reduced by 20% in the Masapaquit 
Creek salt marsh and 45% through the spray irrigation (MA DEP 2003). 
 
2. Program motivation 
 
West Falmouth Harbor suffers from excess nitrogen loading and 
eutrophication (MA DEP 2003). Wastewater constitutes approximately 70-
80% of the nitrogen load in the Harbor (Brian Dudley, personal 
communication, May 24, 2004), or about 55% after considering attenuation 
factors (Burce and Kang 2002). 
 
A 1997 report conducted by Falmouth by the Buzzards Bay Project 
recommended that the Town consider facilities planning and an upgrade to 
tertiary treatment (Costa 1997).  The Falmouth WWTP had reached 80% of its 
permitted facility, which is often the trigger point for DEP review, partly due 
to the renovation of summer homes into year-round use.   Furthermore, 
Falmouth was one of the last four towns in Massachusetts to have a Class III 
groundwater discharge WWTP, and it was likely that the DEP would be 
considering more stringent limits (Costa 1997). Environmentally concerned 
citizens focused on the nitrogen issue and provided the impetus to explore 
nonpoint source nutrient reductions (Brian Dudley, personal communication, 
May 24, 2004).  The Town of Falmouth’s comprehensive wastewater facility 
plan, completed over 1998-2001 with the consulting services of Stearns & 
Wheler, LLC, recommended the sewering and denitification systems in 
addition to the WWTP upgrades (Weeks 2004).   
 
3. Pollutant being traded 
 
Nitrogen 
 
4. Size of program 
 
The potential nitrogen offsets will come from two sources: sewering 400 
properties west of Route 28, and installing on-site denitrification systems east 
of Route 28.  
 
Potential trading parties: Falmouth WWTP; local property owners  
 
5. Stakeholders/participants 
 
• Town of Falmouth 
• Massachusetts Department of Environmental Protection (MA DEP): issues 
groundwater discharge permits; currently evaluating watershed planning 
and nitrogen limits for coastal watersheds under the Massachusetts 
Estuaries Project (MEP) 
 138
• Buzzards Bay Project: prepared nitrogen loading reports for Falmouth 
(Costa 1997) 
• Cape Cod Commission: worked with the Buzzards Bay Project and the 
Town of Falmouth to determine nitrogen loads to West Falmouth Harbor 
• School for Marine Science & Technology (SMAST), University of 
Massachusetts Dartmouth: conducted watershed evaluations and 
developed nitrogen loading limits in partnership with the DEP 
• Local environmentally-concerned citizens: provided impetus for focusing 
on nonpoint source nitrogen loads 
• Stearn’s and Wheler, LLC: consulting company for the Town of 
Falmouth’s wastewater facilities planning 
 
6. Regulatory drivers 
 
The MA DEP issues groundwater discharge permits in Massachusetts.  The 
Falmouth WWTP upgrade did not violate antibacksliding or antidegradation 
provisions of the Clean Water Act, for it drastically reduced the WWTP’s 
nitrogen discharge.  The Town of Falmouth did not face a strict regulatory 
incentive for developing nonpoint source offsets; it was motivated to include 
offsets in its comprehensive wastewater facilities plan because of local citizen 
action.  
 
West Falmouth Harbor does not currently have a TMDL, but it is in the 
Round 1 list of estuaries for which the Massachusetts Estuaries Program 
(MEP) will develop nitrogen limits and TMDLs.   
 
B.  Trade Structure 
7. Determination of credit  
 
The estimated nitrogen carrying capacity of West Falmouth Harbor was used 
to back calculate the nitrogen allocations and reduction goals, taking into 
account the attenuation factors and anticipated offsets (Brian Dudley, personal 
communication, May 24, 2004).  It is not clear whether the individual 
nonpoint source reductions will be quantified and written into the final permit, 
but some kind of accounting system will be developed to ensure that the loads 
to the  Harbor do not exceed the threshold (Brian Dudley, personal 
communication, June 1, 2004).    
 
8. Trading ratios and other mechanisms to deal with uncertainty  
 
The trading ratio was 1:1 (Claire Barker, personal communication, May 4, 
2004), in the sense that offsets were taken into account without a discount for 
uncertainty. 
 
9. Liability/penalties for noncompliance 
 
Not determined. 
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10. Approval process 
 
Not determined. 
 
11. Ex post verification/auditing. 
 
Not determined. 
 
12. Mechanisms for trade identification and communication (education and 
outreach, third party facilitation, embedded ties) 
  
Embedded ties. The comprehensive wastewater management plan, completed 
in 2001, recommended several areas for sewering and installing on-site 
denitrification.  The Town will likely be identifying and negotiating with 
individual property owners within its jurisdiction.  
 
13. Market structure (bilateral, clearinghouse, third party brokers) 
 
Sole-source offsets.  The Town will implement additional sewer connections 
and centrally-managed, on-site denitification systems to offset its wastewater 
treatment plant discharge.  However, since the individual property owners will 
bear much of the costs of offsets, it is difficult to characterize this as a market 
in which a point source purchases offsets from nonpoint sources.   
 
14. Types of trades allowed  
 
Point/nonpoint. 
 
C.  Outcomes 
15. Types and volume of trades that have occurred 
 
None.  No nonpoint source offsets have been constructed yet.  
 
16. Administrative costs 
 
Not determined. 
 
17. Transaction costs 
 
Not determined. 
 
18. Cost savings 
 
The WWTP upgrades will cost approximately $800,000 for design and 
$14,070,000 for construction (Town of Falmouth n.d.). There are no estimates 
yet on the costs of for the nonpoint source nitrogen reduction projects, and 
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funding has not yet been determined.  It is not possible to determine cost 
savings, since the WWTP would probably have continued with current 
operations for some time in the absence of the offset program (Brian Dudley, 
personal communication, May 24, 2004). 
 
19. Program goals achieved  
 
It is still too early to determine the outcome of the program. 
 
20. Program obstacles 
 
Funding and some local political issues may be an obstacle, but the interest 
throughout the town in restoring the embayments will likely overcome these 
problems (Brian Dudley, personal communication, June 1, 2004).  
 
21. NPS involvement and incentives to engage in trading. 
 
Not determined.  Since individual property owners will bear the costs of on-
site denitrification systems, and may pay for sewer connections, presumably 
they will not participate unless their participation solves their own wastewater 
problems.  
 
22. Other 
 
 
 
 
Program information/References 
 
Websites: 
See individual online documents, listed below 
 
Contacts: 
Brian Dudley, Massachusetts Department of Environmental Protection.  (508) 
946-2753 
 
Written Program Information: 
Barker, Claire I. (2003).  Using nutrient offsets to improve water quality 
[Powerpoint].  Massachusetts Estuary Project, Massachusetts 
Department of Environmental Protection.  Presented to the 
Environmental Business Council of New England on February 23, 
2003.  Retrieved on May 3, 2004 from 
http://www.ebcne.org/ppts/clairebarker.ppt 
Burce, Allison and Kang, Simon (2002).  Quantifying nitrogen attenuation 
through West Falmouth aquifer using boron as a tracer.  Student 
research from the Summer 2002 Semester in Environmental Science.  
Marine Biological Laboratory, Woods Hole, MA.  Retrieved May 
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24, 2004 from 
http://courses.mbl.edu/SES/data/project/2002/burce.pdf 
Costa, Joseph E. (1997).  An updated analysis of wastewater disposal at 
the Falmouth wastewater disposal facility with respect to nitrogen 
loading in West Falmouth Harbor.  Buzzards Bay Project, National 
Estuary Program. Retrieved May 23, 2004 from 
http://www.buzzardsbay.org/wfup997.htm 
Massachusetts Department of Environmental Protection (MA DEP) 
(2003).  Appendix 1: nutrient trading: background and case studes.  
In The Massachusetts Estuaries Project: embayment restoration and 
guidance for implementation strategies.  Retrieved May 4, 2004 from 
http://www.mass.gov/dep/smerp/files/mepappen.pdf 
------(2002).  Discharge Permit SE#3-168.  Issued to the Town of 
Falmouth Utilities Department for the Falmouth municipal 
wastewater treatment facility, February 15, 2002. 
Town of Falmouth (2003). Wastewater Treatment Facility (WWTF) 
Improvement Project.  Retrieved May 24, 2004 from 
http://www.town.falmouth.ma.us/deppage.php?number=65 
Weeks, Nathan C (2004). Wastewater and nitrogen management planning 
in coastal watershed.  Stearns & Wheler, LLC. Presented at the New 
York Water Environment Association Annual Meeting, New York, 
NY, February 4, 2004. Retrieved May 25, 2004 from   
 http://www.sw-engineers.com/downloads/Wastewater%20and%20N 
 itrogen%20Management%20Planning.pdf 
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Massachusetts Estuaries Project (MEP) 
 
A.  Program Background 
1. Program description 
 
The Massachusetts Estuaries Project (MEP) is a $12 million project to provide 
technical data and guidance on nitrogen loading, limits, and management 
options for 89 estuaries in southeastern Massachusetts.  The project was 
initiated in 2001 and will run for six years.  Coastal communities are 
encouraged by the MEP guidance document to consider nitrogen trading, and 
the DEP initiated pilot projects in three estuaries to provide roadmaps for 
trading and watershed-wide permitting.  The pilots were initiated in October, 
2003 with a Water Quality Cooperative Agreement grant from the EPA Office 
of Wastewater Management, and they will run through September, 2005 
(Claire Barker, personal communication, May 4, 2004).  
  
The three estuaries chosen as pilots are Popponesset Bay, Three Bays, and the 
Wareham-Agawam River.  Each pilot was chosen because it is representative 
of many other estuaries and will provide a good model for other communities. 
To date, no trading framework has been determined (Claire Barker, personal 
communication, May 4, 2004).  
   
2. Program motivation 
 
Nitrogen trading will give coastal communities another tool to address 
nitrogen pollution.  Heavy nutrient loads, particularly nitrogen, have reduced 
the dissolved oxygen available in the water, leading to fish kills and declines 
in eelgrass beds (a crucial aquatic habitat).   
 
The DEP expects that the pilots will help develop a trading framework, inform 
future regulation, and provide a roadmap for watershed-based  permitting and 
nutrient trading.  Southeastern Massachusetts relies heavily on fishing and 
tourism; many of its citizens and officials are very environmentally aware and 
understand the issues raised by nitrogen pollution.  (Claire Barker, personal 
communication, May 4, 2004).   
 
3. Pollutant being traded 
 
Nitrogen 
 
4. Size of program 
 
Wastewater, primarily from septic systems but also from groundwater 
discharge wastewater treatment plants (WWTPs), is the dominant source of 
nitrogen loading in the Poppenesset Bay and Three Bays areas.  Stormwater 
runoff is another source of nitrogen, while cranberry bogs and wetlands result 
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in nitrogen uptake. The Wareham-Agawam River Watershed also includes 
WWTPs that discharge into surface water.  
 
Potential trading parties: wastewater treatment plants; stormwater runoff; 
cranberry bogs; wetlands 
 
5. Stakeholders/participants 
 
• Massachusetts Department of Environmental Protection (DEP): 
collaborative partner in the MEP; conducting nutrient trading pilot 
programs 
• University of Massachusetts, School of Marine Science and Technology 
(SMAST): collaborative partner in the MEP; conducting nutrient 
monitoring, eel grass mapping, and regional estuary modeling to 
determine target nitrogen loads 
• U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Region 1: collaborative partner in 
the MEP 
• Massachusetts Executive Office of Environmental Affairs (EOEA): 
collaborative partner in the MEP 
• Cape Cod Commission: collaborative partner in the MEP 
• Communities within the three pilot watersheds (Mashpee, Barnstable, 
Sandwich, Wareham, Plymouth and Carver):  
 
6. Regulatory drivers 
 
Massachusetts does not have regulations that explicitly authorize nutrient 
trading, but the DEP has encouraged communities to explore trading in their 
watershed planning and nutrient reduction plans (MA DEP 2003).  The MEP 
will establish target nitrogen load limits that will form the basis of TMDLs.  
The pilots will evaluate how to incorporate water quality trading into TMDL 
implementation (Claire Barker, personal communication, May 4, 2004).  
 
B.  Trade Structure 
7. Determination of credit  
 
Not determined. It is not clear how the TMDLs will affect the baselines for 
trading (Claire Barker, personal communication, May 4, 2004). 
 
8. Trading ratios and other mechanisms to deal with uncertainty  
 
Not determined. 
 
9. Liability/penalties for noncompliance 
 
Not determined. 
 
10. Approval process 
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Not determined. 
 
11. Ex post verification/auditing. 
 
Not determined. 
  
12. Mechanisms for trade identification and communication (education and 
outreach, third party facilitation, embedded ties) 
 
Not determined. 
 
13. Market structure (bilateral, clearinghouse, third party brokers) 
 
Not determined. 
 
14. Types of trades allowed  
 
Point/nonpoint trading will be explored.  
 
C.  Outcomes 
15. Types and volume of trades that have occurred 
 
None.  The MEP is only beginning to explore trading structures and rules.   
 
16. Administrative costs 
 
All cost estimates will depend largely on the trade structure, which has yet to 
be developed.  
 
17. Transaction costs 
 
Not determined. 
 
18. Cost savings 
 
Not determined. 
  
19. Program goals achieved  
 
The goal of the program is not necessarily to see trading but to develop 
guidance on the development of a trading framework, community nutrient 
management options, and future regulation on trading.  It is too early to 
determine whether the program will achieve these goals.  
 
20. Program obstacles 
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The small geographic size and small number of nitrogen sources in each 
estuary may limit the use of trading as a nitrogen reduction strategy (Claire 
Barker, personal communication, May 4, 2004). 
 
21. NPS involvement and incentives to engage in trading. 
 
Not determined. 
 
22. Other 
 
 
Program information/References 
 
Websites: 
Massachusetts Department of Environmental Protection: Massachusetts 
Estuaries Project.  http://www.mass.gov/dep/smerp/smerp.htm 
 
Contacts: 
Claire Barker, Massachusetts Department of Environmental Protection.  (617) 
556-1128 
 
Written Program Information: 
Massachusetts Department of Environmental Protection (MA DEP) 
(2003).  The Massachusetts Estuaries Project: embayment restoration 
and guidance for implementation strategies 2003.  Retrieved May 4, 
2004 from http://www.mass.gov/dep/smerp/smerp.htm 
 
 
Reviewed by Claire Barker, Massachusetts Department of Environmental Protection. 
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Specialty Minerals, Inc. (MA) 
 
A.  Program Background 
1. Program description 
 
The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has issued a NPDES 
permit to Specialty Minerals, Inc. (SMI) containing elements of river 
temperature offsets. SMI will be permitted to discharge a greater volume of 
water from its limestone processing plant once an upstream flood chute 
restoration project lowers the river temperature by 4º F.  Although this holistic 
watershed management approach departs from traditional permitting, it is 
difficult to characterize it as a formal trade since SMI is not legally obligated 
to contribute to the restoration project. 
 
SMI’s plant discharges clean but warm water into the Hoosic River. SMI 
renewed its NPDES permit every five years since 1975, but in the late 1990s it 
wanted to expand operations and increase its discharge from 4.2 million 
gallons per day (mgd) to 6 mgd.  When SMI claimed that more stringent 
temperature restrictions would force them to construct three expensive and 
unsightly cooling towers along the river, the USEPA began looking into 
offsets.  The Hoosic River Watershed Association (HooRWA) had conducted 
extensive temperature monitoring several years earlier and warned the 
USEPA that increased high-temperature discharge could raise river 
temperatures high enough to damage wild trout populations. HooRWA had 
also discovered, however, that SMI was not predominantly responsible for the 
high instream temperatures; while SMI's discharge raised the river 
temperature by about 1.25º F, upstream flood control chutes raised the river 
temperature by as much as 7º F during sunny, low flow conditions (Ely 2002).  
 
The Army Corps of Engineers had constructed the flood control chutes within 
the Towns of Adams, North Adams, and Williamstown after major floods in 
the 1950s. The wide concrete channels create a shallow flow with a large 
surface area, and the consequent water heating creates potentially harmful 
temperature conditions for the wild trout population.  Once HooRWA’s 
documentation of river temperature came to light, the EPA invited the Corps 
to investigate restoration options (Ely 2002).   The Corps initiated a $1.1 
million restoration project to deepen channels and create more natural flow 
conditions with rock features and vegetation, improving habitat and reducing 
water heating. The Preliminary Restoration Plan was approved in June, 2000, 
and the feasibility phase was initiated in February, 2002 (USACOE n.d.).   
However, funding for the Corps project has recently been cut, and the project 
may or may not move forward.  The total cost of the project is too expensive 
for SMI alone to support (David Pincumbe, personal communication, June 1, 
2004). 
 
In the original proposal for the offset, SMI would have been required to place 
contributions into an escrow fund or contribute in-kind services (BRPC 2003). 
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SMI initially agreed to contribute approximately $100,000 but objected to 
having contribution requirements in its NPDES permit. SMI’s NPDES permit, 
issued in September, 2003, simply assumes that the restoration project will be 
completed to lower river temperatures by 4º F within the next five years 
(David Pincumbe, personal communication, July 3, 2003).   
 
The NPDES permit builds in this condition by establishing two sets of 
temperature and flow limits:  SMI is initially authorized to discharge 5 mgd 
with a limit of 84.7º F, which will result in an instream river temperature of 
82º F.  If the river temperature decreases by 4º F through the restoration 
project, SMI will be permitted to discharge 6 mgd with a limit of 81.5º F, 
which will result in an instream river temperature of 79º F (BRPC 2003). If 
the temperature reductions are not realized within the five-year permit 
duration, then SMI will face more stringent effluent limits (David Pincumbe, 
personal communication, June 1, 2004). 
 
At this time, given the state of the Corps’ funding, the restoration project may 
not be completed within the permit duration.  In any case, SMI is doing well 
at 5 mgd and may not need to access the additional 1 mgd capacity (David 
Pincumbe, personal communication, June 1, 2004). 
 
2. Program motivation 
 
The restoration and offset project grew out of SMI’s desire for a new NPDES 
permit with an increased discharge volume.   The Town of Adams was 
interested in supporting the project because SMI is one of its largest 
businesses and employers (Danforth 2003).      
 
The Hoosic River is designated as a warm water fishery with instream 
temperature limits of 83º F.  SMI faced more stringent temperature discharge 
limits, however, because the mortality temperature for trout is considered to 
be 79º F (BRPC 2003).  The Clean Water Act’s antidegradation provisions 
require the Massachusetts DEP and the EPA to protect the river at the state in 
which it currently exists.  Since there are trout in the river now, and the 
temperatures are too warm for the trout, the EPA interpreted the 
antidegradation requirements as not merely keeping the river at current 
conditions but actually improving conditions to allow for the continued 
survival of trout (David Pincumbe, personal communication, February 2, 
2002).    
 
3. Pollutant being traded 
 
Temperature 
 
4. Size of program 
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The ACOE project will modify approximately 2.2 miles of the flood damage 
channels to restore more natural flow and habitat (BRPC 2003). 
 
Potential trading parties: Specialty Minerals, Inc.; flood chute restoration 
project sponsored by U.S. Army Corps of Engineers 
 
5. Stakeholders/participants 
 
• Specialty Minerals, Inc. (SMI) 
• U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), Region I: issues NPDES 
permits in Massachusetts.   
• Massachusetts Department of Environmental Protection (DEP): 
• U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (ACOE):  implementing a stream 
restoration project through the Ecosystem Restoration Program, which 
uses federal funds to restore habitat that has been degraded by past Corps 
projects 
• Hoosic River Watershed Association (HooRWA):  conducted extensive 
monitoring that was a key to designing the offset provisions 
• Town of Adams, MA: works in partnership with the ACOE on the 
feasibility analysis for the flood chute restoration project  
• Berkshire Regional Planning Council (BRPC): provided a review to the 
draft NPDES permit 
 
6. Regulatory drivers 
 
The Antidegradation Provision of the Clean Water Act stipulates that all 
existing uses and the water quality needed to sustain those uses must be 
protected.  In determining temperature discharge limits for SMI’s permit, the 
EPA interpreted this to mean that the river temperature must be reduced to 
protect the wild trout population.   
 
The Massachusetts Water Quality Standards designated the Hoosic River as a 
warm water fishery.  Although this allows a maximum temperature of 83º F, 
the antidegradation rules further constrain water temperatures.  
  
The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency issues NPDES permits in 
Massachusetts.   
 
B.  Trade Structure 
7. Determination of credit  
 
The “credit” in this offset will be instream temperature reductions generated 
by the ACOE’s flood chute restoration project.  If the project reduces river 
temperatures by 4º F, then SMI will be permitted to discharge a greater 
volume of water.   
 
8. Trading ratios and other mechanisms to deal with uncertainty  
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The trade ratio is 1:1.  Temperature is measurable, reducing uncertainty, and 
the restoration project and SMI have equivalent impacts on water temperature 
(Environomics 1999).  
 
9. Liability/penalties for noncompliance 
 
If the project does not reduce river temperatures within five years, then SMI 
will be required to reduce the river temperature by those 4º F, most likely with 
cooling towers (David Pincumbe, personal communication, February 19, 
2002).  
 
10. Approval process 
 
Once the Army Corps decided to take on the flood chute restoration project, 
the EPA only needed to place offset provisions in SMI’s NPDES permit.  
There is no oversight of any actual “trade,” since SMI is not required to 
contribute to the restoration project.  The EPA only needs to monitor river 
temperature, not trading activities.  
 
11. Ex post verification/auditing. 
 
Monitoring will most likely be done by local groups, such as HooRWA.  The 
EPA will also audit river temperatures at the end of the five year permit, or 
sooner if necessary (David Pincumber, personal communication, February 19, 
2002).  
 
12. Mechanisms for trade identification and communication (education and 
outreach, third party facilitation, embedded ties) 
 
Third party facilitation.  HooRWA’s research showed the relative heating 
impact of both SMI and the flood control channels, which provided the 
foundation for the temperature offset arrangement. 
 
13. Market structure (bilateral, clearinghouse, third party brokers) 
 
This offset project does not fit any clear trading or market structure, since SMI 
is not obligated to contribute to the restoration project.  It is perhaps closest to 
a bilateral structure in the sense that SMI’s contributions would go directly to 
the restoration project rather than through a clearinghouse or broker. 
 
14. Types of trades allowed  
 
Closest to point/nonpoint trade, offsetting end-of-pipe temperature discharges 
through river flow and habitat restoration efforts. However, temperature does 
not follow the same designations as pollution discharge.  
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C.  Outcomes 
15. Types and volume of trades that have occurred 
 
None. The ACOE will proceed with the flood chute restoration project if it is 
able to secure more funding, but SMI is not obligated to contribute to the 
project.  The cost of restoration is too great for SMI alone to fund (David 
Pincumbe, personal communication, June 1, 2004).  
 
16. Administrative costs 
 
The offset arrangement was crafted during the NPDES permitting process.  It 
is difficult to separate the costs of designing the “trade” from the process of 
permitting.  The administration costs associated with the offset itself are 
minimal, since SMI will simply be allowed to discharge a higher volume of 
water from its plant if river temperature monitoring shows a 4º F reduction. 
 
17. Transaction costs 
 
Not determined. 
 
18. Cost savings 
 
Installing cooling towers would be a very expensive strategy for reducing 
SMI’s discharge temperature.  Although the offset may provide SMI with a 
low or no cost mechanism (depending on its contributions) for gaining 
permission to discharge 6 mgd, SMI may still face costs to reduce the 
discharge temperature to 81.5º F.  Furthermore, if the restoration project is not 
completed, does not sufficiently reduce river temperatures, or is reclassified as 
a cold water fishery, SMI will face a more stringent permit.  
 
19. Program goals achieved  
 
If the restoration project succeeds in reducing river temperatures by 4º F, then 
the entire offset arrangement will successfully meet environmental goals as 
well as SMI’s goal of increasing discharge.   
 
20. Program obstacles 
 
 A review of the draft permit by the Berkshire Regional Planning Commission 
(BRPC 2003) asserted that the permit may create a disincentive for SMI to 
contribute, since SMI could face increased water treatment costs when the 
discharge temperature limit declines at 6 mgd.  The BRPC review further 
observed that the Town of Adam will likely follow the lead of SMI and may 
similarly choose to not contribute the money that it had approved for the 
purpose.     
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The bigger discincentive, however, would have come from the potential 
reclassification of the Hoosic River as a cold water fishery (David Pincumbe, 
personal communication, June 1, 2004).  The Hoosic River is classified as a 
warm water fishery, but temperatures needed to sustain trout health are lower 
than is required by this designation.  Although SMI argued that the existence 
of the fish demonstrates that river temperatures need not be significantly 
reduced (Roberts 2003), there was a movement among other stakeholders to 
reclassify the river as a cold water fishery.  In the end, the DEP has decided 
that the fish must be protected, but it has stopped short of reclassifying the 
river (David Pincumbe, personal communication, June 1, 2004).  
 
21. NPS involvement and incentives to engage in trading. 
 
The flood chute restoration project is closer to a nonpoint source than a single 
point of discharge, although the point/nonpoint source classifications are not 
an accurate fit for temperature.   The Army Corps’ motivation for funding and 
implementing the restoration project is environmental (rather than most NPS 
offsets, which depend on financial incentives for farmers, stormwater systems, 
failing septic tank owners, etc.).  The Army Corps is authorized by the 
Ecosystem Restoration Program to use federal funds to restore habitat that has 
been degraded by past Corps project (Ely 2003).   
 
22. Other 
 
 
Program information/References 
 
Websites: 
See individual online documents, listed below 
 
Contacts: 
David Pincumbe, U.S. EPA Region I. (617) 918-1695 
 
Written Program Information: 
Berkshire Regional Planning Commission (BRPC) (2003).  Review of 
Draft NPDES Permit for Specialty Minerals Inc. Retrieved May 19, 
2004 from 
http://www.berkshireplanning.org/download/ADM_SMI%202.11.03
%20-%20Final.pdf 
Danforth, Nina (2003).  River recovery: how wild species can be the 
catalyst for activism. Conservation Perspectives, the online journal 
of the New England Chapter of the Society for Conservation Biology 
(NESBC), 1. Retrieved January 19, 2004 from 
http://www.nescb.org/epublications/spring2003/danforth.html  
Ely, Eleanor (2002).  Keeping trout cool.  The Volunteer Monitor, the 
national newsletter of Volunteer Watershed Monitoring, 14:2.   
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Reviewed by David Pincumbe, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Region I. 
 
 153
Wayland Business Center Permit (MA) 
 
A.  Program Background 
1. Program description 
 
When the Wayland Business Center, LLC (WBC) redeveloped an abandoned 
commercial property in Wayland, MA, it sought to reactivate the previous 
owner’s NPDES permit for the small, on-site wastewater treatment plant 
(WWTP).  The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (USEPA) and the 
Massachusetts Department of Environmental Protection (MA DEP) denied 
WBC the permit renewal, interpreting the discharge as a new source to the 
Sudbury River.   In developing a new NPDES permit for WBC, the USEPA 
initially set a 0.2 mg/L phosphorus limit, but the final permit allowed a 0.5 
mg/L phosphorus limit in exchange for nonpoint source offsets.  The nonpoint 
source phosphorus reductions came from sewering over two dozen properties 
in downtown Wayland that have failing septic systems 
 
The Raytheon Corporation had previously operated a 403,000 square foot 
research and testing facility on the 55-acre property (McDonald 2003).  
Raytheon had a small WWTP to treat its own effluent, but the NPDES permit 
was cancelled when Raytheon closed the facility in 1995 (Jaksch 2000).  
Congress Group Ventures purchased the Raytheon property in 1996 and 
established WBC as a subsidiary to redevelop the building into office space.  
Thinking that the NPDES permit was transferred with the property, WBC 
approached the EPA for a renewal in 1997.   
 
The EPA and the MA DEP ruled that WBC’s discharge was a new source that 
should be capped at a 0.2 mg/L phosphorus limit.  After extensive 
negotiations, the USEPA issued a permit in September, 1998a allowing WBC 
to discharge at 0.5 mg/L in exchange for reducing three times as much 
phosphorus loading from nonpoint sources.  Since many properties in 
downtown Wayland had leaky or failing septic systems, WBC could generate 
phosphorus offsets by treating the effluent from these properties at its WWTP.  
The permit set a total flow limit of 65,000 gallons per day (gpd) and stipulated 
that a minimum of 4,740 gpd (up to 20,000 gpd) must be “tie-ins” from 
existing, failing sewer systems.  As of 1999, 33 properties, with a daily flow 
of 10,000-18,000 gallons, had pledged connections to the WWTP (Jaksch 
2000), and 25 properties had been connected as of January, 2003 (MA DEP 
2003).  
 
Although WBC negotiated and received the NPDES permit for the WWTP, 
the Town of Wayland quickly took over the operation of the facility and the 
implementation of the offsets.  The Town of Wayland had voted to acquire the 
WWTP by eminent domain in June, 1998a, three months before the NPDES 
permit was issued.  The Town wanted to be able to limit individual property 
owners’ access to the WWTP as a form of zoning control to restrict 
subdivisions of larger lots (Jaksch 2000).  WBC opposed the taking of the 
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facility, but it signed a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) with the Town in 
August, 1999 to transfer the title. WBC was reimbursed for the facility and 
guaranteed 45,000 gpd in treatment capacity.  The Wayland Wastewater 
Management District Commission (WDMC) has been operating the WWTP 
since October 1999.  
 
Changes in the ownership and use of the Raytheon property could affect the 
future treatment distribution of the WWTP.  Credit Suisse First Boston took 
the title for the property from WBC in December 2003. WBC’s last tenant for 
the building had been Polaroid, which went bankrupt in 2001. Most recently, 
several officials for the Town of Wayland have expressed an interest in 
developing a downtown business district on the site (McDonald 2003).  
 
2. Program motivation 
 
The Sudbury River is highly eutrophic during the warmer months and 
frequently suffers from algae blooms and nuisance aquatic weeds.  
Phosphorus loading from both point and nonpoint sources is the largest 
contributor to the eutrophic conditions (Jaksch 2000). 
 
WBC’s motivation for pursuing a trading option was the high cost of treating 
their effluent to a 0.2 mg/L phosphorus limit.  The Town of Wayland pushed 
for the trading provisions because it helped address their long-term problem of 
failing septic systems.  Wayland does not have a POTW, partly out of concern 
that it would encourage growth and subdivision of larger properties.  
However, old septic systems in the Town are a significant source of 
phosphorus pollution because the water table in the area is very shallow.  
Many septic tanks are below the water table during the wet months of the 
year, and their leach field release pollutants directly into the groundwater.  
(Jaksch 2000).   
 
3. Pollutant being traded 
 
Phosphorus 
 
4. Size of program 
 
The Sudbury River is only 28.8 miles long and is part of the greater Sudbury-
Assabet-Concord (SuAsCo) watershed.   The permit allowed WBC to 
investigate three types of nonpoint source offets within the watershed: treating 
the effluent of existing, failing septic systems, repairing or upgrading failing 
septic systems, and harvesting nuisance plants or other phosphorus-releasing 
materials.  The sewer connection plan was the most permanent and cost-
effective option. 
 
Potential trading parties: Wayland Business Corporation; property owners in 
downtown Wayland with leaking septic systems 
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5. Stakeholders/participants 
 
• Congress Group Ventures and its subsidiary Wayland Business Center, 
LLC (WBC): developer of the abandoned Raytheon property 
• U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (USEPA) Region I: issues NPDES 
permits in Massachusetts 
• Massachusetts Department of Environmental Protection (MA DEP): sets 
State Water Quality Standards; worked cooperatively with the USEPA 
during the permitting process although the MA DEP does not issue 
NPDES permits  
• Town of Wayland:  provided comments to the permitting process; 
assumed the WBC NPDES permit and WWTP by eminent domain so that 
it could restrict the number of hookups to the facility 
• Wayland Wastewater Management District Commission (WMDC): 
establishes small wastewater systems in Town; now operates the WWTP 
taken from WBC through eminent domain 
• Wayland Board of Health (WBOH): is responsible for ensuring that the 
town’s septic systems are not a public health threat; provided comments to 
the permitting process  
• U.S. National Park System: provided comments to the permitting process 
because the Sudbury River is listed as a Wild and Scenic River   
• SuAsCo Watershed Coalition: represents environmental interests; 
provided comments to the permitting process  
• Neighboring property owners 
 
6. Regulatory drivers 
 
The trade took place without a TMDL for the Sudbury River, although one is 
planned.  Water quality standards are set by the Massachusetts DEP.  The 
Sudbury River is designated a Class B water, which means that it must meet 
standards to support aquatic life and allow fishing and swimming (Jaksch 
2000).   Since the Sudbury did not meet water quality standards, the EPA 
wanted to regulate new discharge at 0.2 mg/L, and the costs associated with 
this limit were high enough to drive interest in trading as a more innovative, 
cost-effective solution (Environomics 1999). Massachusetts is a non-delegated 
state, and the USEPA issues NPDES permits.  
 
The DEP determined that the permitted discharge from the WBC facility will 
not violate Clean Water Act Antidegradation provisions since it will result in a 
net reduction of nutrient loading (Jaksch 2000).   
 
B.  Trade Structure 
7. Determination of credit  
 
The permit stipulates that WBC must achieve 0.375 lb/day of phosphorus 
reductions to offset the 0.125 lb/day to be discharged.  The EPA estimated the 
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phosphorus loading from septic systems at approximately 10 mg/L.  Diverting 
the wastewater from septic systems to the WWTP, which discharges 
phosphorus at 0.5 mg/L, therefore reduces phosphorus loading by 9.5 mg/L 
(Jaksch 2000).  At this rate, the WWTP must treat a minimum of 4,740 gpd 
from newly sewered properties to achieve 0.375 lb/day of offsets.  
 
8. Trading ratios and other mechanisms to deal with uncertainty  
 
The permit sets a trading ratio of 3:1. In real terms, the WWTP must achieve 
phosphorus reductions of  0.375 lb/day to offset its phosphorus discharge of 
0.125 lb/day.   Sewering properties with failing septic systems offers a 
permanent source of phosphorus reductions.  Since these reductions are not 
quantified and monitored, however, the trading ratio provides a margin of 
safety. 
 
9. Liability/penalties for noncompliance 
 
The offset provisions are written into the permit, and the permittee is 
responsible for achieving the nonpoint source reductions necessary to comply 
with the permit.  
 
10. Approval process 
 
The negotiation process for the modified permit took about a year.   
 
11. Ex post verification/auditing. 
 
The permit specifies monitoring requirements and protocols.  Phosphorus is 
measured weekly, and the permittee must submit monthly and annual 
monitoring reports to the EPA and the DEP.  The annual reports discuss 
compliance with the permit, scheduled milestones for phosphorus offsets, and 
efforts to reduce phosphorus loading in the forthcoming year.  In addition to 
discharge monitoring, the permit requires in-stream monitoring of the Sudbury 
River upstream and downstream of the discharge.  The EPA and the DEP 
approve the sampling locations, and sampling must be conducted monthly 
from May to November. 
 
However, there is no monitoring system in place to quantify the nonpoint 
source reductions for the trade.  Monitoring the phosphorus loading reduction 
that result from sewering each property would be prohibitively expensive 
(Jaksch 2000).   
 
12. Mechanisms for trade identification and communication (education and 
outreach, third party facilitation, embedded ties) 
 
The Town of Wayland was responsible for identifying the failing septic 
systems and building the sewer line (US EPA 1998a).  As long as WBC was 
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the permittee, this would have appeared to be third party facilitation.  The 
Town of Wayland intended to take over the WWTP even before the NPDES 
permit was issued, however, so it is more accurate to think of this as outreach 
and trade identification conducted directly by the buyer.  
 
13. Market structure (bilateral, clearinghouse, third party brokers) 
 
This “market” does not clearly fit any of the water quality trading market 
structures.  Since the individual property owners will likely have to pay the 
connection cost (Franklin 1998a), it is difficult to characterize this as a 
bilateral trade in which point source purchase offsets from nonpoint source.  
Since the Town of Wayland operates the WWTP, it appears more like a 
traditional POTW that charges residents for treating their effluent.   
 
14. Types of trades allowed  
 
Point/nonpoint.   
 
C.  Outcomes 
15. Types and volume of trades that have occurred 
 
As of January, 2003, 25 properties had been connected to the sewer line (MA 
DEP 2003).  
 
16. Administrative costs 
 
The costs associated with the permitting process were higher than for a 
traditional permit, partly because this was the first trading project for the EPA 
Region 1 (Jaksch 2000). However, since monitoring of nonpoint source 
reductions is not required, and the offset provisions do not demand much 
additional monitoring or oversight compared to a traditional permit, the 
ongoing administrative costs are presumably not burdensome.   
 
17. Transaction costs 
  
Not determined.  
 
18. Cost savings 
 
Under the 0.2 mg/L phosphorus limit (i.e. in the absence of offset provisions), 
WBC would have faced $1 million in plant upgrades.  Since the Raytheon 
plant was already upgraded for phosphorus removal, the 0.5 mg/L phosphorus 
limit only required $140,000 for upgrades.   WBC would have paid the 
connection fees for individual properties (US EPA 1998a), but with the Town 
operating the WWTP, property owners must pay for the hookup (MA DEP 
2003). The Town agreed to pay WBC $250,000 for the facility, but WBC in 
turn had to pay back approximately $173,000 as a one-time user fee.  In all, 
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the offset provisions saved WBC approximately $937,000 ($1 million - 
$140,000 + $250,000 - $173,000) (Jaksch 2000).    
  
The Town of Wayland spent $731, 367 for the treatment facility and the sewer 
system, financed through Town bonds and low interest loans from a revolving 
State fund.  The capital costs will be recovered through “betterment 
assessments” of connected properties, and operating costs are funded through 
user fees (Town of Wayland n.d.).    
  
19. Program goals achieved  
 
The offset provisions provided WBC with a cost-effective solution for gaining 
its NPDES permit.  Environmentally, it promised to reduce net phosphorus 
loading to the Sudbury River.  The 0.5 mg/L limit represented an 80% 
phosphorus reduction compared to the Raytheon discharge, and the 3:1 
trading ratio ensured a net phosphorus reduction (Jaksch 2000).  Since the 
trade enabled the redevelopment of the property to move forward, the Town 
of Wayland benefited from the trade through increased tax rolls and the 
revitalization of an abandoned property.  
 
Another interpretation, however, is that WBC got a break for fixing a problem 
that the Town should have cleaned up on its own.  The State could have issued 
an order for Wayland to take care of the septic problem, either by tight-
tanking the failing septic systems or by starting their own POTW.  This would 
have resulted in both the Town and WBC cleaning up their respective 
phosphorus loading (David Pincumbe, personal communication, July 3, 2003).     
 
20. Program obstacles 
 
Public comments on the draft permit from the Town of Wayland, the Wayland 
Board of Health, the SuAsCo Watershed Coalition, the National Park Service, 
and the Massachusetts DEP show several environmental concerns, including 
that the 0.5 mg/l was not sufficiently stringent, that the permit allows for 
deferred trading after the onset of the discharge, that nitrogen should also be 
addressed.  The EPA’s Response to Public Comments explained its rationale 
in response to each of these concerns. 
 
21. NPS involvement and incentives to engage in trading. 
 
Property owners had both economics and aesthetic reasons to connect to the 
WWTP.  Compared to installing raised leach fields or tight-tanking failing 
septic systems, connecting to the WWTP may have provided a more cost-
effective and aesthetically pleasing alternative (MA DEP 2003).  
 
22. Other 
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Reviewed by David Pincumbe, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Region I and 
Claire Barker, Massachusetts Department of Environmental Protection. 
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Kalamazoo River Water Quality Demonstration Project (MI) 
 
A.  Program Background 
1. Program description 
 
A coalition of local watershed partners implemented a point/nonpoint source 
water quality demonstration project on the Kalamazoo River targeting 
voluntary nonpoint source phosphorus reductions.  Program formulation 
began in late 1996, and the Kalamazoo Project was formally launched in July 
1997 (Kieser 2000).  The project was directed by a Steering Committee 
comprised of state and local regulatory agency representatives, industrial and 
municipal dischargers, farmers, agricultural organizations, local nonprofits, 
and environmental consultants.  With a focus on consensus building and 
community participation, the negotiations over trading rules and credit 
allocation took nearly two years.   
 
The Steering Committee administered a fund, financed by grants and point 
source contributions, to support the installation of nonpoint source phosphorus 
controls.  The Natural Resources Conservation Service (NRCS) partnered 
with the project to develop conservation plans, oversee the installation of 
phosphorus controls, and provide follow-up inspections.  All credits generated 
from the project fund were banked with the Steering Committee.  In 
purchasing nonpoint source reduction credits, point sources would receive 
credits in proportion to their contribution to the cost of best management 
practices (BMPs). 
 
Although farmers were much more reluctant to participate than had been 
expected, the project eventually succeeded in implementing BMPs and 
structural controls at six sites beginning in 1998.  The credits generated by 
these controls were never purchased, however, and they were retired when the 
demonstration project ended in late 2000.  A local paper company had 
contributed $25,000 to the fund in anticipation of credits needed to address a 
production increase.  The paper company’s participation had helped drive 
community support of trading and had served to establish initial nonpoint 
source targets, but the company went out of business before purchasing 
credits.  Consequently, the project shifted towards credit banking, but no other 
credit purchasers were identified before the end of the demonstration project 
in 2000.  (David Batchelor, personal communication, March 21, 2003). 
 
2. Program motivation 
 
Three interests coalesced in 1996-1997 to create the Kalamazoo River 
demonstration project:  a local coalition’s interest in reducing nonpoint source 
pollution, the State of Michigan’s desire for a pilot trading program, and a 
local paper company’s interest in accommodating increased wastewater loads 
of phosphorus from new production that would otherwise require expensive 
capital investments for new equipment.  Trading provided an opportunities for 
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lower compliance costs. The paper company, which processed special orders 
and had cyclical production needs, wanted to increase discharge in order to 
reach maximum production capacity at select times of the year.  Despite 
recent upgrades to control Biochemical Oxygen Demand (BOD), it was 
estimated that holding phosphorus discharge steady at 1 mg/L would require 
another $1.5-2 million in engineering and capital costs and $500,000/yr in 
operating costs (Kieser 2000).  The MDEQ had denied their request to 
increase their discharge due to hypereutrophic conditions in the downstream 
impoundment, Lake Allegan, and an anticipated TMDL for the Kalamazoo 
River and this impoundment (Mark Kieser, personal communication, May 28, 
2004).  The paper mill was therefore looking for more cost-effective 
alternatives to upgrades (David Batchelor, personal communication, March 
21, 2003).   
 
The driving motivations of the multiple stakeholders are reflected in the goals 
of this initiative, as explained on the DEQ website: “to form partnerships, 
improve water quality, optimize costs and provide greater flexibility for a 
sustained local economy.  The project will identify policy issues and provide 
design information for a statewide program.” (Kalamazoo Water Quality 
Trading Demonstration Project Summary n.d.). 
 
3. Pollutant being traded 
 
Phosphorus 
 
4. Size of program 
 
The Kalamazoo watershed includes over 2,000 square miles.  There are over 
fifty permitted dischargers in the watershed, primarily municipal wastewater 
treatment plants and paper mills, although the City of Kalamazoo Water 
Reclamation Plant and the Crown Vantage Paper Company were the only 
major point sources in the demonstration project study area (Kieser 2000).  
 
Potential trading participants: point sources (initially the Crown Vantage 
Paper Co.); farmers implementing agricultural BMPs; landowners installing 
streambank restoration controls 
 
 
5. Stakeholders/participants 
 
• Michigan Department of Environmental Quality (MDEQ): regulatory 
agency overseeing demonstration project 
• The Forum of Greater Kalamazoo: nonprofit co-principal investigator for 
project administration and communications 
• Kieser and Associates: Co-principal investigator on technical issues, 
voluntary chair of steering committee 
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• Natural Resources Conservation Service (NRCS): provided technical 
assistance to farms with conservation planning and monitoring 
• Kalamazoo Conservation District: provided technical support and 
framework development 
• City of Kalamazoo Water Reclamation Plant: provided input on municipal 
point source perspectives 
• Crown Vantage Paper Company:  potential point source purchaser of 
credits, assisted with technical review and framework development 
• Menasha Corporation-Paperboard Division: contributed industrial 
perspective on trading 
• Kalamazoo Environmental Council: contributed environmental 
community perspective on trading 
• Michigan Farm Bureau: contributed agricultural perspective and assisted 
with outreach to farmers 
• Michigan Agricultural Stewardship Association: provided agricultural 
perspective and agricultural participant monetary support 
• Michigan Department of Agriculture:  provided regulatory perspectives 
for agriculture 
• Michigan Integrated Food and Farming Services (MIFFS): advocate and 
public liaison representative for agricultural NPS partners 
(for more detailed list of roles, see Kieser 2000). 
 
6. Regulatory drivers 
 
The demonstration project preceded a TMDL, although the fact that a TMDL 
was in the pipeline was hoped to be a driver for farmers’ participation (David 
Batchelor, personal communication, March 21, 2003).   The TMDL was 
finalized in July 2002.  
 
 
B.  Trade Structure 
7. Determination of credit   
 
Trading credits and costs are calculated in a six-step process: 1. Monitor to 
determine baseline conditions and annual reductions; 2. Apply trading ratios 
to calculate available credits for trading; 3. Calculate total costs, including 
design, construction, and monitoring; 4. Assess the life span of installed 
BMPs; 5. Calculate the annual cost per pound of phosphorus reductions; 6. 
Calculate the value of each credit based on the trading ratio and per pound 
costs, amortizing for the BMP life span (Kieser 2000).  
 
The minimum eligibility requirement for a baseline for agricultural credits 
was set by Generally Accepted Agricultural Management Practices 
(GAAMPs).  Improvements to achieve GAAMPs were discounted 50% 
(Kalamazoo Water Quality Trading Demonstration Project Summary n.d.).  
Extensive background monitoring included historical site data, aerial 
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photographs, soils information, property use history, current practices, surface 
water sampling, and a revised soil loss equation (Kieser 2000).  
 
8. Trading ratios and other mechanisms to deal with uncertainty 
 
Trading ratios were used both to deal with uncertainty and to guarantee a net 
environmental benefit with each trade.  The trading ratio for point-nonpoint 
trades was 2:1 (4:1 for BMPs to achieve GAAMPs).  Any point-point trades 
would have had a 1.1:1 trading ratio (Kalamazoo River/Lake Allegan TMDL 
Implementation Committee 2002).  Further trading ratios and restrictions 
could also be used to address distance, seasonality, and equivalence 
(Kalamazoo Water Quality Trading Demonstration Project Summary n.d.).   
 
Service agreements with nonpoint sources established a schedule of three 
payments for phosphorus controls: 25% after agreeing on conservation plans, 
50% after implementation and completion of controls, and the final 25% after 
determination that the controls are operating as proposed (Kieser 2000).  
 
9. Liability/penalties for noncompliance 
 
The Service Agreements established that the noncompliance results in a 
Steering Committee notification to correct deficiencies within 60 days.  If the 
nonpoint source partner failed to respond, payments would need to be 
refunded within 90 days (Kieser 2000).   
 
10. Approval process 
 
Once a nonpoint source project was identified, the landowner submitted a 
Service Agreement to the Steering Committee for approval.  An example of a 
generic service agreement, which was modified for individual needs and site 
conditions, is available in Kieser 2000, Appendix A.  Subsequently, Kieser & 
Associates completed background site monitoring, and the NRCS worked 
with the landowner to develop conservation plans and implement BMPs.  The 
Steering Committee, Kieser & Associates, and the NRCS also assisted the 
landowners in soliciting and evaluating bids for the construction (Kieser 
2000).  In all, project planning and approval typically took 4-10 weeks but 
could take up to 4-6 months (Kieser 2000). 
 
The approval process for a point sources’ purchase of credits was not 
determined. 
 
11. Ex post verification/auditing. 
 
Follow up monitoring and technical assistance are conducted by the NRCS.   
Kieser & Associates also conducted follow-up water quality monitoring where 
possible (Kieser 2000).   
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12. Mechanisms for trade identification and communication (education and 
outreach, third party facilitation, embedded ties) 
 
Education and Outreach.  The Steering Committee identified potential 
nonpoint source sites using U.S. Department of Agriculture Farm Services 
Agency aerial photographs, U.S. Geological Survey topographic maps, and 
county ownership maps (Kieser 2000).  Agricultural producers on the steering 
committee held informal meetings to educate farmers about trading and 
visited landowners who expressed interest (Mark Kieser, personal 
communication, March 27, 2003). 
 
13. Market structure (bilateral, clearinghouse, third party brokers) 
 
Clearinghouse.  The Steering Committee acted as the clearinghouse for 
banking all nonpoint source credits and negotiating separately with point and 
nonpoint sources.    
 
14. Types of trades allowed  
 
Point/nonpoint.  All nonpoint source credits were banked with the Steering 
Committee, which allocated credits to point sources. Unpurchased credits 
were retired in 2000 at the end of the demonstration project.  Point sources 
could purchase credits to accommodate growth but not to discharge above 
their NPDES limits (Kieser 2000).   
 
C.  Outcomes 
15. Types and volume of trades that have occurred 
 
Six nonpoint source projects were implemented to generate credits for trading, 
but no credits were purchased and the credits were retired.  The six projects 
included agricultural BMPs on two farms (animal exclusion, soil fertility 
sampling, and treatment of feedlot runoff) and streambank stabilization 
projects on two industrial sites, one municipal site, and one private site.  For 
more details, see Kieser 2000.   
 
16. Administrative costs 
 
The administrative costs involved in installing nonpoint source controls 
include identifying and designing BMPs, creating bid specifications, obtaining 
bids for work, selecting contractors, overseeing construction, and calculating a 
cost per pound for each credit generated (Kieser 2000).  Coordinating many of 
these activities through the NCRS helped reduce administrative costs.  
 
17. Transaction costs  
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The purchaser would be responsible for contractual arrangements, negotiating 
the funding level if credits were not already generated, and post-
implementation tracking (Kieser 2000).  
 
18. Cost savings 
 
The paper company estimated that their first year capital costs would average 
$292/lb phosphorus, with five- and ten-year costs respectively $58.40 and 
$29.20/lb phosphorous.  For nonpoint source controls, first year costs ranged 
from $8.18-$372.23/lb, with five- and ten-year costs respectively $1.64-
$193.59 and $0.82-$96.80/lb (not reflecting a trade ratio).  These costs 
indicate that the use of nonpoint source controls could be cost-effective, 
particularly when accounting for point source operating costs (Kieser 2000).    
 
19. Program goals achieved  
 
While no nonpoint source credits were purchased, the Kalamazoo River 
demonstration project established a local framework for trading, implemented 
voluntary nonpoint source reductions, and demonstrated how trading can 
potentially be a cost-effective water quality solution before a TMDL (Kieser 
2000).  The MDEQ asserts that the demonstration project “is nationally 
recognized as a highly successful innovative program built on partnerships 
and voluntary local initiatives…[that] demonstrated how trading can occur, 
improved water quality and provided information to help design the state 
water quality trading program” (MDEQ n.d.).  
 
20. Program obstacles 
 
It took nearly two years of continuous negotiations to formulate the trading 
rules due to the lack of existing partnerships and interagency coordination, 
conflicting perceptions of various stakeholders, clashes with the personal 
interests of several individuals on the Steering Committee, and unexpected 
resistance from local environmental groups that had declined earlier 
involvement (David Batchelor, personal communication, March 21, 2003; 
Kieser 2000).   A broad-based community education and participation 
initiative eventually built consensus around the local trading framework.  
 
The collaboration with the NRCS was valuable for reducing administrative 
costs and giving farmers a trusted contact.  The lack of sufficient NRCS staff 
time, however, significantly slowed the program implementation, left 
nonpoint sources waiting for approval, permits, and construction, and may 
have risked the credibility of the project (Mark Kieser, personal 
communication, March 27, 2003).  
 
The Project had more difficulty identifying both point source and nonpoint 
source participants.  The City of Kalamazoo was not responsive to the trading 
program because it perceived a number of barriers for both economic and 
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social reasons (detailed in Kieser 2000).   Farmers’s reluctance to participate 
is explained below.   
 
21. NPS involvement and incentives to engage in trading. 
 
In practical terms for the farmer, there was not a significant difference 
between traditional cost-sharing subsidy programs and trading payments 
(Mark Kieser, personal communication, March 27, 2003).  Furthermore, it 
was anticipated that the specter of a future TMDL would have provided an 
incentive to implement BMPs before they became mandatory. Yet the project 
did not achieve widespread support from the agricultural community because 
farmers did not trust regulators, were afraid of being targeted as polluters, and 
were reluctant to make voluntary changes that might later become required 
(David Batchelor, personal communication, March 21, 2003).    
 
Informal meetings with farmers on the Steering Committee were instrumental 
in recruiting two farmers for trading.  Identifying sites by geographic location 
(rather than the farmer’s name) and letting the farmers work with trusted and 
recognized agricultural contacts were also important steps in eliciting farmers’ 
voluntary participation (Kieser 2000).  
 
22. Other 
 
 
Program information/References 
 
Websites: 
Environmental Trading Network.  http://www.envtn.org 
Kalamzooriver.net: “water resource information for the Kalamazoo River 
watershed communities.”  http://www.kalamazooriver.net 
 
Contacts: 
Mark Kieser, Senior Scientist, Kieser and Associates.  (269) 344-7117 
David Batchelor, US EPA. Retired. 
 
Written program information: 
Environomics (1999).  A summary of U.S. effluent trading and offset projects.  
A report prepared for Dr. Mahesh Podar, U.S. Environmental Protection 
Agency, Office of Water.  Retrieved May 7, 2004 from 
http://www.epa.gov/owow/watershed/trading/traenvrn.pdf 
Kalamazoo River/Lake Allegan TMDL Implementation Committee (2002).  
Water quality improvement (implementation) plan for the Kalamazoo 
River watershed and Lake Allegan through a phosphorus Total 
Maximum Daily Load (TMDL) process.  Retrieved October 20, 2003 
from 
http://www.kalamazooriver.net/tmdl/implement/Implementation_text.P
DF 
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Kalamazoo Water Quality Trading Demonstration Project Summary (n.d.).  
Retrieved May 1, 2002 from http://www.deq.state.mi.us/documents/deq-
swq-trading-TradingDemonstration.doc 
Kieser, Mark (2000).  Phosphorus credit trading in the Kalamazoo River 
basin: forging nontraditional partnerships. Water Environment Research 
Foundation, Project 97-IRM-5C.   
Michigan Department of Environmental Quality (MDEQ) (n.d.).  Water 
Quality program overview.  Retrieved February 3, 2004 from 
http://www.michigan.gov/deq/0,1607,7-135-3313_3682_3719-13825--
,00.html 
 
Reviewed by Mark Kieser, Senior Scientist, Kieser and Associates.  
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Minnesota River (MN) 
 
A.  Program Background 
1. Program description 
 
Upstream phosphorus discharge is leading to high algal growth and low 
dissolved oxygen concentrations in the lower 22 miles of the Minnesota River.  
To combat this problem a two phase process has begun.  Phase I set 
wastewater treatment plant biochemical oxygen demand (BOD) discharge 
limits for plants in the lower 22 miles of the river and established a 40% BOD 
reduction goal for the river upstream of Shakopee (MPCA 2004).  Phase I is 
complete.  Phase II is outlined in the Lower Minnesota River Dissolved 
Oxygen TMDL (2004) and focuses on reducing the level of phosphorus in the 
river upstream of the metropolitan area in order to achieve the 40% BOD 
reduction.  A model of phosphorus sources and their impacts was made to aid 
an advisory committee with assessing potential land changes and to help 
understand how these changes would alter phosphorus concentrations (MPCA 
2004).  As Phase II continues, a watershed permit which will deal exclusively 
with phosphorus will be drafted for the Minnesota River Basin. 
 
The implementation plan of Phase II requires that communities and all 
continuous and controlled dischargers explore the feasibility of a 30-50% 
phosphorus reduction, which will be implemented if found feasible.  Two 
alternatives for reducing phosphorus from large wastewater treatment plants 
discharging 1,800 pounds per year or more of phosphorus are being 
considered. 
 
1. A 1 mg/l effluent limit will be implemented in the watershed permit to 
achieve a 51% phosphorus reduction in 10 years (MPCA 2004);  or 
2. A point-point trading system will be implemented and trades will 
incorporated into an initial 5 year watershed permit.  In the first 5 years, a 
35% reduction in phosphorus loading will be achieved, which will be 
followed by a five year watershed permit requiring the 1 mg/l effluent 
limit described above to be met (MPCA 2004).  (The watershed permit 
will be revised every five years subsequently).   
 
This trading plan has been developed to allow point sources to trade 
phosphorus release credits with other point sources so that the pollution of 
facilities without treatment capacity can be offset by the facilities that do 
have the capacity.  It is expected that after 5 years those without treatment 
capacity will establish treatment capacity.  The trading scheme would 
allow flexibility in the time frame given to the large polluters to build 
treatment capacity.  This is important because several studies on effective 
ways to reduce phosphorus are not complete and will not be complete until 
the first 5 year phase is complete.  The results of these studies will be 
integrated into the next version of the basin wide permit after they become 
available.  Thus a point-point trading program will allow facilities to 
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update treatment facilities after all information is made available and a 
more stable watershed permit has been drafted (Larry Gunderson, personal 
communication, May 19, 2004). 
 
2. Program motivation 
 
The current water-quality of the Minnesota River does not meet expectations 
for uses including drinking, swimming, industrial and agricultural uses, and 
safety of aquatic life (MPCA 2004). 
 
Low total dissolved oxygen problems are occurring in low flow periods in the 
lower 22 mile stretch of the Minnesota River (MPCA 2004).  Upstream input 
of phosphorus has been found to influence downstream total dissolved oxygen 
concentrations (MPCA 2004).  In 1985, a Wasteload Allocation Study 
established biochemical oxygen demand (BOD) discharge limits for plants on 
the lower 22 miles of the river as Phase I of the TMDL (MPCA 2004). 
 
Phase II will target phosphorus because high phosphorus levels will result in 
high algal growth which leads to low dissolved oxygen (MPCA 2004). 
 
3. Pollutant being traded 
 
Phosphorus. 
 
4. Size of program 
 
The Minnesota River is about 335 miles long and flows from Big Stone Lake 
to where it meets the Mississippi at Fort Snelling (MPCA 2004).  The River 
Basin covers almost 17,000 square miles, almost 20% of the state with 
approximately 486,000 residents (MPCA 2004). 
 
Parties to trade: Point source polluters without treatment capacity are expected 
to trade with those who have treatment capacity if the point-point trading 
scheme is implemented. 
 
5. Stakeholders/participants 
 
Advisory Committee: A 45 member advisory committee was established to 
discuss the model of phosphorus sources and the potential impacts of changes 
in land use (MPCA, 2004).  The committee was composed of cites and their 
consulting groups, industry, agriculture, commodity groups, counties, 
watershed projects, and environmental groups (MPCA 2004). 
 
Minnesota River Assessment Project (MRAP): 
The MPCA and other agencies founded this project to look into upstream 
sources of BOD.  Summarizes of their studies on water-quality issues on the 
river can be found at: 
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http://mrbdc.mnsu.edu/projects/ 
 
6. Regulatory drivers 
 
Clean Water Act/ EPA’s Water Quality Planning and Management 
Regulations 
Both of these pieces of legislation require states with polluted water bodies 
that do not meet criteria of good health, to develop TMDL’s for these water 
bodies (MPCA 2004). 
 
Lower Minnesota River Dissolved Oxygen Total Maximum Daily Load Report 
This report sets out the draft TDML for the lower Minnesota River.  The 
TDML is 752 pounds of phosphorus per day including a waste allocation for 
point sources, a load allocation for nonpoint sources, a margin of safety (based 
on modeling assumptions), and a reserve capacity for growth (MPCA 2004).  
This is a reduction from the 1,240 pounds currently projected to enter the 
basin during critically low flow conditions (MPCA 2004). 
According to the a Minnesota Pollution Control Agency (MPCA) “the 
emphasis of this low flow TMDL is on wastewater facilities, although 
agriculture, noncompliant ISTS and stormwater are also considered” (MPCA, 
2004).  The modeling done for the Advisory Committee led to the realization 
that it is the point sources that are the largest contributors to the phosphorus 
problem, and thus the TMDL focuses on reducing point source phosphorus 
discharge (Larry Gunderson, personal communication, May 19, 2004) 
 
Watershed Permit for the Minnesota River Basin 
A wastewater permit for the entire basin will be drafted requiring wastewater 
treatment facilities discharging over 1,800 pounds of phosphorus per year to 
1) develop a phosphorus management plan with a seasonal average goal of 1 
mg/l which will result in a 51% phosphorus reduction in 10 years or 2) a 
point-point trading program will be implemented so that dischargers can 
choose to treat to meet an individual 35% reduction goal, or trade to meet the 
35% reduction goal as part of a trade association team (MPCA 2004).  
Furthermore, all communities and continuous and controlled dischargers will 
evaluate the potential of a 30-50% phosphorus reduction, and, where feasible, 
will implement these reductions (MPCA 2004).   
 
Lower Minnesota River Model project:  This project should be completed by 
the Metropolitan Council in 2007 and its findings will be incorporated into 
future watershed permits and TMDL allocations. 
 
Revised 1985 Wasteload Allocation: The 1985 Wasteload Allocation should 
be revised by the MPCA after the completion of the Lower Minnesota River 
Model.  Any information gained from the potential trading program between 
point sources will be included in the final allocations as well (MPCA 2004). 
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B.  Trade Structure 
 
The actual watershed permit and an implementation plan have not been drafted yet.  
However, the TMDL gives some vague idea of what trading may be like, under the 
implementation strategy chosen. 
 
7. Determination of credit  
 
It has been implied in the 2004 TMDL report that perhaps a 1.1 to 1 ratio in 
trading would be used (MPCA 2004).  This would lead to a net benefit from 
trading and provide a margin of error. 
 
8. Trading ratios and other mechanisms to deal with uncertainty  
 
N/A 
 
9. Liability/penalties for noncompliance 
 
N/A 
 
10. Approval process 
 
N/A 
 
11. Ex post verification/auditing. 
 
N/A 
 
12. Mechanisms for trade identification and communication (education and 
outreach, third party facilitation, embedded ties) 
 
N/A 
 
13. Market structure (bilateral, clearinghouse, third party brokers) 
 
N/A 
 
14. Types of trades allowed 
 
It is anticipated that only point-point trading would occur between the 40 
1,800 pound plus polluters (Larry Gunderson, personal communication, May 
19, 2004).  It is planned that trade agreements will take into account both 
geographic transport factors, and actual discharged loading (MPCA 2004).  
Both of these factors have been explored in modeling experiments and will 
help access the potential outcomes and success of trades. 
 
 
 173
C.  Outcomes 
 
No trades have occurred. 
 
15. Types and volume of trades that have occurred 
 
N/A 
 
16. Administrative costs 
 
N/A 
 
17. Transaction costs 
 
N/A 
 
18. Cost savings 
 
N/A 
 
19. Program goals achieved  
 
N/A 
 
20. Program obstacles 
 
N/A 
 
21. NPS involvement and incentives to engage in trading. 
 
N/A 
 
22. Other 
 
 
 
Program information/References 
 
Websites: 
N/A 
 
Contacts: 
Gunderson, Larry, Minnesota River Basin Coordinator, Minnesota Pollution 
Control Agency.  (651) 297-3825. 
 
Written Program Information: 
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Minnesota Pollution Control Agency (MPCA): Regional Environmental 
Management Division (2004). Lower Minnesota River Dissolved Oxygen 
Total Maximum Daily Load Report. Accessed online May 19, 2004 from the 
World Wide Web: 
http://www.pca.state.mn.us/publications/reports/tmdl-final-lowermn-
doreport.pdf 
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Rahr Malting Company Permit (MN) 
 
A.  Program Background 
1. Program description 
 
The Rahr Malting Company negotiated an agreement with the Minnesota 
Pollution Control Agency (MPCA) to offset five-day carbonaceous 
biochemical oxygen demand (CBOD5) discharge from its new wastewater 
treatment plant by funding upstream nonpoint source phosphorus reductions.   
A TMDL on the Minnesota River had barred Rahr from obtaining a load 
allocation for CBOD5 and therefore from building a wastewater treatment 
plant, but Rahr worked cooperatively with the MPCA, the EPA, and several 
environmental organizations to craft a NPDES permit incorporating pollution 
trading.  
 
Rahr’s permit was issued in 1997.  Their wastewater treatment plant began 
operating in June, 1999 under an effluent cap of 2 mg/L for phosphorus and 
12 mg/L average for CBOD5 (estimated at 150 lbs/day of CBOD5).  To secure 
nonpoint source offsets, Rahr established the Minnesota River Corporate 
Sponsorship Program with a $275,000 fund (Riggs and Hartwell 2000).  The 
board of this fund oversees the selection of nonpoint source projects and must 
include representatives from Rahr, state agencies, and local citizen groups 
(MPCA 1997a). 
 
In the five years of the project, Rahr achieved the nonpoint source credit 
requirements through four trades.  Two projects converted farmland back to 
floodplain by restoring vegetation and setting aside the land through 
easements.  Two projects stabilized eroding stream banks with structural 
work, one of which additionally included livestock exclusion (Fang and Easter 
2003).   
 
2. Program motivation 
 
Rahr’s desire to operate its own wastewater treatment plan was part of a 
strategy to reduce and control costs while increasing production by 20%.  
Rahr’s discharge had been treated at the Blue Lake regional wastewater 
treatment plant, and the planned expansion would have cost an additional $1 
million in sewer access charges (Peplin 1998).   
 
Rahr was initially unable to obtain an NPDES permit in 1996, since a TMDL 
for CBOD5 on the Minnesota River did not allow for an additional load 
allocation (US EPA 2003).  Rahr’s discharge was already allocated to Blue 
Lake facility, and Rahr was unable to get the discharge rights transferred.   
Water quality trading – in this case reducing upstream nutrient discharge as a 
means of reducing downstream oxygen demand – remained the only viable 
solution.     
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3. Pollutant being traded 
 
Phosphorus, nitrogen, 5-day carbonaceous biochemical oxygen demand 
(CBOD5), and sediment.  
 
4. Size of program 
 
Rahr Malting Company is the single point source.  Nonpoint source sites must 
be upstream of Shakopee in the Minnesota River Basin.  In all, the Minnesota 
River Basin drains 16,700 square miles.  Nonpoint sources account for 74% of 
the phosphorus loading in the watershed under long-term average flow 
conditions (MPCA n.d.). 
 
Trading parties: Rahr Malting Company; farmers 
 
5. Stakeholders/participants 
 
• Rahr Malting Company 
• Minnesota Pollution Control Agency (MPCA): issues NPDES permit, 
approves nonpoint source projects, conducts site visits to monitor nonpoint 
source projects 
• Soil and Water Conservation Districts: helped determine selection of 
BMPs 
• EPA Region V: advised modification of NPDES permit 
• City of New Ulm: assisted with monitoring 
• Coalition for a Clean Minnesota River: helped identify nonpoint source 
projects and negotiate with farmers 
• HDR Inc., American Wetland Engineering: consultants 
 
6. Regulatory drivers 
 
In 1988, a TMDL for the lower Minnesota River had been established for 
CBOD5.   The loads for CBOD5 were fully allocated to other point sources 
under the TMDL.  Rahr was therefore unable to obtain the load allocation 
necessary for discharging to the river.    
  
 
B.  Trade Structure 
7. Determination of credit  
 
The MPCA specified that acceptable projects include soil erosion BMPs, 
livestock exclusion, rotational grazing, wetland restoration, and land set-
asides.  BMPs that are already being widely adopted, such as reduced tillage, 
would not be considered additional and are therefore not eligible for trading.   
 
The permit is able to trade off nonpoint source nutrient discharge (phosphorus, 
nitrogen, and sediments) and point source CBOD5 loading because the 
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nutrient discharge is converted to organic matter, whose subsequent decay 
increases oxygen demand.  The MPCA based the crediting ratio for these 
multiple parameters on the research of Erwin Van Nieuwenhuyse (formerly 
MPCA staff) correlating phosphorus with chlorophyll-a and chlorophyll-a 
with CBOD5. The phosphorus to BOD credit ratio is 1:8 in addition to a 0.75 
safety factor for soil phosphorus content.  The nitrogen to BOD ratio is 1:4, 
and calculations of nitrogen will assume a field loss factor of 50%.  
Furthermore, the credits are discounted using delivery ratios (DR) to account 
for location.   A DR of 100% will be used for riparian areas, but the DR is 
reduced to 20% for lands within a quarter mile and 10% for lands further 
away (MPCA 1997a).     
 
The credits are granted in a schedule to give the point source greater 
flexibility in meeting the permit requirements: 45% are granted when the 
contractual agreements are reached, 45% when the nonpoint source controls 
have been implemented, and 10% when vegetation establishment criteria are 
reached (Fang and Easter 2003).  
 
8. Trading ratios and other mechanisms to deal with uncertainty  
 
In addition to the ratios correlating nutrients, a 2:1 trading ratio is applied to 
trades.  BMPs must be visually trackable or monitorable, as well as subject to 
a contract for long-term assurance of BMPs (MPCA 1997a).  The corporate 
sponsorship program uses long-term contracts, easements, and land purchases.  
 
9. Liability/penalties for noncompliance 
 
The NPDES permit specifies that Rahr is liable for securing nonpoint source 
credits, and noncompliance is subject to enforcement.  If a nonpoint source 
seller defaults, then Rahr is responsible for finding another project (Jim 
Klang, personal communication, June 4, 2003).  
 
10. Approval process 
 
The Commissioner of the MPCA gives final approval for each nonpoint 
source project and determines the amount of CBOD5 credits generated 
(MPCA 1997a).   
 
11. Ex post verification/auditing. 
 
For both of the Minnesota trading programs, the point source is responsible 
for submitting technical and engineering reports, including structural 
specification, operation plans, and detailed photographs, to the MPCA before 
and after each trade (Fang and Easter 2003).  The permit also requires annual 
reports accounting for nonpoint source credits (MPCA1997).  The MPCA 
monitors the implementation of BMPs with period site inspections.  However, 
the MPCA does not verify pollution reduction with systematic monitoring, 
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which would be very expensive and would have to be long-term to generate 
conclusive results (Fang and Easter 2003). 
 
12. Mechanisms for trade identification and communication (education and 
outreach, third party facilitation, embedded ties) 
 
Third Party Facilitation.  A board of citizens, state officials, and company 
representatives oversee the final selection of BMP sites, but the process of 
initial trade identification was very “network driven” and depended on local 
environmental organizations and agency personnel (Scott Sparlin, personal 
communication, April 27, 2003).  Two trades were identified by CCMR, one 
trade was identified by a hydrologist from the Minnesota Department of 
Natural Resources (DNR), and one trade was identified by a member of the 
American Waters’ local chapter (Fang and Easter 2003).  
 
13. Market structure (bilateral, clearinghouse, third party brokers) 
 
Sole-source offsets. [note: Woodward, Kaiser, and Wicks (2002) identify Rahr 
as a clearinghouse because of the trust fund].   Rahr is responsible for 
identifying and contracting for nonpoint source credits to satisfy its NPDES 
permit.   
 
14. Types of trades allowed 
 
Point/nonpoint. Trading provisions are written into the NPDES permit. If Rahr 
discharges less than 150 lb/day of CBOD5, then they are not required to obtain 
150 nonpoint source load reduction units within the term of the permit.  Rahr 
does, however, have to achieve the reductions within ten years (MPCA 
1997a).   
 
C.  Outcomes 
15. Types and volume of trades that have occurred 
 
Rahr funded four nonpoint source projects.  Two included conservation 
easements and vegetation restoration on former floodplains.  Two involved 
structural streambank stabilization, one of which also included animal 
exclusion at a feedlot operation.  (Fang and Easter 2003). 
 
16. Administrative costs 
 
See below under “Transaction Costs.”  Fang and Easter (2003) provide 
comprehensive information on transaction costs that include program 
administration.  
 
17. Transaction costs 
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The transaction costs associated with this trading program were high because 
there was no water quality trading precedent in Minnesota.  Rahr and the 
MPCA had to design a permit and trading framework, determine the 
effectiveness of BMPs, negotiate with landowners, write detailed contracts, 
and monitor the implementation of nonpoint source controls.   The 
participation of CCMR in identifying trades significantly helped to reduce 
transaction costs (Riggs and Hartwell 2000). 
 
Fang and Easter (2003) break down transaction costs between the permitting 
and implementation phases.  During the two-year permitting phase Rahr spent 
about $16,500 ($12,000 for consultants and $4,500 for staff time), while the 
MPCA spent about $51,800 on staff time.  During the implementation phase, 
Rahr spent about $2,200 on staff time, the MPCA spent about $33,000 on staff 
time, a local citizen’s group spent about $750, and nonpoint sources spent 
about $500 on legal assistance.  The grand total for transaction costs during 
these two phases was about $105,000, 81% of which were borne by the 
MPCA as it designed the overall trading structure (Fang and Easter 2003).    
 
18. Cost savings 
 
Overall, nonpoint source phosphorus control did appear to be cost-effective.  
The four nonpoint source projects controlled phosphorus at costs ranging from 
$2.22 to 2.64/lb during the five years permit phase, which sets the cost of 
credits (calculated with a 2:1 trading ratio) from $4.44-5.28/lb P.  Including 
the transaction costs raises the average cost of nonpoint source phosphorus 
control to $8.56 over five years, but if the structural improvements last twenty 
years, which is likely, then the annualized cost is reduced to about $2.10/lb P. 
 
To compare this to pollution control costs outside of a trade, we have to use 
the cost of controlling CBOD5 to 1 mg/L through the municipal WWTP.  
Senjem (1997) estimated this point source control  at $4-18/lb P for capital 
and operating costs, based on a 20 year investment and an 8% annual interest 
rate.  For more details about costs, see Fang and Easter (2003).   
 
19. Program goals achieved  
 
Yes.  Rahr achieved its goal of building its own WWTP, which lowered 
production costs and increased operational flexibility.  This offset was also an 
environmental success; Rahr obtained nonpoint source credits for 204 lb 
CBOD5 per day, exceeding its discharge of 150 lb CBOD5/day (USEPA 
2003).   
 
20. Program obstacles 
 
One significant challenge was defining the appropriate trade ratio between 
upstream nonpoint source phosphorus loading and CBOD discharges from 
Rahr’s WWTP (Riggs and Hartwell 2000; Fang and Easter 2003).  The 
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MPCA was able to determine a 1:8 trading ratio by conducting studies relating 
phosphorus to chlorophyll-a and chlorophyll-a to CBOD.  
 
Local environmentalists initially objected to the trading program, but Rahr 
gained their support by cooperatively working with and accepting input from 
environmental organizations (Riggs and Hartwell 2000).  
 
21. NPS involvement and incentives to engage in trading. 
 
NPS were financially compensated, and the BMPs provided ancillary benefits 
by improving land stability.  In the case of two agricultural sites, the farmers 
were very concerned about the severe riverbank erosion that threatened their 
agricultural land, fences and buildings, and for years they had been searching 
unsuccessfully for financial assistance (Riggs and Hartwell 2000; Fang and 
Easter 2003).  
 
Landowners’ participation also had a strong social component.  Farmers were 
recognized for their good stewardship of the land, and newspaper coverage 
helped build community support.  The trading program may also have been 
well-received in the agricultural community because it was seen as a private 
initiative, while CCMR’s participation meant that farmers were approached by 
a trustworthy local conservationist rather than a corporate, governmental, or 
environmental representative (Scott Sparlin, personal communication, April 
27, 2003).   
 
22. Other 
 
Rahr benefited from the fact that it was already viewed as a “good actor” in 
the watershed and worked cooperatively with local stakeholders (Jim Klang, 
personal communication, June 4, 2003).  In addition, they were able to give 
something back to the community.  Rahr donated two sites, one to the City of 
New Ulm and one to the Coalition for a Clean Minnesota River, to be used for 
parkland and environmental education (Fang and Easter 2003). 
 
Program information/References 
 
Websites: 
See individual online documents, listed below 
 
Contacts: 
Jim Klang, Minnesota Pollution Control Agency. (651) 296-8402. 
Scott Sparlin, Coalition for a Clean Minnesota River, (507) 359-2346. 
 
Written Program Information: 
Environomics (1999).  A summary of U.S. effluent trading and offset 
projects.  A report prepared for Dr. Mahesh Podar, U.S. 
Environmental Protection Agency, Office of Water.  Retrieved May 
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Southern Minnesota Beet Sugar Cooperative Permit (MN) 
 
A.  Program Background 
1. Program description 
 
The Minnesota Pollution Control Agency (MPCA) incorporated water quality 
trading provisions into the wastewater treatment permit for the Southern 
Minnesota Beet Sugar Cooperative (SMBSC).  A TMDL on the lower 
Minnesota River prohibited the addition of a new discharger, but the MPCA 
allowed SMBSC to build a wastewater treatment plant providing it offset all 
discharge with nonpoint source phosphorus reductions.   
 
The permit was issued in April, 1999.  SMBSC was obligated to establish a 
trust fund of $300,000 to implement nonpoint source projects.  A trade board, 
made up of a processing plant official, SMBSC’s consultant, a Soil and Water 
Conservation District official, the Hawk Creek watershed coordinator, and an 
environmental advocacy representative, oversees the release of funds (Jim 
Klang, personal communication, June 4, 2003).   
 
SMBSC is able to discharge nearly 5,000 lbs of phosphorus per year, and in 
the first two years it offset this discharge by contracting with its beet growers 
to grow spring cover crops on about 36,000 acres (Fang and Easter 2003).  In 
the future, SMBSC may shift towards more permanent and cost-effective 
nonpoint source projects, such as replacing surface tile water intake systems 
with subsurface tiles (Jim Klang, personal communication, June 4, 2003).   
 
2. Program motivation 
 
SMBSC wanted to build a wastewater treatment plant to accommodate a 
proposed 40% expansion in production.  Previously, wastewater was stored in 
holding ponds during the processing season and spray-irrigated over 500 acres 
of alfalfa and grassland during the growing season (Fang and Easter 2003).   
This approach was reaching its limits because hydrogen-sulfide from the 
holding ponds had created a major odor nuisance and more land was needed 
for spray irrigation (Jim Klang, personal communication, June 4, 2003).  
 
The wastewater treatment plant would have discharged into a tributary of the 
Minnesota River, but the TMDL for the lower Minnesota River for CBOD5 
was already fully allocated and prohibited additional dischargers. Water 
quality trading was the only viable strategy for accommodating the addition of 
SMBSC as a discharger (Jim Klang, personal communication, June 4, 2003).  
 
3. Pollutant being traded 
 
Phosphorus 
 
4. Size of program 
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SMBSC is the sole point source.  Landowners in the lower two-thirds of the 
Minnesota River Basin are eligible nonpoint sources (MPCA 1999).  There 
are 600 beet growers, cultivating a total of 120,000 acres, in this region (Jim 
Klang, personal communication, June 4, 2003), and approximately 100 
growers have participated in the program during each of the last four years 
(Griesser 2004).   In all, the Minnesota River Basin drains 16,700 square 
miles.  Nonpoint sources account for 74% of the phosphorus loading in the 
watershed under long-term average flow conditions (MPCA n.d.). 
 
Trading parties: SMBSC, sugar beet farmers, cattle ranchers 
 
5. Stakeholders/participants 
 
• Southern Minnesota Beet Sugar Cooperative (SMBSC) 
• Minnesota Pollution Control Agency (MPCA): issues NPDES permit, 
approves nonpoint source projects, conducts site visits to monitor nonpoint 
source projects 
• Minnesota Department of Natural Resources (MDNR) 
• Minnesota River Basin Joint Powers Board: facilitated the negotiation on 
the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between SMBS, the MPCA, 
the MDNR, the Hawk Creek Watershed Project, Chippewa River 
Watershed Project, Redwood-Cottonwood Rivers Control Area, Sibley 
County Water Resources Advisory Committee, Rivers Council of 
Minnesota, and Minnesota Center for Environmental Advocacy (MCEA).  
• Sugar beet growers (shareholders in SMBSC): have implemented cover 
crop BMPs to satisfy the nonpoint source requirements of the SMBSC 
permit.  
• Cattle ranchers: were approached by SMBSC as a potential trading 
partner. 
 
6. Regulatory drivers 
 
A TMDL has existed since 1988 on the lower Minnesota River for 
carbonaceous biochemical oxygen demand as determined by a five-day test 
(CBOD5).   The loads for CBOD5 were fully allocated to other point sources 
under the TMDL.  SMBSC’s wastewater treatment plant would have 
discharged into Beaver Creek, a tributary to the Minnesota River.  
 
B.  Trade Structure 
7. Determination of credit  
 
The MPCA specified that acceptable BMPs included cattle exclusions, buffer 
strips, constructed wetlands, set-asides, alternative surface tile inlets and cover 
cropping, all of which are designed to reduce the runoff of phosphorus to 
surface waters (MPCA 1999). 
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The SMBSC NPDES permit specifies the formulas used to calculate 
phosphorus credits from each BMP.  For soil erosion and cover cropping 
BMPs, the Revised Universal Soil Loss Equation (RUSLE) was used to 
estimate the soil erosion reduction (tons/acre/year), which was subsequently 
multiplied by area, a delivery ratio, and a soil phosphorus content factor to 
determine phosphorus reductions.   For cattle exclusion and rotational grazing, 
the phosphorus load is calculated from the manure deposited in each pasture 
area and the associated phosphorus content and delivery ratio.  The permit 
also specifies phosphorus reduction calculations for critical area set-asides, 
constructed wetland treatment systems, and alternative surface tile inlets 
(Fang and Easter 2003).  
 
8. Trading ratios and other mechanisms to deal with uncertainty 
 
The trading ratio is 2.6:1, which reflects 1 lb for the offset, 1 lb for 
environmental improvement, and 0.6 lb as an “engineering safety factor” 
(Environomics 1999).  
 
9. Liability/penalties for noncompliance 
 
SMBSC is liable for ensuring nonpoint source phosphorus reductions.  If 
BMPs are not properly implemented or maintained, then the SMBSC will be 
responsible for identifying another project (Jim Klang, personal 
communication, June 4, 2003). 
 
10. Approval process 
 
After a trade has been approved by the trade board, it must receive final 
approval from the MPCA.  Compared to the Rahr Malting Company’s permit, 
SMBSC’s permit had many more prescriptive elements for documenting 
BMPs to submit for approval (Jim Klang, personal communication, June 4, 
2003) 
 
11. Ex post verification/auditing. 
 
For both of the Minnesota trading programs, the point source is responsible 
for submitting technical and engineering reports, including structural 
specification, operation plans, and detailed photographs, to the MPCA before 
and after each trade (Fang and Easter 2003).  The permit also requires annual 
reports accounting for nonpoint source credits (MPCA 1997).  The MPCA 
monitors the implementation of BMPs with periodic site inspections, 
randomly auditing 10% of the contract sites (Griesser 2004).  However, the 
MPCA does not verify pollution reduction with systematic monitoring, which 
would be very expensive and would have to be long-term to generate 
conclusive results (Fang and Easter 2003). 
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12. Mechanisms for trade identification and communication (education and 
outreach, third party facilitation, embedded ties) 
 
Embedded Ties.  Although SMBSC did approach several cattle ranchers as 
potential trade partners, nearly all nonpoint source credits have come from the 
beet growers who are shareholders in SMBSC.   
 
13. Market structure (bilateral, clearinghouse, third party brokers) 
 
Sole-source offset with bilateral negotiation.  SMBSC is responsible for 
identifying and contracting for nonpoint source credits to satisfy its NPDES 
permit. 
 
14. Types of trades allowed  
 
Point/nonpoint. 
 
C.  Outcomes 
15. Types and volume of trades that have occurred 
 
Out of a total of 120,000 acres in cultivation for sugar beets, spring cover 
cropping had been implemented on 35,839 acres during 2000 and 2001.  
SMBSC generated an average of 5,765 lbs. of phosphorus credits each year, 
which exceeds their discharge limit of approximately 5,000 lbs (Fang and 
Easter 2003). As of spring 2004, SMBSC has worked with a total of 399 cover 
crop contracts for over 39,000 acres (Jim Klang, personal communication, 
May 18, 2004).  SMBSC also contracted with one cattle operation for a cattle 
exclusion and bank stabilization project (Jim Klang, personal communication, 
June 6, 2003).  In addition, SMBSC has been working with Hawk Creek 
Watershed Organization to install surface tile intakes and is exploring surface 
tile intake contracts with Redwood River and Chippewa River organizations 
(Jim Klang, personal communication, May 18, 2004). 
 
16. Administrative costs 
 
Fang and Easter (2003) estimated that the SMBSC program required 
approximately three times more staff time than the Rahr Malting Co. program 
due to the large number of trades and the individual approval required for 
each trade.  SMBSC disputes Fang and Easter’s conclusions (Jim Klang, 
personal communication, May 18, 2004).  See below under “Transaction 
Costs” for more details.    
 
17. Transaction costs 
 
SMBSC finalized its trading framework and NPDES permit in one and a half 
years.  The MPCA’s experience with the Rahr Malting Co. permit presumably 
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helped reduce the permitting time and associated transaction costs for SMBSC 
(Fang and Easter 2003).   
 
SMBSC reduced the costs of identifying trades and negotiating with farmers 
by trading with its own shareholders, the beet growers.   Despite the 
advantages of this internal trading, however, the total transaction costs may be 
higher than in the Rahr Malting Co. project because of the MPCA staff time 
required to administer the trades (Fang and Easter 2003).  The cover crop 
BMPs required a large number of individual trades, each of which had to be 
individually documented and verified by the MPCA staff.    
 
18. Cost savings 
 
SMBSC implemented BMPs on approximately 18,000 acres/year, generating 
an average of 5,765 lbs of phosphorus reduction credits.  Since SMBSC paid 
farmers $2/acre to implement spring cover crop BMPs, the cost to SMBSC of 
nonpoint source offsets was $6.22/lb.  However, this does not reflect that 
farmers themselves incurred a cost of $6/acre, which would bring the actual 
cost of phosphorus credits to $18.65/lb, while including transaction costs 
could drive the cost higher than $24/lb.  Fang and Easter (2003) conclude 
from this analysis that SMBSC’s trading was not more cost-effective than the 
phosphorus controls for a small-to-medium sized waste water treatment plant.  
 
SMBSC, however, disputes Fang and Easter’s conclusions (Jim Klang, 
personal communication, May 18, 2004).   Fang and Easter (2003) compared 
the nonpoint source controls to the cost of reducing point source discharge 
from 1.5 mg/L to 1.0 mg/L, but SMBSC was actually looking at bringing the 
limit down to 0 mg/L, a scenario in which trading did indeed lower 
compliance costs (Griesser 2004).  SMBSC does not release the details of the 
actual trading costs out of concerns that doing so may encourage farmers to 
demand a higher offset price (Griesser 2004). 
 
19. Program goals achieved  
 
Water quality trading enabled SMBSC to obtain an NPDES permit and solved 
the hydrogen-sulfide odor problem that had been a significant community 
nuisance.  SMBSC has successfully met its nonpoint source offset 
requirements by implementing sugar beet spring cover crops.  The wastewater 
treatment plant can discharge a maximum of 4,982 lbs of phosphorus/year, 
and the cover crop BMPs generated reduction credits for 5,675 lbs. 
phosphorus/year (Fang and Easter 2003).    
 
20. Program obstacles 
 
The environmental community was initially uneasy with the trading program 
because SMBSC had a history of environmental compliance problems.  
Consequently, the NPDES permit was contingent on the resolution of these 
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alleged environmental violations.   SMBSC entered into a Compliance 
Agreement with the MPCA that contained a schedule of corrective actions, 
including the implementation of an environmental management system 
(MPCA 1999).   
 
SMBSC’s sub-par environmental track record, coupled with concerns that the 
Rahr permit had not required enough explicit documentation, resulted in the 
SMBSC permit having more prescriptive requirements than the Rahr permit 
(Jim Klang, personal communication, June 4, 2003).   
 
SMBSC tried to engage several cattle ranchers as potential trade partners, but 
they were turned down by three cattle operations.  Most likely the ranchers did 
not want to cooperate with SMBSC because of historical tensions between 
ranchers and beet growers regarding land values (Jim Klang, personal 
communication, June 4, 2003).  
 
21. NPS involvement and incentives to engage in trading. 
 
Although farmers were compensated at $2/acre for implementing BMPs, it 
actually cost farmers $6/acre.  The spring cover crops provide additional 
benefits to farmers, however, by protecting young sugar beet plants (Fang and 
Easter 2003). 
 
SMBSC tried to engage cattle farmers for the trade, and they did have one 
contract for cattle exclusion and bank stabilization.  Three other cattle farmers 
turned them down, most likely because of tensions between cattle farmers and 
sugar beet growers.  The cattle farmers thought that the beet growers drove up 
land prices, and they did not want to do business with the beet growers even if 
it made financial sense (Jim Klang, personal communication, June 4, 2003). 
 
22. Other 
 
Fang and Easter (2003) assert that the use of the Revised Universal Soil Loss 
Equation (RUSLE) may have underestimated the phosphorus load reductions 
from soil erosion BMPs.  They have compared RUSLE to the Agricultural 
Drainage and Pesticide Transport (ADAPT) model, which also includes 
hydrology components.    
 
 
Program information/References 
 
Websites: 
See individual online documents, listed below 
 
Contacts: 
Jim Klang, Minnesota Pollution Control Agency. (651) 296-8402  
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Truckee River Water Quality Settlement Agreement and Truckee 
Meadows Wastewater Reclamation Facility Permit (NV) 
 
A.  Program Background 
1. Program description 
 
The Cities of Reno and Sparks, Washoe County, and the Nevada Division of 
Environmental Protection (DEP) are developing creative solutions to solve 
water quality and flow issues in the Truckee River, which flows from Lake 
Tahoe to Pyramid Lake through the Cities of Reno and Sparks.   Three 
avenues of water quality trading are being explored to authorize increased 
discharge at the Truckee Meadows Water Reclamation Facility (TMWRF): 
water rights purchases and flow augmentation as part of the 1996 Truckee 
River Water Quality Settlement Agreement (WQSA), point/nonpoint trading 
for agricultural best management practices (BMPs) and septic conversions, 
and point/point trading with two other wastewater treatment plants (WWTPs).   
 
Under the WQSA, Reno, Sparks, Washoe County, and the Department of the 
Interior will purchase water rights to improve water quality and increase 
instream flows.  The water will be held in a federal reservoir and released to 
the river during the summer, when the river is very low or even dry (US DOJ 
1996).  This arrangement does not constitute direct trading or offsets, since 
Reno and Sparks will not receive a higher wasteload allocation (WLA) in 
exchange for increasing instream flow.  However, since the higher flows will 
enable the river to carry a higher nutrient load, and since this increased 
assimilative capacity could lead to an increased TMDL and WLA, the Cities’ 
acquisition of water rights could indirectly allow greater discharge at TMWRF 
in the future (RWPC 2004).  
 
When the WQSA was granted a five-year extension in 2001, only seventeen 
contracts for water rights had been signed (Cheryl McGovern, personal 
communication, July 21, 2003).  By spring 2004, 33 contracts, totaling 4197 
acre feet of water, have been signed (Susan Rothe, personal communication, 
May 27, 2004).   Only a fraction of the water rights needed to fulfill the 
WQSA have been acquired so far, but purchases will be initiated on a much 
larger scale once the Truckee River Operating Agreement (TROA) is finalized 
in summer 2004 (Mahmood Azad, personal communication, May 26, 2004).   
 
Provisions in the TMWRF NPDES permit allow for two more kinds of 
trading.  Point/point trades between TMWRF and two other WWTPs – Sparks 
Marina Park and Canyon Vista Group - is possible under a permit clause 
stating that a discharger that does not use its full allocation can share any 
remaining allocations with the other dischargers.  (NDEP 2003, Part I.A.3).  
From a practical view, however, it is unlikely that this will ever lead to 
point/point trades, since neither Sparks Marina Park nor Canyon Vista Group 
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will be able to reduce nitrogen loading enough to create a trade (Mike Brisbin, 
personal communication, May 24, 2004).  
 
The outlook for point/nonpoint trades is more promising.  Part I.A.5 of the  
TMWRF permit establishes a three-phase approach for modifying the WLA to 
reflect water quality trades or offsets (NDEP 2003, Part I.A.5).  The Water 
Quality Standards Branch (WQSB) is simply waiting for TMWRF to put 
together a proposal (Randy Pahl, personal communication, May 20, 2004).  
TMWRF will probably submit a proposal in 2005, based on the Watershed 
Analysis Risk Management Framework (WARMF) being developed by 
Systech Engineers, Inc. for the Truckee River.  The WARMF watershed 
model, which should be completed in late 2004, will estimate the predicted 
nutrient and sediment loading reductions from nonpoint source projects 
(Mahmood Azad, personal communication, May 26, 2004).   
 
2. Program motivation 
 
The motivation for trading has been both environmental and financial.  The 
WQSA in particular was developed to be an environmentally beneficial and 
cost-effective solution to accommodate the PLPT’s needs as well as the needs 
of the TMWRF to expand.   
 
Low flows and heavy pollutant loading have caused a variety of water quality 
challenges in the Truckee River.  Summer flows can be low enough that there 
is no significant aquatic habitat, and flow augmentation can have a significant 
effect on the biological communities and water quality of the river (Mahmood 
Azad, personal communication, May 26, 2004; RWPC 2004).    
 
TMWRF needed to expand capacity, but the Cities needed to seek creative 
solutions because TMWRF already faced the most stringent nitrogen 
discharge limits in the nation as a result of the TMDL.  Higher flows and 
lower nonpoint source pollution will mitigate the impact of TMWRF’s 
effluent and can allow TMWRF to expand capacity.  The EPA has 
traditionally preferred to treat pollution rather than allowing for increased 
dilution, but it recognized that, given the low river flows and the difficulty of 
increased treatment, flow augmentation provided the greatest and most cost-
effective benefits (Cheryl McGovern, personal communication, July 21, 
2003).    
 
3. Pollutant being traded 
 
Potentially point/point or point/nonpoint trades for total nitrogen, total 
phosphorus, or total dissolved solids (TDS); water rights purchases may 
enable the TMWRF to increase its nitrogen, phosphorus, or TDS discharge 
 
4. Size of program 
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The Truckee River watershed contains a variety of point and nonpoint sources 
that could provide trading opportunities.  The Truckee River is just over 110 
miles long, but many interests compete for the water, including irrigated 
agriculture, wastewater treatment, light industry, power generation, urban and 
residential development, and fishing (Doherty 2002).   
 
Potential trading parties:  The TMWRF is the central actor within all three 
potential trade structures.  The point/point trades would only involve two 
other WWTPs.  The point/nonpoint trades will likely include agricultural 
BMPs and septic tank conversions, although a 5-mile river restoration project 
with the Nature Conservancy might be evaluated for trading purposes as well 
(Mike Brisbin, personal communication, May 24, 2004).  In the Final 
Environmental Impact Statement (FEIS) for the proposal to initiate the water 
rights purchases, the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) presumes that most of the 
water rights will be acquired from the Truckee Newlands project, with 
additional water coming from the Reno-Sparks metropolitan area and land 
within the Truckee River corridor from Vista downstream to Wadsworth 
(McCaleb 2002).   
 
5. Stakeholders/participants 
 
• Cities of Reno and Sparks: jointly operate the Truckee Meadows Water 
Reclamation Facility; contributing funds to purchase water rights 
• Washoe County: contributing funds to purchase water rights 
• Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe: party to WQSA 
• U.S. Department of Interior, Bureau of Reclamation: contributing funds to 
purchase water rights 
• U.S. Bureau of Indian Affairs: completed a Final Environmental Impact 
Statement for the federal acquisition of water rights under WQSA 
• U.S. Environmental Protection Agency: party to WQSA 
• Nevada Division of Environmental Protection: issues NPDES permits, 
will approve nonpoint source offsets, party to WQSA 
• Washoe County Regional Water Planning Commission (RWPC) 
• Sparks Marina Lake and Canyon Vista Group: WWTPs that have an 
umbrella clause in their permits to allow sharing of the individual WLAs 
to meet an aggregate WLA  
• Systech Engineering, Inc.: developing WARMF watershed model for 
Truckee River, to be used in nonpoint source trades and possibly an 
update of a TMDL 
• Desert Research Institute (DRI): consultant regarding salt loadings and 
irrigated agriculture 
 
6. Regulatory drivers 
 
Water quality standards in the Truckee River have been set by a TMDL for 
total nitrogen, total phosphorus, and total dissolved solids (TDS) since 1994.  
The TMDL and stringent nutrient allocations are the drivesr for TMWRF’s 
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interest in nonpoint source offsets.  TMWRF currently discharges nitrogen at 
1.6 mg/L, which is the lowest nitrogen limit in the nation (Mahmood Azad, 
personal communication, May 26, 2004).  
 
The broad context of water rights allocations is set by the Truckee-Carson-
Pyramid Lake Water Rights Settlement Act (Public Law No. 101-618), which 
was passed by Congress in 1990 to address the negotiation and development 
of water rights allocations among the watershed’s many competing interests.  
Section 205 of the Settlement Act directed the Department of the Interior to 
negotiate an operating agreement for the Truckee River Reservoirs.  A draft of 
the Truckee River Operating Agreement (TROA) was released in 2003, and 
the final TROA will be promulgated as Section 205(a)(5) of the Settlement 
Act once the Environmental Impact Report is completed in 2004.  The TROA 
will provide the regulatory foundation for purchasing water rights. 
 
The driver for the water rights “trades” came from the Truckee River Water 
Quality Service Agreement (WQSA), which was signed in 1996 after two 
years of negotiations among the Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe (PLPT), the Cities 
of Reno and Sparks, Washoe County, the Nevada Division of Environmental 
Protection, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, the U.S. Department 
of the Interior (DOI), and the U.S. Department of Justice.  The WQSA 
resolved a lawsuit filed by the PLPT for alleged violations of the Endangered 
Species Act, Clean Water Act, National Environmental Protection Act, and 
the federal government’s responsibility to the tribe. Under the agreement, $12 
million from Reno, Sparks, and Washoe County and $12 from the DOI will be 
used to purchase water rights in the Truckee River.  The water will be stored 
upstream in federal reservoirs and released to the river during low-flow times 
(typically June through September) (US DOJ 1996).   In July, 2001, the 
WQSA was extended for another five years to give the parties time to finalize 
the Operating agreement and obtain water rights purchases (Cheryl 
McGovern, personal communication, July 21, 2003). 
 
B.  Trade Structure 
7. Determination of credit  
 
The water rights will be purchased to comply with the WQSA and will not 
directly authorize increased discharges at TMWRF.   Increasing the flow in 
the river is expected to improve habitat and increase the river’s capacity to 
assimilate nutrients, which could potentially lead to an increased TMDL and 
TMWRF’s WLA.  Any offsets will therefore be determined through the 
TMDL revision process. 
 
For the point/nonpoint trades, watershed modeling (the WARMF model) will 
estimate the nutrient and sediment loading reductions resulting from 
agricultural BMPs, structural improvements, and septic conversions. 
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For the point/point trades, all discharge is measurable. The baseline is set by 
the individual WLAs, and a facility that discharges below its WLA could 
share its remaining allocation with another facility.    
 
8. Trading ratios and other mechanisms to deal with uncertainty  
 
No trading ratio is applicable for the water rights purchases, since the offset is 
not as straightforward as allowing an additional amount of discharge for each 
unit of additional flow in the water.  The TMDL sets nitrogen, phosphorus, 
and TDS limits by mass, not concentration, so TMWRF will face the same 
WLA until the additional flow leads to a revised TMDL. 
 
The trading ratio has not yet been determined for point/nonpoint trades 
(Mahmood Azad, personal communication, May 26, 2004).  Point sources 
would share their WLAs with one another without a discount (i.e. a 1:1 ratio).  
 
9. Liability/penalties for noncompliance 
 
The water rights will be purchased to comply with the WQSA, and failure to 
obtain sufficient water rights will result in enforcement action.  Any additional 
discharge rights that result from the increased flow will be granted in the 
context of a revised TMDL.  
 
Liability and penalties are not yet determined for point/nonpoint and 
point/point trades.  Point sources are ultimately responsible for meeting their 
own discharge limits, and the permit clause for point/point trades merely 
states that no discharger would be penalized for the WLA exceedances of 
another discharger (NDEP 2003, Part I.A.3).   
  
10. Approval process 
 
The water rights purchases were approved as part of the WQSA.  The TROA, 
which will be finalized by late 2004, will establish the regulatory framework 
for water rights acquisitions  
 
The TMWRF NPDES permit establishes a three-phased approach to 
implementing a point/nonpoint trading program and incorporating offsets into 
the permit.  Phase I, based on the permit reopener clause (Part I.A.5), will 
allow for case-by-case reviews of potential trades without reopening other 
provisions of the permit.  Phase II focuses on the development of trade 
proposals that include demonstration projects.  Upon approval, the 
demonstration project will be implemented and the results monitored, and a 
Water Quality Management Demonstration Project Report will be submitted 
to the DEP.  The DEP will decide whether to proceed with full 
implementation of the proposal.  Phase III is the full implementation of the 
water quality management project and the development of trading ratios, 
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monitoring and enforcement provisions, and a phase-in schedule for WLA 
increases (NDEP 2003, Part I.A.5).   
 
11. Ex post verification/auditing. 
 
Auditing for the water rights project is conducted under the WQSA and the 
TMDL.   Monitoring and enforcement provisions for nonpoint source offsets 
will be determined through the process of trade approval (see “Approval 
Process”) (NDEP 2003). 
 
12. Mechanisms for trade identification and communication (education and 
outreach, third party facilitation, embedded ties) 
  
Third party facilitation for water rights.  The water rights will be purchased 
through established water rights broker.  The trade identification process has 
not been determined for nonpoint source offsets, but it is unlikely that Reno 
and Sparks will directly negotiate with individual farmers or property owners.  
(Mahmood Azad, personal communication, May 26, 2004).  
 
13. Market structure (bilateral, clearinghouse, third party brokers) 
 
The water rights will be purchased through brokers, but it is inaccurate to say 
that this makes it a brokered water quality trade.  The potential water quality 
offset does not fit any market models, since TMWRF does not receive direct 
offsets in exchange for increasing water flow downstream.  TMWRF will only 
receive an increased WLA if the increased flow can lead to a revised TMDL. 
 
The market structure for nonpoint trades has not yet been determined.   
Point/point trades would be bilateral.  
 
14. Types of trades allowed  
 
Point/point, point/nonpoint.  The water rights “trade” does not fit into any 
category, but point/nonpoint is probably the best approximation 
(Environomics 1999).  
 
C.  Outcomes 
15. Types and volume of trades that have occurred 
 
Thirty-three water rights contracts, comprising 4,197 acre feet, have been 
signed as of May, 2004 (Susan Rothe, personal communication, May 27, 
2004). 
 
TMWRF will probably propose a nonpoint source trade within the next year 
(Mahmood Azad, personal communication, May 26,2004).  It is unlikely that 
there will be any point/point trading with Sparks Marina Lake and Vista 
Canyon Group (Mike Brisbin, personal communication, May 24, 2004). 
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16. Administrative costs 
 
Not determined.   
 
17. Transaction costs 
 
Not determined. 
 
18. Cost savings 
 
Not determined.  Any point/nonpoint trades will likely help the TMWRF 
increase capacity with lower costs than they would face through conventional 
treatment.  The water rights will probably cost $20-40 million dollars 
(Mahmood Azad, personal communication, May 26, 2004), and it remains to 
be seen whether the increased flow leads provide a financial ‘payback’ 
through a revised TMDL and higher WLA.   
  
19. Program goals achieved  
 
After extensive negotiations, policy-making, and modeling efforts, it appears 
that water quality trading in the Truckee River is likely to come to fruition in 
2005.  The foundation for acquiring water rights on a large scale will finally 
be in place by late 2004, nearly a decade after the WQSA.  Greater water 
rights purchases and flow augmentation will probably be initiated within the 
following year.  Once the watershed modeling is finished, proposals for 
nonpoint source trades will be submitted to the DEP (Mahmood Azad, 
personal communication, May 26, 2004). 
 
20. Program obstacles 
 
Water rights are a highly contentious and politically charged issue in the 
region.  Negotiations for the WQSA, the TROA, and individual offset projects 
have had to proceed slowly and sensitively, which has led to delays in the 
implementation of water rights purchases.   
 
Acquiring water rights is a complex and challenging process.  Water rights are 
a precious commodity in the region, and it may be difficult to find enough 
interested sellers (Randy Pahl, personal communication, May 20, 2004).   
The City of Reno must ensure that it is purchasing senior water rights, that the 
water will be transferable to USBR reservoirs upstream, and that the sellers do 
not perceive that the City is forcefully pressuring them to sell (Mahmood 
Azad, personal communication, May 26, 2004).     
 
Some stakeholders, both at the DEP and TMWRF, have felt that the Truckee 
TMDL is too flawed to consider nonpoint trades at this time (Mahmood Azad, 
personal communication, May 26, 2004).   Nearly 70% of TMWRF’s nitrogen 
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discharge is dissolved organic nitrogen (DON), which may or may not be a 
biologically available form of nitrogen.  If DON has very low 
biodegradability, then it should be removed from the TMDL.  Revising the 
TMDL to remove DON would have an enormous impact on TMWRF’s need 
to further control nitrogen, since TMWRF is currently close to its WLA for 
total nitrogen (Mike Brisbin, personal communication, May 24, 2004).  
 
21. NPS involvement and incentives to engage in trading. 
 
Nonpoint sources will primarily have a financial incentive to engage in 
trading.   
 
22. Other 
 
 
Program information/References 
 
Websites: 
See individual online documents, listed below 
 
Contacts: 
Moody Azad, City of Reno.  (775) 334-3311 
Mike Brisbin, Water Quality Control Technician, Truckee Meadows Water 
Reclamation Facility.  (775) 861-4148 
Susan Rothe, Reno City Attorney.  (775) 334-2069 
Randy Pahl, Nevada Division of Environmental Protection. (775) 687-4670 
Cheryl McGovern, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency. (415) 972-3415 
 
Written Program Information: 
Draft Truckee River Operating Agreement (2003).  U.S. Bureau of 
Reclamation.  Retrieved May 26, 2004 from 
http://www.usbr.gov/mp/lbao/troa/docs/TROAdraft.pdf 
Doherty, John (2002).  ‘Dilution’ no longer the ‘solution to pollution:’ 
finding a new future for Truckee River water quality.  DRI News.  
Desert Research Institute.  Retrieved May 26, 2004 from 
http://newsletter.dri.edu/2002/fall/truckeeriver.htm 
Environomics (1999).  A summary of U.S. effluent trading and offset 
projects.  A report prepared for Dr. Mahesh Podar, U.S. 
Environmental Protection Agency, Office of Water.  Retrieved May 
7, 2004 from 
http://www.epa.gov/owow/watershed/trading/traenvrn.pdf 
McCaleb, Neal A. (2002).  Notice of availability of the Final 
Environmental Impact Statement for the Truckee River Water 
Quality Settlement Agreement, Federal Water Rights Acquisition 
Program for Washoe, Storey, and Lyon Counties, NV.  Federal 
Register 67(198): 63445-6 
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Nevada Division of Environmental Protection (NDEP) (2003).  Fact 
Sheet, Permit NV0020120 – Renewal, Truckee Meadows Water 
Reclamation Facility.  Retrieved May 20, 2004 from 
http://ndep.nv.gov/sec/20150ffact.pdf 
Regional Water Planning Commission (RWPC) (2004).  The Washoe 
County Regional Water Management Plan, 2004 Update, 
Administrative Draft.  Retrieved May 23, 2004 from 
http://www.co.washoe.nv.us/water_dept/rwpc/regionalpln.htm 
U.S. Department of Justice (US DOJ) (1996).  Settlement reached in 
Truckee River dispute.  Press release #500: 10-10-96.  Retrieved 
May 26, 2004 from http://www.usdoj.gov/pr/1996/Oct96/500enr.htm 
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Passaic Valley Sewerage Commissioners Pretreatment Trading 
Project (NJ) 
 
A.  Program Background 
1. Program description 
 
The Passaic Valley Sewerage Commissioners (PVSC), a publicly-owned 
treatment works (POTW) servicing domestic and industrial wastewater, 
incorporated trading of heavy metals into its rules for indirect discharges.  
PVSC’s trading provisions were intended to provide its industrial permittees 
with greater flexibility in meeting its new local pretreatment limits.  
Although the trading rule was made effective in 1994, industrial facilities did 
not pursue trading as a result of high transaction costs and uncertainties 
associated with the negotiation process (US EPA 1998).   
 
In November 1996, working with PVSC, the New Jersey Department of 
Environmental Protection (NJ DEP) and EPA Region 2, the Effluent Trading 
Pilot Team of the New Jersey Chemical Industry Project began to facilitate 
trading among industrial permittees within the PVSC service area. At an 
information session held by the Pilot Team to identify parties interested in 
trading, small companies revealed that the minimum trade amounts set by 
PVSC in 1994 were too large for their participation in the program. In 
response, PVSC adjusted the trade requirements in order to accommodate the 
small companies and establish a larger trading market (see “Approval 
Process” below).    
 
The first trade agreement took effect on July 1, 1997.  To date, there have 
been two executed contracts, one of which is still effective (see “Types and 
volumes of trades” below) (Andy Caltagirone, Personal Communication, 
May 14, 2004).     
 
2. Program motivation 
 
PVSC decided to “beneficially reuse” its biosolids and, in order to meet 
“exceptional quality” standards by June 30, 1997, established more stringent, 
local pretreatment limits for certain heavy metals (US EPA 1998, 
Environomics 1999).  PVSC included the option of trading heavy metals to 
meet new local limits in response to concerns raised by indirect dischargers (a 
large leather tanner in particular) already meeting federal categorical 
pretreatment standards (US EPA 1998).  The indirect dischargers were 
concerned that large and expensive renovations to pretreatment equipment 
would be required and certain production processes might have to be curtailed 
or stopped altogether if costs proved to be too prohibitive.  PVSC determined 
that flexibility could be established in assigning local pretreatment limits 
through trading provided that ex post adjusted local limits did not exceed 
federal categorical limits (US EPA 1998).  Trading would enable facilities 
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within the PVSC service area to reduce compliance costs and also remove the 
incentive for “local limits shopping” (US EPA 1998, pp. 3-2). 
 
The Effluent Trading Pilot Project was chosen by the New Jersey Chemical 
Industry Project Stakeholder Group as one of four pilot projects designed to 
test strategies that would enable and encourage companies to achieve greater 
environmental protection.  With rules and regulations already in effect that 
allowed trading, the Pilot Team for the Effluent Trading Project worked 
within the PVSC service area to facilitate trading of local pretreatment limits. 
 
3. Pollutant being traded 
 
Heavy metals (Cadmium, Copper, Lead, Mercury, Nickel, and Zinc) 
 
4. Size of program 
 
Located in Newark, New Jersey, the PVSC service area encompasses land  
“draining into the Passaic River from the Great Falls in Paterson to Newark 
Bay” (US EPA 1998, 1-1).  Spread across 48 municipalities in four counties 
(Passaic, Bergen, Essex and Hudson), the PVSC treats domestic and industrial 
wastewaters from northeastern New Jersey (Andy Caltagirone, Personal 
Communication, May 14, 2004).  260 major industrial plants discharge their 
wastewater into the PVSC sewer system (Andy Caltagirone, Personal 
Communication, May 14, 2004).  Of those 260, the vast majority need to 
pretreat their effluent in order to meet chemical, heavy metal and pH local 
limits (Andy Caltagirone, Personal Communication, May 14, 2004, Sharing 
1998).  The main industries include “electroplaters, metal finishers, 
pharmaceutical and organic chemical manufacturers, textile dyers, hospitals, 
electronic products manufacturers, and newsprint recycling mills” (PVSC 
2003). 
 
To date, three industrial facilities have participated in the pretreatment trading 
program: two buyers (one organic chemical manufacturer and one 
pharmaceutical company) and one seller (an organic chemical manufacturer) 
(Andy Caltagirone, Personal Communication, May 14, 2004). 
 
Potential trading parties:  Indirect dischargers within the PVSC service area 
 
5. Stakeholders/participants 
 
• Passaic Valley Sewerage Commissioners (PVSC) – designed trading 
requirements, determines local pretreatment limits, approves trading 
agreements and revises discharge limits according to trade contracts 
• Pilot Team for the Effluent Trading Pilot Project – facilitated trade 
negotiations, helped facilities identify potential trading partners, provided 
guidance on trading qualifications and preparation of trading agreements, 
and represented industry, environmental, and regulatory interests as subset 
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of New Jersey Chemical Industry Project Stakeholder group with 
additional experts (for a complete list of Pilot Team members see US EPA 
1998). 
• New Jersey Chemical Industry Project Stakeholder group – composed of 
representatives from EPA, POTWs, the chemical manufacturing industry, 
trade associations, unions, academia and the community, created to 
analyze environmental protection strategies   
• New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection (NJ DEP) – 
participated in New Jersey Chemical Industry Project and Effluent 
Trading Pilot Project 
• Environmental Protection Agency Region 2 (EPA) - participated in New 
Jersey Chemical Industry Project and Effluent Trading Pilot Project 
• EPA’s Industry Strategies Group – helped establish New Jersey Chemical 
Industry Project 
 
6. Regulatory drivers 
 
Pretreatment local limits set by PVSC to achieve “exceptional quality” sludge, 
and the strong enforcement of compliance requirements drive the trading of 
heavy metals.  Such trading of uniform local pretreatment limits by industrial 
facilities is allowed in the rules and regulations regarding indirect discharges 
made effective in 1994 by PVSC in accordance with state and federal 
pretreatment and residual management regulations.   
 
Applicable federal regulations include EPA’s water quality trading policy and 
40 CFR Part 403 (general pretreatment regulations) particularly Sections 
403.8(f)(4) and 403.5 (for more information visit 
http://cfpub.epa.gov/npdes/pretreatment/pstandards.cfm#local).   
 
At the state level, guidance for local limits is provided in the New Jersey 
Pollution Discharge Elimination System Regulations, N.J.A.C.7: 14A-1.1 et 
seq (visit http://www.state.nj.us/dep/dwq/loc_lim.htm for more information). 
 
B.  Trade Structure 
7. Determination of credit   
 
In order to qualify as a seller, an industrial facility must illustrate to PVSC 
through monitoring data and compliance records that it has achieved positive 
reductions for the traded metal through control measures or pollution 
prevention techniques implemented to meet the most recent local pretreatment 
limits (Murphy 1997).  Excess reductions for sale cannot come from the 
discontinuation of a production process (Murphy 1997).    
 
Buyers may purchase credits for more than one metal, but for a given metal, 
the entire credit amount must come from a single seller (PVSC 2003).  Sellers 
may sell credits for a given metal to a maximum of ten buyers (Murphy 1997). 
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Trades for heavy metals’ credits are conducted in pounds per day while local 
limits are expressed as concentrations (US EPA 1998).  Trading partners must 
convert between pounds and concentrations using average annual discharge 
volumes to determine level of trade (US EPA 1998).  The Pilot Team 
provided sample calculations to potential trading partners (US EPA 1998). 
 
8. Trading ratios and other mechanisms to deal with uncertainty  
 
The trading ratio is 10:8.  20% of reductions purchased are “banked” or 
“retired” for environmental benefit, not to be counted towards the discharge 
limit of the buyer, leading to an overall reduction in pollutant loading (US 
EPA 1998). 
 
9. Liability/penalties for noncompliance 
 
If a seller goes out of business or discontinues the production process that 
discharges the heavy metal traded, the buyer loses those purchased credits for 
reductions as indicated in the trading agreement (US EPA 1998).  PVSC gives 
the buyer a reasonable time to come into compliance (US EPA 1998). 
 
Once a trade is approved and discharge limits have been adjusted by PVSC, 
each facility is responsible for meeting its own revised permit level.  A 
violation by one trading partner does not affect the other facility’s compliance 
status.  However, if routine violations occur, PVSC may adjust the trade 
agreement to reflect the lack of compliance (US EPA 1998). 
 
10. Approval process 
 
PVSC approves trades based on the following criteria:  buyers and sellers are 
in compliance with all other POTW requirements; both trading partners have 
illustrated the ability to comply with the adjusted discharge limits; the traded 
amount is greater than 0.1 lbs per day (adjusted in 1997 to accommodate small 
companies, originally 1.0 lbs per day); the metal is traded in increments of no 
less than 0.05 lbs per day (originally 0.5 lbs per day), the price of the credits 
and terms of payment are defined, and the timeframe of the agreement is 
established including timing of renewals and adjustments (PVSC 2003). 
 
11. Ex post verification/auditing. 
 
Each permittee must perform monthly sampling and discharge monitoring 
data is compiled by PVSC.   
 
12. Mechanisms for trade identification and communication (education and 
outreach, third party facilitation, embedded ties) 
 
The Pilot Team facilitated identification of trading partners through its 
outreach program which included a letter inviting industrial facilities within 
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the PVSC service area to attend a meeting at which the logistics of trading 
local limits would be discussed, and a follow-up letter after the meeting, 
providing contact information and identifying companies’ specific interests in 
trading (i.e. buyer or seller, specific heavy metal and approximate amount to 
be traded) (US EPA 1998).  The Pilot Team also facilitated the negotiation 
process by establishing guidance for trading agreements (US EPA 1998). 
 
13. Market structure (bilateral, clearinghouse, third party brokers) 
 
The market structure is currently bilateral.  A consortium approach involving 
one seller with multiple buyers for a given metal could develop if found to be 
practical, which could be the case for smaller companies (US EPA 1998).  In 
the initial stages of the program’s development, the Pilot Team’s role 
resembled that of  a third party broker and in fact, EPA considered bringing in 
a mediator for price negotiations but the initial trading partners were able to 
reach an agreement on their own (US EPA 1998).  The Pilot Team does 
indicate that a brokerage service or consortium approach might help overcome 
trading obstacles (US EPA 1998).  The brokerage service may even be 
provided by PVSC (or more generally, the POTW) taking a more active role 
in identifying potential trading partners through the compilation of a database 
containing discharge monitoring data and the distribution of information (US 
EPA 1998).   
 
14. Types of trades allowed  
 
Point/Point  
 
 
C.  Outcomes 
15. Types and volume of trades that have occurred 
 
Two trading agreements have occurred through the program, one of which is 
still effective as of May 2004.  Both agreements involved the same seller.   
 
The initial trade, which is no longer effective, was a trade for copper between 
two organic chemical manufacturers.  Although the buyer in this agreement 
eventually went out of business, the industrial facility used the contract time, 
including multi-year reauthorizations, to improve its own pretreatment 
equipment.  Once the buyer came into compliance, the contract was 
terminated and the revised discharge limits were adjusted back to the uniform 
local limits set by PVSC (Andy Caltagirone, Personal Communication, May 
14, 2004). 
 
In the second contract, a pharmaceutical company has purchased zinc and 
copper credits from an organic chemical manufacturer (Andy Caltagirone, 
Personal Communication, May 14, 2004). 
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16. Administrative costs 
 
Administrative costs are negligible for PVSC: estimated to be in the hundred 
of dollars per contract (Andy Caltagirone, Personal Communication, May 14, 
2004).  Administrative costs involve employee time spent reviewing final 
contract drafts for approval and associated adjustment of permit limits (Andy 
Caltagirone, Personal Communication, May 14, 2004). 
 
17. Transaction costs 
 
Not determined but perceived in the initial stages of development, especially 
by small companies, to be high, requiring the investment of a lot of time and 
resources during the negotiation process (US EPA 1998).  PVSC does not 
charge for overseeing transactions (Andy Caltagirone, Personal 
Communication, May 14, 2004). 
 
18. Cost savings 
 
There are no analytical cost savings as each permittee must continue to 
perform monthly sampling (Andy Caltagirone, Personal Communication, May 
14, 2004).  Buyers are able to avoid fines associated with noncompliance, but 
actual quantification of this value is difficult as the number depends on how 
many times and by how much the buyer would not have been in compliance if 
not for the trade (Andy Caltagirone, Personal Communication, May 14, 2004).  
Sellers are able to defray pretreatment costs through revenue gained from the 
sale of excess reductions. 
 
19. Program goals achieved  
 
The goal of the Effluent Trading Pilot Project was to develop trading 
arrangements among indirect dischargers within the PVSC service area to help 
industrial facilities achieve compliance with local pretreatment limits.  PVSC 
credited fair and credible enforcement as a necessary prerequisite for 
acceptance of such a program by the public (Catherine Tunis, Personal 
Communication, May 27, 2004).  Lower costs of compliance were a crucial 
motivator in encouraging participation in the program by industries that were 
going to have trouble meeting compliance requirements (Catherine Tunis, 
Personal Communication, May 27, 2004). Lessons learned in the PVSC 
service area could be extrapolated for developing similar trading opportunities 
in other POTW service areas and recommendations to improve the process 
were made by the Pilot Team. 
 
20. Program obstacles 
 
No precedent existed for a formal pretreatment trading program involving 
indirect discharges (US EPA 1998, Environomics 1999).  Uncertainties 
regarding price negotiations, transaction costs, how much information 
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businesses should share, and a general lack of information regarding trading 
as allowed by PVSC’s rules and regulations led to a lack of trading during the 
initial stages of development (US EPA 1998).  By the time the Pilot Team 
initiated the facilitation of trades and the trading rules were finalized by 
PVSC, many facilities had already made compliance investments, changing 
the nature of the market and affecting price negotiations (US EPA 1998).  The 
available market for trading that remained was small, consisting of twenty 
facilities only two of which were potential sellers (US EPA 1998, 
Environomics 1999).  No new interest involving participation in the program 
has been generated since 1999 (date second agreement executed) (Andy 
Caltagirone, Personal Communication, May 14, 2004). 
 
21. NPS involvement and incentives to engage in trading. 
 
Non-point sources are not involved in the PVSC Effluent Trading Project.   
 
22. Other 
 
The Effluent Trading Pilot Team identified a need for trading to be authorized 
in the rules and regulations of a POTW, to be initiated at the same time new 
local pretreatment limits are being developed in order to maximize cost-
effectiveness and participation, and to be facilitated through the dispersal of 
information (US EPA 1998).   
 
 
Program information/References 
 
Websites: 
Passaic Valley Sewerage Commissioners (Home) http://www.pvsc.com/ 
Passaic Valley Sewerage Commissioners (Industrial Rules and Regulations) 
http://www.pvsc.com/industrial/rules.htm 
NJ DEP, Division of Water Quality http://www.state.nj.us/dep/dwq/ 
NJ DEP, Division of Water Quality, Bureau of Pretreatment and Residuals 
http://www.state.nj.us/dep/dwq/bpr.htm 
NJ DEP, Division of Water Quality, Bureau of Pretreatment and Residuals, 
Excerpts Regarding Development and Implementation of Local 
Discharge Limitations http://www.state.nj.us/dep/dwq/loc_lim.htm 
US EPA, National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES), 
Pretreatment Standards and Limits 
http://cfpub.epa.gov/npdes/pretreatment/pstandards.cfm#local 
 
Contacts: 
Andy Caltagirone, PVSC Manager of Industrial & Pollution Control.  
Telephone: (973)-817-5710.  E-mail: acaltagirone@PVSC.COM
Catherine Tunis, US EPA Office of Policy, Economics and Innovation.  
Telephone: (202)-566-2830.  E-mail: 
tunis.catherine@epamail.epa.gov        
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Written Program Information: 
Murphy, Jim. 1997. “PVSC Kicks Off Effluent Trading Pilot Project,” New 
Jersey Discharger.  Vol. 5, No.1: Summer 1997.  Retrieved on April 
30, 2004 from http://www.state.nj.us/dep/dwq/discharg/v5n1b.htm 
Murphy, Jim. 1998. “Update on Effluent Trading,” New Jersey Discharger.  
Vol. 6, No.1: Summer 1998.  Retrieved on April 30, 2004 from 
http://www.state.nj.us/dep/dwq/discharg/v6n1c.htm 
Passaic Valley Sewerage Commissioners (PVSC). 2003.  Rules and 
Regulations Concerning Discharges to the Passaic Valley Sewerage 
Commissioners, Section B-104.  Retrieved on May 5, 2004 from 
http://www.pvsc.com/pdf/rules.pdf 
US Environmental Protection Agency (US EPA), Office of Policy, 
Economics, and Innovation.  1998. “Sharing the Load: Effluent 
Trading for Indirect Dischargers,” Lessons from the New Jersey 
Chemical Industry Project—Effluent Trading Team.  Retrieved on 
April 29, 2004 from http://www.indecon.com/njcip/etdoc/home.htm 
Environomics. 1999.  A summary of U.S. effluent trading and offset projects.  
A report prepared for Dr. Mahesh Podar, U.S. Environmental Protection 
Agency, Office of Water.  Retrieved May 7, 2004 from 
http://www.epa.gov/owow/watershed/trading/traenvrn.pdf 
US Environmental Protection Agency, Office of Water. 2003. Water Quality 
Trading Policy.  Retrieved May 13, 2004 from 
http://www.epa.gov/owow/watershed/trading/finalpolicy2003.pdf 
 
 
Reviewed by Andy Caltagirone, PVSC Manager of Industrial & Pollution Control and                    
Catherine Tunis, US EPA Office of Policy, Economics and Innovation 
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New York City Watershed Phosphorus Offset Pilot Programs (NY) 
 
A.  Program Background 
1. Program description 
 
 As part of the comprehensive 1997 Watershed Rules and Regulations 
(WR&R) for the Protection from Contamination, Degradation and Pollution of 
the New York City Water Supply and Its Sources, the Phosphorus Offset Pilot 
Programs were designed to support economic growth while protecting water 
quality. The pilot programs permit the construction of new and expansion of 
existing WWTPs with surface water discharges in phosphorus-restricted 
basins (otherwise prohibited by the WR&Rs).  Counties east and west of the 
Hudson River designed comprehensive water quality strategies in order to 
participate in the pilot programs.  Spread across eight counties in upstate New 
York and a small area in Fairfield County, Connecticut, the New York City 
water supply system is divided into three components: the Catskill and 
Delaware systems located West of the Hudson River and the Croton system 
located East of the Hudson River (City of New York 1997)  
 
East of the Hudson River, the Phosphorus Pilot Offset Program allows for the 
development of up to three new WWTPs with a total discharge not to exceed 
150,000 gpd.  West of the Hudson River, a maximum of three projects 
involving new or expanding WWTPs with a discharge limited to 100,000 gpd 
is allowed by the pilot program.  Offsets accommodating phosphorus 
discharges may be obtained through point or nonpoint source reductions.  In 
order to qualify as an offset, a phosphorus reduction is required to be 
“surplus,” “quantifiable,” “permanent” and “enforceable” (City of New York 
1997, Section 18-16 (70)). 
 
To date, ten applications have been received by the New York City 
Department of Environmental Protection (NYC DEP) and three were found to 
meet the basic offset requirements.  Of the three applications approved by 
NYC DEP, one project has been developed (see “Types and Volumes of 
Trades” below).  The WR&Rs gave the pilot programs an experimental term 
of five years to be extended another five if insufficient data exists to 
determine the success of the program as measured by the achievement of 
offsets.  In 2002, NYC DEP extended the pilot programs and it is likely that 
another extension will be granted in 2007 (Jim Benson, Personal 
Communication, May 26, 2004).  If found to be successful, the pilot programs 
may become permanent (City of New York 1997, Section 18-84). 
 
2. Program motivation 
 
In response to federal regulation of surface water supplies through the 1986 
Safe Drinking Water Act Amendments and the 1989 Surface Water Treatment 
Rule, the City of New York updated its own watershed rules and regulations 
dating back to 1953.  The 1986 Safe Drinking Water Act Amendments 
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required disinfection by all public water supply systems and the development 
of filtration criteria by the EPA.  The 1989 Surface Water Treatment Rule 
(SWTR) established the objective water quality, operational, and watershed 
control criteria needed for filtration avoidance determinations.    
 
The New York City water supply system is one of the largest, unfiltered, 
surface water supply systems in the country with a storage capacity of 
approximately 600 billion gallons and supplying, on average, 1.3 billion 
gallons of drinking water each day to 8 million NYC residents and 1 million 
suburban residents (NRC 2000, Rodenhausen 2000).  Wanting to avoid the 
high costs of a filtration plant, originally estimated at $6-8 billion, the City 
applied for a filtration waiver for the Catskill/Delaware systems in 1991 
(Hoffer 2003).  The City did not apply for a filtration waiver for the Croton 
system because of “periodic violations of aesthetic standards for color, odor, 
and taste” and the anticipation that the Croton system would not be able to 
meet future water quality standards and treatment regulations (NYC DEP 
2001).  The City is under Consent Decree to construct a filtration plant for the 
Croton system by 2010 or 2011, depending on site location (Hoffer 2003).  
  
In order to meet the watershed control requirements for filtration avoidance 
for the Catskill/Delaware systems, the City needed to develop a water quality 
protection plan. The Memorandum of Agreement and WR&Rs were signed 
and implemented in 1997 after six years of negotiation between upstate 
watershed communities, environmental groups, EPA, the City and New York 
State.  A major challenge throughout the negotiations was balancing the City’s 
interest in protecting the quality of its water supply with the economic 
interests of watershed residents (NRC 2000).  At the time, only 6% of the 
Catskill/Delaware watershed was owned by New York City and residents of 
upstate watershed communities feared that the protection of a drinking water 
supply which they did not use would come at their expense (NRC 2000). 
 
Phosphorus levels were chosen as a measure of reservoir health (NRC 2000).  
Considered to be the limiting nutrient in the NYC watershed, when found in 
excess amounts, phosphorus leads to eutrophication and increased algal 
growth which affects color, odor and taste of drinking water. TMDLs were 
established for the entire watershed in a two-phase approach as part of the 
City’s filtration avoidance determinations and State’s requirements under 
Section 303 (d) of the Clean Water Act. 
 
TMDLs and guidance values for phosphorus restriction make new 
development in basins that exceed designated phosphorus levels difficult 
without the employment of offsets (Environomics 1999).  The Phosphorus 
Pilot Offset Programs East and West of the Hudson River allow development 
to continue in phosphorus-restricted basins while maintaining water quality by 
preventing a net increase in phosphorus loading.   
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To date, the City has received 5 filtration avoidance determinations for the 
Catskill/Delaware supply systems with the latest one expiring in 2007 (Hoffer 
2003).  The City is on a “dual-track approach,” to meet surface drinking water 
quality standards, creating a water quality protection plan while investigating 
filtration options for the future (NRC 2000) 
 
3. Pollutant being offset 
 
Phosphorus 
 
4. Size of program 
 
The New York City Water Supply watershed encompasses 1,968 sq miles. 
(Rodenhausen 2000).  The Catskill, Delaware, and Croton water supply 
systems consist of 19 reservoirs and 3 controlled lakes (Rodenhausen 2000).  
Over 100 WWTPs, the majority of which are located East of the Hudson in 
the developed Westchester and Putnam counties, discharge into the surface 
water of the watershed while operating under SPDES permits (Rodenhausen 
2000, NRC 2000).  Any plant whose point of discharge is located in a 
phosphorus- restricted basin is subject to expansion and construction 
limitations set by the WR&Rs (Sections 18-36, 18-61).   
 
According to the City of New York, in 2002, eight reservoirs and two 
controlled lakes in the Croton system were classified as phosphorus-restricted: 
Amawalk Reservoir, Bog Brook Reservoir, Croton Falls Reservoir, Diverting 
Reservoir, East Branch Reservoir, Middle Branch Reservoir, Muscoot 
Reservoir, Titicus Reservoir, Lake Gleneida and Lake Gilead.  No reservoirs 
in the Catskill or Delaware System were on the 2002 list and therefore would 
not qualify for participation in the offset pilot program (Jim Benson, Personal 
Communication, May 26, 2004).  However, any new or expanding surface 
water discharges West of the Hudson would operate under specific permitting 
conditions in accordance with phosphorus TMDLs.  (Jim Benson, Personal 
Communication, May 26, 2004).  Before 2002, the Cannonsville Reservoir in 
the Delaware System was phosphorus-restricted and the Village of Delhi was 
considering participation in the offset pilot program for expansion purposes, 
however no formal application was filed and the Reservoir has since been 
taken off the phosphorus restricted list (Jim Benson, Personal Communication 
May 26, 2004) 
 
The phosphorus offset pilot programs authorize a maximum of 6 projects in 
phosphorus-restricted basins over a trial period of five years to be extended 
another five if insufficient data exists for determining the success of the 
programs. Three new WWTPs may be built on the East side not to exceed a 
total discharge of 150,000 gallons per day (gpd) and three new or expanding 
WWTPs are allowed on the West side with a total discharge limited to 
100,000gpd (NRC 2000, NYC DEP 2001).  In order to participate in the pilot 
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offset program, a county must have developed a comprehensive water quality 
plan (City of New York 1997, Sections 18-82&18-83). 
 
Potential trading parties: New or expanding wastewater treatment plants 
trading with stormwater best management practice retrofits, street sweeping, 
land reclamation, surplus reductions from existing WWTPs, diverted flow 
from existing WWTPs, conversion from surface to subsurface discharges, 
removal of  poorly functioning septic systems, or wetland restoration 
 
5. Stakeholders/participants 
 
• U.S. Environmental Protection Agency Region 2 (USEPA) – approves 
filtration avoidance waiver for the Catskill/Delaware watershed subject to 
criteria outlined under the Surface Water Treatment Rule of 1989, helped 
develop offset program guidelines 
• City of New York Department of Environmental Protection (NYC DEP) - 
ensures quality of drinking water, administers WR&Rs, monitors major 
waterbodies, inspects WWTPs, runs nonpoint source control programs, 
regulates activities which might affect water quality, implements programs 
and TMDLs in NYC watershed, issues guidance documents for programs, 
provides educational outreach, helped develop offset program guidelines 
and reviews applications (NYC DEP 2001) 
• New York State Department of Environmental Conservation (NYSDEC) – 
develops TMDLs, administers SPDES permitting programs, helped 
develop MOA, WR&R’s and offset program guidelines (NRC 2000) 
• New York State Department of Health – acquires primacy in 2007 from the 
EPA for overseeing the MOA, helped develop offset program guidelines 
(NRC 2000) 
• City and County Departments of Health  - monitor waterborne diseases 
and quality of drinking water subject to public health laws 
• Environmental Organizations (i.e. Natural Resources Defense Council, 
Catskill Center for Conservation and Development, Hudson Riverkeeper, 
Trust for Public Land, Open Space Institute, New York Public Interest 
Group) 
• Coalition of Watershed Towns (CWT) – organized in 1991 to represent 
thirty watershed towns during negotiations for updated WR&Rs, took lead 
opposition role to ensure continued economic development while 
demanding compensation for costs to communities as a result of watershed 
protection plan (NRC 2000) 
• Catskill Watershed Corporation – manages Watershed Protection and 
Partnership Programs in the West of Hudson to enable development while 
preserving water quality, administers Catskill Fund for the Future 
• Watershed Protection and Partnership Council – consists of twenty-seven 
members representing the interests of the city, state, watershed counties, 
environmental groups, agricultural sector, and EPA; established in Article 
IV of the MOA as a forum to share ideas, concerns, information and 
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recommendations “relating to watershed protection and environmentally 
responsible economic development” (City of New York 1997). 
• Watershed Communities (i.e. particularly Westchester and Putnam 
Counties in East of the Hudson and Delaware County in West of the 
Hudson – developed comprehensive water quality strategies identifying 
available economic resources, water quality problems, possible solutions 
for water quality problems and recommendations for economic 
development that would not diminish the integrity of the water supply as 
required in Section 18-82 and 18-83 of the WR&Rs for participation in the 
pilot offset program, review applications for potential participants in the 
offset program) (NRC 2000)   
• Developers (i.e. Delaware Engineering, Lexington Realty, Emgee 
Highlands, Putnam Seabury Partnership) 
 
6. Regulatory drivers 
 
The 1989 Surface Water Treatment Rule spurred the development of a 
watershed protection plan for the NYC water supply system as a way to avoid 
costly filtration for the Catskill/Delaware systems (Hoffer 2003). The 
subsequent 1997 Rules and Regulations for the Protection From 
Contamination, Degradation and Pollution of the New York City Water 
Supply and Its Sources, particularly Sections 18-36, 18-61, 18-82, 18-83 and 
18-84, became the regulatory drivers for the pilot offset program. Section 18-
36 (a14b) prohibits the construction of new and the expansion of existent 
WWTPs with surface discharges in phosphorus-restricted basins.   
 
Phosphorus restriction is determined by a basin’s inability to meet phosphorus 
water quality guidance values.  A reservoir is designated phosphorus-
restricted if the average phosphorus concentration over five years exceeds the 
NYS phosphorus guidance value (20µg/L) two years in a row (NRC 2000).  
TMDLs (Phase I: 20µg/l, Phase II:15µg/L, source-specific) exist for the entire 
watershed, established by the NYS DEC  and NYC DEP to meet the city’s 
filtration avoidance determinations and as required by Section 303(d) of the 
Clean Water Act (National 2000, Kane 1999).  All projects receiving approval 
to participate in the pilot program must receive SPDES permits and be 
incorporated into the TMDL for the watershed (NRC 2000). 
 
 
B.  Trade Structure 
7. Determination of credit   
 
Determination of credit depends on the offset mechanism.  Applicants must 
first calculate the projected phosphorus load increase from the WWTP and 
any accompanying nonpoint sources of phosphorus.  Nonpoint source loading 
for specific developments is determined using models such as the Simple 
Method, the P8 Urban Catchment Model, or Stormwater Management Model 
(NRC 2000).  If post-development nonpoint source loading is less than pre-
 211
development, the decrease in phosphorus can be used as an offset (NRC 
2000).  However, this decrease is not able to diminish the overall net increase 
in phosphorus loading as determined by the contribution from the WWTP 
(NRC 2000).  Once the phosphorus load for the project is calculated, it is 
multiplied by three (trading ratio) to determine the offset requirement.   
 
As a variety of offset mechanisms are allowed, the determination of estimated 
reductions for each mechanism requires different techniques.  For point source 
offsets, the “reduction in flow is multiplied by the effluent limit” (NRC 2000, 
p. 347).  For nonpoint sources, the NYC DEP guidance allows for any reliable 
method that estimates phosphorus reductions (NRC 2000).  Reductions 
generated by stormwater retrofits are calculated as “a function of the 
predevelopment loading rate and estimated BMP removal rates,” provided in 
the NYC DEP guidance (NRC 2000). Land reclamation and wetland 
restoration practices compare loading rates across gradients of land quality 
(NRC 2000).  For the removal of septic systems, an offset is calculated by 
multiplying the daily flow of the septic system by the phosphorus 
concentration in septic discharge as determined by the NYSDOH (NRC 
2000). 
 
All offsets must be “surplus,” “quantifiable,” “permanent,” and “enforceable” 
(City of New York 1997).  NYC DEP needs to develop criteria to determine 
whether baseline, required phosphorus reductions are in place before defining 
“surplus” reductions (NRC 2000). 
      
8. Trading ratios and other mechanisms to deal with uncertainty 
 
The trading ratio is 3:1.  Reductions and discharges must occur within the 
same basin, except in Putnam County.  A new WWTP locating in Putnam 
County may receive credit for a reduction in an upstream phosphorus–
restricted basin that is hydrologically connected to the basin of surface 
discharge (NYC DEP 2001). 
 
9. Liability/penalties for noncompliance 
 
Contingency plans must be in place before approval will be given on an  
application, allowing for the event that actual offsets are less than  
predicted estimates. 
 
10. Approval process 
 
Conceptual offset plans are first screened by an application review committee 
to ensure that the proposed reductions are “surplus,” “quantifiable,” 
“permanent” and “enforceable” in order to qualify as offsets (NYC DEP 
2001).  The application review committee consists of representatives from 
City/DEP engineering, water quality, planning and legal departments (NYC 
DEP 2001).  The committee makes recommendations to DEP management 
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regarding participant selection (NYC DEP 2001).  The committee also makes 
recommendations to firms as to how their application can be improved in 
order to comply with all regulations and water quality objectives (NYC DEP 
2001).  In order to receive approval, an application must have an appropriate 
model for estimating reductions and satisfactory monitoring, “quality 
assurance/quality control,” contingency, and maintenance plans (NRC 2000, 
347).  All potential participants must obtain approval from the County/town in 
which their projects will be located in addition to NYC DEP (City of New 
York 1997 Sections 18-82, 18-83). 
 
11. Ex post verification/auditing. 
 
All WWTPs are responsible for self monitoring offset mechanisms by 
measuring input and outflow (James Benson, personal communication, May 
31, 2002).  According to a committee established to review the entire MOA, 
“The establishment of a reliable, long-term monitoring program is probably 
the most challenging aspect of the New York City pilot phosphorus program,” 
(NRC 2000, p. 353). 
 
12. Mechanisms for trade identification and communication (education and 
outreach, third party facilitation, embedded ties) 
 
Individuals requesting participation in the pilot offset program design their 
own offset mechanisms.  Suggestions for offset mechanisms provided in NYC 
DEP guidance include stormwater best management practice retrofits, land 
reclamation, surplus reductions from existing WWTPs, diversion of flow from 
existing WWTPs to a location outside the NYC watershed, conversion of an 
existing surface discharger to a subsurface discharger, complete removal of  
poorly functioning or damaged septic systems, or wetland restoration (NRC 
2000).  Reductions performed by the Catskill Fund for the Future and the 
Stormwater Retrofit Program may be used as offsets in West of the Hudson 
(NRC 2000).  Reductions funded through mandated MOA programs do not 
count towards offsets (NYC DEP 1999). 
 
13. Market structure (bilateral, clearinghouse, third party brokers) 
 
Bilateral – each WWTP is required to determine its own offset mechanism.  
For West of the Hudson projects, the Catskill Fund for the Future and 
Stormwater Retrofit Program may supply reductions in a clearinghouse 
capacity. 
 
14. Types of trades allowed  
 
Point/Nonpoint or Point/Point.   To date, all approved applications have 
utilized nonpoint source reductions. 
 
C.  Outcomes 
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15. Types and volume of trades that have occurred 
 
While three out of ten applications were approved by the NYC DEP, only one 
program has been implemented to date.  In 1998, Emgee Highlands, 
Incorporated, submitted a conceptual offset plan to allow for the development 
of a WWTP in the Town of Southeast.  The WWTP would discharge 
36,000gpd into the phosphorus-restricted Middle Branch Reservoir basin in 
Putnam County (NYC DEP 2001).  The proposed offset was on-site 
stormwater treatment.  Emgee Highlands was required to recycle wastewater, 
reducing surface discharge to 12,000gpd, obtain an SPDES permit with a 
phosphorus effluent limit of  0.10mg/l, and create quality assurance, 
monitoring and contingency plans before obtaining approval from the Town 
of Southeast and DEP.   Baseline water quality sampling by Emgee Highlands 
began in 1999 and construction began in 2000.  Final approval on revised 
quality assurance and contingency plans was given by DEP in spring 2001.   
The Emgee Highlands offset project has been able to achieve 8:1 reductions as 
opposed to the required 3:1 trading ratio (Jim Benson, Personal 
Communication, May 26, 2004). 
 
Kent Manor, a project approved by DEP, employing on-site and off-site 
stormwater treatment as an offset, did not obtain approval from the Town of 
Kent and Putnam County.  In December 1999, Kent Manor sued the Town of 
Kent as a result of the town’s refusal to approve the project (NYC DEP 2001).   
 
Campus at Field Corners, another project proposed in the Town of Southeast 
in Putnam County, decided to revise its development plans because, the 
discharge DEP allowed (68,000 gpd) was less than the amount requested 
(110,450 gpd).  Campus at Field Corners initially proposed removal of failing 
septic systems as the offset mechanism, but DEP did not find that these 
reductions met the “surplus” requirement.  The agreed upon offset plan 
became weekly street sweeping, the extent of which would be increased as 
part of a contingency plan if monitoring showed that less phosphorus was 
being reduced than predicted (NYC DEP 2001).  In 2004, NYC DEP 
approved another conceptual plan submitted by Campus at Field Corners.   
Scaled down development plans were delayed by a two-year moratorium on 
development in the Town of Southeast and then had to be redesigned again as 
a result of new town wetland regulations for a total delay of four years (Jim 
Benson, Personal Communication, May 26, 2004). 
 
16. Administrative costs 
 
For development of the comprehensive strategies in the Croton System, the 
NYC DEP allocated up to $1 million to each county required to develop a 
water quality protection plan (NRC 2000).  In support of the pilot program, 
New York State offered to provide each pilot plant developer up to $100,000 
towards the design, engineering, construction and maintenance of equipment 
and facilities needed for reductions and monitoring (Rodenhausen 2000). In 
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West of the Hudson, potential participants may use reductions generated by 
the Catskill Fund for the Future, a $59.9 million fund established in the MOA 
to increase economic welfare within watershed communities by supporting 
development that maintains water quality (NRC 2000, City of New York 
1997; Hoffer 2003). 
 
17. Transaction costs 
 
Not determined.  To date, all offset mechanisms have been designed by the 
individual developers.  In an attempt to encourage applications and lower 
costs, DEP requires a “conceptual plan rather than detailed offset proposals” 
in the initial stages of project development (Environomics 1999, p. 29). 
 
18. Cost savings 
 
As part of the MOA, the pilot program has enabled the Catskill/Delaware 
watershed to avoid the cost of filtration.  However, the goal of the pilot 
program was not to achieve a certain level of phosphorus reductions at the 
lowest possible cost, but rather allow development that might otherwise be 
prohibited (NRC 2000).  As such, offset mechanisms have been chosen based 
more on the developer’s “familiarity with operating and monitoring” than  
cost-effectiveness (NRC 2000, p. 357). 
 
19. Program goals achieved  
 
The first five year time limit for evaluating the success of the program passed 
in 2002 with only one documented successful trade.  This trade, however, did 
achieve the program goal of enabling economic growth within a phosphorus-
restricted basin without a decline in water quality and surpassed the required 
3:1 trading ratio to achieve 8:1 reductions (Jim Benson, Personal 
Communication, May 26, 2004).  While one trade is not enough to evaluate 
the pilot program as a whole and lead to the implementation of a permanent 
phosphorus offset program, it does allow an extension of the pilot program for 
another five years (City of New York 1997, Section 18-84). 
 
20. Program obstacles 
 
The negotiation of the entire MOA proved to be a challenge because the 
people who benefited from improved water quality and filtration avoidance 
were not the same people who would incur the economic hardships of stricter 
water quality regulations, including limits on development (NRC 2000). 74% 
of the watershed is privately owned and there was some concern of eminent 
domain (NRC 2000).  Although the pilot program allowed development of 
WWTPs in otherwise restricted areas, interest in the trading program 
remained low as evidenced by the following outtake from the Delaware 
County Comprehensive Strategy for Phosphorus Reductions: “Trading may be 
greeted with great reluctance by municipalities and businesses in Delaware 
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County, none of whom benefit from water quality in the Cannonsville 
Reservoir” (NYS Water Resources Institute and Delaware County Department 
of Planning and Economic Development 1999).    
 
Since 2002, there have been no phosphorus-restricted reservoirs West of the 
Hudson so no new development projects would qualify for participation in the 
offset pilot program (James Benson, Personal Communication, May 26, 
2004). 
 
Despite an educational outreach campaign by DEP designed to inform the 
public, prospective applicants and regulatory authorities, the Kent Manor 
project, approved by NYC DEP, failed to obtain approval from the Town of 
Kent and Putnam County because of a misunderstanding regarding the use of 
available allowances.  The Town of Kent did not approve the Kent Manor 
project, which was allowed a flow discharge of 70,000gpd by DEP, because 
the town thought it could support another project that used the 70,000 gallons 
in an alternative way (James Benson, personal communication, May 31, 
2002).   
 
Changing town environmental regulations have delayed approval and 
implementation of offset development projects (i.e. Campus at Field Corners 
and the Town of Southeast). 
 
A law suit brought against the city in 1999, asserting the approval process for 
participation in the pilot program was “arbitrary,” sought to obtain an 
injunction, preventing any approved projects from proceeding with 
construction.  In January 2001, the Court granted summary judgment for the 
City and dismissed the lawsuit (NYC DEP 2001). 
  
Identification of reductions as “surplus” and finding appropriate offset 
mechanisms has also been a challenge for some communities (NRC 2000). 
 
21. NPS involvement and incentives to engage in trading. 
 
Since counties cannot build or expand WWTPs in phosphorus-restricted 
basins without offsets, incentives to engage in generating reductions through 
nonpoint sources are high (James Benson, personal communication, May 31, 
2002).  All approved applications have employed nonpoint offset 
mechanisms. 
 
22. Other 
 
The Committee to Review the New York City Watershed Management 
Strategy had the following recommendations for the Phosphorus Offset Pilot 
Programs in 2000:  phosphorus concentration data for an entire year, not just 
the growing season, should be used in determining phosphorus-restriction and 
the phase II TMDL value of 15µg/L should be used as the phosphorus 
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guidance value instead of the phase I, 20µg/L;  NYC DEP needs to develop 
criteria to determine whether baseline, required phosphorus reductions are in 
place before defining “surplus” reductions; and NYC DEP should reevaluate 
trading ratios in order to ensure the quality of the drinking water supply, 
reflect safety margins associated with offset mechanisms, account for spatial 
and temporal variability between the discharge and offset, and accommodate 
different forms of phosphorus (NRC 2000). 
 
 
Program information/References 
 
Websites: 
New York City water supply watersheds, 
http://www.nyc.gov/html/dep/watershed 
 
Contacts: 
James Benson, Project Manager, New York City Department of  
Environmental Protection.  Telephone: (914) 742-2034  E-mail: 
Jbenson@dep.nyc.gov 
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Neuse River Basin Nutrient Sensitive Waters Management Strategy 
(NC) 
 
A.  Program Background 
1. Program description 
 
The 1997 Nutrient Management Strategy for the Neuse River basin 
established nitrogen allocations and control options, including elements of 
point/point trading for nitrogen allocations and point/nonpoint offsets for 
nitrogen loading.  The Strategy also established a group compliance option for 
point source dischargers (currently 22 point sources are members of the Neuse 
River Compliance Association, which is issued a single, collective NPDES 
permit for nitrogen based on the sum of the members’ individual nitrogen 
allocations).  Point/point transactions for nitrogen allocations can occur either 
internally within the Association or between members of the Compliance 
Association and non-members.  Point/nonpoint trades are conducted indirectly 
through the North Carolina Wetlands Restoration Fund.  If new or expanding 
dischargers cannot secure nitrogen allocations from other point sources, they 
can purchase nonpoint source offsets by paying into the Fund. The 
Compliance Association must pay into the fund at a fixed, per-pound price if it 
exceeds its annual nitrogen allocation.  Similar in structure to the trading 
program for the adjacent Tar-Pamlico Basin, the nonpoint source offset 
arrangement for the Compliance Association is more akin to an exceedance 
tax than a traditional trading program.   
 
The Compliance Association was established in 2002 and was issued a 
NPDES permit effective January 1, 2003 (Brookhart 2003).  There are 
currently 22 members, primarily large municipalities. Each of these facilities 
has an individual nitrogen load allocation, although it is not enforced by the 
State, and the group nitrogen discharge cap is the sum of the individual caps. 
The Compliance Association met its 2003 cap with relative ease and did not 
need to purchase offsets.  Although point sources in the basin were charged 
with a 30% nitrogen reduction, the larger facilities in the Compliance 
Association achieved an approximately 50% reduction (Mike Templeton, 
personal communication, May 20, 2004).  
 
The North Carolina Division of Water Quality (DWQ) oversees compliance 
with the group nitrogen cap.  The Compliance Association manages the 
individual nitrogen discharge of members through an internal fee system, and 
it expects all facilities to come into compliance with individual limits within 
five years.  In 2003, the Compliance Association allowed a grace period and 
did not levy fees for exceeding individual caps.  In 2004, members exceeding 
their individual caps must pay 25% of what they would have paid to the 
Wetlands Restoration Fund for their personal exceedance, regardless of 
whether the group as a whole meets its cap.  This fee for individual 
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noncompliance will be raised to 50% in 2005, 75% in 2006, and 100% in 
2007.  (Mike Templeton, personal communication, May 20, 2004). 
 
2. Program motivation 
 
The Neuse River basin suffers from excess nutrient loading and 
eutrophication.  The upper portion of the basin (Falls Lake and the freshwater 
reaches just upstream of the estuary) was declared as Nutrient Sensitive 
Waters (NSW) for total phosphorus in 1983, and the entire basin was 
classified as Nutrient Sensitive in 1988.  The State developed a Nutrient 
Management Strategy in response to the 1988 NSW classification, and issued 
a Basinwide Water Quality Plan in 1993.  In the 1997 update of the Nutrient 
Management Strategy, the DWQ included a group compliance option and 
established a mechanism for funding offsets.  The 1997 Strategy focused on 
nitrogen issues at the estuary and some total phosphorus controls upstream. 
These options were enacted as permanent rules by the General Assembly in 
1998. 
 
The group compliance option came about during the development of the 1997 
Strategy.  Point sources were concerned that stringent nutrient allocations 
would have been burdensomely expensive, and they were interested in more 
cost-effective and flexible regulatory structures.  The experiences of the Tar-
Pamlico Basin Association provided an obvious model for exploring a 
collective nutrient cap with provisions for offsets (Mike Templeton, personal 
communication, May 20, 2004).  
 
3. Pollutant being traded 
 
Nitrogen 
 
4. Size of program 
 
The Neuse River basin covers 6,192 square miles.  Point sources contribute 
approximately 24% of the nitrogen loading to the estuary (Brookhart 2003). 
There were 111 dischargers in 1995 (the baseline year).  The largest 32 
accounted for over 95% of the total phosphorus loading to the estuary.  The 
Neuse River Compliance Association has 19 members with a total of 23 
facilities (Mike Templeton, personal communication, May 20, 2004). 
 
Potential trading parties: members of the Neuse River Compliance 
Association; any discharger holding an allocation; landowners receiving 
grants from the Wetlands Restoration Fund (indirectly) 
 
5. Stakeholders/participants 
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• North Carolina Division of Water Quality (DWQ): issues NPDES permits 
to individual dischargers and permit to NRCA, provides regulatory 
oversight for the group nitrogen allocation 
• North Carolina Environmental Management Commission (EMC): 
responsible for developing and adopting the Neuse River Nutrient 
Management Strategies and associated rules 
• Neuse River Compliance Association (NRCA): association of point source 
dischargers, primarily large municipal wastewater treatment plants, with a 
common nutrient cap 
• Lower Neuse Basin Association (LNBA): a nonprofit coalition of 
dischargers that conducts instream monitoring; preceded the NRCA by 
several years and served as the starting point for the development of the 
NRCA.  May LNBA members became NRCA members 
• Wetlands Restoration Fund 
• U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Region IV:  
• Neuse River Foundation and Neuse Riverkeepers: environmental 
advocates 
 
6. Regulatory drivers 
 
The upper portion of the Neuse River basin was declared Nutrient Sensitive 
Waters in 1983, and the rest of the basin joined in this designation in 1988.  In 
response to this classification, the North Carolina Environmental Management 
Commission (EMC) adopted a Nutrient Management Strategy for the basin, 
establishing a 2 mg/L phosphorus limit for point sources discharging 0.5 
million gallons per day (mgd).  In 1993, the first Neuse River Basinwide 
Water Quality Plan was approved.  The Basinwide Plan recommended 
reducing nutrients and oxygen-consuming wastes, and it recommended that 
the Nutrient Management Strategy be revisited before the 1998 renewal date 
because nitrogen was increasingly being recognized as a problem (NCDENR 
1998).   
 
Major fish kills in the estuary in the summer and fall of 1995 prompted 
legislation requiring nutrient controls, and the EMC revised the Nutrient 
Management Strategy in 1997.  The 1997 Strategy established a system of 
allocations and controls that were intended to reduce total nitrogen loading in 
the Neuse River Estuary by 30% by 2003.  The 1997 Strategy maintained 
technology-based concentration limits for phosphorus and added water 
quality-based nitrogen allocations, charging both point and nonpoint sources 
with the 30% reduction.  A group compliance and offset option was included 
to help point sources meet this nitrogen reduction goal more cost-effectively.  
The EMC  approved the 30% reduction, the nitrogen allocations and group 
compliance option for wastewater dischargers, and the offset provisions were 
enacted as permanent rules, effective August, 1998 (respectively Rules .0232, 
.0234, and .0240 of 15A NCAC 2B). 
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A TMDL for total nitrogen in the Neuse estuary was subsequently approved in 
1999 (Environomics 1999).  The TMDL references the allocations and 
nutrient controls that had been established by the 1997 (Mike Templeton, 
personal communication, June 2, 2004).  
 
B.  Trade Structure 
7. Determination of credit  
 
Nonpoint source offsets are funded through the Watershed Restoration Fund 
at a fixed price of $11/lb of nitrogen per year.  New and expanding 
dischargers that acquire allocation must pay 200% of that rate and purchase 30 
years’ allocation prior to applying for an NPDES permit. (Mike Templeton, 
personal communication, June 2, 2004). 
 
8. Trading ratios and other mechanisms to deal with uncertainty  
 
There is no trade ratio for point/point trades, nor is the nonpoint source offset 
rate paid to the Wetlands Restoration Fund formally a trade ratio.  However, 
Environomics (1999) suggest that a 2:1 trading ratio is embedded in the offset 
rate since the $11/lb price represents about twice the cost of the least cost-
effective nutrient BMPs (based on calculations done for the Tar-Pamlico 
Basin trading program). 
 
9. Liability/penalties for noncompliance 
 
The Compliance Association is responsible for making offset payments into 
the Wetlands Restoration Fund if it exceeds its cap.  The State assumes 
responsibility for ensuring that the money results in nonpoint source nitrogen 
reduction.  
 
In addition to the offset payments, the Association is subject to penalties and 
other enforcement action for any exceedance.  In that event, the Association 
members are also subject to enforcement if they exceed their individual 
allocations as listed in the Association’s permit.  Non-members with total 
nitrogen limits are not required to make offset payments but are subject to 
enforcement for any exceedance of their total nitrogen limits (Mike 
Templeton, personal communication, June 2, 2004).  
 
10. Approval process 
 
No individual approval is needed for nonpoint source offsets through the 
Wetlands Restoration Fund.  The Compliance Association is simply obliged to 
pay into the Fund if the group nitrogen cap is exceeded.  
 
The Association is free to conduct internal point/point trades.  Transactions 
are not subject to DWQ oversight except to ensure that allocations are verified 
and calculated correctly.  However, the Association and/or affected 
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dischargers must obtain a permit modification if the changes are to be 
reflected in their enforceable permit limits (Mike Templeton, personal 
communication, June 2, 2004). 
 
11. Ex post verification/auditing. 
 
Co-permittees in the Compliance Association submit monthly Discharge 
Monitoring Reports to the DWQ as specified in their NPDES permits.  The 
NRCA compiles the co-permittee reports for its own reporting (Watershed-
based permitting case study 2002).  As a group, the Association submits mid-
year, year-end, and five-year reports (Brookhart 2003).  
 
12. Mechanisms for trade identification and communication (education and 
outreach, third party facilitation, embedded ties) 
  
Embedded ties for nonpoint source offsets.  The point sources do not identify 
individual offsets or communicate directly with landowners.  The Wetlands 
Restoration Fund has taken on these roles.  
 
13. Market structure (bilateral, clearinghouse, third party brokers) 
 
Clearinghouse for nonpoint source offsets.  All offsets are funded at a fixed 
price through the Wetlands Restoration Fund, and there is no direct link 
between point sources and landowners 
 
14. Types of trades allowed  
 
Point/nonpoint offsets would be funded through a fixed-price payment to the 
Wetlands Restoration Fund.  Point/point trades are also permitted.     
 
C.  Outcomes 
15. Types and volume of trades that have occurred 
 
The Compliance Association has met its group cap with relative ease due to 
capital and operational offsets at several of its member facilities and has not 
needed to fund nonpoint source offsets through the Wetlands Restoration 
Fund.   
 
One point/point trade is being considered that would raise the Association’s 
nitrogen cap.  A sewer district near the estuary converted to a land application 
system, and it sold the allocation for its two NPDES permits to an upstream 
discharger in the Compliance Association.  The trade, if approved, will double 
the buyers total nitrogen allocation, and there is some concern that the trade 
may not be protective of Falls Lake, which is the major drinking water supply 
for the City of Raleigh.  The permit modification is in public review, and the 
issue has not yet been resolved (Mike Templeton, personal communication, 
May 20, 2004).   
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16. Administrative costs 
 
Not determined. 
 
17. Transaction costs 
 
The State, rather than the Compliance Association, would assume most of the 
transaction costs associated with nonpoint source offsets (Environomics 
1999).  Transaction costs for point/point trades within the Compliance 
Association would presumably be very low. There are no transaction cost 
estimates for the point/point trade with a non-member (Mike Templeton, 
personal communication, June 2, 2004).  
 
18. Cost savings 
 
Environomics (1999) notes that the $11/lb offset payment can be compared to 
the $25-30/lb nitrogen control costs estimated for point sources elsewhere in 
North Carolina.  It appears, however, that the greatest cost savings result from 
the flexibility afforded by the group NPDES permit rather than the nonpoint 
source offset options.    
 
19. Program goals achieved  
 
The goal of this “trading” program was to provide another option for 
achieving compliance with nitrogen allocations.  The Compliance Association 
has successfully met its nitrogen reduction goals to date without needing to 
purchase offsets. 
 
20. Program obstacles 
 
Not available.  
 
21. NPS involvement and incentives to engage in trading. 
 
Landowners voluntarily participate in the Wetlands Restoration Fund.  
Agricultural BMPs are not eligible for trading within this program.  
 
22. Other 
 
 
 
Program information/References 
 
Websites: 
See individual online documents, listed below 
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Contacts: 
Mike Templeton, North Carolina Division of Water Quality.  (919) 733-5083 
 
Written Program Information: 
Brookhart, Morris (2003).  Watershed permitting in North Carolina: 
NPDES Permit NCC000001 became effective Jan 1, 2003, Neuse 
River Compliance Association [Powerpoint]. Presented at the 
National Forum on Water Quality Trading, Chicago, IL, July 22-23, 
2003. Retrieved May 18, 2004 from 
www.epa.gov/owow/watershed/trading/brookhart.ppt 
Environomics (1999).  A summary of U.S. effluent trading and offset 
projects.  A report prepared for Dr. Mahesh Podar, U.S. 
Environmental Protection Agency, Office of Water.  Retrieved May 
7, 2004 from 
http://www.epa.gov/owow/watershed/trading/traenvrn.pdf 
North Carolina Department of Environment and Natural Resources 
(NCDENR). 1998. Neuse River Basinwide Water Quality Plan.  
http://h2o.enr.state.nc.us/basinwide/Neuse/neuse_wq_management_
plan.htm 
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency. (USEPA) 2002.  Watershed based 
permitting case study: final permit, Neuse River Compliance 
Association.  Retrieve May 18, 2004 from 
http://www.epa.gov/npdes/pubs/wq_casestudy_factsht11.pdf 
 
 
Reviewed by Mike Templeton, North Carolina Division of Water Quality.
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Tar-Pamlico Nutrient Reduction Trading Program (NC) 
 
A.  Program Background 
1. Program description 
 
Nutrient trading in the Tar-Pamlico Basin allows a group of point sources to 
meet nutrient reduction goals by funding agricultural best management 
practices (BMPs).  The trade structure is perhaps most accurately 
characterized as an exceedence tax on the sixteen municipal and industrial 
dischargers in the Tar-Pamlico Basin Association (NCDENR 2001).  
Members of the Association, who comprise approximately 94% of point 
source discharge flows in the basin, have a common cap for nitrogen and 
phosphorus (Rich Gannon, personal communication, May 21, 2004).  If the 
Association exceeds the nutrient cap, it must fund nutrient-reducing BMPs by 
paying a fixed, per-kilogram price to the North Carolina Agricultural Cost-
Share Program. Cost-Share is an existing program, administered by the 
Division of Soil and Water Conservation (DSWC), that pays farmers up to 
75% of the costs of installing BMPs.  
 
In Phase I (1990-1994), the Association agreed to fund the development of 
estuarine computer modeling, conduct an efficiency evaluation of their water 
treatment facilities, submit annual reports on nutrient loading, and make 
minimum payments for administering and implementing BMPs 
(NCDENR1994).   The Association’s nutrient cap was gradually stepped 
down from 525,000 to 425,000 kg/yr, and the price of nonpoint source offsets 
was set at $56/kg.  By implementing several operational measures and minor 
capital improvements at several larger facilities, as recommended by the 
efficiency study, the Association successfully reached its nutrient reduction 
goals without trading (Environomics 1999).  Even so, the Association 
provided $850,000 for demonstration projects to bank credits, $400,000 for 
estuary nutrient modeling, and $150,000 for additional DSWC personnel to 
assist in trade identification and BMP implementation (Jacobson et al. 1994).   
 
In Phase II (1995-2004), the focus of the nutrient management strategy shifted 
to include nonpoint sources based on the recognition that nonpoint sources 
contribute the majority of nutrient loading to the watershed.  The Association 
cap Phase II calculations estimated that nonpoint sources account for 92% of 
the nutrient loads (Coan 2002), although a more accurate estimate is 
approximately 83% (Rich Gannon, personal communication, May 21, 2004). 
While the Association maintained steady, separate caps for nitrogen and 
phosphorus (adjusted only for the addition of new members) in Phase II, 
nonpoint sources were charged with a voluntary 30% nitrogen reduction goal, 
based on the instream, biologically-based reduction goals produced by the 
estuary model.  Mandated rules on riparian buffers, fertilizer application, 
stormwater, and agriculture were adopted by the Environmental Management 
Commission and went into effect in 2000 and 2001 (NCDENR 2003).   The 
price of nonpoint source credits was reduced to $29/kg, but through 2003 the 
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Association has discharged well below its caps without needing nonpoint 
source offsets (Rich Gannon, personal communication, May 21, 2004).  
 
Now entering Phase III, the North Carolina Division of Water Quality will be 
revisiting the caps and offset rates.  Modeling and other studies are being 
conducted, although a final decision may not be reached until mid-2005 (Rich 
Gannon, personal communication, May 21, 2004). 
 
2. Program motivation 
 
Eutrophication in the upper Pamlico River prompted the North Carolina 
Environmental Management Commission (EMC) to classify the entire Tar-
Pamlico River Basin as Nutrient Sensitive Waters (NSW) in September, 1989.  
This designation requires the state Division of Environmental Management 
(DEM) to develop a special nutrient management strategy.  The DEM 
proposed stricter nutrient discharge limits for point sources at estimated 
capital costs of $50 million, despite the fact that nonpoint sources accounted 
for 80% of nutrient loading in the basin (Hall and Howett 1994).  In response, 
a coalition of point sources formed the Tar-Pamlico Basin Association and 
collaborated with the Environmental Defense Fund and the Pamlico-Tar River 
Foundation to develop a cost-effective alternative addressing both point and 
nonpoint source pollution.  Approved by the EMC in December 1989 and 
finalized in 1992, this plan combined group point-source controls, nutrient 
trading to fund BMPs, and estuary modeling.   
 
3. Pollutant being traded 
 
Nitrogen and Phosphorus 
 
4. Size of program 
 
The Tar-Pamlico Basin encompasses 11,650 km2.  As of 1989, there were 
approximately 875 hog, chicken, dairy, and turkey operations in the basin 
(USEPA n.d.).  Of the point source dischargers in the basin, seven are major 
municipals, twelve are minor municipals, two are major industrial, and 127 
are nonmunicipal (Jacobson et al. 1994).  The 16-member Association now 
comprises about 94% of the point source discharge (Rich Gannon, personal 
communication, May 21, 2004).  
 
Trading participants: Tar-Pamlico Basin Association (originally 12 members, 
currently 16 members); farmers  
 
5. Stakeholders/participants 
 
Parties to Phase I:  Tar-Pamlico Basin Association; Division of Water Quality; 
Division of Soil and Water Conservation; two environmental groups - the 
Environmental Defense Fund and the Pamlico-Tar River Foundation  
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Parties to Phase II: Tar-Pamlico Basin Association; Division of Water 
Quality; Division of Soil and Water Conservation.  The environmental groups 
did not sign because they disagreed with several points.  
 
• North Carolina Environmental Management Commission – Approved 
trading program  
• North Carolina Division of Water Quality (aka Division of Environmental 
Management) – Regulatory agency, oversees trading program 
• North Carolina Division of Soil and Water Conservation (DSWC) – 
administers nonpoint source participation in trading program through its 
Agricultural Cost-Share program. 
 
6. Regulatory drivers 
 
The NSW designation requires the DEM to create a nutrient management plan 
known as the NSW Implementation Strategy.  
 
A TMDL for nitrogen and phosphorus was developed during Phase I, assisted 
by the estuarine modeling initiative, and approved in 1995 (Environomics 
1999). The trading program is one element of the implementation strategy of 
the Tar-Pamlico nutrient TMDL (NCDENR 2001).  The TMDL also charges 
agriculture and stormwater with a 30% nutrient reduction.   
 
 
 
B.  Trade Structure 
7. Determination of credit   
 
Nonpoint source credits are purchased at a fixed, per-kilogram price. The 
price takes into account farmers’ capital costs, maintenance costs, BMP 
effectiveness, area affected, and BMP life expectancy (McCarthy et al. 1996).   
BMP effectiveness values were based on a literature review that included 
empirical studies of conservation tillage, terracing, and buffer strip BMPs in 
the Chesapeake Bay. The cost to point sources also includes a trading ratio 
that reflects a 10% increase for administrative costs and a margin of safety.  
Credits for structural BMPs have a useful life of ten years, while non-
structural BMPs have a credit life of three years (NCDENR 1994). 
 
In October 2003, the EMC approved the Nitrogen Loss Evaluation Worksheet 
(NLEW), developed at North Carolina State University, as the primary 
method for estimating nitrogen reductions from agricultural BMPs and 
measuring progress towards the 30% reduction goal (Tar-Pamlico Basin 
Oversight Committee 2003).  
 
8. Trading ratios and other mechanisms to deal with uncertainty  
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The effective trading ratio is 2.1:1.  This reflects a margin of safety of two 
plus 10% administrative costs (Gannon 2003).  
 
9. Liability/penalties for noncompliance 
 
Once point sources have purchased credits, they are no longer liable.  The 
State assumes responsibility for the monitoring and verification of BMPs.  
Nonpoint sources in noncompliance must return the cost-share funds (Gannon 
2003). 
 
10. Approval process 
 
The Association submits annual nutrient loading reports, which determine the 
need for nonpoint source offsets, to the DWQ every March 1.  The DWQ has 
final authority over nutrient tradeoffs and allocations, and the Soil and Water 
Conservation Commission has final authority over BMP implementation 
(NCDENR 1994). 
 
11. Ex post verification/auditing. 
 
The Soil and Water Conservation Districts inspect at least 5% of the contracts 
each year, and the Division of Soil and Water Conservation reviews all local 
programs after five years.  Animal waste systems are inspected twice a year 
(Gannon 2003).  
 
12. Mechanisms for trade identification and communication (education and 
outreach, third party facilitation, embedded ties 
 
Embedded ties.  The North Carolina Agricultural Cost-Share Program 
assumes the responsibility of communicating with farmers and negotiating 
nutrient management plans.  Cost-Share is a voluntary program, and farmers’ 
interest in participating exceeds the available funds.  
 
13. Market structure (bilateral, clearinghouse, third party brokers) 
 
Clearinghouse.  The Cost-Share program operates like a clearinghouse 
because it breaks any direct connection between buyers and sellers and 
delivers credits at a uniform price (Woodward, Kaiser & Wicks 2002). 
 
14. Types of trades allowed  
 
Point/Point, Point/Nonpoint.   Informal point/point tradeoffs occur among the 
sixteen members of the Tar-Pamlico Basin Association.  In some sense, the 
larger facilities implementing upgrades have covered for the smaller facilities, 
but there is no formal structure for determining an equitable distribution of 
loading among members of the Association (Rich Gannon, personal 
communication, May 14, 2003).   
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Formal point/nonpoint trades would be conducted via Cost-Share, although no 
point/nonpoint trades have occurred yet.  The Association’s payments to Cost-
Share in Phase I were used to bank credits at $56/kg.  Any funds not utilized 
by Cost-Share during Phase I were carried over to fund BMPs in Phase II at 
$29/kg.  
 
C.  Outcomes 
15. Types and volume of trades that have occurred 
 
The Association has consistently discharged below the nutrient cap without 
engaging in trading.  In Phase I, however, it did allocate nearly $1 million to 
fund agricultural BMPs in anticipation of needing nonpoint source offsets.   
 
16. Administrative costs 
 
The Association gave $150,000 to the DEM during Phase I to fund a staff 
position, and the trading ratio includes 10% for administrative costs.   
 
17. Transaction costs 
 
For the point sources in the Association, using Cost-Share to administer 
nonpoint source projects minimizes the transaction costs of individual trades.  
 
18. Cost savings 
 
Original projections of the Association’s cost of meeting the nutrient cap in 
Phase I were $50-100 million through individual technology-based limits and 
$11.8 million through offsets by agricultural BMPs.  The actual cost to the 
Association in Phases I and II totaled $1.35 million, broken down as follows: 
$400,000 for the estuary model, $50,000 for the facility optimization study, 
$50,000 for the trading document, $150,000 for staff time at the DWSC, and 
$700,000 for the implementation of BMPs through the Cost-Share program. 
The Association received a Clean Water Act 104b3 grant to fund all but the 
estuary modeling and facility optimization study (Rich Gannon, personal 
communication, May 21, 2004).  
 
19. Program goals achieved  
 
The program is viewed as a success by the Division of Water Quality because 
it achieved its nutrient reduction goals at a significantly lower cost (NCDENR 
2001) The NC DEM estimated that total nutrient loading in the absence of a 
nutrient management strategy would have reached 625,000 kg/yr by 1994 
(Jacobson et al. 1994), but the Association succeeded in discharging only 
371,200 kg in that year despite increasing flows by 25-33% (Gannon 2003) 
 
20. Program obstacles 
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Environmentalists have criticized the Tar-Pamlico Nutrient Strategy, arguing 
that the caps were set too high and the nutrient reduction goal was set too low 
(Gannon 2003).    
 
Now that the TMDL charges agriculture and stormwater with a 30% reduction 
in nitrogen and no net increase for phosphorus, the Association would need to 
implement BMPs other than those that needed to satisfy the TMDL if they 
wanted to purchase credits (Rich Gannon, personal communication, May 14, 
2003).    
 
Administering trades through Cost-Share streamlined the program in many 
ways, but Cost-Share staff ran into difficulty predicting available funds and 
staffing needs in Phase II, when the Association was no longer required to 
make minimum payments for these purposes.  Some stakeholders have argued 
that a funding baseline is necessary to guarantee that Cost-Share infrastructure 
and staff are available to install BMPs and document credits in the event of a 
trade (Coan 2002).  
 
21. NPS involvement and incentives to engage in trading. 
 
Farmers participate voluntarily in the Cost-Share program, and farmers’ 
interest typically exceeds available funds.  Farmers are educated and recruited 
by a number of agencies, including the North Carolina Cooperative Extension 
Service, local Soil and Water Conservation Districts, and the Natural 
Resources Conservation Service (NRCS) (Rich Gannon, personal 
communication, May 14, 2003).  
 
Although the trading program has succeeded in increasing cost-share funding, 
North Carolina farmers observe that it has also led from voluntary 
participation to regulatory mandates.  Farmers perceive that the baseline for 
Phase II reductions did not adequately account for what they had already 
achieved voluntarily, and better documentation of voluntary progress might 
have precluded the need for regulations (Coan 2002).   
 
22. Other 
 
 
Program information/References 
 
Websites: 
North Carolina Department of Environment and Natural Resources.  “Tar-
Pamlico Nutrient Strategy.” http://h2o.enr.state.nc.us/nps/tarpam.htm 
 
Contacts: 
Rich Gannon, Division of Water Quality, North Carolina Department of 
Environment and Natural Resources.  (919) 733-5083 
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Written Program Information: 
Coan, Anne (2002).  The Tar-Pamlico trading program and North Carolina 
farmers’ experiences.  Testimony before the Subcommittee on Water 
Resources and the Environment of the House Transportation and 
Infrastructure Committee regarding trading water pollution credits. 
Retrieved October 10, 2003 from: 
http://www.house.gov/transportation/water/06-13-02/coan.html 
Gannon, Rich (2003).  Nutrient ‘trading’ in the Tar-Pamlico River Basin, 
North Carolina.  Slideshow presented at the USDA Seminar on Nutrient 
Trading, October 23, 2003.  Retrieved May 7, 2004 from 
http://h2o.enr.state.nc.us/nps/NSW-Oview-USDA10-03.ppt 
Hall, John and Howlett, Ciannat. (1994).  Albemarle-Pamlico: Case study in 
pollutant trading. EPA Journal. 20: 27-29. 
Jacobson, Elaine Mullaly, Danielson, Leon E., and Hoag, Dana  L. (1994).  
The Tar-Pamlico River basin trading program.  Retrieved May 7, 2004 
from 
http://www5.bae.ncsu.edu/programs/extension/publicat/arep/tarpam.htm
l 
McCarthy, Michael, Dodd, Randall, Tippett, John M., and Harding, David 
(1996).  Cost-effectiveness and targeting of agricultural BMPs for the 
Tar-Pamlico nutrient trading program.  In the proceedings of the 
Watershed 1996 Moving Ahead Together Technical Conference and 
Exposition, Baltimore, MD, June 8-12, 1996.  Retrieved May 2, 2002 
from http://www.epa.gov/owowwtr1/watershed/Proceed/mccarthy.html 
 North Carolina Department of Environment and Natural Resources 
(NCDENR) (2003). Tar-Pamlico nutrient strategy.  Retrieved January 
27, 2003 from http://h2o.enr.state.nc.us/nps/tarpam.htm 
------(2001).  Frequently asked questions about the Tar-Pamlico nutrient 
trading program. Retrieved January 10, 2003 from 
http://h2o.enr.state.nc.us/nps/FAQs9-01prn.pdf. 
------(1994).  Tar-Pamlico NSW Implementation Strategy: Phase II (1994).  
Retrieved January 12, 2003 from 
http://h2o.enr.state.nc.us/nps/PhIIAgreemtOrig-prn.pdf 
Tar-Pamlico Basin Oversight Committee (2003). Request for approval of 
Local Nitrogen Strategies: Tar-Pamlico agriculture rule.  A report to the 
North Carolina Environmental Management Commission. Retrieved 
February 3, 2004 from http://h2o.enr.state.nc.us/nps/EMCRpt-
LocStrtgs10-03prn.pdf 
US Environmental Protection Agency (n.d.).  TMDL case study: Tar-Pamlico 
Basin, North Carolina.  Retrieved January 26, 2002 from 
http://www.epa.gov/owow/watershed/trading/cs10.htm 
Woodward, Richard T., Kaiser, Ronald A. & Wicks, Aaron-Marie B.  (2002).  
The structure and practice of water quality trading markets.  Journal of 
the American Water Resources Association.  38: 967-979 
 
Reviewed by Rich Gannon, North Carolina Department of Natural Resources. 
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Clermont County (OH) 
 
A.  Program Background 
1. Program description 
 
This program is still in the planning stages.  The U.S. Environmental 
Protection Agency awarded a Project XL grant of $225,000 to Clermont 
County to assign a pollution budget for each point and nonpoint pollution 
source in the County.  This project will investigate whether Clermont County 
can design a watershed management plan for point and nonpoint pollution 
sources, based on participation on the part of stakeholders, that can improve 
environmental conditions for a rapidly growing community.  The goal is to 
maintain a balance between economic growth, preservation of rural character, 
and protection of area water quality (USEPA 2002).  A computer-based model 
has been constructed and will be used to identify policy and capital changes 
that can be made to meet the County’s water quality goals (USEPA 2002; 
John McManus, personal communication, April 21, 2004).  The County is 
experimenting with a unique process by which all polluters, environmental 
groups, and community members can come together to set water quality goals 
that the County will then translate into pollution permits. The County will 
explore the possibility of developing an effluent trading program where point 
and nonpoint sources can trade pollution rights.  Finally, Clermont County 
hopes to establish a community designed, local framework for water quality 
control by instituting a local sampling and monitoring program, a computer-
based watershed model, and a County environmental protection plan.  
 
2. Program motivation 
 
The State of Ohio has set standards regarding the concentration of pollutants 
in water that are used to determine the health of an aquatic system.  When 
these standards are exceeded, a pollution allowance schedule called the “Total 
Maximum Daily Load,” or TMDL, must be developed (Clermont County, 
OEQ 2001d).  In the case of the East Fork Little Miami River and its 
watershed, this level has been reached.   
 
It is also hoped that this program will improve polluted streams and protect 
existing streams in order that these are suitable for recreation and as a 
drinking water supply (Clermont Country, OEQ 2001d).   
 
3. Pollutant being traded 
 
The program is not yet to the point where specific pollutants to be traded have 
been identified.  However, if a program is eventually put into place it would 
likely focus on nutrients and solids (John McManus, personal communication, 
April 21, 2004). It is anticipated that through various modes of testing and 
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community input, the pollutants that should be regulated and thus would be 
traded will be identified.  This project will focus on the type and level of 
pollutant that stream life is unable to tolerate when making this determination 
(Clermont Country, OEQ 2001b).   
 
All point and nonpoint sources will receive a discharge budget, including 
nonpoint pollution sources such as stormwater runoff.  These sources must 
meet or stay below their budget to ensure stream protection (Clermont 
Country OEQ 2001c).    
 
4. Size of program 
 
The program will span the East Fork Little Miami Watershed.  The East Fork 
of the Little Miami River (EFLMR) encompasses an area of approximately 
320,000 acres (500 square miles) and includes portions of five counties 
(Clermont Country, OEQ 2001a).   
 
Potential trading parties: Both point sources (WWTPs) and nonpoint sources 
(agricultural, stormwater, land development) could participate in trading.  Of 
course this could only occur in the future after a TMDL has been developed 
and discharge permits have been written.  
 
5. Stakeholders/participants 
 
• Clermont Country, Office of Environmental Quality (OEQ): The OEQ is 
responsible for monitoring environmental conditions in Clermont County 
and investigating how environmental processes are impacted (OEQ 2001).  
The OEQ’s goal for the future is to predict the impacts of human activities 
on environmental conditions and work to balance environmental quality 
with continued growth and development. 
• East Fork Watershed Collaborative: The Collaborative is made up of a 
diverse group of local public and private entities and agencies, and 
includes representation from all four counties that discharge into the East 
Fork River. The East Fork Watershed Collaborative has a mission, “to 
protect and enhance the biological, chemical, and physical integrity of the 
East Fork of the Little Miami River and its tributaries” (Clermont County, 
Department of Community Planning and Development n.d.). 
• It is anticipated that local governments, regional area consortia or 
governments, neighborhood and community organizations, empowerment 
zones and enterprise communities, community development organizations, 
and private and public local entities will be integral in making this project 
a success (USEPA 2002).  The plan is that all these groups should come 
together to set regional water quality goals through a participation scheme 
designed to deliver more cost-effective environmental and public health 
protection (USEPA 2002). 
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6. Regulatory drivers 
 
See Section 2. 
 
 
B.  Trade Structure 
7. Determination of credit  
 
To date, no trading structure has been designed. 
 
8. Trading ratios and other mechanisms to deal with uncertainty 
 
N/A 
 
9. Liability/penalties for noncompliance 
 
N/A 
 
10. Approval process 
 
N/A 
 
11. Ex post verification/auditing. 
 
N/A 
 
12. Mechanisms for trade identification and communication (education and 
outreach, third party facilitation, embedded ties) 
 
N/A 
 
13. Market structure (bilateral, clearinghouse, third party brokers) 
 
N/A 
 
14. Types of trades allowed  
 
N/A 
 
 
C.  Outcomes 
15. Types and volume of trades that have occurred 
 
To date no trades have occurred.  The OEQ is currently in the process of 
creating management plans for different segments of the watershed.  These 
management plans include an inventory of resources and stream conditions, as 
well as recommended management strategies.  During and after the plans are 
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written, they are subject to public comment.  The watershed management plan 
for the Lower East Fork of the Little Miami River (available at 
http://www.oeq.net/default.php?section=wataction) is the only plan completed 
as of May 2004. The Lower East Fork Watershed Management Plan has been 
accepted by the state, implying that it meets the criteria for additional funding 
to assist with implementation.  However, only much later in the process will 
pollutants to be traded be identified, TMDL’s created and trades occur.  
According to the Project Manager at the OEQ, John McManus, the County is 
just beginning to develop a TMDL for the East Fork watershed. 
   
16. Administrative costs 
 
N/A 
 
17. Transaction costs 
 
N/A 
 
18. Cost savings 
 
N/A 
 
19. Program goals achieved  
 
N/A 
 
20. Program obstacles 
 
N/A 
 
21. NPS involvement and incentives to engage in trading. 
 
N/A 
 
22. Other 
 
 
Program information/References 
 
Websites: 
Clermont County, Office of Environmental Quality.  http://www.oeq.net 
 
Contacts: 
John McManus, Project Manager, Office of Environmental Quality, Clermont 
County.  (513) 732-7310 
 
Written Program Information: 
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Clermont County, Department of Community Planning and Development, 
(n.d.) Ohio 32 Vision Plan: open space action item implementation 
strategies.  Retrieved May 11, 2004 from 
http://www.co.clermont.oh.us/planning/vision%20open%20space.htm 
Clermont County, Office of Environmental Quality (OEQ) (2000). Project 
XLC Phase I Agreement.  Retrieved May 11, 2004 from 
http://www.oeq.net/upload/XLPhase108-11-00.pdf   
------(2001a).  Water Quality: East Fork Little Miami River Watershed.  
Retrieved May 11, 2004 from 
http://www.oeq.net/default.php?section=eforkshed 
------(2001b).  Water Quality: East Fork Little Miami River Watershed.  
Retrieved May 11, 2004 from 
http://www.oeq.net/default.php?section=monitor 
------(2001c).  Water Quality: East Fork Little Miami River Watershed.  
Retrieved May 11, 2004 from 
http://www.oeq.net/default.php?section=projects 
------(2001d).  Water Quality: East Fork Little Miami River Watershed.  
Retrieved May 11, 2004 from 
http://www.oeq.net/default.php?section=news&article=tmdl&type=true 
Environomics (1999).  A summary of U.S. effluent trading and offset projects.  
A report prepared for Dr. Mahesh Podar, U.S. Environmental Protection 
Agency, Office of Water.  Retrieved May 7, 2004 from 
http://www.epa.gov/owow/watershed/trading/traenvrn.pdf 
Tetra Tech, Inc. (2000).  2000 Water Quality Report: Supplement to the East 
Fork Little Miami River Water Quality Assessment Report for Clermont 
County, Ohio.  A report prepared for Clermont County OEQ.  Retrieved 
May 19, 2004 from http://www.oeq.net/upload/WQReport2000.pdf 
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (2002).  Clermont County, Ohio 
(XLC).  Retrieved January 31, 2004 from 
http://www.epa.gov/projectxl/clermont/ 
 
 
 
Reviewed by John McManus, Clermont County Office of Environmental Quality 
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Great Miami River Watershed Water Quality Credit Trading Pilot 
Program (OH) 
 
A.  Program Background 
1. Program description 
 
The Great Miami River Watershed Water Quality Credit Trading Pilot 
Program is a ten-year project scheduled to begin in October 2004 (MCD 
2004a).  Managed by the Miami Conservancy District (MCD), a watershed-
based regional government agency, the point/nonpoint trading program will 
focus on the reduction of phosphorus and nitrogen loadings into the Great 
Miami River (MCD 2004a).  Reductions will be achieved by agricultural 
producers through the implementation of best management practices (BMPs) 
funded by regulated dischargers looking to purchase upstream credits in order 
to cost-effectively comply with stricter water quality standards (MCD 2004a).  
Continuation of the program and possible implementation elsewhere in the 
Ohio River Basin will depend on program success (MCD 2004b). 
 
2. Program motivation 
 
Despite pollutant reductions by point sources, over 40% of the rivers and 
streams in the Great Miami River watershed do not meet Ohio’s water quality 
standards and will be subject to TMDLs and state-wide nutrient criteria (MCD 
2004a).  Nonpoint sources, especially agriculture, are the major remaining 
causes of impairment, but will not be subject to nutrient regulations expected 
in 2005 (impoundments and reservoirs) and 2007 (rivers and streams) 
(Douglas Hall, personal communication, June 2, 2004).  The pilot trading 
program will enable regulated dischargers to meet stricter effluent standards 
by purchasing credits generated through voluntary and less costly nonpoint 
source reductions rather than installing more expensive technology upgrades 
(MCD 2004b).   
 
The ten-year pilot program will focus on the installation of best management 
practices on agricultural lands based on cost-effectiveness and the 
predominance of agriculture within the watershed (MCD 2004a).   
 
Trading will ensure water quality improvement in the Great Miami River 
watershed, Ohio River, Mississippi River, and Gulf of Mexico.  Reduction of 
nutrient loadings within the Great Miami River will help to alleviate the Gulf 
of Mexico hypoxia problem (MCD 2004a).  It is estimated that 32% of the 
nutrients entering the Gulf of Mexico come from the Ohio River Basin, a 
significant portion of which originate in the Great Miami River watershed 
(Mississippi River/Gulf of Mexico Watershed Nutrient Task Force 2003, 
MCD 2004a). 
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Improvement of surface water quality will also help to ensure the quality of 
underlying groundwater, which is the source of drinking water for more than 
one million people in the region (MCD 2004a). 
 
3. Pollutant being traded 
 
Phosphorus and Nitrogen 
  
4. Size of program 
 
Composed of four major sub-watersheds (Lower Great Miami River, Mad 
River, Upper Great Miami River, and Stillwater River), the Great Miami 
River watershed in Ohio is located across fifteen counties and drains 
approximately 4,000 square miles (Kieser & Associates 2004, MCD 2004a).  
Land use is 12% residential, commercial, and urban, and over 80% 
agricultural (MCD 2004a).  According to preliminary estimates, while 
approximately 50% of croplands are currently under no-till practices, less than 
5% of agricultural producers within the watershed employ nutrient 
management plans (Kieser & Associates 2004).  314 point sources discharge 
into the watershed (Kieser & Associates 2004).  
 
Potential trading parties:  Point sources operating under NPDES permits and 
upstream agricultural producers 
 
5. Stakeholders/participants 
 
• Miami Conservancy District (MCD) – initiated trading program 
development, requested economic and market analysis from Kieser and 
Associates to determine trading opportunities, manages the Project, and 
brokers trades. 
• Ohio Environmental Protection Agency (Ohio EPA) – supported 
development of a watershed-wide trading program, regulates point sources 
through NPDES permits, modifies permits based on participation in the 
trading program, supports an Adaptive Implementation Approach.  
• US EPA – encouraged the development of a trading program within the 
Ohio River Basin to combat the Gulf of Mexico hypoxia problem. 
• Ohio Department of Natural Resources (Ohio DNR), Division of Soil and 
Water Conservation – participated in development of the program, 
provides in-kind training regarding the calculation of BMP performance, 
helps quantify credits, supports an Adaptive Implementation Approach. 
• County Soil and Water Conservation Districts – participated in program 
development, work with agricultural producers to identify and install most 
effective BMPs, help quantify credits. 
• Ohio Farm Bureau Federation and county farm bureaus- participated in 
program development, facilitate agricultural participation. 
• USDA Farm Service Agency – will help MCD ensure that participating 
agricultural producers are EQIP-eligible as necessary. 
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• USDA-NRCS – participated in program development, helps quantify 
credits. 
• Ohio River Valley Sanitation Commission (ORSANCO) –participated in 
program development and will evaluate program to see if applicable to 
other areas within the Ohio River Basin. 
• Kieser & Associates – conducted economic and market analysis.  
• Environmental Trading Network - participated in Conservation Innovation 
Grant proposal, provides trading information and educational outreach. 
• Eligible Regulated Dischargers -  purchase credits and provide 
administrative funding. 
• Wastewater Treatment Plants - Dayton, Englewood, Union, Butler 
County, and Tri-Cities Wastewater Authority – will establish initial fund 
for best management practices to obtain upstream credits to meet 
regulatory requirements.  
• Agricultural Producers – implement best management practices to 
generate reductions as supported by local soil and water conservation 
districts. 
 
6. Regulatory drivers 
 
Stricter state-wide nutrient standards are expected in 2005 (impoundments and 
reservoirs) and 2007 (rivers and streams) (Douglas Hall, personal 
communication, June 2, 2004).  TMDL studies began in 2001 (MCD 2004a). 
 
 
B.  Trade Structure 
7. Determination of credit  
 
Credits achieved through voluntary reductions (i.e. reductions not required by 
local, state, or federal regulations) will be in terms of pounds of nitrogen 
reduced and pounds of phosphorus reduced as quantified by “qualified soil 
and water conservation professionals” according to standardized procedures 
(MCD 2004a).  Buyers may only purchase credits generated upstream from 
the point of discharge (MCD 2004b).  Costs of each credit are generally 
expected to be the cost of the best management practice divided by the 
number of pounds of nutrient reduced ($/lb) (MCD 2004b). 
 
8. Trading ratios and other mechanisms to deal with uncertainty 
 
The Trading Program distinguishes between final and predicted credits (MCD 
2004b).  While a BMP is still in the implementation phase and the final result 
is uncertain the credits are “predicted” (Douglas Hall, personal 
communication, June 2, 2004).  Predicted credits must be matched by other 
predicted credits to provide “insurance” that regulatory commitments can be 
met (ibid).  As broker, MCD holds the extra predicted credits in escrow and 
applies them as necessary to ensure regulated dischargers meet their permit 
obligations (ibid).  Final credits are based on BMPs that are already completed 
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(ibid). Because the BMP is complete, the result is more certain (ibid). Hence, 
final credits are not required to be “insured” and are more desirable from an 
economic perspective (ibid).  This creates an economic incentive for regulated 
dischargers to acquire credits to meet regulatory obligations in advance (ibid).  
This approach also accelerates watershed improvements (ibid).  Predicted 
credits and final credits are quantified by local soil and water conservation 
experts (ibid).  Trading ratios are applied based on whether or not a regulated 
discharger discharges to a water body that is meeting water quality standards 
(ibid).  The trading ratio is larger for discharges to non-attainment waters to 
provide greater environmental benefits (ibid).   The following chart is taken 
from The Miami Conservancy District Water Quality Credit Trading Proposal 
(April 2004): 
 
Credit Type Ratio for Buyer with 
Discharge to Fully Attaining 
Waters 
Ratio for Buyer with 
Discharge to Impaired Waters 
Final 1:1 2:1 
Predicted 2:1 3:1 
 
9. Liability/penalties for noncompliance 
 
Predicted credits of one BMP are backed by predicted credits from another 
project to ensure compliance (MCD 2004b).  If a best management practice 
generating credits for a direct discharger does not reduce as much as expected, 
back-up credits held in “escrow” by MCD may be used to meet the deficit 
(MCD 2004b).  If final credits equal predicted credits, final back-up credits 
may be sold to other direct dischargers (MCD 2004b). 
 
Provisions for the recovery of funds from failed projects will be incorporated 
into BMP project agreements (Douglas Hall, personal communication, June 2, 
2004).   
 
10. Approval process 
 
An advisory group representing WWTPs, agricultural producers, county soil 
and water conservation districts, USDA-NRCS, the Water Environment 
Federation/Ohio Water Environment Association, the Ohio Farm Bureau 
Federation, the Ohio DNR, and community-based watershed organizations 
will develop criteria for award of funds to credit-generating projects (Douglas 
Hall, personal communication, June 2, 2004).  Consideration will be given to 
the existence of an approved watershed action plan or TMDL (ibid).  The 
advisory group will also review proposals and make recommendations for 
funding (MCD 2004a).  Producers proposing to generate credits and receiving 
grants enter into contractual agreements with implementing agencies (soil and 
water conservation districts, NRCS, Ohio DNR etc.) in a manner similar to 
existing practices (Douglas Hall, personal communication, June 2, 2004).  
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MCD will contract with the implementing agency to obtain the water quality 
credits (ibid). 
 
11. Ex post verification/auditing. 
 
Site-specific monitoring will occur at 5-10% of BMPs and continuous water 
sampling will take place every eight hours at four locations on a sub-
watershed scale (MCD 2004a).   Twice a year predicted versus actual 
reductions will be reviewed and assessed through an Adaptive Implementation 
Approach that will serve to improve nutrient reduction predictions throughout 
the duration of the Program (MCD 2004a, 2004c). 
 
12. Mechanisms for trade identification and communication (education and 
outreach, third party facilitation, embedded ties) 
 
Local soil and water conservation professionals will help agricultural 
producers identify and install the most effective BMPs (MCD 2004a).  The 
Ohio Farm Bureau Federation will train producers on conservation self-
assessments for BMP identification (Douglas Hall, personal communication, 
June 2, 2004).  State-funded 319 projects may also generate credits (MCD 
2004b).   
 
13. Market structure (bilateral, clearinghouse, third party brokers) 
 
MCD serves as a non-regulatory, third party broker (MCD 2004b).  MCD 
obtains water quality credits through contractual agreements with agencies 
and organizations that traditionally sponsor agricultural producers 
implementing BMPs (Douglas Hall, personal communication, June 2, 2004).  
MCD then sells the voluntary reductions to regulated direct dischargers under 
a separate contractual agreement (MCD 2004b).  Funds from the sale of 
credits are used to fund more BMPs for the generation of additional nutrient 
reductions (MCD 2004b).  The process for funding BMPs is competitive 
(Douglas Hall, personal communication, June 2, 2004). 
 
The cost of a water quality credit is generally expected to be equal to the cost 
of the BMP from which the credit is generated, divided by the pounds of 
pollutant reduced (MCD 2004b). 
 
14. Types of trades allowed  
 
Point/Nonpoint (upstream) 
 
C.  Outcomes 
15. Types and volume of trades that have occurred 
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N/A.  A start date of October 1, 2004 is dependent upon grant funding (MCD 
2004a).  Additional funding strategies for startup and long-term operation are 
being evaluated (Douglas Hall, personal communication, June 2, 2004). 
   
16. Administrative costs 
 
The Conservation Innovation Grant anticipates a three-year project cost of 
$1,999,965 including $500,000 to fund BMPs (Douglas Hall, personal 
communication, June 2, 2004).  For the grant, the Program receives in-kind 
support primarily in the form of water quality monitoring and the training of 
soil and water conservation professionals by other organizations (MCD 
2004a).  A Water Quality Credit Fund of $500,000, capitalized by a loan from 
Ohio’s State Revolving Fund, will be used to generate the first credits (MCD 
2004a).  These credits will go to the WWTPs borrowing the money from the 
State Revolving Fund (MCD 2004a).  In the longer term, administrative costs 
are expected to be between $400,000 and $600,000 per year (Douglas Hall, 
personal communication, June 2, 2004).  The majority of the administrative 
costs arise from the extensive subwatershed water quality monitoring 
proposed (ibid).  MCD will maintain administrative and project funds 
separately (ibid).  In the absence of grant funding, it is expected that 
wastewater treatment plants will fund the administrative costs of the program 
from the dollars they save through participation (ibid). 
 
17. Transaction costs 
 
Minimal as a result of third-party brokerage service provided by MCD. 
 
18. Cost savings 
 
An economic and market analysis conducted by Kieser and Associates in 
2004 estimated a cost savings for wastewater treatment plants of $314M - 
$384.7M over a twenty-year period (Kieser and Associates 2004, Douglas 
Hall, personal communication, June 2, 2004). 
 
19. Program goals achieved  
 
N/A.  Grant project objectives are: “establish and broker an innovative Water 
Quality Credits Trading Pilot Program; increase funding for agricultural 
BMPs in the Great Miami River watershed; provide regulated dischargers 
with a cost-effective regulatory compliance option; analyze water quality to 
evaluate the Pilot Program and watershed conditions; improve water quality in 
the Great Miami River watershed, Ohio River, Mississippi River, and Gulf of 
Mexico, provide a trading model for use throughout the Ohio River Basin and 
the nation” (MCD 2004a).   
 
20. Program obstacles 
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Uncertainty associated with the calculation of nonpoint source reductions and 
the cost of overcoming that uncertainty through increased monitoring are the 
major obstacles faced by the program (Douglas Hall, personal 
communication, June 1, 2004). 
Restricting valid credit purchases to upstream reductions limits the market for 
direct dischargers at the headwaters of the watershed (Kieser & Associates 
2004).  
 
21. NPS involvement and incentives to engage in trading. 
 
NPS involvement is at the crux of this trading program.  Agricultural 
producers have high financial incentives (up to 100% full cost coverage of 
BMP implementation) to participate in the Trading Program (MCD 2004a).  
BMPs, while improving water quality, will also improve agricultural 
performance.  Agricultural producers do not have to worry about facing legal 
battles with credit buyers if final credits are less than predicted or projects fail 
entirely due to the brokerage service provided by MCD (MCD 2004b). 
 
22. Other 
 
 
Program information/References 
 
Websites: 
The Miami Conservancy District (home) 
http://www.miamiconservancy.org/default.asp 
The Miami Conservancy District (Great Miami River Watershed) 
http://www.miamiconservancy.org/Great_Miami_River_Watershed/
default.htm 
 
Contacts: 
Douglas “Dusty” Hall, Manager, Watershed Initiatives, The Miami  
Conservancy District. Telephone: (937)-223-1278 ext 3210  E-mail:  
dhall@miamiconservancy.org  
Sarah Hippensteel, Watershed Coordinator, The Miami Conservancy  
District. Telephone: (937)-223-1278 ext 3244  E-mail:  
shippensteel@miamiconservancy.org  
 
Written Program Information: 
      Environmental Trading Network (ETN).  “Great Lakes Protection Fund –  
       Final Report: Market-Based Approach to Ecosystem Improvement  
       Grant #609.”  No date.  Attachment A.  Retrieved on May 25, 2004,   
       from http://www.envtn.org/docs/finalGLPFreport.pdf     
Kieser & Associates.  2004. Executive Summary for the Preliminary 
Economic Analysis of Water Quality Trading Opportunities in the 
Great Miami River Watershed, Ohio.  (Preliminary Draft).  May 19,    
2004. 
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Miami Conservancy District (MCD).  2004a. Conservation Innovation Grant 
Proposal (May 2004). 
-------- 2004b. Water Quality Credit Trading Proposal of The Miami 
Conservancy District (April 2004) 
---------2004c.  An Adaptive Implementation Approach to Predicting Nutrient  
Reductions, Project Description (May 2004) 
Mississippi River/Gulf of Mexico Watershed Nutrient Task Force.  2003. 
Tenth Meeting of the Mississippi River/Gulf of Mexico Watershed 
Nutrient Task Force.  Meeting Summary.  Saint Louis, Missouri: 
November 19, 2003.  Retrieved on May 26, 2004, from 
http://www.epa.gov/msbasin/pdf/10thMeetSumm.pdf 
 
 
Reviewed by Dusty Hall, Manager, Watershed Initiatives, The Miami Conservancy District.
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Conestoga River Nutrient Trading Pilot (PA) 
 
A.  Program Background 
1. Program description 
 
The Conestoga River Nutrient Trading Pilot is a Pennsylvania pilot within the 
Chesapeake Bay trading scheme.  The Conestoga River has the highest 
nutrient concentrations of all Pennsylvania rivers, and multi-credit trading is 
being explored as a means of avoiding a TMDL.  The pilot program is also 
intended to raise awareness about nutrient pollution and to inform the 
development of state trading policy.  
 
The Pennsylvania Environmental Council (PEC) and Enterprising 
Environmental Solutions, Inc. (EESI) submitted a proposal for a trading pilot 
to the Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Protection (DEP) in the fall 
of 2000.  The Steering Committee launched the pilot in fall of 2001, and by 
early 2002 they had begun nutrient modeling and drafting a trading 
framework. EPA Water Quality Trading guidelines were finalized in 2003.   
The PA DEP developed a Draft Nutrient Credit Trading Discussion Paper in 
April 2003 and continues to develop trading policy options for the state.   An 
outreach team, including representatives from the Plain Sect and Amish 
communities, has been conducting informal meetings and field trips to 
demonstrate BMPs.  At this time, one demonstration project with a poultry 
producer is being pursued (Scott Van de Mark, personal communication, 
October, 2003).  The pilot is expected to run through 2005.  
 
2. Program motivation 
 
Several segments within the Conestoga River watershed have been listed by 
the DEP as impaired, primarily due to nitrogen and phosphorus enrichment.  
Several TMDLs for the watershed are in development, and the specter of a 
TMDL has been one factor motivating point and nonpoint sources’ interest in 
trading (Scott Van de Mark, personal communication, October, 2003). 
 
The watershed was chosen as a pilot program because it has a mixture or 
intensive agriculture and rapid growth.  Active grassroots efforts to improve 
water quality also gave this watershed potential for broad stakeholder 
involvement (Crable 2002). 
 
3. Pollutant being traded 
 
Nitrogen and Phosphorus 
 
4. Size of program. 
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The Conestoga River watershed drains nearly 500 miles in Lancaster, 
Lebanon, and Berk Counties.  There are 1,250 small farms within the 
watershed (PA DEP n.d.). 
 
5. Stakeholders/participants 
 
• The Pennsylvania Environmental Council (PEC), Enterprising 
Environmental Solutions, Inc. (EESI), the Chesapeake Bay Foundation, 
Environmental Defense, and the Conservation Fund are partnering to 
develop the Conestoga River pilot.   
• Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Protection (PA DEP): 
provides regulatory oversight 
• CH2M Hill: consultant 
• Jones-Day: law firm 
• Local watershed associations. 
• Steering Committee’ Outreach Team, with representatives from the 
Lancaster County Conservation District, Wenger Feeds, Severn Trent 
Services, Pfizer, LandStudies, ELA Group and a member of the local 
farming community  
 
6. Regulatory drivers 
 
The Conestoga River has been listed as impaired, and several TMDLs are 
under development within the watershed.  Local stakeholders are interested in 
trading as a means of avoiding a TMDL (Crable 2002). 
 
 
B.  Trade Structure 
7. Determination of credit  
 
The State has not yet established baselines to determine agricultural credits. 
 
8. Trading ratios and other mechanisms to deal with uncertainty  
 
Trading ratios will likely be used, although the exact trading ratio has yet to 
be determined. 
 
9. Liability/penalties for noncompliance 
 
Not yet determined. 
 
10. Approval process 
 
Credits will be given after the nutrient loading reductions have already been 
verified.  After verification, the point source will submit a credit certificate to 
register the trade (EESI n.d.)  The program is currently exploring design 
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specifications for a trading registry (Scott Van de Mark, personal 
communication, May 5, 2004). 
 
11. Ex post verification/auditing. 
 
Not determined. 
 
12. Mechanisms for trade identification and communication (education and 
outreach, third party facilitation, embedded ties). 
 
The Steering Committee designated an outreach team, including 
representatives from the agricultural and Amish communities, to conduct 
informal meetings and field trips to demonstrate BMPs (Scott Van de Mark, 
personal communication, October, 2003).   
 
13. Market structure (bilateral, clearinghouse, third party brokers) 
 
The Steering Committee is exploring design specifications for a water quality 
trading registry and credit bank.  It is not yet determined whether a registry 
and bank would be administered by the DEP or as an independent entity 
(Scott Van de Mark, personal communication, May, 2004). 
 
14. Types of trades allowed. 
 
The trading policy has yet to be developed and finalized, but it is likely that it 
will include point/nonpoint trades.  Any entity can potentially purchase 
credits, whether as a point source offset or to retire credits for environmental 
improvement. 
 
C.  Outcomes 
15. Types and volume of trades that have occurred 
 
The pilot is conducting a demonstration project with a poultry producer.  This 
demonstration project provides an exercise in the quantification of credits, and 
it is unlikely that it will generate any trades.  At this time, there exists neither 
the regulatory framework nor the demand for credits needed for actual trading 
(Scott Van de Mark, personal communication, May 5, 2004).  
 
16. Administrative costs. 
 
Not yet determined.  One option may be to finance administrative costs 
through fees associated with the trades themselves (Scott Van de Mark, 
personal communication, May 11, 2004). 
 
17. Transaction costs. 
 
Not available. 
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18. Cost savings. 
 
No cost-savings analyses have been conducted at this time (Scott Van de 
Mark, personal communication, May 5, 2004). 
 
19. Program goals achieved  
 
The goals of the Conestoga River pilot are to reduce nutrient loadings in the 
watershed, increase stakeholder involvement, and inform the development of 
a state-wide trading network (EESI n.d.).   The project is making significant 
progress in terms of stakeholder outreach and involvement and trading policy 
development (Scott Van de Mark, personal communication, May 5, 2004), 
although a trading framework has yet to be finalized. 
 
20. Program obstacles 
 
21. NPS involvement and incentives to engage in trading. 
 
The threat of a TMDL has motivated stakeholders in the watershed to explore 
conservation options (Scott Van de Mark, personal communication, October, 
2003).  Trading in particular might be attractive to farmers because it is seen 
as private money rather than a government initiative (Crable 2002).  
 
22. Other 
 
 
Program information/References 
 
Websites: 
Enterprising Environmental Solutions, Inc. http://www.eesi21.org/market.htm 
 
Contacts: 
Scott Van de Mark, Director of Special Projects, Pennsylvania Environmental 
Council.  (412) 481-9400 
 
Written Program Information: 
Crable, A. (2002).  Polluters urged: pay farmers to clean waterways. Lancaster New 
Era, August 26, 2002. Retrieved February 22, 2004 from 
http://www.waterobservatory.org/News/news.cfm?News_ID=375 
Enterprising Environmental Solutions Inc. (EESI) (n.d.). Multi-credit trading and the 
Conestoga River Nutrient Trading Pilot [Brochure].  Retrieved February 22, 
2004 from http://www.envtn.org/docs/conestogabrochure.doc 
Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Protection (PA DEP) (2003).  
Pilot projects featured during nutrient trading event.  Environmental 
Quality Update  [newsletter].  Retrieved on March 1, 2004 from: 
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http://www.dep.state.pa.us/newsletter/?varQueryType=PrintVersion&Ne
wsletterID=102 
------(n.d.) Pennsylvania Businesses for the Bay (B4B) Environmental 
Management Resources.  Retrieved May 11, 2004 from 
http://www.dep.state.pa.us/dep/deputate/pollprev/b4b/envManResources
.htm 
Pennsylvania Environmental Council (PEC) (n.d.).  Nutrient Trading Pilot 
Project:  Conestoga River Watershed, Pennsylvania.  Powerpoint 
presentation.  Retrieved on March 1, 2004 from: 
http://www.eesi21.org/ConestogaNutrientTradingPowerPoint.pdf 
 
 
Reviewed by Scott Van de Mark, Pennsylvania Environmental Council. 
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Pennsylvania Water-based Trading Simulations (PA) 
 
A.  Program Background 
1. Program description 
 
Sponsored by the US EPA and supported by the Pennsylvania Department of 
Environmental Protection (PA DEP), four trading simulations were conducted 
in Pennsylvania to “develop insights about trading policies and standards and 
quantitative issues, and to bring out the pros and cons on the many variables 
by which trades can be structured and evaluated.”  The trading variables 
included pollutant selection, trade structure, “units of trade and minimum 
quantities,” potential trading partners, “directionality [of the trade, upstream 
or downstream],” “size of trading area,” “trading ratio,” “monitoring 
requirements,” “banking,” “inter-pollutant trades,” load calculation, assurance 
of  real trades, “trade approvals,” “enforcement and responsibility,” 
“registration system,” credit verification, “anyway credits,” “public 
information,” and “interstate trading.”   
 
Pennsylvania was chosen to host the simulations based on its impaired waters, 
“good mix of point and nonpoint source challenges,” relation to the 
Chesapeake Bay watershed and nutrient trading initiative, and proximity to 
the EPA contractor charged with managing the simulation process.   
 
Between March 30 and August 12, 1999, the simulation working group 
evaluated four out of a proposed seven trading simulations.  All seven were 
not reviewed due to time and data constraints.  Each of the simulated trades 
involved actual sources of pollution and real stream data subject to real or 
assumed regulatory requirements and water quality standards.  At the time the 
study was performed, Pennsylvania was in the early stages of TMDL 
implementation.  While this served as an incentive for PA DEP to participate 
in the simulation project in order to gain a better understanding of how trading 
might be incorporated into the TMDL process, it also served as an obstacle in 
the determination of necessary pollutant reductions and evaluation of trading 
opportunities within the simulations.  Other obstacles faced by the trading 
simulation working group included stream data collection, identification of 
potential trading partners, indirect load calculations, and Pennsylvania’s 
mostly voluntary approach to nonpoint source pollution control.  
 
Trading simulations represented point/point, point/nonpoint, and 
nonpoint/nonpoint trades.  Pollutants to be traded included carbonaceous 
biochemical oxygen demand (CBOD), phosphorus, nitrogen, suspended 
solids, ammonia, acid and metals, depending on the particular simulation.  A 
brief description of each trading simulation is provided below: 
   
Delaware River New Source Offset - The expansion of an existing POTW in 
Special Protection Waters required offsets for both direct and indirect 
pollutant loadings. Although both point/point and point/nonpoint trades were 
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investigated, the working group determined that an interstate trade involving 
another POTW was “the only likely trading candidate.” 
 
Moshanon Creek Coal Mine Drainage Simulation - The Rushton coal mine 
located in North Central Pennsylvania would be able to replace treatment of a 
contaminated groundwater pool with upstream treatment of acid mine 
drainage leading to “in-stream benefits.”  More specifically, five miles of 
fishable waters would be created by changing the site of treatment.  Despite 
fishery generation, the change in treatment would also result in increased 
loadings of iron and manganese.  The working group questioned whether the 
increased loadings would be in violation of technology-based treatment 
standards and anti-backsliding requirements of the Clean Water Act.   
 
Swatara Creek POTW Nutrient Simulation - A POTW could achieve nutrient 
reductions through nonpoint sources in order to meet reduced permit levels.  
Predominant nonpoint sources in the area included agricultural lands and golf 
courses.  The working group found that a trade for phosphorus was not 
economically viable even if nutrients could be substituted for one another (i.e. 
nitrogen for phosphorus).  The possibility that BMP reductions would be 
required by TMDL implementation plans limited trading options.   
   
Spring Creek Simulation - Trading between nonpoint sources in impaired 
waters as required by an assumed TMDL.  (Point sources not thought to be the 
sources of impairment.)  The working group discovered that limited trading 
opportunities existed for the various causes of impairment, determining that 
only siltation could be viably traded.  However, the working group 
experienced difficulty in calculating siltation loads and associated nutrient 
amounts and an actual simulation was not performed.  The working group 
recognized that real trades would depend on actual TMDL implementation 
plans and associated BMP requirements and load reductions. 
   
Although no actual trades occurred as a result of the simulations, the “process 
met the goals of capturing a variety of opinions on water-trading from a 
diverse group of participants.”   Pennsylvania is still pursuing trading options   
within the context of TMDL implementation and Chesapeake Bay initiatives 
through such pilot programs as the Conestoga River Nutrient Trading Pilot.  
The state is also in the early stages of developing a multi-credit trading 
registry and statewide trading framework. 
 
Conclusions drawn from the trading simulations included: the different 
motives of potential trading partners “coupled with regulatory goals and 
public concerns [would] make development of a viable trading program 
difficult,” and that the “variability of conditions in each watershed [would] 
further complicate development of a consistent enforceable trading program.”  
These realizations prompted the working group to recommend that trading 
guidelines be flexible, but contain specific criteria for trading ratios.   
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All information in this entry, unless otherwise noted, comes from Marshall 
(1999). 
 
2. Program motivation 
 
The trading simulations were designed as a “bottom-up approach” to 
developing trading programs and testing potential regulations.  As stated in 
the final report on the simulations, “In theory the basis for a regulation or 
program would emerge from resolution of issues raised by the simulations.”  
EPA supported the program as a way to analyze the process by which trading 
criteria is established through the input of a variety of stakeholders examining 
realistic situations.  The simulations allowed “what-if” questions to be 
discussed and economic and technical specifics to be pursued before an 
agency was faced with “an actual proposed trade or regulatory development 
process.”  Pros and cons associated with trading variables were recorded and 
differences among stakeholders noted to aid in the development of future 
programs.  Trading variables requiring federal and state guidance as opposed 
to local evaluation were identified by the working group.   
 
Pennsylvania was chosen to host the simulations based on its impaired waters, 
“good mix of point and nonpoint source challenges,” relation to the 
Chesapeake Bay watershed and nutrient trading initiative, and proximity to 
the EPA contractor charged with managing the simulation process.   
 
(See Regulatory Drivers for Specific Trading Simulation’s Motivation)  
 
3. Pollutant being traded 
 
Multiple: CBOD, phosphorus, nitrogen, suspended solids, ammonia, acid and 
metals, depending on the particular simulation. 
 
Delaware River New Source Offset - CBOD, phosphorus, nitrogen, suspended 
solids, and ammonia 
Moshanon Creek Coal Mine Drainage Simulation - Iron, aluminum, 
manganese, acidity, alkalinity, and pH 
Swatara Creek POTW Nutrient Simulation - Phosphorus and Nitrogen 
Spring Creek Simulation - Siltation 
 
4. Size of program. 
 
The trading simulations occurred throughout Pennsylvania. 
 
Delaware River New Source Offset – One potential polluter (expanding 
POTW) in the Delaware River Basin.  Limits for the trading area were not 
explicitly discussed but could be the entire length of the stream in which 
offsets would be required.  
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Moshanon Creek Coal Mine Drainage Simulation – One mine company, 
largest discharger of treated acid mine drainage in PA.  Trade must occur 
within the same stream but distance between discharge and offset determined 
on a case-by-case basis.  Moshanon Creek is located in North Central 
Pennsylvania and flows into the Susquehanna River which flows into the 
Chesapeake Bay. 
Swatara Creek POTW Nutrient Simulation - TMDL area or entire Chesapeake 
basin depending on regulatory driver.  Swatara Creek is located in central PA 
and flows into the Susquehanna River which flows into the Chesapeake Bay. 
Spring Creek Simulation – Spring Creek is located in central Pennsylvania 
and flows into Swatara Creek.  A proposed land restoration by one major 
landowner, Hershey School, could serve as a source of reductions for other 
nonpoint sources “located on the one mile distance to the next downstream 
confluence with another tributary, or for 1.5 to 2.0 miles downstream of that 
confluence to the Swatara Creek.”   
 
Potential trading parties: 
Delaware River New Source Offset - Point/Point: POTW in Westfalls 
Township, PA would purchase reduction credits from POTW in Port Jervis, 
NY.  Although nonpoint offsets were also considered, the working group 
decided Port Jervis was “the only likely trading candidate.” 
Moshanon Creek Coal Mine Drainage Simulation - Not discussed 
Swatara Creek POTW Nutrient Simulation - Point/Nonpoint:  
POTW/agricultural lands or golf courses 
Spring Creek Simulation -  Nonpoint/Nonpoint:  Hershey School land 
restoration 
 
5. Stakeholders/participants 
 
The simulation working group represented the interests of EPA, Pennsylvania 
Department of Environmental Protection (PA DEP), the Chesapeake Bay 
Program, River Basin Commissions, Conservation Districts, a municipal 
wastewater treatment association, planning commission and land use 
consultant, abandoned mine reclamation, industry, agriculture and the 
environment.  
 
• US EPA - sponsor of the simulation project 
• PA DEP - main supporter and actor: helped coordinate stakeholders to be 
represented in the working group, described PA’s TMDL process, outlined 
key issues associated with the development of trading programs, and 
favored trades involving at least one point source for enforcement reasons 
• Philip Services - EPA contractor for the project: assembled background 
information and presented trading cases to the working group 
 
6. Regulatory drivers 
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Pennsylvania was in the early stages of developing TMDL implementation 
plans for impaired waters. 
 
Delaware River New Source Offset 
Regulatory Driver:  Special Protection Waters as designated by the Delaware 
River Basin Commission Regulations are subject to antidegradation policies 
in which a new or expanding source of pollution must maintain or improve 
water quality and pursue load reduction possibilities to offset associated direct 
and indirect discharges (Environomics 1999).   
Moshanon Creek Coal Mine Drainage Simulation 
Motivation:  Generation of “in-stream benefits” 
Swatara Creek POTW Nutrient Simulation 
Regulatory Driver: TMDL and Chesapeake Bay initiative (Swatara Creek 
flows into the Susquehanna River which flows into the Chesapeake Bay), 
requiring load reductions of phosphorus for improved dissolved oxygen levels 
Spring Creek Simulation 
Regulatory Driver: assumed TMDL  
 
B.  Trade Structure 
7. Determination of credit  
 
Delaware River New Source Offset  
Monitoring Requirements: Trade monitored through NPDES permits 
Moshanon Creek Coal Mine Drainage Simulation 
Monitoring Requirements:  Evaluation of improved stream usage through fish 
and biological studies 
Swatara Creek POTW Nutrient Simulation 
Monitoring Requirements: In-stream monitors and BMP inspections 
Spring Creek Simulation – Credits generated only for reductions beyond BMP 
and load reduction requirements established by actual TMDL. 
 
8. Trading ratios and other mechanisms to deal with uncertainty  
 
Delaware River New Source Offset 
Trading Ratio:  Between 1.1:1 and 1.25:1 based on certainty of point source 
trade under NPDES permits. 
Moshanon Creek Coal Mine Drainage Simulation 
Trading Ratio:  Trades based on “stream miles improved.” 
Swatara Creek POTW Nutrient Simulation 
Trading Ratio:  Between 1.5:1 and 2.0:1; if allowed, pollutants could be 
substituted at a 1:1 ratio (nitrogen for phosphorus). 
Spring Creek Simulation 
Trading Ratio:  Not determined, but would have to account for the uncertainty 
of reference load rates pertaining to nonpoint sources and the actual flow of 
pollutants based on underlying geology. 
 
9. Liability/penalties for noncompliance 
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Delaware River New Source Offset 
Liability:  Regulated through NPDES permits 
Moshanon Creek Coal Mine Drainage Simulation 
Liability: Contingency plan in place if stream not measurably improved 
Swatara Creek POTW Nutrient Simulation 
Liability:  Regulated through NPDES permits and BMP inspections 
Spring Creek Simulation 
Liability: Not determined 
 
10. Approval process 
 
Delaware River New Source Offset - Approval for trade received from EPA 
and state authorities issuing NPDES permits. 
Moshanon Creek Coal Mine Drainage Simulation - Approval for trade 
received through NPDES permitting requirements as determined by PA DEP- 
approved watershed plan. 
Swatara Creek POTW Nutrient Simulation - Approval for trade received 
through state NPDES permit. 
Spring Creek Simulation – Not determined, but reductions would have to be  
       “surplus” 
 
11. Ex post verification/auditing. 
 
Delaware River New Source Offset – monitoring through NPDES permits 
Moshanon Creek Coal Mine Drainage Simulation – not discussed 
Swatara Creek POTW Nutrient Simulation – not discussed  
Spring Creek Simulation – not discussed 
 
12. Mechanisms for trade identification and communication (education and 
outreach, third party facilitation, embedded ties). 
 
Delaware River New Source Offset – interstate facilitation 
Moshanon Creek Coal Mine Drainage Simulation – possible PA DEP 
facilitation, educational outreach for public support 
Swatara Creek POTW Nutrient Simulation – private transactions 
Spring Creek Simulation – N/A; if data available on control costs, least cost 
methods would be identified as “preferred trading candidates.” 
 
13. Market structure (bilateral, clearinghouse, third party brokers) 
 
Delaware River New Source Offset – Due to interstate nature of the trade, 
private, bilateral trade unlikely.  State involvement would be necessary if state 
revolving funds borrowed by POTW to purchase treatment.   
Moshanon Creek Coal Mine Drainage Simulation – bilateral or PA DEP 
facilitation through development of a watershed plan 
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Swatara Creek POTW Nutrient Simulation – bilateral; registration of credits 
not discussed 
Spring Creek Simulation – not discussed   
 
14. Types of trades allowed. 
 
Delaware River New Source Offset – Point/Point 
Moshanon Creek Coal Mine Drainage Simulation – Point/Nonpoint; 
According to a document published in June 2003 regarding PA’s TMDL 
program, abandoned mine discharges are treated as nonpoint sources 
(Pennsylvania 2003). 
Swatara Creek POTW Nutrient Simulation – Point/Nonpoint 
Spring Creek Simulation – Nonpoint/Nonpoint 
 
 
C.  Outcomes 
15. Types and volume of trades that have occurred 
 
N/A 
 
16. Administrative costs. 
 
N/A 
 
17. Transaction costs. 
 
N/A 
 
18. Cost savings. 
 
N/A 
 
19. Program goals achieved  
 
Although no actual trades occurred, the “process met the goals of capturing a 
variety of opinions on water-trading from a diverse group of participants.”  
(See “project description” above).  
 
20. Program obstacles 
 
Delaware River New Source Offset - Interstate nature raised issue of whether 
or not state revolving funds could be borrowed to subsidize the treatment 
process.  Difficulty experienced in calculating indirect loads. 
Moshanon Creek Coal Mine Drainage Simulation - Despite generating 
fishable waters, the change in treatment would result in increased loadings of 
iron and manganese and the working group was faced with deciding if this 
was in violation of technology-based treatment standards and anti-backsliding 
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requirements of the Clean Water Act.  Also public support, especially from 
people living downstream of Rushton, would be needed before an actual trade 
could occur.   
Swatara Creek POTW Nutrient Simulation - Overall, a trade for phosphorus 
was not economically viable even if nutrients could be substituted.  Possibility 
that BMP reductions would be required by TMDL implementation plans 
limited trading options.   
Spring Creek Simulation - Limited trading opportunities existed for the causes 
of impairment.  The working group experienced difficulty in calculating 
siltation loads and associated nutrient amounts.  An actual simulation was not 
performed.  Members of the working group disputed reference load rates and 
nutrient flow.  The working group determined real trades would depend on 
actual TMDL implementation plans requiring BMPs and load reductions.   
 
21. NPS involvement and incentives to engage in trading. 
 
Delaware River New Source Offset – N/A 
Moshanon Creek Coal Mine Drainage Simulation – Improvement of waters 
might be achieved at less cost depending on required treatment.   
Swatara Creek POTW Nutrient Simulation – Incentives for nonpoint source 
involvement greater when facing nitrogen rather than phosphorus load 
reductions.   
Spring Creek Simulation – TMDL implementation plan requiring load 
reductions.  Incentives would be increased if buyers could also obtain credits 
for nutrients not eroded as a result of siltation load reductions.   
 
22. Other 
 
 
Program information/References 
 
Websites: 
PA Department of Environmental Protection, http://www.dep.state.pa.us/ 
Delaware River Basin Commission, http://www.state.nj.us/drbc/drbc.htm 
Susquehanna River Basin Commission, http://www.srbc.net/ 
 
Contacts: 
Charles Marshall, Project Manager.  E-mail: cgmarshall@nni.com 
Paul Scally, Delaware River Basin Commission.  Telephone: (609) 883-9500. 
E-mail: pscally@drbc.state.nj.us 
 
Written Program Information: 
Bureau of Water Supply and Wastewater Management. 2004. Pennsylvania 
DEP’s Six-Year Plan for TMDL Development. Retrieved on May 7, 
2004, from 
http://www.dep.state.pa.us/dep/deputate/watermgt/wqp/wqstandards/TM
DL/TMDL_6yearplan.pdf 
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Delaware River Basin Commission. 2002. 2002 305(b) Water Quality 
Assessment Report.  Retrieved on May 7, 2004, from 
http://www.state.nj.us/drbc/305b02.htm 
Marshall, Chuck. 1999.  Final Report: Results of Water-Based Trading 
Simulations.  US EPA: September 30, 1999. Retrieved on May 7, 2004, 
from http://www.epa.gov/owow/watershed/trading/marshal2.pdf  
Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Protection.  2003. Pennsylvania’s 
TMDL Program: Restoring water quality.  Retrieved on May 7, 2004, 
from 
http://www.dep.state.pa.us/dep/deputate/watermgt/wqp/wqstandards/TM
DL/TMDL_Slides.pdf 
Environomics. 1999.  A summary of U.S. effluent trading and offset projects.  
A report prepared for Dr. Mahesh Podar, U.S. Environmental Protection 
Agency, Office of Water.  Retrieved May 7, 2004 from 
http://www.epa.gov/owow/watershed/trading/traenvrn.pdf 
 
 
 
Reviewed by Chuck Marshall, Project Manager.
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Blue Plains WWTP (VA and Washington, DC) 
 
A.  Program Background 
1. Program description 
 
The State of Virginia considered a nitrogen trading program with the Blue 
Plains WWTP in Washington, D.C. during the late 1990s.  Virginia looked to 
trading as an interim strategy for meeting the state’s Year 2002 commitment 
to achieve a 40% nutrient reduction goal for the Potomac River (John 
Kennedy, personal communication, April 26, 2004).  Several treatment 
facilities in Virginia were still constructing biological nutrient reduction 
(BNR) retrofits at their facilities to meet the tributary nutrient reduction goals.  
The Blue Plains WWTP had already installed BNR on half of its flow to meet 
a 7.5 mg/L nitrogen limit.  Virginia proposed to pay Blue Plains to further 
reduce their nitrogen discharge until the Virginia POTWs could complete their 
own BNR upgrades.   Since each additional mg/L of nitrogen removed from 
Blue Plains’ discharge reduced nitrogen loading to the Chesapeake Bay by 
about 1 million lbs/year, this trade would have allowed Virginia to meet its 
nitrogen reduction commitment on schedule (Environomics 1999; John 
Kennedy, personal communication, May 28, 2004).   
 
Environomics reports that the agreement was near finalization as of late 1999, 
and Virginia had already set aside about $1.5 million in WQIF funds to 
purchase credits beginning in 2000 (John Kennedy, personal communication, 
May 21, 2004).  Trading was expected to last until 2003.   In the end, 
however, Virginia did not sign a trading agreement with Blue Plains.  The 
Chesapeake 2000 Agreement established even more stringent reduction goals, 
which provided further impetus for Virginia’s POTWs to upgrade their 
facilities rather than trade (John Kennedy, personal communication, April 26, 
2004). Other considerations that influenced the negotiations with Blue Plains 
are included under “Program Obstacles.”  
 
2. Program motivation 
 
High levels of nutrients have led to algal growth and low dissolved oxygen in 
the Chesapeake Bay.  Virginia, Maryland, Pennsylvania, and Washington, 
D.C. joined in the Chesapeake Bay Program in 1983 to address this nutrient 
load and eutrophication.   In 1987, they agreed that they needed to reduce the 
Bay’s nutrient load by 40%.  In 1992, they determined that individual 
tributary strategies were needed to achieve this reduction goal.  Virginia’s 
Tributary Strategy for the Shenandoah/Potomac watershed was approved in 
January 1997, setting a 37% nitrogen reduction goal by the end of 2000 
(Commonwealth of Virginia 2004).  
 
The motivation for the Blue Plains trade was established by this tributary 
nitrogen reduction goal.  Virginia explored trading as an interim strategy for 
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meeting the tributary goal while several POTWs in Northern Virginia were 
retrofitting their treatment systems for BNR (Environomics 1999). 
 
3. Pollutant being traded 
 
Nitrogen 
 
4. Size of program 
 
Several Virginia facilities were considering trading with the Blue Plains STP 
in Washington, D.C.   
 
5. Stakeholders/participants 
 
• The State of Virginia 
• Several POTWs in Northern Virginia 
• The District of Columbia 
• The Blue Plains WWTP 
• U.S. EPA – approves trades 
 
6. Regulatory drivers 
 
Although not a regulation, the driver for nutrient reduction actions was the 
1997 Tributary Strategy for the Shenandoah/Potomac watershed.  The 
Tributary Strategies contained implementation plans to achieve the goals of 
the Chesapeake Bay Agreement, which charged Virginia with a 40% nutrient 
reduction target by the end of 2000.  However, when the Chesapeake 2000 
Agreement set new nutrient reduction goals, Virginia no longer needed to 
secure nutrient reduction credits from the Blue Plains facility.  Furthermore, 
since the new goals were more stringent, it made sense to invest more heavily 
in BNR upgrades within Virginia rather than use the funds for interim offsets 
(John Kennedy, personal communication, May 28, 2004).  
 
B.  Trade Structure 
7. Determination of credit  
 
Blue Plains’ concentration limits and annual load allowance were set by a 
federal court order, and the credits available for Virginia’s use would have 
been generated by treating beyond these requirements (John Kennedy, 
personal communication, May 28, 2004). 
 
8. Trading ratios and other mechanisms to deal with uncertainty 
 
The trading ratio would have been 1:1 (Environomics 1999). 
 
9. Liability/penalties for noncompliance 
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Failure to achieve the enhanced treatment levels would have  likely resulted 
with the DC Water and Sewer Authority, which owned and operated Blue 
Plains, receiving less funding from Virginia (John Kennedy, personal 
communication, May 28, 2004).  Since Virginia’s 40% nutrient reduction 
target was not enforceable (it was a voluntary goal established by the 
Chesapeake Bay Agreement), it was not liable for securing additional credits.  
 
10. Approval process 
 
The approval process was simply a negotiation between Virginia and DC 
(John Kennedy, personal communication, May 28, 2004). 
 
11. Ex post verification/auditing. 
 
All wastewater treatment facilities conducted ongoing water monitoring. 
 
12. Mechanisms for trade identification and communication (education and 
outreach, third party facilitation, embedded ties) 
  
Not determined. 
 
13. Market structure (bilateral, clearinghouse, third party brokers) 
 
Not determined. The Virginia DEQ negotiated directly with the Blue Plains 
WWTP on behalf of several POTWs (John Kennedy, personal 
communication, May 28, 2004).  The nutrient reduction goals were 
established for the state and not allocated to individual facilities.     
 
14. Types of trades allowed (past, present and future) 
 
Point/Point. 
 
C.  Outcomes 
15. Types and volume of trades that have occurred 
 
None. 
 
16. Administrative costs 
 
Not determined. 
 
17. Transaction costs 
 
Not determined. 
 
18. Cost savings 
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Virginia had set aside $1.5 million to purchase credits from Blue Plains, 
which was estimated to achieve up to three million pounds of additional 
nutrient reductions (John Kennedy, personal communication, May 28, 2004).  
At approximately $0.58/lb, these reductions presented a very low cost 
alternative for achieving the nitrogen reduction goals. 
  
19. Program goals achieved  
 
Virginia has been short of its 2000 Shenandoah/Potomac point source nitrogen 
reduction goal.  However, the major BNR retrofits in northern Virginia have 
now been completed, and nutrients have been reduced slightly beyond the 
40% reduction goal (John Kennedy, personal communication, May 28, 2004). 
 
20. Program obstacles 
 
Blue Plains had some concerns about anti-backsliding requirements once VA 
no longer provided funds to meet the 4.5 mg/L standard (Environomics 1999). 
In addition, Blue Plains would have needed to accommodate greater methane 
storage (methane is needed for the BNR process, and much of Virginia’s 
funding would have been used to purchase methane for Blue Plains) and 
increased disposal of biosolid waste (John Kennedy, personal communication, 
May 28, 2004).   
 
21. NPS involvement and incentives to engage in trading. 
 
Nonpoint sources were not involved. 
 
22. Other 
 
 
Program information/References 
 
Websites: 
None 
 
Contacts: 
John Kennedy, Virginia DEQ, (804) 698-4312. 
 
Written Program Information: 
Commonwealth of Virginia (2004).  Chesapeake Bay nutrient and sediment 
reduction Tributary Strategy for the Shenandoah and Potomac river 
basins.  Public comment draft.  Retrieved 4/28/04 from 
http://www.naturalresources.virginia.gov/Initiatives/TributaryStrategies/
FinalTribStrats/trib-potomac-shenandoah.pdf 
Environomics (1999).  A summary of U.S. effluent trading and offset projects.  
A report prepared for Dr. Mahesh Podar, U.S. Environmental Protection 
 263
Agency, Office of Water.  Retrieved May 7, 2004 from 
http://www.epa.gov/owow/watershed/trading/traenvrn.pdf 
 
Reviewed by John Kennedy, Virginia Department of Environmental Quality.
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Henry County Public Service Authority and City of Martinsville 
Agreement (VA) 
 
A.  Program Background 
1. Program description 
 
In 1998 a single trade of total dissolved solid (TDS) discharge was proposed 
in Virginia between the Lower Smith River Waste Water Treatment Plant 
(WWTP) in Henry County and the City of Martinsville Sewage Treatment 
Plant (STP).  This trade was intended to allow the Henry County textile 
industry to expand (Environomics 1999), but never occurred because the 
Henry County textile industry encountered financial difficulties.  The textile 
industry was the most significant contributor to total discharged solids, so as 
individual factories went out of business, the need to trade disappeared (Kip 
Foster, personal communication, April 27, 2004).  
 
The proposed trade would have transferred 20,000 kg/day of total dissolved 
solid discharge from the City of Martinsville to the Lower Smith River 
WWTP and led to the rewriting of the two discharge permits associated with 
the trade (Environomics 1999). 
 
2. Program motivation 
 
Dissolved solids in the Smith River were degrading the quality of river water. 
Concern over river water quality arose because the river supplies drinking 
water for the town of Eden, North Carolina (Environomics 1999).  In 1988, 
TDS limits were developed for both the Martinsville STP and Lower Smith 
River WWTP so as to maintain an in stream standard of 500 mg/l maximum 
TDS at Eden (Wise 2000).  These limits were written into the permits of each 
of these sources, so that the Martinsville STP was issued a maximum weekly 
average TDS limit of 110,00 kg/d and the Lower Smith River WWTP was 
issued a maximum weekly average TDS limit of 55,000 kg/d (Wise 2000).  
When the textile plant Bassett Walker proposed an expansion of its facilities, 
which would lead to an increase in discharge waste into the Lower Smith 
WWTP, it became apparent that the Lower Smith WWTP could not handle 
the waste within the confines of its permit (Wise 2000).  The two waste 
treatment plants agreed to lower the TDS limit of the Martinsville plant to 
90,000 kg/d and increase the TDS limit of the Lower Smith Plant to 75,000 
kg/d (Wise 2000).  
 
3. Pollutant being traded 
 
Total dissolved solids 
 
4. Size of program 
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The trade would have been between two point sources in the Roanoke River 
Basin on the Smith River in Virginia (Wise 1999). 
 
Potential trading parties: Lower Smith River Waste Water Treatment Plant 
(WWTP) in Henry County and the City of Martinsville Sewage Treatment 
Plant (STP) 
 
5. Stakeholders/participants 
 
• Henry County’s Lower Smith River Wastewater Treatment Plant: The 
WWTP could not take on more industrial waste without violating its 
permit regulating total dissolved solids (Environomics 1999).  
• Martinsville sewage treatment plant: This plant entered into trade 
negotiations with Henry County’s WWTP that would lead to a 
modification of its permit reflecting a decrease in dissolved solid pollution 
to allow Henry County’s WWTP to raise the dissolved solid pollution 
allowance on its permit. 
• Virginia Department of Environmental Quality Permitting Division: This 
agency was responsible for ensuring that the trade would be acceptable 
under the EPA’s Clean Water Act of 1997 (Environomics 1999). 
• Bassett Walker: This textile plant considered an expansion of its facilities 
around 1999.  As the chief contributor of waste to the Lower Smith River 
WWTP, contributing about 95% of total waste, this increase would have 
put the Lower Smith River Plant beyond its permitted allowance (Wise 
1999).  This plant, along with other textile plants in the area, went out of 
business in the late 90’s, eliminating the need to trade.  
 
6. Regulatory drivers 
 
The Virginia Department of Environmental Quality had to ensure that trading 
would not violate the anti-backsliding clause included in the Clean Water Act 
(Environomics 1999).  
 
The Virginia anti-backsliding policy (9 VAC 25-31-220L): Relaxation of 
water quality standards is permitted as long as it does not violate anti-
degradation policy (Wise 1999).  The rewriting of permits in this case would 
have been allowable since the two dischargers were considered part of the 
same stream segment and therefore no net increase in pollutants would be 
discharged (Wise 1999).  
 
 
B.  Trade Structure 
 
7. Determination of credit  
 
Since no trade occurred, credit was not determined. 
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8. Trading ratios and other mechanisms to deal with uncertainty  
 
A 1:1 trading ratio would have been applied to the trade (Environomics 
1999)—i.e., Henry County’s Lower Smith River WWTP would have 
increased its permitted allowance of total dissolved solid discharge by 
reducing the Martinsville’s sewage treatment plant’s allowance by the same 
amount. 
  
9. Liability/penalties for noncompliance 
 
N/A 
 
10. Approval process 
 
N/A 
 
11. Ex post verification/auditing. 
 
N/A 
 
12. Mechanisms for trade identification and communication (education and 
outreach, third party facilitation, embedded ties) 
 
N/A 
 
13. Market structure (bilateral, clearinghouse, third party brokers) 
 
N/A 
 
14. Types of trades allowed  
 
This would have been a point/point trade. 
 
C.  Outcomes 
 
15. Types and volume of trades that have occurred 
 
None.   
 
16. Administrative costs 
 
N/A 
 
17. Transaction costs 
 
N/A 
 
 267
18. Cost savings 
 
N/A 
 
19. Program goals achieved  
 
The trade was initially intended to enable the textile industry to expand, but 
there was no need to pursue trading once the textile industry began to decline. 
 
20. Program obstacles 
 
The textile industry was the most significant contributor to total discharged 
solids, so as individual factories went out of business, the need to trade 
disappeared (Kip Foster, personal communication, April 27, 2004).  
 
21. NPS involvement and incentives to engage in trading. 
 
This would have been a point/point trade. 
 
22. Other 
 
 
Program information/References 
 
Websites: 
None 
 
Contacts: 
Kip Foster, Virginia Department of Environmental Quality.  (540) 562-6782 
 
Written program information: 
Environomics (1999).  A summary of U.S. effluent trading and offset projects.  
A report prepared for Dr. Mahesh Podar, U.S. Environmental Protection 
Agency, Office of Water.  Retrieved May 7, 2004 from 
http://www.epa.gov/owow/watershed/trading/traenvrn.pdf 
Wise, Lynn (2000). Martinsville Water Pollution Control Plant; VODES 
Permit No. VA0025305. Virginia Department of Environmental Quality, 
West Central Regional Office. 
Wise, Lynn (1999). VDDES Permit Program Fact Sheet: Lower Smith River 
WWTP. Virginia Department of Environmental Quality, West Central 
Regional Office. 
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Fox-Wolf Basin Watershed Pilot Trading Program (WI) 
 
A.  Program Background 
1. Program description. 
 
As part of the State of Wisconsin’s effort to investigate trading, the Wisconsin 
Department of Natural Resources (WDNR) chose the Fox-Wolf Basin as one 
of three trading pilot programs in 1997 (WDNR 2002).   The Fox-Wolf 
Watershed Alliance (FWWA, formerly Fox-Wolf Basin 2000), a non-profit 
organization focused on water quality, had taken the lead in conducting 
extensive water quality monitoring, modeling, economic analysis, and policy 
formulation regarding water quality trading (Baumgart et al. 2000).   
 
Despite FWWA’s extensive research and promotion of trading, the lack of 
regulatory drivers and economic incentives has hindered the program.   Point 
sources already faced phosphorus limits of 1 mg/L, and it has proven to be 
more economically attractive to meet this limit through plant upgrades than 
through substantial trades.  In addition, several dischargers demonstrating 
economic hardship were granted temporary alternative limits, which suggests 
that  point sources will most likely not be compelled to explore trading until a 
TMDL is implemented (Kramer 2003).  This lack of regulatory and economic 
drivers, coupled with uncertain state trading guidelines, has effectively held 
up trading in the Basin. 
 
It appears unlikely that any trades will occur in the Basin unless the State of 
Wisconsin formulates definitive trading guidelines and stricter effluent limits 
for point sources (Kramer 2003; Linda Stoll, personal communication, March 
13, 2003). In the future, smaller point sources that need to expand for 
population growth might hold potential for trading. Dischargers with 
temporary alternative limits might also look to trading when renewing their 
permits.  (Linda Stoll, personal communication, March 13, 2003).  
 
2. Program motivation 
 
The Fox-Wolf River Basin drains into Lake Michigan’s Green Bay, which has 
faced excessive nutrient loading since the mid-1980s.  Point sources have 
been regulated down to a 1 mg/L phosphorus limit as part of a 1988 Remedial 
Action Plan for the Basin (Environomics 1999), but the basin’s aquatic health 
has continued to decline.  This motivated many stakeholders in the basin to 
explore water quality trading as a mechanism for addressing nonpoint source 
pollution and improving water quality in a cost-effective manner.  Despite the 
environmental logic for trading, however, the program has been held up by the 
lack of regulatory drivers and economic incentives. 
 
3. Pollutant being traded 
 
Phosphorus 
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4. Size of program 
 
The Fox-Wolf Basin includes 6,400 square miles in the Lower Fox, Upper 
Fox, and Wolf river basins and drains into the Green Bay in Lake Michigan 
(FWWA website).  There are potentially hundreds of point source 
participants, particularly wastewater treatment plants, in this area 
(Environomics 1999). 
 
Potential participants in trading:  wastewater treatment plants; farmers 
 
5. Stakeholders/participants 
 
• Wisconsin Department of Natural Resources (WDNR): authorized pilot 
trading programs 
• Fox-Wolf Watershed Alliance (FWWA), formerly Fox-Wolf Basin 2000: 
conducted monitoring, modeling, economic analyses, and policy 
formulation 
• United States Geological Survey: assisted with monitoring 
• Water Environment Research Foundation: provided funding for 
monitoring and policy analysis 
• Resource Strategies, Inc.: consultant to FWWA 
 
6. Regulatory drivers 
 
FWWA has advocated strongly for a TMDL, noting that there exists no other 
regulatory driver for trading at this time.  Although the WDNR indicates that 
the Upper and Lower Fox Rivers were on the 1998 TMDL Development Two-
Year Schedule, no TMDL has been developed for the basin (James Baumann, 
personal communication, 5/31/02).  
 
Many point sources in Wisconsin were affected by the 1999 addition of 
Chapter NR 217 to the Wisconsin Administrative Code, which stipulates a 1 
mg/L phosphorus discharge limit for municipal and industrial treatment plants 
of a certain size.  Since point sources in the Fox-Wolf Basin have faced this 
limit for many years, and several point sources have been able to acquire 
alternative permit limits due to economic hardship, the phosphorus discharge 
limit has not been an adequate driver for cost-effective trades (WDNR 2002).   
In the future, however, the DNR may require non-compliant or struggling 
point sources to consider trading as a margin of safety (WDNR 2002).   
 
Without definitive state-wide guidelines on trading, it is not clear how trading 
will be integrated with other regulations on nonpoint source pollution. For 
example, Wisconsin recently ruled that nonpoint sources do not have to 
comply with water quality standards when there is not enough money 
available to subsidize BMPs (Kramer 2003).  Since nonpoint sources may not 
be able to trade unless they are incompliance with water quality standards, 
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trading may be limited by the availability of state cost-share funds.   Without 
standardized state guidelines on trading, point sources wishing to trade face 
considerable uncertainty regarding trading costs, liability, applicability to 
federal permits, and trade ratios (Kramer 2003).   
 
 
B.  Trade Structure 
7. Determination of credit  
 
FWWA has actively supported much of the technical effort to facilitate 
trading in the watershed, primarily through the Soil and Water Assessment 
Tool (SWAT) model and the promotion of the World Resources Institute’s 
NutrientNet software.  However, since no trades have occurred, there does not 
yet exist an established method for determining credits. 
  
8. Trading ratios and other mechanisms to deal with uncertainty 
 
Early estimates of point/nonpoint source pollution abatement costs assumed a 
2:1 trading ratio, but the State has at times mentioned trading ratios as high as 
10:1 (Linda Stoll, personal communication, March 13, 2003).   
 
9. Liability/penalties for noncompliance 
 
Not determined. 
 
10. Approval process 
 
Not determined. 
 
11. Ex post verification/auditing. 
 
Not determined. 
 
12. Mechanisms for trade identification and communication (education and 
outreach, third party facilitation, embedded ties) 
 
The Fox-Wolf Watershed Alliance has promoted the use of NutrientNet, an 
online nutrient registry from the World Resources Institute, to help establish a 
market for pollution credits.  
 
13. Market structure (bilateral, clearinghouse, third party brokers) 
 
The market structure will most likely be bilateral, although brokered trades 
have also been discussed as a possibility (Kramer 2003).  At this point, point 
sources interested in trading would have to individually design trades.  
 
14. Types of trades allowed  
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Point/point and point/nonpoint trades have both been discussed, although no 
trades have occurred and trading guidelines have not been defined.   
 
C.  Outcomes 
15. Types and volume of trades that have occurred 
 
To date, no trades have occurred in the Fox-Wolf Basin.  The City of Ripon 
discussed trading with the WDNR in 1999, but it decided not to pursue a trade 
due to the uncertainty of correlating phosphorus with other pollutants.  Ripon 
had been interested in offsetting biological oxygen demand (BOD) and/or 
ammonia limits with phosphorus BMPS (WDNR 2000) 
 
16. Administrative costs 
 
Not determined. 
 
17. Transaction costs  
 
Without clearer guidance and leadership from the state on trading, anticipated 
transaction costs for point sources are high.  Point sources interested in trading 
would be responsible for developing much of their own trading program, 
while there is a fear of a backlash from the environmental community if 
trading is not supported by state guidelines (Linda Stoll, personal 
communication, March 13, 2003).   Faced with large reductions, point sources 
may choose to trade with other point sources rather than negotiate with many 
small nonpoint sources (Kramer 1999).   
 
18. Cost savings 
 
Initial estimates indicated a viable economic basis for trading in the basin, 
with average phosphorus control costs estimated at $73/lb for point sources 
and $26/lb for agricultural BMPs (Environomics 1999).  Subsequent 
economic analyses, however, determined that phosphorus control costs were 
lower for point sources than for nonpoint sources in the Upper Fox and Wolf 
Rivers, leaving only the Lower Fox River with a favorable cost differential 
(Kramer 1999).   
 
19. Program goals achieved  
 
The purpose of the pilot programs was to assess under which conditions 
trading might be viable, not to establish robust trading (WDNR 2002).   By 
this broad definition, the Fox-Wolf Basin pilot has been useful in generating 
much valuable information and lessons.  However, no trades have been 
completed, no trading model has been defined, and the potential for future 
trades seems weak without greater state leadership on a TMDL or trading 
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guidelines.  Many stakeholders view the initiative as more “frustrating” than 
productive (Linda Stoll, personal communication, March 13, 2003).   
 
20. Program obstacles 
 
The primary obstacle has been the lack of regulatory and economic incentives.  
In addition, point sources have been reluctant to trade because of high 
uncertainty and anticipated transaction costs, while farmers have hesitated to 
become involved with a government pilot program (Kramer 2001).   The lack 
of communication between stakeholders, state and federal agency ambiguities, 
and a resistance to innovation have also posed significant challenges to 
trading (Kramer 2003; Baumgarten et al. 2000). 
 
21. NPS involvement and incentives to engage in trading. 
 
Nonpoint sources would be more than adequately compensated for any BMPs 
that took land out of production.  Many farmers, however, had a strong sense 
of property rights and were not interested in being involved with the 
government (Linda Stoll, personal communication, March 13, 2003). 
 
22. Other 
 
Program information/References 
 
Websites: 
Fox-Wolf Watershed Alliance.  http://www.fwwa.org 
Wisconsin Department of Natural Resources: Watershed-based pollutant 
trading. http://www.dnr.state.wi.us/org/water/wm/nps/pt/ 
 
Contacts: 
Linda Stoll, Director, Fox-Wolf Watershed Alliance.  (920) 738-7025 
James Baumann, Wisconsin Department of Natural Resources.  (608) 266-
9277. 
 
Written Program Information: 
Baumgart, P., Johnson, B. N., & Pinkham, J. R. (2000).  Phosphorus credit 
trading in the Fox-Wolf Basin:  exploring legal, economic, and technical 
issues. Water Environment Research Foundation, Project 97-IRM-5D.  
De Alessi, Michael. (n.d.).  New tools for addressing the nutrient loading 
problem in the Fox-Wolf River basin: trading white paper. Retrieved 
January 28, 2004 from 
http://www.fwwa.org/PDF/NewToolsMarketIncentives.pdf 
------(2003).  Removing muck with markets: a case study on pollutant trading 
for cleaner water. Reason Public Policy Institute, Policy Brief 24.  
Retrieved January 28, 2004 from http://www.rppi.org/pb24.pdf 
Environomics (1999).  A summary of U.S. effluent trading and offset projects.  
A report prepared for Dr. Mahesh Podar, U.S. Environmental Protection 
 273
Agency, Office of Water.  Retrieved May 7, 2004 from 
http://www.epa.gov/owow/watershed/trading/traenvrn.pdf 
Kramer, Joseph M. (2003).  Lessons from the trading pilots: applications for 
Wisconsin water quality trading policy. Resources Strategies, Inc: A 
report prepared for the Fox-Wolf Watershed Alliance. Retrieved January 
28, 2003 from http://www.fwwa.org/pdf/WisconsinTradingFinal.pdf 
------(1999).  Analysis of phosphorus control costs and effectiveness for point 
and nonpoint sources in the Fox-Wolf Basin.  Resource Strategies, Inc.: 
A report prepared for Fox-Wolf Basin 2000.  Retrieved May 7, 2004 
from http://www.rs-inc.com/FWB2K_Final_Report.pdf 
Wisconsin Department of Natural Resources (WDNR) (2002). Fourth 
progress report on the trading of water pollution credits.  Retrieved 
January 30, 2004 from 
http://www.dnr.state.wi.us/org/water/wm/nps/pt/PT2002.htm 
------(2000).  Third progress report on the trading of water pollution credits.  
Retrieved May 4, 2004 from 
http://www.dnr.state.wi.us/org/water/wm/nps/pt/ptreport2000.pdf 
------(1999).  Second progress report on the trading of water pollution credits.  
Retrieved May 4, 2004 from 
http://www.dnr.state.wi.us/org/water/wm/nps/pt/Pollutanttrade.pdf 
------(1998).  First progress report on the trading of water pollution credits. 
Retrieved May 4, 2004 from 
http://www.dnr.state.wi.us/org/water/wm/nps/pt/Govrept98.pdf 
 
 
Reviewed by Linda Stoll, Fox-Wolf Watershed Alliance. 
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Red Cedar River Nutrient Trading Pilot Program (WI) 
 
A.  Program Background 
1. Program description 
 
The Red Cedar River was chosen in 1997/1998 as one of three water quality 
trading pilots for the State of Wisconsin.  A local group called the Red Cedar 
Steering Committee, which later incorporated as the non-profit Red Cedar 
River Basin, Inc., had been exploring watershed-based water quality 
management options for the basin since 1994.  Funded by a USEPA grant and 
coordinated by a University of Wisconsin Extension basin educator, the 
Steering Committee coordinated water quality monitoring at several lakes and 
developed the Simulator for Water Resources in Rural Basins (SWRRB) 
model to determine the phosphorus loading rates of different land uses. 
 
By 1999, there were only two municipalities actively considering water 
quality trading: the City of Cumberland and the Village of Colfax.  
Cumberland wanted to postpone expensive upgrades for its publicly owned 
treatment work (POTW) by purchasing 4400 lbs. of annual phosphorus 
offsets.  The City agreed to obtain trading commitments by October 1, 2000 
and implement the trades by October 1, 2001. The Barron County Land 
Conservation Department (LCD) served as a liaison with farmers, signing 
farmers up for trading and verifying best management practices (BMPs).    By 
July, 2001, Cumberland had contracted with 22 farmers and obtained 5000 
lbs. of phosphorus credits (WDNR 2002).  Cumberland contracted with a 
similar number of farmers in 2002 and 2003 and intends to continue the 
trading program until it is too difficult to identify enough eligible farmers 
(Peter Prusak, personal communication, June 1, 2004). 
 
Colfax eventually determined that water quality trading was not economically 
feasible.   They would have needed 1750 lbs. of phosphorus offsets within a 
budget of $23,500.  However, without the same participation from Dunn 
County LCD, the administrative costs of identifying and verifying trades were 
too high (WDNR 2002). 
 
2. Program motivation 
 
Watershed-wide, water quality management activities were started in 1994 by 
the Red Cedar Steering Committee, prompted by algal blooms and 
eutrophication in Tainter Lake.  
 
The City of Cumberland, faced with a 1 mg/L phosphorus discharge limit for 
their publicly owned treatment work (POTW), looked to water quality trading 
as a means of reducing compliance costs (Environomics 1999).   The City 
strongly believed that a non-point phosphorus reduction effort would be more 
beneficial for protecting water quality than chemical phosphorus removal at 
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the POTW.  Non-point trades will reduce both phosphorus and sediment 
(Peter Prusak, personal communication, June 2, 2004). 
 
The Village of Colfax applied for an alternative POTW effluent limit on the 
basis of economic hardship.  Since Colfax is within the trading area, it was 
obligated to evaluate the economic feasibility of water quality trading as a 
requirement of this application (WDNR 2002).   
 
3. Pollutant being traded 
 
Phosphorus 
 
4. Size of program 
 
The Red Cedar Watershed drains 1,800 square miles in west central 
Wisconsin.  Nonpoint sources deliver an estimated 93% of the phosphorus 
loading to the watershed. The basin includes 18 municipalities: Menomonie, 
Glenwood City, Downing, Boyceville, Wheeler, Colfax, Prairie Farm, 
Ridgeland, Dallas, Chetek, Turtle Lake, Almeana, Barron, Cameron, Rice 
Lake, Cumberland, Haugen, and Birchwood (WDNR 2002).   
For the City of Cumberland's trade, all land must have been in the Hay River 
watershed above the Prairie Farm impoundment, and the majority of treated 
fields must lie within 400 feet of channelized flow (WDNR 2002). Thirty 
farmers originally signed up for trading through the LCD, and 22 met the final 
criteria. 
 
Potential trading parties: municipal wastewater treatment plants, farmers 
 
5. Stakeholders/participants 
 
• Wisconsin Department of Natural Resource (WDNR): 
• Red Cedar River Steering Committee (incorporated in 1996 as Red Cedar 
River Basin, Inc.) 
• Municipal POTWs.   
• City of Cumberland 
• Village of Colfax 
• Barron County Land Conservation Department: coordinated with farmers 
for the City of Cumberland’s trades.  
• Dunn County Land Conservation Department 
 
6. Regulatory drivers 
 
Tainter Lake, a downstream impoundment on the Red Cedar River, and a 
small section of the Red Cedar River in Barron County are listed as impaired 
waters (Peter Prusak, personal communication, June 2, 2004).  These sections 
of the River were listed as a Wisconsin Impaired River with the EPA in 1998 
and was on a TMDL Development Two Year Schedule, but no specific plan 
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for a TMDL has been developed for the Basin (James Baumann, personal 
communication, May 31, 2002). 
 
The primary regulatory driver for point sources is Chapter NR 217 of the 
Wisconsin Administrative Code. Ch. NR 217 mandated 1 mg/L phosphorus 
discharge limits for municipal treatment plants with a monthly discharge 
exceeding 150 lb. of phosphorus and industrial sources with a monthly 
discharge exceeding 60 lb. of phosphorus.  This was expected to affect 35-
40% of all POTWs in the state.   Exemptions from this effluent limit are only 
granted in four conditions, including proven economic hardship 
 
 
B.  Trade Structure 
7. Determination of credit  
 
Farmers can only receive payment for a BMP for three years.  The phosphorus 
reduction credits associated with a BMP were estimated using phosphorus 
loading models that have been developed for and used by many Priority 
Watershed projects (Peter Prusak, personal communication, June 1, 2004).  
All of the trades have involved nutrient management planning or no-tillage, 
which are well established and understood practices.  
 
8. Trading ratios and other mechanisms to deal with uncertainty 
 
Trades are subject to a 2:1 trading ratio (Environomics 1999).   
 
9. Liability/penalties for noncompliance 
 
Liability is not handled within the permitting framework, since the trading 
program is authorized by a letter from the DNR to Cumberland (Peter Prusak, 
personal communication, June 1, 2004).  The City of Cumberland and the 
DNR agreed that Cumberland could discontinue the trading agreement at any 
time providing that Cumberland installs phosphorus removal at its POTW 
within one year to meet the 1 mg/L phosphorus effluent limit (Environomics 
1999).  Farmers’ noncompliance is not a significant risk because payment is 
only given for a BMP after the DNR has verified that it is has been properly 
implemented (Peter Prusak, personal communication, June 1, 2004).  
 
10. Approval process 
 
The Barron County LCD and the City of Cumberland evaluated landowners 
according to the trading area criteria.  Soil testing of each field was done to 
calculate the phosphorus delivery to the stream from the field where the BMP 
was used.  (WDNR 2002).  
 
11. Ex post verification/auditing. 
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The Barron County LCD verified all BMPs implemented for trading with 
Cumberland (WDNR 2002). 
 
12. Mechanisms for trade identification and communication (education and 
outreach, third party facilitation, embedded ties) 
 
Embedded ties – City of Cumberland.  The City of Cumberland partnered 
with the Barron County LCD to identify and negotiate with landowners.  
Cumberland matched its incentive payments to the LCD’s soil and water 
conservation payments, and the LCD advertised both programs to farmers at 
the same time.  The farmers could choose whether to enroll in the trading 
program or the traditional cost-share program (WDNR 2002).   
 
Third Party Facilitation - Village of Colfax.  Since the  Dunn County LCD 
was not interested in taking on the cost of identifying and administering 
trades, the Village of Colfax would likely hire a crop consultant to contact 
farmers.  After estimating that these administrative costs were prohibitive, the 
Village of Colfax did not pursue trading (WDNR 2002). 
 
13. Market structure (bilateral, clearinghouse, third party brokers) 
 
Bilateral.  The discharger is responsible for contracting directly with the 
removing sources. 
 
14. Types of trades allowed  
 
Point/nonpoint.  Dischargers may only trade to meet phosphorus 
requirements. 
 
C.  Outcomes 
15. Types and volume of trades that have occurred 
 
In 2001 the City of Cumberland paid 22 landowners a total of $14,526, 
primarily for reduced tillage on lands with excessive phosphorus soil tests.  
These trades resulted in 5000 lbs. of phosphorus credits (WDNR 2002).  
Approximately the same number of farmers participated in 2002 and 2003 as 
well, and it is anticipated that the City will continue trading until it becomes 
impossible to secure enough nonpoint source credits (Peter Prusak, personal 
communication, June 1, 2004).   
 
16. Administrative costs 
 
The City of Cumberland benefited from the fact that the Barron County LCD 
took on many of the administrative costs of trading, but the Village of Colfax 
determined that, without similar cooperation from the Dunn County LCD, the 
administrative costs would be almost as expensive as the costs of 
implementing BMPs.  
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17. Transaction costs 
 
Not available. 
 
18. Cost savings 
 
The WWTP would have spent approximately $35,000 to control phosphorus 
at the plant, and nonpoint source phosphorus reductions were achieved for 
about $20,000.  The trading program saved Cumberland approximately 
$15,000 in 1998, and savings were probably similar in subsequent years (Peter 
Prusak, personal communication, June 1, 2004).   
 
19. Program goals achieved  
 
The City of Cumberland, which was the only municipality completing a trade 
on the Red Cedar River, was successful in meeting its trading goals.  They 
were required to purchase 4400 lbs. of phosphorus credits annually, and the 
BMPs resulted in 5000 lbs. of phosphorus reductions (WDNR 2002).  It is too 
soon to determine if this trade has measurably improved water quality (Peter 
Prusak, personal communication, June 1, 2004).  The Village of Colfax would 
have needed 1570 lbs. of phosphorus credits, but the administrative costs were 
too high to pursue trading (WDNR 2002). 
 
20. Program obstacles 
 
Many farmers in Wisconsin have been wary of entering into long-term 
agreements for water quality trading (USEPA).  Introducing farmers to trading 
through the LCD, which has strong working relationships with the agricultural 
community, was a successful approach to recruit agricultural trading partners.   
 
Determining a precise phosphorus credit for BMPs posed a challenge for 
implementing point-nonpoint source trading.  Across the three Wisconsin 
pilots, differing information came out of the City of Cumberland’s 
monitoring, the Rock River project’s monitoring, and the Conservation 
Reserve Enhancement Program (CREP) model (WDNR 2000).  
 
The Village of Colfax concluded that the administrative costs of identifying 
trades were too high without the full partnership of the LCD.   The Dunn 
County LCD, however, was not interested in assuming the administrative 
costs for the project.   
 
21. NPS involvement and incentives to engage in trading. 
 
The City of Cumberland compensated landowners at the same rate as other 
county or federal cost-share programs: reduced tillage at $15/acre, no till at 
$18.50/acre, contour farming at $3/acre, contour strip cropping at $6/acre, 
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buffer strips at $35/acre, and a nutrient management plan at $3/acre.  These 
BMPs are expected to have ancillary benefits for the farmers, and it is hoped 
that farmers will continue to practice them after the three years of  trading 
payments (WDNR 2002). 
 
Trading payments were modeled on the cost-share payments, but trading was 
more attractive to farmers because the cost-share agreements took longer to 
implement (Peter Prusak, personal communication, June 1, 2004).  
 
22. Other 
 
Program information/References 
 
Websites: 
Wisconsin Department of Natural Resources: Watershed-based pollutant 
trading. http://www.dnr.state.wi.us/org/water/wm/nps/pt/ 
 
Contacts: 
Peter Prusak, Basin Engineer, Wisconsin Department of Natural Resources.  
(715) 822-5421 
James Baumann, Wisconsin  Department of Natural Resources, (608) 266-
9277. 
 
Written Program Information: 
Environomics (1999).  A summary of U.S. effluent trading and offset projects.  
A report prepared for Dr. Mahesh Podar, U.S. Environmental Protection 
Agency, Office of Water.  Retrieved May 7, 2004 from 
http://www.epa.gov/owow/watershed/trading/traenvrn.pdf 
Griesser, J. Elliot (2004).  Offset projects: success and suitability in 
addressing water quality impairment.  Unpublished master’s thesis, 
Bard College, Annandale on Hudson, NY. 
Kramer, J. M. (2003).  Lessons from the trading pilots: applications for 
Wisconsin water quality trading policy. Retrieved January 28, 2003 
from http://www.fwwa.org/pdf/WisconsinTradingFinal.pdf 
Wisconsin Department of Natural Resources (WDNR) (2002). Fourth 
progress report on the trading of water pollution credits.  Retrieved 
January 30, 2004 from 
http://www.dnr.state.wi.us/org/water/wm/nps/pt/PT2002.htm 
------(2000).  Third progress report on the trading of water pollution credits.  
Retrieved May 4, 2004 from 
http://www.dnr.state.wi.us/org/water/wm/nps/pt/ptreport2000.pdf 
------(1999).  Second progress report on the trading of water pollution credits.  
Retrieved May 4, 2004 from 
http://www.dnr.state.wi.us/org/water/wm/nps/pt/Pollutanttrade.pdf 
------(1998).  First progress report on the trading of water pollution credits. 
Retrieved May 4, 2004 from 
http://www.dnr.state.wi.us/org/water/wm/nps/pt/Govrept98.pdf 
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Beginning in 2005, Cumberland will submit annual reports to the DNR on the 
status of the water quality trading program.   
 
Reviewed by Peter Prusak, Wisconsin Department of Natural Resources  
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Rock River Nutrient Trading Pilot Program (WI) 
 
A.  Program Background 
1. Program description 
 
In 1997/1998, the Rock River was chosen as one of three pilot trading 
programs for the State of Wisconsin.  The idea of water quality trading in the 
basin was originally proposed in 1996, as part of the Rock River Watershed 
Partnership’s (RRWP) exploration of a more holistic watershed-wide 
approach to water quality.  Since the RRWP is a local stakeholder group 
without budgetary authority, a group of POTWs formed the offshoot Rock 
River POTW Watershed Group and raised over $300,000 to conduct 
watershed modeling, coordinate water quality monitoring, draft a trading 
framework, complete a literature review of agricultural best management 
practices (BMPs), and analyze instream results of phosphorus controls.   In 
1997, the POTW group had signed a three-year Memorandum of 
Understanding (MOU) with the Wisconsin Department of Natural Resources 
(WDNR) that stated among other things that point sources would not be 
mandated to implement phosphorus controls if the nutrient reductions could 
be achieved more cost-effectively through nonpoint source offsets. 
 
The Trading Structure Workgroup (TSW) of the RRWP formulated trading 
rules with the WDNR.  Trades were to be approved in five-year increments, 
tied to Wisconsin Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (WPDES) permits.  
Out of over sixty point sources that initially expressed interest in trading, ten 
conducted feasibility analyses in 2000.  All point sources ultimately decided 
to implement phosphorus controls at their treatment plants rather than 
purchase nonpoint source offsets, largely because water quality trading in the 
basin did not prove to be as cost-effective as anticipated.  For more details on 
the economic feasibility studies of point sources, see WDNR (2002). 
 
2. Program motivation 
 
The primary environmental problem that prompted state and local interest in 
water quality trading was poor water quality – eutrophication, excessive 
nutrients, and high sediment content - in the Rock River Basin.   
 
Many point sources were motivated to explore trading as a result of Chapter 
NR 217, Wisconsin Administrative Code.  Ch. NR 217 mandates a 1 mg/L 
phosphorus discharge limit for publicly owned treatment works (POTWs) and 
industrial facilities of a certain size, respectively 150 lbs. and 60 lbs. of annual 
phosphorus discharge.   Over sixty participants expressed interest in trading, 
many as a means of complying with Ch. NR 217 without expensive 
phosphorus control upgrades.   
 
3. Pollutant being traded 
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Trading program development initially focused on phosphorus but did not rule 
out trading of other pollutants in the future.  
 
4. Size of program 
 
The Rock River watershed encompasses 3,000 square miles in south central 
Wisconsin (WDNR 2000).  Soil and Water Assessment Tool (SWAT) 
modeling estimated that nonpoint sources contribute 59% of the annual 
phosphorus load to the basin (RRPWG 2000).  As of late 1999, over sixty 
participants had committed to trading, including 24 publicly owned treatment 
works (POTWs) (Environomics 1999).  By 2000 only ten dischargers 
continued to show an interest, and only seven completed feasibility analyses 
of trading by the end of the year.  By 2002 only one discharger remained 
interested in trading, in this case a point-point trade (WDNR 2002).  
 
Potential trading parties: wastewater treatment plants, dairy processing plant, 
farmers 
 
5. Stakeholders/participants 
 
• Wisconsin Department of Natural Resource (WDNR): collaborated on 
water quality monitoring 
• Rock River Watershed Partnership (RRWP): stakeholder group 
coordinating the pilot program 
• Rock River POTW Watershed Group (RRPWG): group of POTWs that 
conducted economic feasibility studies 
• U.S. Geologic Service (USGS): collaborated on water quality monitoring 
• University of Wisconsin: collaborated on instream monitoring of nonpoint 
source phosphorus load reductions 
 
6. Regulatory drivers 
 
The Upper Rock River was listed as a Wisconsin Impaired River with the 
EPA in 1998, but a TMDL has not yet been developed for the basin (James 
Baumann, personal communication, May 31, 2002).  
 
The primary regulatory driver for point sources was expected to be Chapter 
NR 217 of the Wisconsin Administrative Code. Ch. NR 217 mandated 1 mg/L 
phosphorus discharge limits for municipal treatment plants with a monthly 
discharge exceeding 150 lb. of phosphorus and industrial sources with a 
monthly discharge exceeding 60 lb. of phosphorus.  This was expected to 
affect 35-40% of all POTWs in the state, and it did encourage many 
dischargers to consider trading.  However, the DNR concluded that this 
effluent limit was not an adequate driver for trading and that a TMDL will be 
necessary to make trading more financially attractive (WDNR 2002).  
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B.  Trade Structure 
7. Determination of credit   
 
The Trading Structure Workgroup (TSW) of RRWP agreed that any BMP or 
nonpoint source project that is not a “minimal standard practice” for all for 
farmers in the county will be considered eligible. A BMP could be considered 
for trading in more than one five-year permit increment providing that it has 
not yet been adopted as a standard practice or been found to be less effective 
at phosphorus control (RRWP 1999).  
 
8. Trading ratios and other mechanisms to deal with uncertainty  
 
The Trade Ratio Workgroup (TRW) of RRWP defined trade ratios ranging 
from 1:1 to 1.5:1 for point-point trades and from 1.75:1 to 3.6:1 for point-
nonpoint trades.  The formula for calculating trade ratios is as follows: 
A) Base Trade Ratio: 1.0 for point-point and 1.75 for point-nonpoint trading. 
B) Add 0.125 if trade is not in target area.  (Target areas are those “sub-basins 
with the highest loading rates” and those “contributing runoff to identified 
significant water resources.”)  
C) Add 0.125 if trade is not in same WDNR “Watershed.”  
D) Add 0.125 if trade is not “nearby” (within 20 miles). 
E) Add 0.125 if  “credits” are obtained downstream of trader’s location.  
Trade Ratio = A + B + C + D + E 
(RRPWG 2000) 
 
9. Liability/penalties for noncompliance 
 
The point sources are ultimately responsible for obtaining the required 
nonpoint source credits and will be liable if repairs are needed to maintain 
BMP effectiveness, the BMP is determined to be less effective than predicted, 
or the nonpoint source fails to install or maintain BMPs.   Deed restrictions 
can be placed on a property to maintain BMPs if a landowner goes bankrupt 
(RRPWG 2000).   
 
10. Approval process 
 
Not available. 
 
11. Ex post verification/auditing. 
 
The point source is responsible for enforcing contracts with nonpoint source 
trading partners, but the TSW notes that, from a practical standpoint, a county 
Land Conservation District (LCD) might assume the responsibility of 
verifying BMPs and monitoring compliance with trading contracts.  Although 
the WDNR may conduct follow up monitoring in targeted areas, it would not 
require that water quality improvements from individual trades be 
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demonstrated by water chemistry monitoring; a trade will be assumed to have 
achieved the nutrient reduction goals if all trading contracts and point source 
discharge limits are met (RRPWG 2000).  
 
12. Mechanisms for trade identification and communication (education and 
outreach, third party facilitation, embedded ties) 
 
All three mechanisms would be permitted, but third party facilitation or 
embedded ties appears to be the most likely.  The WDNR had hoped that 
County LCDs, who have a strong working relationship with the agricultural 
community, would function as third party brokers.  The LCDs in Dane and 
Fond du Lac Counties did work with POTWs to identify trades, but budget 
and staff time constraints made most LCDs reluctant to assume this 
responsibility (WDNR 2000). 
 
13. Market structure (bilateral, clearinghouse, third party brokers) 
 
Bilateral or Third Party Brokers.  The TSW agreed to allow two different 
trade scenarios: 1. Trade initiator deals directly with trade recipient; 2. Trade 
initiator deals directly through a third party.  State or local government 
agencies could act as brokers (RRPWG 2000). 
 
14. Types of trades allowed  
 
Both point/point and point/nonpoint trades have been investigated 
(Environomics 1999).   Trades will be approved in five-year increments, tied 
to the Wisconsin Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (WPDES) permit.  
The TSW had not yet determined if this would occur through a permit 
modification or a side letter to the existing permit (RRPWG 2000).   
 
C.  Outcomes 
15. Types and volume of trades that have occurred 
 
No trades have occurred.  Based primarily on cost and trading requirements, 
many communities decided to implement phosphorus removal at their 
POTWs.  The Village of Fall River was still considering a point-point trade as 
late as 2002, but by 2003 it had received loans for a $3.6 million upgrade for 
their POTW.  
 
16. Administrative costs 
 
Not available. The TSW did agree that administrative costs exceeding the 
normal cost of business may be charged to the trade initiator (RRPWG 2000). 
 
17. Transaction costs 
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Overall transaction costs not available but were likely substantial.  Certainly 
the information costs associated with monitoring and feasibility studies were 
considerable.  For example, the City of Waumpun spent $20,000 on 
consulting services before deciding that trading was not economically feasible 
(WDNR 2002). 
 
18. Cost savings 
 
Initial cost estimates indicated that water quality trading could be a cost-
effective strategy for meeting state phosphorus limits, but later studies 
revealed that trades were difficult to justify on cost savings.  Actual 
phosphorus control costs at 20 POTWs ranged from $0.40-$20/lb, with most 
between $2 and $10.  Nonpoint source phosphorus control costs were 
estimated at $0.50-$4.50/lb for converting to conservation tillage, $0.40-$2.50 
for converting to no-till, and $1-$100 for 50 ft. wide buffer strips  (WDNR 
2000).    At least two of the final seven point sources determined that they 
would need a 1.1:1 trading ratio to make trades economically viable (WDNR 
2002).  The Rock River Watershed Group of POTWs also suggested that trade 
periods of greater than 5 years could spread the capital costs over more time 
(RRPWG 2000). 
 
19. Program goals achieved  
 
No trades have been completed, although the pilot was valuable as a learning 
tool for Wisconsin (WDNR 2002).  The TSW asserted that the DNR would 
consider the pilot successful if a straightforward mathematical calculation 
showed the desired net phosphorus reduction in the basin (RRPWG 2000), 
which presumably has been achieved by POTW upgrades.  
 
20. Program obstacles 
 
Most point sources decided that trades were not economically feasible.  
Establishing the trade ratio was a difficult process (Environomics 1999), and 
the POTW group reported that the high trade ratio might have jeopardized the 
effectiveness of the pilot project.  The five-year trade limit may have further 
reduced the cost-effectiveness of nonpoint source controls (RRPWG 2000).  
 
Reaching farmers was also an inherently difficult task (Suzanne Wade, 
personal communication, June 4, 2002).  Several point sources were unable to 
identify a sufficiently large pool of nonpoint source trading partners (WDNR 
2002).   The WDNR had hoped that the LCDs would assist in identifying 
farmers, but few LCDs were eager to devote their resources to facilitate 
trading. 
 
21. NPS involvement and incentives to engage in trading. 
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The primary incentive offered to landowners was economic compensation for 
implementing BMPs.  The TSW and the WDNR agreed that farmers who 
already received federal cost-share funds could also receive trading dollars for 
the same BMPs, with credit likely awarded according to the proportion of 
trading dollars.  Many of the BMPs could be economically beneficial to 
farmers on their own merit, such as composting manure to produce a 
commercially viable product (RRPWG 2000).   
 
The Jefferson County LCD conducted a survey of farmers.  They found that 
farmers in their county would consider converting 5,408 acres from 
conventional to conservation tillage at an average of $31/acre, 6,213 acres 
from conventional tillage to no-till at an average of $30/acre, 3,678 acres from 
conventional tillage to no-till at an average of $41/acre, 1,302 acres of tilled 
land to wetlands for $651/acre, and 71,600 feet tilled lands to buffers at 
$53/foot (WDNR 2000). 
 
22. Other 
 
 
Program information/References 
 
Websites: 
Rock River Watershed Partnership.  http://clean-water.uwex.edu/rrp/ 
Wisconsin Department of Natural Resources: Watershed-based pollutant 
trading. http://www.dnr.state.wi.us/org/water/wm/nps/pt/ 
 
Contacts: 
Suzanne Wade, Rock River Watershed Partnership. (920) 674-8972   
James Baumann, Wisconsin Department of Natural Resources.  (608) 266-
9277. 
 
Written Program Information: 
Environomics (1999).  A summary of U.S. effluent trading and offset projects.  
A report prepared for Dr. Mahesh Podar, U.S. Environmental Protection 
Agency, Office of Water.  Retrieved May 7, 2004 from 
http://www.epa.gov/owow/watershed/trading/traenvrn.pdf 
Kramer, J. M. (2003).  Lessons from the trading pilots: applications for 
Wisconsin water quality trading policy. Retrieved January 28, 2003 from 
http://www.fwwa.org/pdf/WisconsinTradingFinal.pdf 
Rock River POTW Watershed Group (RRPWG) (2000).  Summary of 
Watershed Studies.  Retrieved on March 25, 2004 from http://clean-
water.uwex.edu/rockriver/Watershed%20Study%20Summary.htm 
Rock River Watershed Partnership (RRWP) (1999).  Trading Structure 
Workgroup: Draft Issue List.  Retrieved on May 1, 2002 from 
http://clean-water.uwex.edu/rrp/ISSList.htm 
Wisconsin Department of Natural Resources (WDNR) (2002). Fourth 
progress report on the trading of water pollution credits.  Retrieved 
 287
January 30, 2004 from 
http://www.dnr.state.wi.us/org/water/wm/nps/pt/PT2002.htm 
------(2000).  Third progress report on the trading of water pollution credits.  
Retrieved May 4, 2004 from 
http://www.dnr.state.wi.us/org/water/wm/nps/pt/ptreport2000.pdf 
------(1999).  Second progress report on the trading of water pollution credits.  
Retrieved May 4, 2004 from 
http://www.dnr.state.wi.us/org/water/wm/nps/pt/Pollutanttrade.pdf 
------(1998).  First progress report on the trading of water pollution credits. 
Retrieved May 4, 2004 from 
http://www.dnr.state.wi.us/org/water/wm/nps/pt/Govrept98.pdf 
 
Reviewed by Suzanne Wade, Rock River Watershed Partnership. 
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Chesapeake Bay Nutrient Trading Program (VA, MD, PA, and 
Washington, D.C.) 
 
A.  Program Background 
1. Program description 
 
The Chesapeake Bay Program has developed voluntary nutrient trading 
guidelines for its member jurisdictions (Pennsylvania, Maryland, Virginia, 
and the District of Columbia).  Trading will be one option for achieving 
existing nutrient reduction goals and tributary strategies. 
 
Cooperative action to address nutrient loading in the Bay dates to 1983, when 
the Chesapeake Bay Program was initiated by the states of Virginia, 
Pennsylvania, and Maryland, the District of Columbia, the U.S. 
Environmental Protection Agency, and the tri-state Chesapeake Bay 
Commission.  The 1987 Chesapeake Bay Agreement established a 40% 
reduction goal for nutrients from controllable sources by 2000, with the 
baseline set by 1985 levels.  In 1992, individual reduction goals were set for 
each major tributary, and the states committed to achieving these goals 
through Tributary Strategies.  Under the Chesapeake Bay 2000 agreement, all 
of the states agreed to a collective cap on nitrogen and phosphorus. Formal 
allocations for each state and basin were finally established in April 2003.  
TMDLs will be imposed if the nutrient reduction goals set by these policies 
are not achieved by 2010.  
 
Nutrient trading surfaced during this policy-making process as one potential 
mechanism for meeting nutrient reduction goals.  By early 1998, both Virginia 
and Maryland were exploring the idea, and the Chesapeake Bay Program 
found broad stakeholder interest in developing a coordinated nutrient trading 
plan for the entire Bay.  A Nutrient Trading Negotiation Team was convened 
in 1999 and produced draft nutrient trading guidelines by September, 2000.  
After extensive public review, the nutrient trading guidelines were approved 
in March 2001.   
 
The guidelines specifically address nitrogen and phosphorus trading in pre-
TMDL waters with nutrient baselines and caps established by Tributary 
Strategies.   At the core of the guidelines are eight fundamental trading 
principles, summarized as: 1. Trades must not negatively affect local water 
quality; 2. Trades are allowed only within each major Bay tributary; 3. 
Trading programs must comply with all federal, state, and local regulations 
and be flexible enough to adapt to regulatory changes; 4. Trading programs 
must be consistent with Tributary Strategies and nutrient reduction goals; 5. 
Each trade must reduce net nutrient loading; 6. Trading should only be 
pursued after all sources have achieved a 40% reduction in nutrient loading; 7. 
Trading participants must be good actors in substantial compliance with all 
laws and regulations; 8. Trading programs must seek the guidance of a diverse 
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set of stakeholders (for exact wording, see Chesapeake Bay Program Nutrient 
Trading Negotiation Team 2001).   
 
The trading plan also offers guidance on six elements of trading programs: 1. 
nutrient reduction goals; 2. eligibility; 3. trade administration;  4. 
accountability; 5. assessment/indicators; 6. stakeholder involvement. 
 
The guidelines are voluntary, and each jurisdiction will be responsible for 
determining  an individual trading policy, establishing mechanisms for 
certifying and registering credits, creating a central coordinating office for 
tracking trades, and developing a system of monitoring  and evaluating  
performance (Chesapeake Bay Program Nutrient Trading Negotiation Team 
2001).  Interstate trading within a single watershed may become a possibility 
in the future, but trading will likely proceed within each state first.   
 
2. Program motivation 
 
Chesapeake Bay has long suffered from excess nutrient loading, which results 
in algae blooms and low dissolved oxygen levels.  Rapid population growth, 
agricultural runoff, and industrial development have all contributed to 
continued pressure on the ecosystem, despite significant attempts to reduce 
both point and nonpoint source nutrient pollution.  Maryland, Pennsylvania, 
Virginia, and the District of Columbia have been collaborating on efforts to 
address this pollution since the Chesapeake Bay Agreement was signed in 
1983.   
With the threat of TMDLs if nutrient reduction goals are not met by 2010, 
there is an increased interest in innovative mechanisms for addressing nutrient 
loading in the Bay.  Trading is seen as an attractive strategy because it offers 
rapid nutrient reductions at low cost, engages nonpoint sources, provides a 
mechanism to offset population growth, and encourages technological 
innovation (Chesapeake Bay Program 2002). 
 
3. Pollutant being traded 
 
Nitrogen and Phosphorus 
 
4. Size of program 
 
The Chesapeake Bay is the largest estuary in the U.S., covering approximately 
64,000 square miles in Virginia, West Virginia, Maryland, Pennsylvania, 
Delaware, New York, and the District of Columbia.  The major Bay 
tributaries include Susquehanna, Potomac, Rappahannock, York, James, 
Patuxent, Maryland Western Shore, Virginia Western Shore, Maryland 
Eastern Shore.   Eligibility for trading will be defined in separate state rules, 
so it is not possible to conclusively state the number of potential trading 
parties.   
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Potential trading parties: POTWs, industrial point source, urban runoff, 
agricultural sources, oyster farms 
 
5. Stakeholders/participants 
 
• States/Jurisdictions (PA, MD, VA, and Washington D.C):  States will be 
responsible for developing their own trading programs based on the Bay-
wide Nutrient Trading recommendations.   
• Chesapeake Bay Program: convened the Nutrient Trading Negotiation 
Team to explore the feasibility of nutrient and develop voluntary nutrient 
trading guidelines 
• Trading Negotiation Team, with representatives from EPA-CB, EPA-
Region III, State of Maryland, State of Pennsylvania, District of 
Columbia, Commonwealth of Virginia, local governments, public interest, 
environmental groups, stormwater interests, point source interests, 
nonpoint source interests, Chesapeake Bay Commission.  
 
6. Regulatory drivers 
 
The Chesapeake Bay Program set Bay-wide nutrient caps in 2000 and state 
and basin allocations in 2003, and each state agreed to establish Tributary 
Strategies to meet their goals.   Maryland, Pennsylvania, Virginia, and the 
District of Columbia have substantial incentives for achieving nutrient 
reduction goals under the threat of TMDLs.  Trading is seen as one promising 
strategy for meeting the reductions specified by the Tributary Strategies.   
 
The regulatory drivers for developing trading programs vary in each state.  
Maryland, Virginia, Delaware and D.C. are on schedules to complete water 
quality standards that will be one step further towards having a regulatory 
driver for trading.  All four jurisdictions are working to produce similar 
standards to increase uniformity across the watershed (Robert Rose, personal 
communication, May 26, 2004).  For more details on the development of 
trading programs in particular for the states under the Chesapeake Bay 
Agreement, see individual entries under “State Rules” for Pennsylvania, 
Maryland, and Virginia.   
 
 
B.  Trade Structure 
7. Determination of credit 
 
The nutrient trading guidelines specify that nonpoint sources must have a 
mechanism in place for calculating credits, but each state must individually 
determine how to calculate credits (Nutrient Trading for the Chesapeake Bay 
2002).   
 
8. Trading ratios and other mechanisms to deal with uncertainty  
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Trading ratios are recommended in consideration of delivery, retirement, 
uncertainty, and special needs (Chesapeake Bay Program 2002) 
 
9. Liability/penalties for noncompliance  
 
The Nutrient Trading guidelines state that the buyer should be ultimately 
responsible for complying with its own permit and ensuring that adequate 
credits are delivered.  Buyers should be given time to correct for 
noncompliance when a seller defaults and should be able to seek legal 
recourse against the seller.  Depending on the contract, a seller may be 
required to pay penalties, return the trading dollars, or lose state certification 
for trades (Chesapeake Bay Program Nutrient Trading Negotiation Team 
2001).  
 
10. Approval process 
 
The Nutrient Trading guidelines strongly recommend that trades be governed 
by state policy rather than individual approval of contracts.  States will be 
responsible for certifying and registering credits, although the approval 
process will vary by state. (Chesapeake Bay Program Nutrient Trading 
Negotiation Team 2001). 
 
11. Ex post verification/auditing. 
 
The Nutrient Trading guidelines outline that point sources will be responsible 
for self-monitoring and reporting on a monthly basis, while nonpoint sources 
must monitor on a seasonal basis.  Nonpoint source monitoring  should 
include an annual on-site inspections to ensure that BMPs are functioning  
properly.  Credits will be calculated annually (Chesapeake Bay Program 
2002).   
 
States will be responsible for monitoring ambient water quality and other data 
(e.g. weather, slope, soil types) necessary for overall program assessment.    
(Chesapeake Bay Program Nutrient Trading Negotiation Team 2001). 
 
12. Mechanisms for trade identification and communication (education and 
outreach, third party facilitation, embedded ties)  
 
NutrientNet, an online trading registry developed by the World Resources 
Institute, is being explored as one mechanism for identifying trading partners. 
(Allison Wiedeman, personal communication, May 15, 2003) 
 
13. Market structure (bilateral, clearinghouse, third party brokers) 
 
It is still too early to tell whether nutrient markets in each state will be 
structured as bilateral agreements or clearinghouses.  Many farmers do not 
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want to be written into a point source permit, but point sources need to have a 
link to the trades in their permits.  The preferable outcome might be a 
clearinghouse, possibly a quasi-state company, that obtains a large enough 
pool of credits to assume liability (Allison Wiedeman, personal 
communication, May 15, 2003).   
 
14. Types of trades allowed  
 
Potentially both point/point and point/nonpoint.  The nutrient trading 
guidelines recommended that point/nonpoint trading only be permitted after 
the 40% reduction goal has been met.  This guarantees the greatest possible 
contributions from both point and nonpoint sources to the nutrient reduction 
goals (Chesapeake Bay Program Nutrient Trading Negotiation Team 2001). 
 
C.  Outcomes 
15. Types and volume of trades that have occurred 
 
No trades have occurred in the Chesapeake Bay, and no Bay state has yet 
developed state-wide trading regulations. Maryland considered developing 
state rules, although recent legislation requiring POTWs to apply limits of 
technology standards may undermine the economic incentives for trading (see 
Maryland under “State Rules”).  Pennsylvania established a pilot trading 
program on the Conestoga River (see “Trading Initiatives”) and is looking 
into state-wide rules, including multi-credit trading.  Virginia decided against 
trading with the Blue Plains WWTP in Washington, D.C. (see “Trading 
Initiatives”), but is considering two new pilots and a state-wide trading 
scheme for Water Quality Improvement Fund grantees (see “State Rules”).  
 
16. Administrative costs 
 
Administrative costs will depend on each state’s trading rules.  
 
17. Transaction costs 
 
Transaction costs will depend on each state’s trading rules.  
 
18. Cost savings 
 
Cost savings will depend on each state’s trading rules.  Estimates of point 
source nutrient reduction costs were collected by the Nutrient Reduction 
Technology Cost Task Force (2002).   
 
19. Program goals achieved  
 
The Negotiation Team did succeed in creating nutrient trading guidelines for 
the entire Chesapeake Bay.  Each jurisdiction may choose to design trading 
rules and implement workable trading programs. The final test for whether 
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trading helps each state achieve its nutrient reduction goals will come in 2010, 
when TMDLs will be imposed on non-achieving waters. At this time, it 
appears that the momentum for trading within each state may be slowing (see 
individual entries under “State Rules”) 
 
20. Program obstacles 
 
Environomics (1999) notes that balancing the interests of such a diverse set of 
stakeholders was a challenge for developing Bay-wide trading guidance.  
 
21. NPS involvement and incentives to engage in trading. 
 
Nonpoint source interests have participated in the Negotiation Team.  Most 
trading programs will establish economic incentives for farmers to install 
BMPs.  Many farmers, however, do not want to be regulated and oppose being 
written into a point source permit (Allison Wiedeman, personal 
communication, May 15, 2003).   
 
22. Other 
 
Program information/References 
 
Websites: 
Chesapeake Bay Program: Nutrient Trading.  
http://www.chesapeakebay.net/trading.htm 
 
Contacts: 
Robert Rose, Chesapeake Bay Program, U.S. Environmental Protection 
Agency.  410-267-5779 
 
Written program references: 
Chesapeake Bay Program, Nutrient Trading Negotiation Team (2001). 
Chesapeake Bay Program Nutrient Trading Fundamental Principles and 
Guidelines.  Retrieved May 11, 2004 from 
http://www.chesapeakebay.net/pubs/subcommittee/nsc/final15guidanced
oc.pdf 
Chesapeake Bay Program, Nutrient trading for the Chesapeake Bay 
[Powerpoint] (2002).  Retrieved April 28, 2004 from 
http://www.mde.state.md.us/assets/document/Nutrient%20Trading%20f
or%20the%20Chesapeake%20Bay_AW.pdf 
Environomics (1999).  A summary of U.S. effluent trading and offset projects.  
A report prepared for Dr. Mahesh Podar, U.S. Environmental Protection 
Agency, Office of Water.  Retrieved May 7, 2004 from 
http://www.epa.gov/owow/watershed/trading/traenvrn.pdf 
Nutrient Reduction Technology Cost Task Force (2002).  Nutrient reduction 
technology cost estimations for point sources in the Chesapeake Bay 
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Watershed.  Chesapeake Bay Program.  Retrieved May 24, 2004 from 
http://www.chesapeakebay.net/pubs/NRT_REPORT_FINAL.pdf 
 
Reviewed by Robert Rose, Chesapeake Bay Program, U.S. EPA.. 
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State-wide Policies 
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Maryland Nutrient Trading Policy 
 
A.  Program Background 
1. Program description  
 
The State of Maryland began exploring water quality trading in the mid 1990s 
as a strategy for improving water quality and meeting the nutrient reduction 
goals established by the Chesapeake Bay Agreement (Environomics 1999).  It 
was estimated that nutrient trading could save $9 million to $12 million 
annually in compliance costs compared to all plants meeting a 5 mg/L limit 
without trading (Water Environment Research Foundation 2002).   
 
The Maryland Department of the Environment (MDE) developed a draft 
concept paper on nutrient trading in 1997, but conclusive guidance and trading 
rules were never finalized.  MDE also participated in an EPA Chesapeake Bay 
Program effort that developed regional guidance on trading. MDE brought 
renewed focus to nutrient trading with a March 2003 forum to gauge statewide 
interest and discuss possible program development.  Maryland also continues 
to work with the World Resources Institute (WRI) in the development of a 
NutrientNet website for the Potomac River.  Finally, two pilot programs are 
being in various stages of possible development. 
 
In spring 2004, state legislation (MD House Bill 555 and MD Senate Bill 320) 
authorized the funding of the Chesapeake Bay Watershed Restoration Fund 
through fees assessed on users of public sewers and septic systems.  The 
Fund, effective as of October 1, 2004, will be used to support wastewater 
treatment plant upgrades and cover crop programs on agricultural fields.  As a 
result of this state policy, the primary economic incentive to trade has been 
significantly reduced by providing a dedicated funding stream for wastewater 
treatment plant upgrades.  In the future, urban stormwater systems facing high 
retrofit costs and load maintenance issues could potentially revive a focus on 
water quality trading.  Based on the low load and concentration levels 
required of municipal point sources and the high implementation levels of 
agricultural best management practices associated with tributary strategies it 
appears that opportunities for nutrient trading in Maryland are minimal.   
 
2. Potential trading participants 
 
Wastewater treatment facilities; stormwater municipalities with MS-4 permits; 
farmers. 
 
3. Regulatory context  
  
In 2004, the State Legislature passed legislation to fund upgrades of major 
wastewater treatment facilities (defined as greater than 0.5 million 
gallons/day) through user fees.  Total nitrogen and phosphorus discharges will 
be lowered to levels approaching the limit of current technology (3mg/L – 
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4mg/L TN and 0.18mg/L - 0.2mg/L TP).  Additionally, the Maryland Water 
Quality Improvement Act requires nutrient management plans for all farms 
within the state.   
 
Although a non-regulatory program, Maryland is a party to the Chesapeake 
Bay Agreement.  Based on the revised agreement signed in 2000, Maryland 
has recently completed Tributary Strategies that focus on reducing the load of 
nutrients entering into the Chesapeake Bay.  Based on the Tributary 
Strategies, Maryland is attempting to significantly reduce its nutrient loading 
by undertaking efforts to reduce point source discharges through wastewater 
plant upgrades, and nonpoint source discharges though the installation of 
urban and agricultural BMPs.  As a result of the high levels of implementation 
associated with this effort there are a limited number of potential credits 
available for trades based on the current theory on how to determine credits.  
The Chesapeake Bay is scheduled to have a TMDL developed for it if water 
quality does not meet standards by 2010. 
 
B.  Trade Structure 
 
4. Specific rules governing trades 
 
Maryland has not finalized rules governing nutrient trading.  The 1997 draft 
concept paper on trading suggested a 2:1 trading ratio for point/nonpoint 
trades (Environomics 1999).  A formal determination has not been made 
regarding the specific impacts (e.g., baseline for generation of agricultural 
credits) associated with the 2004 approval of the Chesapeake Bay Watershed 
Restoration Fund and the Maryland Tributary Strategies (Scott Macomber, 
personal communication, May 18, 2004).   
 
5. Market structure (bilateral, clearinghouse, third party brokers) 
 
Banking and clearinghouse concepts have been discussed.  NutrientNet is an 
option for structuring trade monitoring and market pricing (Scott Macomber, 
personal communication, May 18, 2004). 
 
6. Types of trades allowed  
 
Point/point, point/nonpoint, and nonpoint/nonpoint have all been considered.  
 
C.  Outcomes 
7. Trading programs operating under state rules or pilot programs informing rule 
development  
 
There are two pilot programs in the funding proposal stage: 
• Monocacy River watershed.  See “Recent Proposals” 
• St. Martin’s River watershed.  See “Recent Proposals” 
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These pilots, if funded, will help the State of Maryland determine more 
specific rules for trading. 
 
8. Program obstacles 
 
High levels of urban and agricultural BMP implementation are required to 
reduce nonpoint source loads necessary for improvements in Chesapeake Bay 
water quality.  Current legislation will fund upgrades to municipal point 
sources >0.5mgd to levels approaching the limits of technology.  As a result 
of these policies, the potential available credits for trading are limited, 
therefore reducing the economic driver for trades to occur.   
 
9. Other 
 
Program information/References  
 
Websites: 
Maryland Department of the Environment (MDE). “Maryland Nutrient 
Trading Program Exploration.” 
http://www.mde.state.md.us/Programs/WaterPrograms/TMDL/home/Nutrient
%20Trading%20Exploration.asp 
 
Contact Information: 
Scott Macomber, Maryland Department of the Environment.  (410) 537-3077 
Marya Levelev, Maryland Department of the Environment.  (410) 537-3720 
 
Written information: 
Environomics (1999).  A summary of U.S. effluent trading and offset projects.  
A report prepared for Dr. Mahesh Podar, U.S. Environmental Protection 
Agency, Office of Water.  Retrieved May 7, 2004 from 
http://www.epa.gov/owow/watershed/trading/traenvrn.pdf 
Water Environment Research Foundation (2002).  Nitrogen credit trading in 
Maryland: a market analysis for establishing a statewide framework.  
Maryland Department of the Environment (MDE) (1997).  Concept paper for 
a nutrient trading policy. Available from MDE on request. 
 
Reviewed by Scott Macomber, Maryland Department of the Environment. 
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Michigan Water Quality Trading Rules 
 
A.  Program Background 
1. Program description  
 
The State of Michigan began exploring water quality trading in 1995 and 
completed a Market Based Program Feasibility Study in 1997.  The Surface 
Water Quality Division subsequently established a Water Quality Trading 
Workgroup and initiated a watershed-based trading demonstration project in 
1998.  The workgroup completed a draft of water quality trading rules in 
August 1999, and formal rulemaking began in January 2000.  After a series of 
public hearings, the rules were adopted in November 2002 (MDEQ 2002c).   
 
The primary motivation for developing state-wide trading rules was to address 
unregulated nonpoint source runoff that is a major source of pollution to the 
Great Lakes. Water quality trading promised to provide nonpoint sources with 
the financial incentives to implement nutrient- and sediment-reducing best 
management practices (BMPs), while giving point sources an additional tool 
for maintaining environmental compliance (Michigan Office of Regulatory 
Reform 2000).  The rules note that the trading program is also intended to 
facilitate the implementation of TMDLs and encourage the development of 
new quantification procedures (MDEQ 1999). 
 
2. Potential trading participants 
 
The water quality trading rules permit nutrient trading between and among 
point sources, stormwater sources, agricultural sources, and streambank 
erosion sources.  
 
3. Regulatory context 
  
Water quality rules are promulgated under part 31 of the Natural Resources 
and Environmental Protection Act, 1994 PA 451, as Amended (Act 451).    
 
All trading under the state-wide rule must be consistent with the federal Clean 
Water Act, NPDES permit requirements, and antidegradation policy as well as 
state water quality standards (MDEQ 2002b).  Open trading may occur in 
water that attains water quality standards.  Closed trading may occur in 
impaired waters under a total maximum daily load (TMDL), lakewide 
management plan (LaMP), remedial action plan (RAP), or watershed 
management plan (WSMP) approved by the DEQ.   
 
Point sources are ineligible to trade if they do not comply with technology-
based discharge limitations or established monitoring and record-keeping 
requirements.  Nonpoint source credits cannot be generated by management 
practices used to abate a nuisance under the Michigan Right to Farm Act, 
1981 PA 93, or funded under Section 319 of the Clean Water Act or the Clean 
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Michigan Initiative, 1998 PA 288.   Nonpoint sources may, however, generate 
tradable credits from projects administered by the Natural Resource 
Conservation Service (NRCS) in proportion to the percent local match 
(MDEQ 1999).   
 
B.  Trade Structure 
4. Specific rules governing trades  
 
Michigan’s regulations for state-wide trading contain explicit rules for 
eligibility requirements, baselines, water quality contributions, credit banking, 
notification and registration requirements for credit generation and use, the 
water quality trading registry, delineation of watersheds, program evaluation, 
and compliance and enforcement.  The Program description and reference to 
rules (MDEQ n.d.) provides a detailed summary for each rule.  Here we 
include only a brief summary of the rules: 
  
General rules:  Trading occurs by rule rather than by individual permit 
modifications.  Reductions must be “real, surplus, and quantifiable.”  “Real” 
means that an actual change must be made.  “Surplus” means that reductions 
must be greater than those required by regulation (note that “surplus” is not 
the same test as “additional”).  
 
Eligibility: Trading parties must be within the same watershed.  Point sources 
must be in compliance with monitoring and record-keeping requirements.   
 
Determination of credits:  Point source baselines are established by actual 
loading levels (rather than discharge limits) over a 3-year period.  The 
baseline is calculated as the product of flow, concentration, and a unit 
conversion constant.  Nonpoint source baselines are set by the TMDL, a 
TMDL, remedial action plan (RAP), lakewide management plan (LaMP), or a 
watershed management plan (WSMP) in closed trading. In open trading, 
agricultural baselines are set by a certified nutrient management plan, while 
streambank erosion and unregulated stormwater runoff baselines are derived 
from pollutant-specific loading estimates for different land uses or 
management practices.    
 
Uncertainty: To guarantee environmental improvement, each point source 
must retire 10% of the credits it generates (effectively a 1.1:1 trading ratio) 
and each nonpoint source must retire 50% of the credits it generates 
(effectively a 2:1 trading ratio).  Additional site-specific discount factors may 
be applied to provide greater equivalence where there is an impoundment 
between sources and greater net reduction in impaired waters pre-TMDL. 
 
Noncompliance:  Nonpoint source reductions are not written into point source 
permits.  Michigan holds both credit sellers and purchasers liable in each 
trade.  Generators of credits must obtain three times the number of registered 
but insufficient credits, which are retired to promote water quality.  Purchasers 
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of credits are solely responsible for complying with their permits and showing 
due diligence.  If they provide notice of insufficient credits without having 
received previous notice from the DEQ, or if purchasers use credits that are 
later discovered to be insufficient (and the DEQ determines that they had no 
way of knowing), they are given a reconciliation period to true-up insufficient 
credits.  This reconciliation period provides an incentive for internal audits.  
 
Registry for the generation and use of credits:  Sources intending to sell 
credits must submit a notice of credit generation or use, which are reviewed 
for completeness and certified within 30 days.  The changes specified by the 
notice become legally enforceable once the DEQ has certified them.  For point 
sources, the generation or use of credits constitutes a permit modification by 
rule.   
 
Monitoring: Individuals farmers must submit annual reports to verify that the 
BMPs are successfully installed.  Point sources already must submit discharge 
monitoring reports, which will be used to monitor compliance with trading 
requirements.  The DEQ conducts ambient water quality monitoring and cost 
calculations as well as more comprehensive program evaluations every five 
years.  The first program evaluation will be due in 2005. 
 
5. Market structure (bilateral, clearinghouse, third party brokers) 
 
The DEQ will maintain a trading registry to record and monitor trades, but the 
trade structure itself appears to be bilateral.  The registry could potentially be 
one mechanism by which purchasers of credits could identify trading 
opportunities.   
 
Open trading can occur where water quality standards are being met or in 
impaired waters with a TMDL.  Closed trading may occur where a pollutant-
specific cap and load allocations have been established by a TMDL, remedial 
action plan (RAP), lakewide management plan (LaMP), or a watershed 
management plan (WSMP) approved by the department for the purposes of 
trading (MDEQ 1999).   
 
6. Types of trades allowed  
 
Point/point, point/nonpoint, and nonpoint/nonpoint.  Banking of credits for 
five years is allowed to encourage early reductions, but all banking must be 
individually approved (MDEQ 2002a).  Trading of pollutants other than 
nutrients, cross-pollutant trading, intra-plant trading, and trading under a 
LaMP or a RAP are not covered by the state-wide rules and must be 
individually approved.   
 
C.  Outcomes 
7. Trading programs operating under state rules or pilot programs informing rule 
development  
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The State of Michigan conducted one pilot program on the Kalamazoo River 
(see “Trading Initiatives”) that informed the development of state-wide rules.  
 
8. Program obstacles 
 
The 1999 Environomics report cites information gaps, misperceptions about 
trading, and federal-state disputes about legality as obstacles. 
 
9. Other 
 
The rules establish many new responsibilities for the MDEQ, as listed in 
MDEQ 2002b.  The administrative costs of the state-wide trading program 
were estimated at $208,700 for the first three years.  This cost covered the 
salaries and benefits of three environmental quality personnel (RIS 2000).   
 
 
Program information/References  
 
Websites: 
Michigan Department of Environmental Quality: Water Quality Trading.  
http://www.michigan.gov/deq/0,1607,7-135-3313_3682_3719---,00.html 
 
Contacts: 
Richard Hobrla, Chief, Inland Lakes and Remedial Action Unit, Michigan 
Department of Environmental Quality.  (517) 335-4173 
 
Written information: 
Environomics (1999).  A summary of U.S. effluent trading and offset projects.  
A report prepared for Dr. Mahesh Podar, U.S. Environmental Protection 
Agency, Office of Water.  Retrieved May 7, 2004 from 
http://www.epa.gov/owow/watershed/trading/traenvrn.pdf 
Michigan Department of Environmental Quality (MDEQ) (1999).  Part 30. 
Water Quality Trading Rules.  Retrieved 4/28/04 from 
http://www.state.mi.us/orr/emi/arcrules.asp?type=Numeric&id=1999&s
ubId=1999-036+EQ&subCat=Admincode 
------(2002a).  Executive summary.  Retrieved April 28, 2004 from 
http://www.michigan.gov/printerFriendly/0,1687,7-135--14329--
,00.html  
-------(2002b).  Rules development. Retrieved April 28, 2004 from 
http://www.michigan.gov/printerFriendly/0,1687,7-135--14293--
,00.html 
-------(2002c).  Water quality program overview.  Retrieved April 28, 2004 
from http://www.michigan.gov/printerFriendly/0,1687,7-135--13825--
,00.html 
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-------(n.d.). Program description and reference to rules.  Retrieved April 28, 
2004 from http://www.deq.state.mi.us/documents/deq-swq-trading-
RulesReference.doc 
Michigan Office of Regulatory Reform.  2000.  Regulatory Impact Statement, 
Rule ORR #99-036EQ.  Retrieved May 6, 2004 from 
http://www.state.mi.us/orr/emi/arcrules.asp?type=dept&id=EQ&subId=
1999%2DO36+EQ&subCat=RIS 
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Pennsylvania Multi-Media Trading Registry 
 
A.  Program Background 
1. Program description  
 
The Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Protection (PA DEP) is 
currently working on the development of a multi-media trading registry.  A  
Request for Information (RFI) ended in January 2004 to which the PA DEP 
received ten responses.  The responses discussed issues that need to be 
considered when developing trading programs such as consistency with water 
quality standards (Andy Zemba, Personal Communication, May 27, 2004).  
However, no actual cost estimates or plans for building the registry were 
received (Andy Zemba, Personal Communication, May 27, 2004).  To 
investigate likely constructs and costs of the registry, PA DEP awarded the 
Pennsylvania Environmental Council (PEC) a “Growing Greener” grant of 
$150,000 (Andy Zemba, Personal Communication, May 27, 2004).  PA DEP 
also applied for funding through the EPA (PA DEP 2004). 
 
The registry will likely be a mixed market system, depending on the media.  
In relation to water quality trading, the market will most likely be closed - 
subject to caps through TMDLs or Chesapeake Bay tributary strategies (Andy 
Zemba, Personal Communication, May 27, 2004).   
 
PA DEP has also been working on the development of a statewide trading 
framework.  While there is no official trading rule in place to date, PA DEP 
will be evaluating the Conestoga River Nutrient Trading pilot to guide a final 
trading policy.  Whether the registry precedes the trading guidance will 
depend on the structure of the registry (Andy Zemba, Personal 
Communication, May 27, 2004). 
 
2. Potential trading participants 
 
 Multi-media registry  - wide variety of potential participants  
 
3. Regulatory context 
  
The multi-media trading registry and statewide watershed-based trading 
guidance will operate within the context of TMDLs and Chesapeake Bay 
tributary strategies (Andy Zemba, Personal Communication, May 27, 2004).  
PA DEP will be the regulatory agency responsible for enforcement (PA DEP 
2004).    
 
 
B.  Trade Structure 
4. Specific rules governing trades  
 
The State of Pennsylvania has not adopted definitive trading rules to date.   
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5. Market structure (bilateral, clearinghouse, third party brokers) 
 
The multi-media trading registry may act as a clearinghouse, connecting 
buyers and sellers (PA DEP 2003a).  The registry may also have a banking 
capacity, depending on final design (PA DEP 2003a). 
   
6. Types of trades allowed  
 
Point/point, point/nonpoint, and nonpoint/nonpoint could all be possible. 
  
 
C.  Outcomes 
7. Trading programs operating under state rules or pilot programs informing rule 
development  
 
Pennsylvania currently has one pilot program for the Conestoga River (see 
“Trading Initiatives”).  
 
8. Program obstacles 
 
The scope of the trading registry is the biggest obstacle in actual development.   
 (Andy Zemba, Personal Communication, May 27, 2004).  
 
9. Other 
 
   
 
 
Program information/References  
 
Websites: 
Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Protection, Office of Water 
Management http://www.dep.state.pa.us/dep/deputate/watermgt/watermgt.htm 
Enterprising Environmental Solutions, Inc. http://www.eesi21.org/market.htm 
 
Contacts: 
Andy Zemba, Office of Water Management, DEP.  Telephone: (717)-772-
5633;  E-mail: azemba@state.pa.us  
 
Written information: 
Argall, David G. and Raphael J. Musto.  2001. Report on Water Quality 
Credits and Trading.  Joint Legislative Air and Water Pollution Control 
and Conservation Committee.  February.  Retrieved on May 18, 2004, 
from 
http://jcc.legis.state.pa.us/es/reports/2001%20HR%20361%20Report.do
c 
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Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Protection (PA DEP).  2003a.  
“DEP Seeks Information on Multi-Media Trading Registry,” News 
Release.  Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.  October.  Retrieved on May 
18, 2004, from 
http://www.dep.state.pa.us/newsreleases/default.asp?ID=2626 
Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Protection (PA DEP).  2003b. 
Nutrient Credit Trading for Watershed Improvement PA Discussion 
Paper.  Draft Discussion Paper.  April.  Retrieved on May 18, 2004, 
from http://www.eesi21.org/DEPTrading%20Discussion%20Paper.pdf 
Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Protection (PA DEP). 2004.  
Citizens Advisory Council Meeting Minutes.  March 16, 2004.  Retrieved 
on May 18, 2004, from 
http://www.cacdep.state.pa.us/cac/archives/minutes/2004/04_03min.htm 
 
Reviewed by Andy Zemba, Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Protection. 
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Virginia Nutrient Trading Program 
 
A.  Program Background 
1. Program description  
 
The State of Virginia has considered a nutrient trading program among point 
sources that receive Water Quality Improvement Fund (WQIF) grants.  
Grantees, primarily POTWs, receive cost-share funds for projects that reduce 
phosphorus and nitrogen discharge.  Currently, each WQIF grant agreement 
contains a provision that allows for nutrient trading to be implemented once 
the Virginia Department of Environmental Quality publishes these guidelines 
for market-based incentives (Treacy 2001).  No nutrient trading has occurred, 
however, since the VDEQ has not yet developed these guidelines.   
 
The guidelines were initially expected by the spring of 2000 (Environomics 
1999).  In March 2000, members of the VDEQ Director’s Water Quality 
Advisory Committee were asked to participate in a work group for this 
purpose, but further developments were postponed in light of the Chesapeake 
Bay Program’s new guidelines on nutrient trading (Treacy 2001).  Virginia 
Senate Bill No. 639, proposed in January 2004 by Sen. Mary Whipple and 
written with the help of the Chesapeake Bay Foundation, would have charged 
the State Water Control Board with establishing point and nonpoint source 
nutrient load allocations for each basin and developing a point/point nutrient 
trading program.  S.B. 639 was carried over to the 2005 session (Free Lance-
Star 2004).  
 
Although State guidelines have yet to be developed, draft guidelines (based on 
the Chesapeake Bay Program’s trading guidelines, adopted in March 2001) 
suggest that the trading program would use as a baseline the nutrient 
reductions specified by WQIF grant agreements.  A point source that 
discharges below annual performance requirements would earn nutrient 
credits that could be banked for one year or traded to other WQIF grantees or 
the State.  A point source that fails to meet its annual performance 
requirements would have to secure nutrient credits or repay a portion of the 
cost-share funds with interest (John Kennedy, personal communication, May 
28, 2004). 
 
The trading program was intended to set incentives for wastewater treatment 
facilities to control nutrient discharge more efficiently than required by their 
WQIF grant agreement (Treacy 2001).  Water quality trading has also been 
mentioned as a means of meeting basin-wide nutrient caps in the future 
(Virginia Secretary of Natural Resources et al. 1996).  
 
2. Potential trading participants 
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Initially, trading may only be an option for point sources receiving WQIF 
grants.  As of January 2004, 25 wastewater treatment plants had signed WQIF 
grant agreements with the DEQ (VDEQ 2004a).  
 
3. Regulatory context 
  
Although not enforceable regulations, the interstate Chesapeake Bay 
Agreement established Tributary Strategies in 1996-1998 for each tributary to 
the Chesapeake Bay, including the Shenandoah-Potomac basin in Virginia.  
The Strategies provide the impetus and implementation plans for achieving 
nutrient reduction goals. The Water Quality Improvement Act of 1997, which 
authorized creation of the Water Quality Improvement Fund, was part of the 
State’s effort to implement its tributary strategies.     
 
Virginia is currently drafting regulation to authorize and govern “Technology-
Based Numerical Limits for Nutrient Discharges Within the Chesapeake Bay 
Watershed” (VDEQ 2004b).  This regulation will consider the use of trading 
to comply with nutrient discharge caps and reduction goals for wastewater 
treatment facilities. 
 
B.  Trade Structure 
 
4. Specific rules governing trades  
 
Virginia has not yet developed trading guidelines.  Draft guidelines suggest 
that nutrient credits would be earned by controlling nutrient discharge more 
stringently than is required by the WQIF grant.  A 1:1 trading ratio would 
likely be adopted for point/point trades. Point sources that fail to meet their 
nutrient reduction goals as called for by their WQIF grant would likely be 
required to repay a portion of the cost-share funds with interest or secure 
credits from grantees that had exceeded their performance requirements 
(Environomics 1999; John Kennedy, personal communication, May 28, 2004) 
  
5. Market structure (bilateral, clearinghouse, third party brokers) 
 
Most likely bilateral.  WQIF grantees could secure credits from another point 
source (Environomics 1999).   
 
6. Types of trades allowed  
 
Point/point trading would be implemented in conjunction with WQIF grants, 
although possibly point/nonpoint trading would be explored under the 
Chesapeake Bay Program.  Point sources could bank credits for one year for 
their own use (Environomics 1999).  
 
C.  Outcomes 
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7. Trading programs operating under state rules or pilot programs informing rule 
development  
 
No viable trading program has been administered in Virginia (John Kennedy, 
personal communication, April 2004).   The State of Virginia considered one 
trade with the Blue Plains WWTP in Washington, D.C. (see “Trading 
Initiatives”), but a grant agreement was never reached and the trade became 
unnecessary under the Chesapeake 2000 Agreement’s new reduction targets.  
The Colonial Soil and Water Conservation District has interest in exploring 
trading on the Lower James River (see “Recent Proposals”).   
 
8. Program obstacles 
 
The trading program has not appeared to garner great support from either the 
environmental community or the municipal and industrial dischargers.  Early 
on, environmentalists sought more formal regulation of trading provisions 
rather than mere guidance (Environomics 1999).  More recently, the Virginia 
Manufacturers Association and the Virginia Association of Municipal 
Wastewater Authorities fought the passage of S.B. 639.  Although their 
principal objections focused on the nutrient caps rather than the trading, the 
deferment of S.B. 639 delayed the development of trading guidelines (Bay 
Bill Banished 2004).   
 
9. Other 
 
 
Program information/References 
 
Websites: 
Virginia Department of Environmental Quality (VDEQ).  “Water Quality 
Improvement Fund.” http://www.deq.state.va.us/bay/wqif.html 
 
Contacts: 
John Kennedy, Virginia Department of Environmental Quality, Chesapeake 
Bay Program. (804) 698-4312 
 
Written Material: 
Environomics (1999).  A summary of U.S. effluent trading and offset projects.  
A report prepared for Dr. Mahesh Podar, U.S. Environmental Protection 
Agency, Office of Water.  Retrieved May 7, 2004 from 
http://www.epa.gov/owow/watershed/trading/traenvrn.pdf 
Free Lance-Star (2004).  “Bay bill banished.” (2004, March 29).  
[Fredricksburg, VA].  Retrieved April 15, 2004 from 
http://www.freelancestar.com/News/FLS/2004/032004/03292004/13105
52/printer_friendly 
Treacy, Dennis (2001).  Annual report on the Virginia Water Quality 
Improvement Fund cooperative point source pollution control program.  
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Virginia Department of Environmental Quality.  Retrieved April 14, 
2004 from http://www.deq.state.va.us/bay/wqif2001.pdf 
Virginia Secretary of Natural Resources, Virginia Chesapeake Bay Local 
Assistance Department, Virginia Department of Conservation and 
Recreation, and Virginia Department of Environmental Quality (1996).  
Shenandoah and Potomac river basins tributary nutrient reduction 
strategy.  Retrieved April 19, 2004 from 
http://www.deq.state.va.us/pdf/strategies/potomac.pdf 
Virginia Department of Environmental Quality (2004a).  Signed grant 
agreements. Retrieved April 14, 2004 from 
http://www.deq.state.va.us/bay/wqiflist.html#SGA 
------(2004b). Technology based numerical limitations for nutrients in permits. 
Retrieved May 28, 2004 from 
http://www.deq.virginia.gov/bay/multi.html 
 
Virginia drafted nutrient trading guidelines a preliminary form in the late 
1990s, but they were never finalized or distributed (John Kennedy, personal 
communication, May 28, 2004).  
 
Reviewed by John Kennedy, Virginia Department of Environmental Quality, 
Chesapeake Bay Program.
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West Virginia Trading Framework  
 
A.  Program Background 
1. Program description  
 
The State of West Virginia convened a Water Quality Trading Stakeholders 
Committee (aka the Trading Team) in July, 2002 to evaluate whether a state-
wide trading framework was appropriate and, if so, to develop a conceptual 
framework.  The Trading Team included representatives from the agricultural 
and forestry sectors, utility industries, environmental organizations, and State 
government.  All decisions and recommendations of the Trading Team were 
to be consensus-based. 
 
Ultimately, however, the Trading Team did not reach consensus on whether a 
state-wide trading framework was appropriate for West Virginia.  The final 
report to the West Virginia Department of Environmental Protection (DEP), in 
April 2004, contains further information about specific provisions, but since 
the state is not pursuing a state-wide policy, these recommendations are non-
binding (Water Quality Trading Team 2004).  
 
2. Potential trading participants 
 
The Trading Team considered both point and nonpoint source participants but 
did not specify potential trading participants. 
 
3. Regulatory context  
  
The Water Quality Trading Stakeholders Committee grew out of the State’s 
TMDL Implementation Committee.  Trading was initially seen as a way for 
the State to avoid TMDL mandates, since lawsuits filed against the state for 
slow TMDL development could cause the EPA to step in and develop TMDLs 
(ETN 2004).  The Trading Team agreed that water quality trading did not 
have to take place in the context of a TMDL; they provisionally recommended 
that trading could occur in all waters if the water quality benefit is 
demonstrated (Water Quality Trading Team 2004).  
 
B.  Trade Structure 
 
4. Specific rules governing trades 
 
Since the Trading Team did not reach consensus on whether a trading 
framework was appropriate for West Virginia, its recommendations on 
individual trading issues are to be considered for information only (Water 
Quality Trading Team 2004).  
 
The Trading Team’s provisional recommendations are summarized as 
follows: 
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• Trades should only proceed if nonpoint source nutrient reductions can 
offset point source discharge increases at critical low river flows (Issues 2 
and 3) 
• Trading parties must be not pose undue compliance risks (i.e. they must be 
considered good actors) (Issue 6). 
• Trading does not have to occur under a TMDL; trading can occur in any 
waters where there is a demonstrated environmental benefit (Issues 7 and 
37) 
• Credits should be generated before or during the period in which they will 
be used (Issue 9) 
• The DEP should provide public notice and comment periods when draft 
NPDES permits are developed or modified to include trading, draft 
program evaluations of trading are released, or draft watershed plans that 
included trading are released.  The DEP should also provide real time 
public access when credits are generated for or used by trading registries 
or banks (Issues 11 and 19). 
• Credits may be generated by wetland restoration or creation, stormwater 
pollution control practices, stream restoration, riparian buffers, or 
management practices at orphan mining or contamination sites by an actor 
that is not responsible for either the contamination or its clean up,  (Issue 
13) 
• Trading arrangements in interstate waters should be developed within the 
context of on West Virginia’s participation in ORSANCO, IRPRB, and 
the Chesapeake Bay Partnership (Issue 27). 
• The DEP should require appropriate monitoring of environmental 
effectiveness into the NPDES permits of trading parties.  Point sources, at 
a minimum, should conduct quarterly sampling and analysis.  Nonpoint 
source monitoring may include sampling and analysis not otherwise 
subject to NPDES requirements. Ambient water quality monitoring should 
also be included where assessment of the discharge alone is not sufficient.  
(Issue 28). 
• Trading policies must be sufficiently flexible to address pollutant 
concerns, whether local or extending beyond watershed boundaries  
(Issues 29 and 51).  
• Cross-pollutant trading must provide a net ecological benefit and will be 
subject to strict review by the DEP.  (Issues 30 and 34).  
• Public entities should be included as trading parties (Issue 57). 
• Trades should be allowed within a single NPDES permit, as long as it 
results in a net loading reduction and individual outlets are assigned water 
quality-based effluent limits. (Issue 62).  
• Real monitoring data and modeling should be used to develop baselines, 
performance standards, and loading reductions associated with nonpoint 
sources and agricultural BMPs. (Issues 16 and 42).  
• A net environmental benefit is defined as a net increase in the overall 
environmental condition (measured by physical and chemical properties), 
consistent with pre-TMDL and TMDL standards (Issues 23 and 36). 
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• Trades is 303(d) listed waters must show significant progress towards 
water quality standards, as demonstrated by trading ratios.  Trades in 
TMDL waters must lead to compliance with all water quality standards. 
Trades in unimpaired waters must meet all water quality standards (Issue 
52). 
• Trade credits must be quantifiable, in units of pollutant loads or other 
appropriate measures approved by the DEP.  All pollutants will be tracked 
separately, except for cross-pollutant trading for dissolved oxygen (Issue 
56). 
• The DEP should approve or disapprove all trades (Issue 25) 
 
5. Market structure—e.g., bilateral, clearinghouse, third party brokers. 
 
Not determined. 
 
6. Types of trades allowed  
 
Both point/point and point/nonpoint trades were considered.  
 
C.  Outcomes 
7. Trading programs operating under state rules or pilot programs informing rule 
development  
 
Two pilot programs have been proposed in West Virginia: 
• Cheat River – Acid Mine Drainage.  See “Recent Proposals” 
• Cacapon/Lost River.  See “Recent Proposals” 
 
These pilot programs, however, are not directly connected to the development 
of a statewide trading framework.  The Trading Team itself acknowledges that 
the national momentum driving water quality trading will probably result in 
trading programs in West Virginia, regardless of the outcome of the state-level 
process (Water Quality Trading Team 2004)  
 
8. Program obstacles 
 
The final report concludes with four reasons that some Trading Team 
members did not support a state-wide trading program.  First, the fact that 
consensus could not be reached on several key trading issues raised doubt that 
water quality could be guaranteed.  Second, it was not clear that the State had 
sufficient funds to properly carry out trading, especially since administering 
the trading program could draw funds away from enforcement.  Third, there 
was doubt that the State had the will to carry out the environmental 
enforcement actions necessary for water quality trading.  Fourth, some 
members believed that the State should develop a trading framework on the 
basis of the EPA policy rather than on the recommendations of the Trading 
Team (Water Quality Trading Team 2004). 
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9. Other 
 
Program information/References  
 
Websites: 
West Virginia Department of Natural Resources: water quality trading 
stakeholder committee 
http://www.dep.state.wv.us/item.cfm?ssid=21&ss1id=429 
 
Contact Information: 
Mark Scott, National Institute of Chemical Studies (facilitator of the Trading 
Team).  (304) 346-6349 
 
Written information: 
Environmental Trading Network (2004).  Draft March 2004 Conference Call 
[Minutes].  Retrieved May 4, 2004 from 
http://www.envtn.org/calls/CallSumMar04.PDF 
Water Quality Trading Team (2004).  Final report of the water quality trading 
team.  West Virginia Department of Environmental Protection.  
Retrieved May 28, 2004 from 
http://www.dep.state.wv.us/item.cfm?ssid=21&ss1id=429 
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Wisconsin Watershed-based Pollutant Trading 
 
A.  Program Background 
1. Program description  
 
Several wastewater treatment plants in Wisconsin initiated discussion about 
water quality trading after the state established 1 mg/L phosphorus discharge 
limits (Mary Anne Lowndes, personal communication, May 4, 2004).  The 
Wisconsin legislature authorized three pilots – in the Fox-Wolf Basin, Red 
Cedar River, and Rock River – with Act 27 in 1997.  Due to budget 
constraints, funding for these three pilots was discontinued in 2002 (WDNR 
2002).   
 
The Red Cedar River basin was the only pilot to complete trades.  The final 
progress report on the pilots concluded that a 1 mg/L phosphorus limit was 
not an adequate driver for trading in most areas (WDNR 2002).  Although at 
least one pilot cited the lack of definitive state trading guidelines as a reason 
that point sources were reluctant to trade (Linda Stoll, personal 
communication, March 21, 2003), the outcomes of the pilots created little 
pressure for the WDNR to follow up with state-wide trading rules. 
 
If future TMDLs and performance standards bring renewed demands for 
nutrient trading, then the DNR might revisit the idea of a state-wide trading 
policy (Mary Anne Lowndes, personal communication, May 4, 2004). 
 
2. Potential trading participants 
 
Waste water treatment plants; agricultural producers 
 
3. Regulatory context 
  
Act 27 authorized the Wisconsin DNR to conduct nutrient trading pilots that 
would be used to develop a trading framework (WDNR 2002).  The trading 
pilots were conducted in advance of TMDLs (Environomics 1999).  
Wisconsin passed new agricultural pollution standards in 2002, which would 
set the baseline for generating agricultural credits according to the new EPA 
policy.  However, since the State does not require compliance unless there is 
cost-share money available to the farmers, the availability of State cost-share 
funds could potentially limit farmers’ participation in trading (Kramer 2003). 
 
 
B.  Trade Structure 
 
4. Specific rules governing trades  
 
The State of Wisconsin did not adopt definitive trading rules.  The State 
discussed trading ratios ranging from 2:1 to 10:1 for point/nonpoint trades 
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(Linda Stoll, personal communication, March 21, 2003).  The final progress 
report for the pilots noted that there needs to be an agreed-upon tool for 
quantifying the phosphorus reductions from nonpoint source BMPs (WDNR 
2002).  
 
5. Market structure (bilateral, clearinghouse, third party brokers) 
 
No single market structure has been defined under Wisconsin trading 
guidelines.   The fourth progress report did conclude, however, that having a 
broker or facilitator to assume the administrative role is key for an effective 
trading program (WDNR 2002).  A county land conservation district assisted 
the City of Cumberland in the Red Cedar River pilot.   
 
6. Types of trades allowed  
 
Point/point, point/nonpoint, and nonpoint/nonpoint have all been considered 
(Environomics 1999) 
 
 
C.  Outcomes 
7. Trading programs operating under state rules or pilot programs informing rule 
development  
 
Three pilot programs have been completed in Wisconsin: 
• Fox-Wolf Basin.  See “Trading Initiatives”. 
• Red Cedar River.  See “Trading Initiatives”. 
• Rock River. See “Trading Initiatives”. 
 
The Red Cedar River pilot was the only program that completed trades.  These 
pilots demonstrated that Wisconsin’s 1 mg/L phosphorus limit was not able to 
drive trading in most circumstances.  Most programs will need a TMDL or 
performance standard to drive trading and a broker to perform the 
administrative functions (WDNR 2002). 
 
8. Program obstacles 
 
The relative lack of success of the pilots was a main reason that the state has 
not devoted the resources towards developing state-wide rules on trading 
(Mary Anne Lowndes, personal communication, May 4, 2004).  
 
9. Other 
 
Program information/References 
 
Websites: 
Wisconsin Department of Natural Resources.  “Watershed-based pollutant 
trading.” http://www.dnr.state.wi.us/org/water/wm/nps/pt/ 
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Contacts: 
Mary Anne Lowndes, Wisconsin Department of Natural Resources.  (608) 
261-6420 
Linda Stoll, Director, Fox-Wolf Watershed Alliance.  (920) 738-7025. 
 
Written Material: 
Environomics, Inc. (1999).  A summary of U.S. effluent trading and offset 
projects.  A report prepared for Dr. Mahesh Podar, U.S. Environmental 
Protection Agency, Office of Water.  Retrieved May 7, 2004 from 
http://www.epa.gov/owow/watershed/trading/traenvrn.pdf 
Kramer, Joseph (2003).  Lessons from the trading pilots: applications for 
Wisconsin water quality trading policy.  Resource Strategies, Inc.  
Prepared for Fox-Wolf Watershed Alliance.  Retrieved May 4, 2004 
from http://www.fwwa.org/pdf/WisconsinTradingFinal.pdf 
Wisconsin Department of Natural Resources (WDNR) (2002).  Fourth 
progress report on the trading of water pollution credits. Retrieved May 
4, 2004 from 
http://www.dnr.state.wi.us/org/water/wm/nps/pt/PT2002.htm 
------(2000).  Third progress report on the trading of water pollution credits.  
Retrieved May 4, 2004 from 
http://www.dnr.state.wi.us/org/water/wm/nps/pt/ptreport2000.pdf 
------(1999).  Second progress report on the trading of water pollution credits.  
Retrieved May 4, 2004 from 
http://www.dnr.state.wi.us/org/water/wm/nps/pt/Pollutanttrade.pdf 
------(1998).  First progress report on the trading of water pollution credits. 
Retrieved May 4, 2004 from 
http://www.dnr.state.wi.us/org/water/wm/nps/pt/Govrept98.pdf 
 
 
Reviewed by Mary Anne Lowndes, Wisconsin Department of Natural Resources 
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Other Projects and Recent Proposals 
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Alabama 
 
Montgomery Water Works and Sanitary Sewer Board, Coosa River 
The Montgomery Water Works and Sanitary Sewer Board (Board) is sponsoring a 
trading pilot for their service area, funded by at least $500,000 from the Board and 
$100,000 from the EPA.  They are expecting to establish both closed and open market 
conditions, since not all of the segments of their watershed are 303(d) listed.  Multi-credit 
trading has also been proposed.  State or local partnerships will likely facilitate much of 
the development and implementation of the trading program, such as setting pollutant 
targets and baselines, identifying buyers and sellers, assessing cost-effectiveness, 
developing monitoring and verification systems, registering or certifying trades, and 
managing a web-based marketplace (Morgan 2002).  
 
Contact:  
Thomas “Buddy” Morgan, General Manager, Montgomery Water Works and 
Sanitary Sewer Board. (334) 206-1600 
 
References: 
Morgan, Thomas R. (2002).  Testimony before the U.S. House of Representatives 
Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure Subcommittee on Water 
Resources and Environment: a hearing on “Water quality trading – an 
innovative approach to achieving water quality goals on a watershed basis,” 
June 13, 2002.  Retrieved May 20, 2004 from 
http://www.house.gov/transportation/water/06-13-02/morgan.html 
 
 
California 
 
City of Santa Rosa 
The City of Santa Rosa developed a beneficial reuse program in the early 1990s for more 
than 50% of its tertiary treated wastewater.  The City was not permitted to discharge from 
its regional POTW into the Russian River, due to wastewater discharge prohibitions 
established by the Regional Water Quality Control Board, and the solution was to irrigate 
approximately 6,400 acres of farmlands, vineyards, and urban landscaping with the 
nutrient-rich wastewater (City of Santa Rosa n.d.). The main environmental concern was 
that farmers could apply the wastewater too close to the river, thereby indirectly 
discharging to the water (Dave Smith, personal communication, May 28, 2004).  As the 
regions population swelled, however, the City’s bigger concern was finding a place to 
discharge all of its wastewater, and in 1998 a plan was developed to transfer the 
discharge to the Geysers Recharge Project through a 41-mile pipeline.  The wastewater 
will recharge subterranean caverns in a geothermal steam field that produces electricity. 
These wastewater transfer and beneficial reuse strategies are not accurately characterized 
as trading or offsets, but the agricultural reuse program is sometimes considered a trading 
program, perhaps because the farmers were initially paid (USEPA 1996).   
 
Contacts: 
 320
Dave Smith, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Region 9. (415) 972-3416   
 
References: 
City of Santa Rosa (n.d.).  The Geysers Recharge Project.  Retrieved May 28, 2004 
from http://ci.santa-rosa.ca.us/geysers/project.asp 
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (1996). Appendix C: Examples of existing 
and potential future trading programs, Table 1: Existing programs.  In Draft 
Framework for Watershed-Based Trading, EPA 800-R-96-001, May, 1996.  
Retrieved May 28, 2004 from 
http://www.epa.gov/OWOW/watershed/appc1.pdf 
 
 
Lake Tahoe 
The California Regional Water Quality Control Board and the Nevada Division of 
Environmental Protection received a 2004 Targeted Watershed (formerly Watershed 
Initiative) grant to develop a water quality trading strategy for Lake Tahoe. Water clarity 
in Lake Tahoe has declined at nearly one foot per year since 1968, due to nutrient and 
fine sediment loading.  Major source categories include urban and forest runoff, 
atmospheric deposition (primarily from transportation), stream channel erosion, and 
groundwater.  Potential BMPs to address water clarity include infiltration basins, wetland 
controls, stream bank restoration, flow reductions, dust management, fertilizer 
management, building restrictions, BMP maintenance, highway management, and 
controls on wood burning emissions.  
 
Modeling is currently being developed to link land use, atmospheric deposition, and 
BMPs to lake clarity as part of the TMDL process, which is due to be completed in 2005.  
The Targeted Watershed funds will be used to (1.) create ground-rules for water quality 
trading between agencies and local jurisdictions responsible for mitigation, which 
includes developing a pollution control ‘currency’ and evaluating interstate trading 
options; (2.) evaluate new approaches and technologies for pollution control; and (3.) 
create a load reduction matrix or spreadsheet model to identify opportunities for 
mitigation projects and estimate a basin-wide load reduction potential.   
 
The proposal for the Targeted Watershed grant estimates a total budget of $1.7 million, 
including $737,400 to develop the trading ground rules, $475,000 to develop pollution 
control approaches, and $445,000 for the load reduction matrix. A final report on the 
monitoring program to validate load quantification methodologies will be due in March, 
2006.  Final reports on water quality trading feasibility, load quantification 
methodologies, pollutant reductions from innovative control measures, and load 
reduction opportunities, as well as a final manual on trading aimed at nonpoint sources 
and the final spreadsheet model for nutrient and sediment reductions, will be due in June, 
2006.  A comprehensive evaluation with stakeholder input of load reduction opportunities 
and a calculation of basin-wide load reduction potential will be completed in September, 
2006. (all information from CRWQCB and NDEP (2004)) 
 
Contacts: 
Dave Roberts, CA Regional Water Quality Board. (530) 542-5469  
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John E. Reuter, University of California at Davis; Director of the Tahoe TMDL 
Research Program. 
 
References: 
California Regional Water Quality Control Board and Nevada Division of 
Environmental Protection (2004).  Market-based tools for air and water 
pollutant load reduction to protect Lake Tahoe clarity.  Application to the U.S. 
Environmental Protection Agency, 2004 Watershed Initiative Funding.  
Retrieved July 30, 2004 from 
http://www.epa.gov/owow/watershed/initiative/2004/2004proposals/04laketah
oe.pdf 
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (2004). 2004 Watershed project summaries: 
targeted watersheds under the 2004 Watershed Initiative.  Retrieved July 30, 
2004 from 
http://www.epa.gov/owow/watershed/initiative/2004/04selectsumm.html 
 
 
Sacramento Regional County Sanitation District’s Mercury Offset Program 
Under the EPA’s Water Quality Trading Policy issued in January of 2003, the 
Sacramento Regional County Sanitation District is conducting a pilot project for trading 
in persistent bio-accumulative toxic substances (Vicki Fry, personal communication, May 
25, 2004).  To date, this effort is still in the feasibility study stage and is focusing on how 
to implement an offset program to deal with discharge from abandoned mercury and gold 
mines.  The study is based on the premise that there are more efficient ways to reduce 
mercury than reducing mercury release at the Sacramento Regional Wastewater 
Treatment Plant. 
 
The study is still in its draft stage, but stakeholders including regulators, land managers, 
scientists, NPDES permitees, and other interested parties have been brought together in a 
series of working meetings to identify constraints and concerns (Vicki Fry, personal 
communication, May 25, 2004). 
 
Contacts: 
Vicki Fry, Associate Engineer and Mercury Offset Program Manager of the 
Sacramento Regional County Sanitation District. Phone: (916) 876-6113 
 
References: 
Sacramento Regional County Sanitation (2004). Be Mercury Free offset program.  
Retrieved June 1, 2004 from  http://www.bemercuryfree.net/offsets.html 
 
 
Georgia 
 
Lake Allatoona  
Researchers at the University of Georgia’s River Basin Science and Policy Center are 
developing a framework for point/nonpoint phosphorus trading in the Lake Allatoona 
reservoir.  The researchers will conduct stream sampling, watershed modeling, trading 
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ratio development, cost analyses, and studies of different trading frameworks.  There are 
eight wastewater treatment plants and a variety of agricultural and forestry nonpoint 
sources in the watershed (RBSPC n.d.).  
 
Contact: 
David E. Radcliffe, University of Georgia.  (706) 542-0897 
 
References: 
River Basin Science and Policy Center (RBSPC) (n.d.).  A framework for trading 
phosphorus credits in the Lake Allatoona Watershed.  University of Georgia.  
Retrieved April 27, 2004 from 
http://www.rivercenter.uga.edu/service/agriculture/trading.htm 
 
 
Idaho 
 
Bear River Basin  
The Bear River Commission received a 2004 Targeted Watershed (formerly Watershed 
Initiative) grant to develop a water quality trading program in the Bear River watershed.  
The Bear River watershed crosses boundaries between three states – Idaho, Utah, and 
Wyoming - and two EPA regions and faces water quality impairment from agriculture, 
urban development, logging, phosphate mining, and oil and gas exploration.  The project 
is a collaborative effort between the Bear River Commission, which will manage the 
grant, the Bear River Water Quality Committee, which is composed of the water quality 
agency administrative heads from the three states, and the Bear River Water Quality Task 
Force.   
 
The Targeted Watershed grant will be used to develop: (1.) an integrated Watershed 
Information System (WIS), including a watershed-wide coordination webpage, a 
comprehensive data warehouse, a document warehouse, visualization and statistical tools, 
a virtual trading room, real-time water quality data, and watershed-wide education; (2.) a 
point-nonpoint source phosphorus trading program in the Middle and Lower Bear River, 
driven by TMDLs and managed by the WIS; and (3.) dynamic water quality monitoring 
to evaluate the site-specific phosphorus loading impacts of best management practice 
(BMP), evaluate the viability of individual trades, compare the outcome of different 
watershed-wide management options, and develop equivalence ratios.  
 
The total budget is estimated at $1.1 million, including $352,890 for the WIS, $161,246 
for the water quality trading program, $256,028 for water quality modeling, $226,378 for 
community outreach, and $82,684 for project management.  (all information from Barnett 
2004). 
 
Contact: 
Jack Barnett, Bear River Commission.  (801) 292-4662 
 
References: 
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EPA Watershed Initiative Program.  Bear River Commission.  Application to 
the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, 2004 Watershed Initiative 
Funding.  Retrieved July 30, 2004 from 
http://www.epa.gov/twg/2004/2004proposals/04bearriver.pdf 
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (2004). 2004 Watershed project summaries: 
targeted watersheds under the 2004 Watershed Initiative.  Retrieved July 30, 
2004 from 
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Indiana 
 
Lake Erie Land Company/Little Calumet River 
The Lake Erie Land Co. has spoken with consultants about the potential for water quality 
trading within the Little Calumet River watershed.  The Lake Erie Land Co. is currently 
engaged in wetland mitigation banking for the same watershed (Don Ewoldt, personal 
communication, June 1, 2004).  
 
Contact: 
Don Ewoldt.  Project Manager, Lake Erie Land Company.  (219) 395-5300 
 
 
Maryland 
 
Monocacy River 
The Maryland Department of the Environment (MDE) has submitted a Watershed 
Initiative 2004 proposal for water quality trading in the Monocacy River watershed.  The 
watershed has a mix of urban and agricultural sources, and the project could look very 
flexibly into point/point, point/nonpoint, and nonpoint/nonpoint trading.  The proposal 
was submitted in December 2003.  (Scott Macomber, personal communication, May 18, 
2004).  
 
Contact: 
Scott Macomber, Maryland Department of the Environment.  (410) 537-3077 
 
 
St. Martin’s River Watershed 
The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Region III, has expressed interest in water 
quality trading within the St. Martin’s River basin.  An initial stakeholders meeting is 
planned for early summer 2004, and the EPA probably has a 2-5 year time frame in mind. 
The St. Martin’s River watershed does not have any urban areas, and there are only two 
point source dischargers.  One is already at the limit of technology and the other is only 
one step away.  There are major nonpoint source nutrient loads in the watershed, and 
nonpoint/nonpoint trades could be explored (Scott Macomber, personal communication, 
May 18, 2004) 
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Contact: 
Scott Macomber, Maryland Department of the Environment.  (410) 537-3077 
 
 
Wicomico River 
A 1987 simulation studied the potential cost savings of point/nonpoint trading for 
phosphorus in the Wicomico River basin.  Although the simulation suggested that trading 
offered potentially significant cost savings and water quality improvements, no program 
was developed (USEPA 1996).   
 
References: 
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (1996). Appendix C: Examples of existing 
and potential future trading programs, Table 2: Programs under 
consideration/development.  In Draft Framework for Watershed-Based 
Trading, EPA 800-R-96-001, May, 1996.  Retrieved May 28, 2004 from 
http://www.epa.gov/OWOW/watershed/appc2.pdf 
 
 
Massachusetts 
 
Nashua River 
The Massachusetts Department of Environmental Protection (MDEP) has developed a 
proposal to explore how point/nonpoint phosphorus trading and a watershed-wide permit 
can facilitate TMDL implementation in the Nashua River Watershed.  The DEP hopes 
that the project will also promote interstate cooperation on water quality issues.  The 
MDEP submitted the proposal for a 2004 Targeted Watershed (formerly Watershed 
Initiative) grant in January, 2004 (MDEP 2004).  
 
Contacts: 
Sharon Pelosi, Director of Watershed Permitting, Massachusetts Department of 
Environmental Protection. (617) 556-1104 
Claire Barker, Coordinator for Policy, Outreach and Innovative Technology, 
Watershed Permitting Program, Massachusetts Department of Environmental 
Protection. (617) 556-1128 
Bryant Firmin, NPDES Coordinator, Massachusetts Department of Environmental 
Protection. (508) 849-4003 
 
References: 
Massachusetts Department of Environmental Protection (MDEP) (2004).  Using 
watershed-based permitting and phosphorus trading for TMDL 
implementation in the Nashua River Watershed.  Application to the U.S. 
Environmental Protection Agency, 2004 Watershed Initiative Funding.  
Available from the DEP on request, but not for public distribution. 
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Michigan 
 
Gun Lake Tribe, Kalamazoo River 
The Gun Lake Tribe receieved a 2004 Targeted Watershed (formerly Watershed 
Initiative) grant to develop a water quality trading infrastructure and market tools for the 
Kalamazoo River watershed, which contains their tribal land.  Agricultural BMPs will 
generate nutrient loading reductions, and point/nonpoint trading can help meet TMDL 
goals.  The tribe is leading the initiative in collaboration with a watershed-wide group of 
stakeholders, including the Environmental Trading Network, a TMDL Implementation 
Committee, state and local governments, and county conservation districts (Gun Lake 
Tribe 2004; Mark Kieser, personal communication, May 27, 2004).  
 
Contact: 
Mike Tenenbaum, Gun Lake Tribe. 
Mark Kieser, Kieser & Associates, (269) 344-7117    
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Gun Lake Tribe (2004).  Development and application of infrastructure for a model 
trading registry and agricultural participation in the Kalamazoo River 
Watershed, Michigan.  Application to the U.S. Environmental Protection 
Agency, 2004 Watershed Initiative Funding.  Retrieved July 30, 2004 from 
http://www.epa.gov/twg/2004/2004proposals/04kalamazoo.pdf 
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Nevada 
 
Lake Tahoe 
See entry above, under “California.” 
 
 
New York 
 
East River 
The New York City Department of Environmental Protection (NYC DEP), facing 
modification of SPDES permits for fourteen publicly-owned sewage treatment facilities, 
is requesting that the New York State Department of Environmental Conservation (NYS 
DEC) incorporate nitrogen trading into discharge permits for the East River.  The NYC 
DEP's Upper East River plants are located in management zone eight while the Lower 
East River plants are located in zone nine. The Long Island Sound Study (LISS) 
approved nitrogen trading among management zones as a way to meet water quality 
standards and reduce nitrogen entering the Sound.  A TMDL, developed in 2000 and 
approved by EPA in 2001, is the driver for both nitrogen trading and permit 
modifications (NYS DEC 2004).  Although not formally approved by NYS DEC but 
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included in regulatory reports, NYC DEP has been operating a nitrogen credit bank and 
trading to meet nitrogen limits since November 2002 (Diane Hammerman, personal 
communication, June 2, 2004).  The Lower East River and Upper East River management 
zones trade under a 2:1 trading exchange ratio (LER:UER) approved by LISS (Mark 
Tedesco, personal communication, June 2, 2004 and Diane Hammerman, personal 
communication, 2002).  However, this trading ratio may be raised (4.63:1 – 5.19:1, 
LER:UER) based on an increased impact estimate of Upper East River plants to western 
LIS dissolved oxygen levels as determined by modelling (Diane Hammerman, personal 
communication, 2002).  NYC DEP would like the trading ratios to be formalized by NYS 
DEC through incorporation in SPDES permits but NYS DEC does not currently have a 
state-wide water quality trading guidance or specific trading regulations (NYS DEC 
2004).  The final ruling on nitrogen trading for wastewater discharges is still pending 
with NYC DEP in negotiations with NYS DEC regarding the City’s nitrogen removal 
program (Diane Hammerman, personal communication, June 2, 2004). 
 
Contacts: 
Diane Hammerman, NYC DEP, Bureau of Wastewater Treatment.  E-mail:  
dhammerman@dep.nyc.gov 
Mark Tedesco, Long Island Sound Study.  Telephone: (203)-977-1541. 
 
References: 
New York State Department of Environmental Conservation (NYS DEC).  “ALJ 
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Modification of the Fourteen State Pollutant Discharge Elimination System 
(SPDES) Permits Pursuant to Environmental Conservation Law Article 17 
and 6 NYCRR Parts 621, 624 and 750 et seq., for the City of New York’s 14 
Publicly Owned Sewage Treatment Plants Operated by the City of New York 
Department of Environmental Protection (NYC DEP).”  Ruling on Proposed 
Adjudicable Issues and Petitions for Party Status and Ruling on Motion for 
Stay.  January 28, 2004.  Retrieved on June 2, 2004, from 
http://www.dec.state.ny.us/website/ohms/decis/nycdepspdesr.html 
New York State Department of Environmental Conservation (NYS DEC) and 
Connecticut Department of Environmental Protection.  A Total Maximum 
Daily Load Analysis to Achieve Water Quality Standards for Dissolved 
Oxygen in Long Island Sound.  December 2000.  Retrieved on May 30, 2004, 
from http://www.epa.gov/NE/eco/lis/assets/pdfs/Tmdl.pdf 
 
Websites: 
Long Island Sound Study (home) http://www.longislandsoundstudy.net/index.htm 
New York City Department of Environmental Protection, Bureau of Wastewater 
Treatment http://www.nyc.gov/html/dep/html/wastewater.html 
 
 
North Carolina 
 
Cape Fear River Basin 
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The Cape Fear River Assembly received a 2004 Targeted Watershed (formerly 
Watershed Initiative) grant to develop watershed permitting and water quality trading for 
the heavily urbanized Cape Fear River Basin.  The trading framework will allow point-
point and point-nonpoint trades, and municipal sources will be allowed to trade between 
their NPDES and stormwater (MS4) permits.  Eligible projects may include structural 
urban BMPs, agricultural BMPs, and nonstructural BMPs such as land banking, riparian 
buffering, wetland restoration, low impact development, clustering, and conservation 
subdivisions.   
 
Trading will initially assist in the implementation of a TMDL for the Jordan Lake 
watershed, which is in the upper portion of the Cape Fear River Basin.  The ultimate 
objective is to develop approaches that can be expanded through the entire basin.   In all, 
the proposal outlines has six elements: (1.) “visioning” and project charter; (2.) designing 
the trading framework; (3.) developing an implementation framework, which may 
include watershed permitting; (4.) evaluating and enhancing the existing monitoring; (5.) 
conducting the pilot project in Jordan Lake; (6.) expanding the framework for the rest of 
the basin.  
 
The budget for the entire project is $1.45 million, including $130,000 for visioning and 
chartering, $280,000 for the trading framework, $230,000 for the implementation 
framework, $350,000 to enhance monitoring, $410,000 for the pilot project, and $55,000 
to extend the program throughout the basin.  The pilot project is expected begin in mid-
2005. (all information above from Freeman 2004).  
 
Contact: 
Don Freeman, Jr., Executive Director, Cape Fear River Assembly.  (910) 223-4601 
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Freeman, Don (2004).  Basinwide water quality trading study: incorporating urban 
stormwater management into an incentive-based watershed permitting 
framework.  Cape Fear River Assembly.  Application to the U.S. 
Environmental Protection Agency, 2004 Watershed Initiative Funding.  
Retrieved July 30, 2004 from 
http://www.epa.gov/twg/2004/2004proposals/04capefear.pdf 
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (2004). 2004 Watershed project summaries: 
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Ohio 
 
Ohio River Basin 
The Ohio River Valley Water Sanitation Commission (ORSANCO) and its member 
states (Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, New York, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Virginia and West 
Virginia) will investigate trading as a means of reducing nutrient loadings within the 
Ohio River Basin to improve water quality and mitigate the Gulf of Mexico hypoxia 
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problem.  EPA contacted ORSANCO regarding the possible development of a nutrient 
trading program in 2003 and discussions between ORSANCO, EPA and USDA have 
continued to date (ORSANCO 2003).  ORSANCO is currently developing stream 
nutrient criteria, but a lack of regulatory drivers within states will slow the development 
of a trading program (if states have TMDLs in place, they are usually for phosphorus and 
hypoxia is primarily a nitrogen problem) (Peter Tennant, Personal Communication, May 
27, 2004).  ORSANCO submitted a Watershed Initiative grant to US EPA through WV 
DEP in 2004 to fund the formation of a Sub-Basin Committee that will address ways to 
manage nutrient loadings including trading (ORSANCO 2004).  ORSANCO will also 
evaluate the success of the Great Miami River watershed water quality credit trading pilot 
program to determine if trading might be applied throughout the Basin (Peter Tennant, 
Personal Communication, May 27, 2004).   
 
Contact:  
Peter Tennant, Deputy Executive Director, ORSANCO.  Telephone: (513)-231-
7719.  E-mail: ptennant@orsanco.org 
 
References:   
Mississippi River/Gulf of Mexico Watershed Nutrient Task Force.  2003.  Tenth 
Meeting of the Mississippi River/Gulf of Mexico Watershed Nutrient Task 
Force [Meeting Summary].  Saint Louis, Missouri: November 19, 2003.  
Retrieved on May 26, 2004, from 
http://www.epa.gov/msbasin/pdf/10thMeetSumm.pdf 
Ohio River Valley Water Sanitation Commission (ORSANCO).  2003.  177th  
Commission Meeting [Minutes].  Cincinnati, Ohio: October 16, 2003.  
Retrieved on May 21, 2004, from 
http://www.orsanco.org/orsa/docs/Commission%20Minutes/177th-
commission%20minutes%20oct%2003.pdf
Ohio River Valley Water Sanitation Commission (ORSANCO).  2004.  178th  
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February 12, 2004.  Retrieved on May 21, 2004, from 
http://www.orsanco.org/orsa/docs/Commission%20Minutes/178th-
commission%20minutes%20feb%2004.pdf 
 
Honey Creek Watershed 
EPA sponsored a case study to compare the cost-effectiveness of implementing 
agricultural best managment practices (specifically conservation tillage) versus upgrading 
point source treatment to reduce phosphorus loadings within the Honey Creek watershed, 
a 151 sq. mi. "agricultural watershed in the Lake Erie drainage basin of north central 
Ohio" (DPRA 1986).  An actual trading program was not developed. 
 
References: 
DPRA Incorporated.  1986.  An Evaluation of the Cost Effectiveness of Agricultural Best 
Management Practices and Public Owned Treatment Works in Controlling 
Phosphorus Pollution in the Great Lakes Basin.  Submitted to: US Environmental 
Protection Agency.  Revised February 1989.  Retrieved on June 1, 2004, from 
http://yosemite.epa.gov/ee/epa/eermfile.nsf/vwAN/EE-0317.pdf/$file/EE-317.pdf   
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Oklahoma 
 
Lower North Canadian River 
The Oklahoma Conservation Commission completed a study on water quality trading in 
Oklahoma, using the Lower North Canadian watershed in central Oklahoma as a 
potential case study.  The report concluded that the watershed was unsuitable for a 
point/nonpoint source trading program, since point sources contribute more than 90% of 
the nutrient load.  The large number of point sources, however, raise the possibility of 
point/point trading (OCC 2002).  
 
Contact: 
Cheryl Ormston, Oklahoma Conservation Commission. (405) 522-4735 
 
References: 
Oklahoma Conservation Commission (OCC) (2002). Implementation of a nutrient 
trading strategy in Oklahoma. Available on request from the Oklahoma 
Conservation Commission.  
 
Oregon 
 
Tualitin River 
The Oregon Department of Environmental Quality has incorporated trading for “oxygen-
demanding substances” (ammonia and BOD) and temperature into permit limits issued to 
Clean Water Services.  Clean Water Services (CWS) is a “sewerage and stormwater 
special service district” located in Washington County.  Through the terms of the trade, 
CWS is able to shift, the extent to which depends on instream flow and temperature 
conditions, a portion of load allocations for BOD and ammonia between two, operating 
WWTPs discharging into the Tualitin River basin.  CWS is also able to trade to meet 
temperature standards by engaging in riparian restoration and flow augmentation rather 
than installing more expensive, on-site, cooling technologies (ODEQ 2004). 
 
Contact:  
Sonja Biorn-Hansen, Project Manager, ODEQ, Water Quality Division.  
Telephone: (503) 229-5257.  E-mail: biorn-hansen.sonja@deq.state.or.us 
 
References: 
Oregon Department of Environmental Quality (ODEQ). 2004. Water Quality Credit 
Trading: Frequently Asked Questions.  Retrieved on May 25, 2004, from 
http://www.deq.state.or.us/wq/wqTrading/wqTrading.htm  
 
 
Rhode Island 
 
Providence salting 
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The City of Providence instituted an arrangement between the City’s Department of 
Water and Department of Transportation.  Faced with sodium standards within the supply 
source recharge area, which would have required costly in-plant treatment, the Water 
Department arranged to pay the Transportation Department $60,000 a year to use 
alternative, non-sodium deicing chemicals. The Department of Water was able to meet 
sodium standards at a lower cost (Sohngen 1998; USEPA 1996).  This is included in the 
EPA’s 1996 list of trading programs, but it is more similar to subsidies for alternative 
technologies than trading. 
 
Contacts: 
Michael Russo, Providence Water Department. (401) 521-6300. 
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Tennessee  
 
Boone Reservoir 
A 1989 study evaluated the cost effectiveness of point and nonpoint source controls for 
phosphorus, nitrogen, and BOD in the Boone Reservoir.   A combination of point and 
nonpoint source controls was found to be the most cost-effective means of nutrient and 
BOD control.  No trading program was developed (USEPA 1996).  
 
References: 
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (USEPA) (1996). Appendix C: Examples of 
existing and potential future trading programs, Table 2: Programs under 
consideration/development.  In Draft Framework for Watershed-Based 
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http://www.epa.gov/OWOW/watershed/appc2.pdf 
 
 
Utah 
 
Bear River Basin  
See entry above, under “Idaho.” 
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Virginia 
 
Colonial Soil and Water Conservation District, Lower James River 
The Colonial Soil and Water Conservation District (SWCD) has developed a continuous, 
no-till farm management system, the Innovative Cropping System (ICS), that can reduce 
sediment and nutrient loads by over 90%.   If all 131,300 acres in the Lower James River 
watershed followed ICS, nitrogen loading could be reduced by over 2.5 million lbs/year 
and phosphorus by over 1 million lbs/year (Kieser 2003).  In light of these immense 
pollution reductions, the Colonial SWCD is interested in exploring how the ICS and other 
farm management techniques might be used within a water quality trading program 
(Colonial SWCD n.d.).  In 2003, the Colonial SWCD submitted a proposal to the EPA 
and the Environmental Trading Network conducted a trading workshop for the Lower 
James River, but obtaining funding to initiate a pilot project has been challenging (ETN 
2003).  
 
Contact: 
Brian Noyes, Conservation Specialist and District Coordinator, Colonial SWCD.  
(804) 932-4376 
Jim Wallace, Agricultural Water Quality Specialist, Colonial SWCD.  (804) 932-
4376 
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Washington 
 
Chehalis River 
The Chehalis River appeared to provide an opportunity for initiating a trading program in 
conjunction with a TMDL.  The Chehalis River was first identified as a potential location 
for trading in a 1992 report for the Washington Department of Ecology by Apogee 
Research, Inc.  Further research on the economic, regulatory, and political context for 
trading was conducted, and both point/nonpoint and nonpoint/nonpoint trades were 
considered (USEPA n.d.).  However, the TMDL did not succeed in laying the foundation 
for trading.  The opportunities for trading appeared remote because the load allocation for 
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nonpoint sources above the Skookumchuck was zero, all point sources with wasteload 
allocations happened to be above the Skookumchuck River, and the river sections with 
the lowest assimilative capacities were just above the Skookumchuck River (USEPA 
1996).  A draft implementation plan was developed, but no program was implemented 
(WDOE 1996).  
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Puyallup River 
The USEPA, Region 10, provided grant money in 1997 for a pilot water quality trading 
project in the Puyallup River basin (USEPA 2003).  The project focused on biochemical 
oxygen demand (BOD) and ammonia, and it was agreed that the two point sources with 
waste load allocations(WLAs) for BOD could have permit modifications to allow for 
point/point trading (WDOE 2001).   However, the program did not result in any trading.  
It was determined to be infeasible, primarily because of changing economic needs of the 
point sources (USEPA 2003).  
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Yakima River 
Concurrent studies by Battelle’s Pacific Northwest Laboratory and the Wisconsin 
Department of Ecology identified the Yakima River as a potential location for a 
point/nonpoint source water quality trading program (USEPA 1996).  The Yakima 
TMDL, however, made determining cost-savings and environmental benefits difficult to 
determine, since the TMDL set attainment targets rather than load allocations (WDOE 
1996).  At this time, a coalition of stakeholders has proposed a nonprofit water rights 
clearinghouse and bank called the Yakima Water Exchange (Roundtable Associates 
2003). Promoters of the Yakima Water Exchange proposal point out that it can be used as 
a tool to address water quality, However, the primary mission of the Yakima Water 
Exchange “would be to facilitate the exchange of water and water rights in the Yakima 
basin from willing sellers or lessors to those who wish to acquire water and water rights 
for both in and out of stream uses on a temporary or permanent basis” (Roundtable 
Associates 2003).  Unlike the water rights acquisitions on the Truckee River and the 
flow-trading proposed for the Charles River (see entries under “Trading Initiatives”), the 
Exchange is not focused on trading for the purpose of water quality.  
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http://www.epa.gov/OWOW/watershed/tradecom/level3/wsde.html 
 
 
West Virginia 
 
Cacapon/Lost River 
Friends of the Potomac is interested in carbon and nutrient trading between power 
companies and farms in the upper Potomac basin.  Friends of the Potomac hosted a 
trading forum in September, 2003 and established a steering committee to investigate a 
pilot trading project in the Cacapon/Lost River basin. In collaboration with the 
Environmental Trading Network, Friends submitted a 2004 Watershed Initiative proposal 
for the Cacapon/Lost River pilot program. 
 
Contact: 
Dan Nees, Executive Director, Friends of the Potomac.  (301) 495-6699 
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Cheat River 
As one of eleven water quality trading pilot projects sponsored by US EPA in 2002, the 
Cheat Trading Stakeholder Group met between 2002 and 2004 to assess the potential for 
water quality trading within the Cheat River watershed (Downstream Strategies 2004).  
Water quality trading would enable point and nonpoint sources facing a TMDL to 
achieve pollutant load reductions more quickly and more cost-effectively (Downstream 
Strategies 2004).  In 2001, US EPA established a TMDL for 55 segments of the Cheat 
River and its tributaries because of a failure to meet pH, iron, aluminum, manganese, 
and/or zinc water quality standards (Downstream Strategies 2004). Acid mine drainage 
(AMD) is the dominant limiting factor within the watershed (Downstream Strategies 
2004).  Most of the necessary pollutant reductions are required at orphan mine sites 
which are not regulated by permits and rely on limited government funding for 
remediation (Downstream Strategies 2004).  A trading program could facilitate clean-up 
of these sites by providing cost-effective reduction credits to other regulated sources 
facing more stringent water quality effluent limits under the Cheat TMDL (Downstream 
Strategies 2004).  Another driver for trading is West Virginia’s anti-degradation policy 
(Downstream Strategies 2004).  Although no specific trading rules have been developed, 
a trading framework was finalized by the Cheat Trading Stakeholder Group in February 
2004 and a final report was submitted to US EPA and WV DEP in April.   
 
The trading framework includes guidance for: the generation and approval of credits; 
types of trading allowed (same-pollutant versus cross-pollutant); appropriate units of 
exchange (tons for same-pollutant trades, pounds of acidity for cross-pollutants within 
AMD, “eco-units” for cross-pollutants outside AMD); and the development of  trading 
ratios to account for varying levels of certainty in achieving net reductions or net 
ecological benefits based on the type of trade, spatial relationship between buyer and 
seller, and “contribution to watershed restoration goals” (Cheat Trading Stakeholder 
Group 2004a).   
 
The trading framework also provides for the creation of the Cheat Watershed Restoration 
Authority to develop and monitor a watershed management plan; facilitate trades; 
manage a credit bank jumpstarted by publicly-funded reductions; coordinate funding for 
remediation projects through the development of a Watershed Management Trust Fund 
financed by trades, grants, and contributions; and ensure that all trades are consistent with 
the trading framework, watershed management plan, and local, state and federal water 
quality regulations and policies (Cheat Trading Stakeholder Group 2004a and 
Downstream Strategies 2004).   
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All trades will be incorporated into NPDES permits by WV DEP and the DEP will have 
final authority regarding the approval, monitoring and enforcement of trades 
(Downstream Strategies 2004).   
 
Friends of the Cheat have applied for a Watershed Initiative Grant to support a pilot 
project for a thermal/AMD cross-pollutant trade involving the Albright power plant 
(Cheat Trading Stakeholder Group 2004b).  Pilot projects for AMD/AMD trades may 
also be proposed to DEP for approval (Evan Hansen, Personal Communication, June 1, 
2004). 
 
Contact:  
Evan Hansen, Downstream Strategies.  Telephone: (304)-291-8205.  E-mail: 
ehansen@downstreamstrategies.com 
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Further written information is available from http://downstreamstrategies.com/cheat.html   
 
Reviewed by Evan Hansen, Downstream Strategies. 
 
 
Wyoming 
 
Bear River Basin  
See entry above, under “Idaho.” 
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